

## Preface

This study examines the debate over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement during the Eisenhower presidency. It connects the disagreements amongst the scientific community to the policy deliberations within the administration, focusing on the influence of Eisenhower's scientific counsel on his decisions. The complex interaction of public and private debates among governmental officials and scientists required me to make some difficult choices on the organization and the scope of this work. Developments within the administration and the scientific community often occurred in parallel, at times converging at critical junctures. My analysis within each chapter thus weaves back and forth between the public and the private debates and developments within the scientific community. The chapters appear chronologically and are organized thematically within. The only exceptions are Chapters Three and Four, which assess developments from 1954 through 1955 within the administration and the scientific community separately.

Since it was necessary to limit the scope of my research, I chose which scientists to examine in greater detail based upon their influence on the internal debate within the administration, as well as the availability of primary sources that illuminated their roles. A full-length examination of the role of all scientists on the public test-ban debate warrants a separate study. I focused my analysis on the consideration of the test ban from within the Eisenhower administration and the community of atomic scientists within the United States. Since previous studies emphasized the public debate within the United States and the international pressures on

the administration to ban testing, I limit my discussion of those factors to provide the context that, at times, influenced the internal debate. I examined British archival sources to investigate the discussions between Great Britain and the United States on the test-ban issue. I only briefly speculate on Soviet motives and objectives in the test-ban discussions.

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The *Journal of Strategic Studies* (<http://www.tandf.co.uk>) published an early version of my research in an essay that incorporated some themes and events that I analyze in greater detail in Chapters Two, Four, and Five. An anonymous reviewer from the *Journal of Strategic Studies* offered helpful comments on Eisenhower's efforts toward arms control.

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