

## Introduction

### The Ideology of Naturism in Early Twentieth-Century Germany

**IN 1924 ADOLF KOCH**, a young elementary schoolteacher in Berlin, declared, “The misery of our times, the monotony of work, the world war and its legacies have made us into disturbed human beings, both internally and externally.”<sup>1</sup> To help working-class Germans of all ages overcome this condition, Koch founded a network of thirteen exercise schools in industrial cities throughout Germany. There he and his colleagues put workers and their children through a rigorous program of group exercises in the nude. Members of a Koch School partook of at least two hours of nude training per week, attended lectures and group discussions on matters of importance to the socialist labor movement, and received advice about physical health and sexuality from resident medical experts. The cost for most adults was 5 percent of their yearly income; but the schools were free to children, the unemployed, pregnant women, and mothers of infants. During the warmer months, Adolf Koch’s organization set up nudist camps in wooded areas outside cities. There people exercised, played games, and talked about political issues. The Koch Schools won the support of prominent Social Democratic parliamentarians, educators, sociologists, and physicians. By 1930 several thousand men, women, and children had attended these schools.

Socialist nudists aimed to compensate for the harsh working and living conditions of an urban, industrial society. They saw health in holistic terms—that is, as simultaneously a matter of the body, of the mind, and even of the political consciousness. Nudism was a way for the working class to turn to nature for strength and inspiration. The concept of

“nature” in nudist ideology was twofold—nature was manifested in both the nonhuman rural environment and the naked human body. Moreover, the socialist nudists saw nature as egalitarian. They declared that there was no class hierarchy in nature and banned the formal pronoun for “you” from their discourse. The motto “We are nude and call each other *Du*” (rather than *Sie*) made plain this commitment to working-class solidarity. It was also a proud statement of their political superiority to the traditional, elitist, and status-conscious bourgeois nudist organizations.

Socialist nudism was only one of many organized efforts to bring the German people into closer contact with nature during the early twentieth century. This book investigates three of the most interesting and significant movements—hiking, nudism, and conservation. Although these movements differed in many ways, they were all galvanized by a new ideology that I call *naturism*.<sup>2</sup> This is not to be confused with ecological thought. Although proponents of naturism were deeply concerned with the consequences of industrialization and urbanization, their main concern was not with pollution, natural diversity, or sustainability but with social and cultural crisis. Naturist movements believed that Germany was beset by a number of crises, including the threat of urban living conditions to the body, psyche, moral character, and political consciousness; the capitalist exploitation of industrial workers; the moral and sexual waywardness of adolescents, particularly young males; and the decline in popular devotion to the regional and national “homeland” (*Heimat*). Organized naturists attempted to reorient the German people toward nature, and they hoped thereby to find solutions to the problems of modern society.

The history of naturist movements shows how politically charged popular culture became in early twentieth-century Germany. Not only were naturist perceptions of crisis shot through with political ideologies, but the more controversial ideas and practices of these movements caught the attention of the public, sparking loud debates and moral panics. Adolf Koch’s nudist schools, for example, faced a barrage of attacks from conservative politicians, morality leagues, and clergymen. These enemies of nudism accused Koch and his colleagues of conspiring to rob people of their God-given sense of shame. Nudism, they warned, was encouraging sexual license in the shape of premarital sex, pedophilia, prostitution, and homosexuality.

In part because of such controversies, naturist movements gained considerable cultural influence. Prominent politicians and intellectuals,

including Kaiser Wilhelm II, Friedrich Ebert, Karl Liebknecht, Gertrud Bäumer, and many others, lent their support to projects of turning to nature. Hundreds of thousands of less famous Germans participated directly in organized naturism. The large majority were city dwellers who chose naturist activities over countless other ways to spend their leisure time. The available sources, most of which were written by naturist leaders and functionaries, do not allow definite conclusions about the motives of rank-and-file members. Some inferences can be made, however. First, many city dwellers were seeking relief from the crowds, noise, and dirt of everyday urban life; and hiking and other forms of exercise in a rural setting gave them a sense of escape and rejuvenation. One young metalworker put it this way in a 1912 survey of working-class attitudes and desires: "In the woods I feel myself freer and lighter, and I admire for hours . . . the movement and life of organic nature. But when I think of returning to the treadmill of the human struggle for existence with all its untold miseries, tears of outrage fill my eyes."<sup>3</sup> Second, many people were no doubt attracted by the promise of collective sociability offered by naturist organizations. It was a common desire among city dwellers throughout the urbanizing world to overcome feelings of anonymity by seeking new forms of community. Third, many members of naturist movements probably agreed with the notions of social crisis and ideologies of progress that were expressed by their leaders. Supporting this assertion is the fact that rank-and-file membership in any given naturist movement was highest when there was ideological consensus among leaders, whereas the number of members dropped markedly when that consensus broke down.<sup>4</sup>

The desire to turn to nature as an antidote to the problems of urban-industrial modernity was not at all unique to Germany. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, deep-seated ambivalence toward industrialization and urbanization has been a powerful undercurrent in Western intellectual life. We need only recall such writers as Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and F. Scott Fitzgerald, as well as a host of painters, poets, philosophers, and politicians. A tendency of some German naturists—the drawing of parallels between the rural landscape and national identity—has been omnipresent in nationalist discourse since the nineteenth century. Theodore Roosevelt's celebration of the American wilderness is one of many examples. Moreover, organized naturist movements have been relatively common beyond Germany. Adult-sponsored youth movements, for

instance, tried to use the nature experience to “cure” adolescent waywardness in Britain, the United States, and elsewhere. The American conservation movement predated the German one; and hiking and even nudist groups have been fairly common in Western Europe and North America.<sup>5</sup>

However, in the years 1900–1940, naturism became more popular and better organized in Germany than elsewhere. What was it about Germany in the early twentieth century that made naturism such an important current in popular culture? At the heart of this development lay an unusually strong perception of crisis. Social and political uncertainty, as well as the desire to overcome it, was intense and enduring in Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi Germany. In their book *Shattered Past*, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer call upon historians to study “the extraordinary upheavals that ripped apart a nation, and all the exertions required to allow a people to pull itself back together” through the “processes of the making and unmaking of the German nation.”<sup>6</sup> Although the authors are referring primarily to the upheavals of war and revolution, we should also look to longer-term instabilities, both real and imagined, if we want to understand this era. Organized naturism is a clear example of the general perception among cultural activists that everyday social instabilities were causing an ongoing crisis of the nation.

Until recently, those few historians who paid any attention to naturism tended to condemn it as antirationalist, antimodern, and illiberal. Hans Kohn, George Mosse, and others argued that these characteristics made naturist thought a precursor of Nazism. Taking an intellectual history approach, they asserted that German intellectuals had become peculiarly obsessed with nature in the Romantic era. Because of Romanticism, leading intellectuals had also turned away from Enlightenment values—particularly rationalism and the liberal ideology of progress through more individuality and freedom vis-à-vis the state. This historical misdevelopment persisted into the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the uncertainties that accompanied rapid industrialization and urbanization caused many ordinary Germans to follow the intellectuals in rejecting modernity. As George Mosse put it, many people in the upper and middle classes underwent a “chaos of experience,” which in turn gave rise to a desire to “escape from reality into a dream world where time stood still, a world that pointed back to the past rather than forward to the future.” The result was a naively “romantic” belief in the “healing power of nature, symbolizing the genuine and the immutable, [which] could serve

to reinforce human control over a world forever on the brink of chaos.” This vision of nature appealed to “the need of men and women to annex a piece of eternity in order to keep their bearings.” According to Mosse and others, “folkish” naturist movements such as the *Wandervögel* and the bourgeois conservationists helped to transmit reactionary “agrarian romanticism” to an even broader audience. This outlook was allegedly both nationalist and racist, and it ultimately helped to set the ideological stage for many Germans’ support of Nazism.<sup>7</sup>

This thesis of a peculiarly Teutonic, protofascist agrarian romanticism has been quite influential in the historiography of modern German culture. Yet it fails to explain adequately the origins, ideological complexity, and influence of mass naturist movements. There are several basic flaws. First, these historians derive their claims about deep-seated popular attitudes from a very narrow source base indeed. Texts written primarily by intellectual, artistic, and political elites are juxtaposed to prove the Germans’ rejection of industrial modernity and obsession with nature. In truth, elite texts can tell us little about popular attitudes—they can only tell us about elites.

Second, in seeking the ideological origins of Nazism, these historians take a myopic and teleological view of pre-Nazi German culture. Thus, they tend to ignore the moderate, reformist currents in naturism and exaggerate the influence of the small, far-right-wing “folkish” fringe. A good example is nudism, which began in the pre-World War I era as a fanatically racist fringe movement of the middle class but became a much more popular movement of industrial workers committed to democratic ideals in the 1920s. Only the bizarre racial theories of the bourgeois nudists receive adequate attention in these historians’ studies. The result of this myopia is the incorrect but oft-repeated claim that the only critics of industrialization and urbanization were elite conservatives and/or radical nationalists. In fact, moderate bourgeois reformers and liberal Social Democrats led the way in organizing the popular turn to nature. The most conservative movement, bourgeois conservationism, was also the smallest in terms of membership.

Other flaws in the “naturism to Nazism” argument stem from ideological bias. These historians simply assume that any critique of industrial capitalism and the burgeoning industrial metropolis was irrational. There has been an ongoing struggle between intellectual advocates of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism that has endured to the present; and clearly these historians are on the side of Enlightenment values. But proponents

of the Enlightenment have often exaggerated the ideological differences between the two movements. They have cast rationalism as the sole motor of progress at odds with an allegedly naive, backward-looking, and illiberal romantic worldview. A good example in German history is Thomas Mann. In a 1924 speech calling on his listeners to adopt a rationalist commitment to the Weimar Republic, Mann declared, "All that within us that is opposed to life and the future is romanticism. Romanticism is the siren song of nostalgia for the past, the song of death."<sup>8</sup> After World War II many historians of Germany adopted a similarly derogatory concept of romantic ideology to try to explain the Nazi project of imperialism, war, and genocide. In so doing, they reduced the multifaceted philosophical, aesthetic, and political tradition of Romanticism, which was neither simply antimodern nor simply antirationalist—and certainly not genocidal.<sup>9</sup>

Another ideological source of these historians' critique of naturism lies in their commitment to modernization theory. Originating early in the cold war, this normative model of social and political development offers an ideal narrative of progress from traditional agrarian society to modern industrial society. The avant-garde of progress in this theory is the capitalist middle class working within the liberal-democratic state. Rationalism, in the form of science, industrial technology, and the domination of nature, is a key motor of modernization. These historians' commitment to a specific capitalist model of progress creates a scholarly bias against any historical attempt to construct a different, less exploitative relationship between humanity and the natural environment. It also leads them to underestimate how Nazism was, in its own way, committed to an ideology of progress that combined pseudoscientific rationalism, industrial technology, and the domination of nature.<sup>10</sup>

In short, those historians who cast German naturism as simply irrational and antimodern greatly underestimate the variety of historical responses to urban, industrial modernity. Since the 1990s, however, a number of scholars have begun to challenge this thesis. They have undertaken a rethinking of historical attitudes toward nature in Germany. Using the methods of cultural history, they are analyzing a wide range of nonelite sources in search of evidence about everyday attitudes and practices. Their research is revealing that German cultural attitudes toward urban-industrial modernity were always ambiguous and that there was no direct line of continuity between the naturist critique of modern life and the Nazi attempt to radically overhaul it.<sup>11</sup>

This newer scholarship on naturism is related to a broader shift in the historiography of Germany under way since the 1980s. At the center of this transformation is an ongoing effort to reevaluate modernity itself. The older thesis of German misdevelopment has given way to a paradigm of Germany as a prime example of Western modernity. A new view has taken shape of modern society as complex and multifaceted, with both emancipatory and oppressive potentials.<sup>12</sup> Historians since the 1980s have also developed a broader concept of culture as a set of concepts, perceptions, and ideologies that are created and put into practice in everyday life. One of the most fruitful results of this “cultural turn” has been a growing body of research into how categories of social identity—class, gender, sexual, religious, ethnic, racial, generational—are defined, standardized, and made normative through language and imagery.<sup>13</sup>

Another important development is the strong focus on the ways in which people created a realm of cultural activism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the Second Empire, hundreds of activist organizations were founded that ranged in membership from under one hundred to several hundred thousand. They included such varied initiatives as radical nationalist and anti-Semitic pressure groups, Social Democratic and Catholic subcultural organizations, women’s movements, projects of bourgeois reformism, and the naturist groups that are the subjects of this book. All of these movements took popular culture very seriously, trying to bring about change in the mentalities and lives of the German people. By expanding the public discourse on modern life, the popular ferment in this era brought with it the politicization of all those Germans who were concerned about the future of the collective to which they felt they belonged, be it the class, the confession, the gender, the generation, or the nation as a whole. These movements spread their perceptions of Germany’s problems to the masses; but they also propagated notions of how to move the nation forward by confronting those problems. Millions were seized with an activist desire to have some influence over the nation’s evolution, and the extent to which they organized themselves only increased in the pluralistic atmosphere of the Weimar Republic. Indeed, cultural activism outside the formal political system was the primary way in which both elites and ordinary people carved out a thriving civil society.<sup>14</sup> It took the determined efforts of the Nazis and their supporters to put an end to this diversity in the public sphere.

Thus, we now have a much more open-ended discussion of the early

twentieth century. Historians no longer view Germans' perceptions of the difficulties of modern life as simple expressions of antimodern "cultural despair" but as the very thing that prompted people to seek ways to overcome crisis and reform their society.<sup>15</sup> The new paradigm of a heterogeneous modernity has liberated the field of German history from deterministic narratives of linear continuity from the Kaiserreich to the Third Reich. Modernity is no longer seen as lacking or peculiar in Germany, nor is it identified automatically with a progressive increase in reason and human rights.

Movements for hiking, nudism, and conservation in the early twentieth century were at the forefront of popular cultural efforts to diagnose and solve the problems of urban-industrial society. Naturists focused in particular on the city and everything that it seemed to say about modern life. Their discussions exemplified the typical ambivalence toward urban life that characterized German culture from the late nineteenth century onward. Discussions of the city among intellectuals, for example, nearly always presented it as the pinnacle of modernity; and these discussions were nearly always full of contradiction and unease. To take one example from pre-World War I social thought, the economist Werner Sombart wrote in 1906 that urban conditions were leading to a frightening loss of empathy and indifference to life among the proletariat. Yet elsewhere he wrote of city life as liberating: "The freedom that earlier resided in the mountains has today moved into the cities, and the masses follow after it. . . . It is above all the freedom of personality in the broadest sense that appears to be attractive; negatively expressed, liberation from the bonds of clan, of neighborhood, and of class domination."<sup>16</sup>

Such contradictory views of the city are not surprising when we consider the extremely rapid industrialization and urbanization of Germany. Unification in 1871 gave a tremendous push to industrial capitalism. A remarkably fast-paced urbanization commenced. While the entire population increased 58 percent between 1871 and 1914 (from 41 to 65 million), the number of people living in towns with over 5,000 residents increased by 229 percent (from 9.7 to 31.7 million). Meanwhile, the percentage of the population living in villages with fewer than 2,000 fell to 40 percent. The growth of metropolitan areas with over 100,000 residents is just as striking. In 1871 there were only eight such large cities containing a mere 4.8 percent of the population. By 1914 there were forty-eight, and 20 percent of Germans lived there. Certain industrial cities like Duisburg grew in population by nearly 2,000 percent. And urban sprawl was rapid and un-



stopplable. The average area of larger cities doubled between 1850 and 1910 from twenty-one to forty-two square kilometers. In 1895 the population of Berlin's suburbs was only 17 percent of that city's total population. By 1910 the suburban population of Berlin composed 45 percent of the total.<sup>17</sup>

Mass internal migration to the cities meant that every second German left his or her place of birth for an urban life during the Second Empire. Imagine the new city dwellers' sense of strangeness and dislocation! Alienation compelled many people from smaller towns and villages to build new communities within the city ranging from neighborhood associations, to social and political subcultures, to organized movements. By 1914 the city had become the locus of civil society in which even social outsiders could carve a niche for themselves with others of their ilk.<sup>18</sup> And cities were the source of most economic growth, technological advancement, and cultural innovation. This was one positive side of the expansion of urban life.

The negative side was plain to every city dweller. Miserable living conditions in the industrial city spawned anxieties about public health and fears for the future of the nation. Even though advances in health and sanitation were gradually lowering the urban death rate, the urban environment for the vast majority remained terribly unhealthy and polluted. Air pollution increased dramatically in every city and in rapidly industrializing regions of the Rhineland and Silesia. Water pollution was equally dire. Everyday experiences of the industrial city included pestilent air spewing from factory smokestacks and rivers that were little more than sewers. Consider the following 1903 report on the Ruhr Valley by a state-affiliated agricultural expert:

At many places, what is flowing there is not so much water as a viscous black mass sluggishly pushing itself forward. The thick settlement of the entire southern part of the area with industrial installations, the densely populated cities and towns, the extensive fortified network of roads, and the countless railway embankments have completely erased the formerly agrarian character of the region. . . . [E]very last drop of water, after traveling only a short way from its origin, is changed into intensely fermenting liquid manure.<sup>19</sup>

Crowded living conditions in the city also caused a great sense of foreboding and spawned a movement to combat the "housing emergency" (*Wohnungsnot*). The population density in Germany increased from an average of 76 people per square kilometer in 1871 to 120 in 1911. Expanding

cities like Berlin, Breslau, Hamburg, Aachen, Hannover, and the towns of the Ruhr had up to seven times this average density by 1911. Older neighborhoods saw the construction of rental barracks (*Mietskaserne*), cheap buildings that encompassed up to 80 two- or three-room apartments with very little natural lighting. These were intended for unskilled and semiskilled workers; yet even better-off industrial workers were crowded into ramshackle housing. In Hannover, for instance, some 50 percent of the population lived in apartments with only one heated room. Working-class housing conditions in smaller and medium-sized towns were not significantly better than in the metropolis. In Augsburg, an inspection in 1909 of 1,625 apartments found that over 70 percent were afflicted with construction flaws, overcrowding, or other problems. Nor did the rapidly expanding suburbs, where many skilled and organized workers lived, offer any real relief from overcrowding.<sup>20</sup>

This situation, in which housing in working-class districts was smaller and much more crowded than in upper-class residential areas, was as true of the Weimar era as it was of the late Empire. Article 155 of the Weimar constitution guaranteed healthy living quarters to all citizens. Yet the migration of laborers to the cities had increased during the war, and a stream of refugees came from territories lost in the war's aftermath. Given the wartime hiatus in apartment construction, there was an estimated deficit of 1.5 million apartments by 1920.<sup>21</sup> Not until a state-sponsored program of small-apartment construction began in 1925 did the situation improve somewhat, albeit only for better-off workers with steady jobs.<sup>22</sup>

Even though cultural standards of adequate living space for an individual were lower than they are now, most socially aware Germans saw urban housing as a serious threat to national health. Beginning around 1900, a movement for housing reform began to undertake statistical surveys of urban living. This movement's diagnosis and suggestions for reform offer yet another example of ambivalent, even contradictory, attitudes toward the city. Typical was a 1912 speech by the housing reformer Dr. Von Mangoldt. The speaker warned that "being housed like animals" was endangering the physical and moral health of the urban poor. This crisis was hurting the power of the nation vis-à-vis its competitors by reducing the birth rate and increasing infant mortality. The result would be the limited military fitness of the urban populace. Moreover, the lower classes' love of the *Heimat* and loyalty to the German state were waning. Mangoldt moved easily from a social problem of the city to a cultural and a political problem. The solution that he offered was to reform the city itself. Young

people above all must be removed from these ruinous living conditions, he declared, and the entire layout of Germany's cities would have to be "more expansive and natural."<sup>23</sup>

Mangoldt's solution was characteristic of most bourgeois criticism of the industrial metropolis. These commentators saw no way for the nation to return to agrarianism if it were to thrive in the modern world of intense international competition. They wanted to reform, rather than reject, urban modernity. The large city in the competitive nation-state was the paradigm of modernity within which attempts at reforming Germany had to stand or fall. Yet within this nationalist mind-set, there were also possibilities for the projects of social justice that were developed by socialists and liberals. Attempts to counter the negative effects of the industrial city were complex, forward looking, and ideologically multivalent—far more than mere "agrarian romanticism." Indeed, reformers of the moderate left and right who criticized the city took pains to distance themselves from the reactionary antiurbanist fringe. Their problem-solving efforts grew out of a "basic 'yes' to the city."<sup>24</sup>

The same may be said of a larger and more influential movement for "life reform" (*Lebensreform*) out of which emerged organized nudism. *Lebensreform* ideas were not original to Germany, but they had arrived there by the mid-nineteenth century, when a handful of urban intellectuals began to found tiny vegetarian and homeopathic organizations. The doctor Theodor Hahn coined the term *Lebensreform* in 1870, and by 1900 this had become a full-fledged popular movement, the "most holy duty" of which was to convert "mistaken fellow creatures."<sup>25</sup> Life reformers aimed to improve urban-industrial society by exposing the body to more "natural" ways of living, which ranged from vegetarianism, abstinence from alcohol and nicotine, dress reform, and nudism to natural healing through sunlight, water, and fresh air (*Naturheilkunde*) and the building of rural communes and "garden cities." *Lebensreform* associations were extraordinarily active, promoting their causes in countless public lectures, magazines, pamphlets, and books. The popularity of life reform ideas and practices grew rapidly in the Wilhelmine era. The abstinence movement, for example, published no fewer than sixty-seven journals with a combined circulation of 400,000 by 1909; and the German League of Associations for Natural Living and Healing experienced a steady growth in membership from 19,000 in 1889 to 148,000 in 1913.<sup>26</sup>

*Lebensreform* had an appeal that transcended class differences and

political ideologies. From the beginning, *Lebensreformer* interpreted sickness as holistic—that is, common to the body, the mind, and the spirit. Sickness was caused by the disrupted relation of the individual to nature brought by industrialization and urbanization. Yet most *Lebensreformer* saw their project not as a rejection of the modern world but as an alternative path for society. Indeed, this critique of industrial capitalism helped make these ideas attractive to urban workers.

The example of garden cities reveals how *Lebensreform* attracted conservative, liberal, and socialist reformers alike. The aim of the Garden City Society (founded 1902) was to create a synthesis between city and country. The many proponents of the garden city believed that new, “greener” settlements should be built on the outskirts to alleviate the housing shortage, create better living conditions for workers, and promote a more efficient interaction between urban and rural economies. The garden city concept was also popular among leading labor movement figures. Karl Liebknecht, for instance, said in 1912 that urban dwellers were mentally, morally, and physically crippled and called for cities to be turned into garden cities.<sup>27</sup> No doubt the idea also intrigued poor city dwellers who were plagued by poverty and overcrowding. In Munich, for instance, the local branch of the Garden City Society planned a garden city on the urban outskirts in which every family would own between 80 and 150 square meters of garden. The claim that the garden city would create a sense of community in the citizen sold well to municipal authorities. Nine garden cities and four garden suburbs were built before the First World War, with three more planned.<sup>28</sup>

An overtly socialist branch of the *Lebensreform* movement began to develop after 1900 and went on to become a mass proletarian movement in the 1920s. The first Social Democratic organization was the German Workers’ Abstinence League (*Deutscher Arbeiter-Abstinerten Bund*), which was founded in 1903 “to further the liberationist struggle of the working class, to raise the proletariat’s living standard, and to prevent the degeneration caused by the enjoyment of alcohol.” In 1911 the group declared alcohol a great hindrance to the labor movement and a boon to capitalism that could only be overcome through full abstinence.<sup>29</sup>

The Abstinence League paved the way for other prewar socialist *Lebensreform* organizations. The Federation for People’s Health (*Verband Volksgesundheit*), for example, was formed in 1908 to promote natural healing and vegetarianism. The organization elaborated a trenchant critique of urban physical and cultural conditions under capitalism.<sup>30</sup> The presi-

dent of the *Verband Volksgesundheit* beginning in 1920 was the secondary schoolteacher Hermann Wolf. He came from a large lower-middle-class family; his mother had died giving birth to her thirteenth child. He never forgot the terrible hygienic conditions of his childhood, a situation that he saw repeating itself again and again among his students in eastern Germany; and in 1887 he founded a local organization, the Association for Health and Non-Medicinal Healing. Wolf's experience of dire living conditions, and his growing awareness that this was endemic in the working class, seems to have been typical of many socialist *Lebensreform* leaders.<sup>31</sup> Under his watch, the *Verband Volksgesundheit* became the best example of a deeply politicized version of *Lebensreform*, dedicating itself to strengthening Germany's industrial workers and fighting social inequality. The *Verband* announced that it was "above all determined to awaken the working class to the fact that our current miserable health conditions are intertwined with our social relations."<sup>32</sup> As we will see in Chapters 1 and 2, the Social Democratic naturist movements took this central political tenet of left-wing *Lebensreform* very seriously indeed.

In the 1920s and 1930s, naturist-influenced projects of cultural activism remained intensely committed to solving the perceived crises of modern urban-industrial society. As Andrew Lees points out, by contrast to France and Great Britain, "Germany produced more and more writing about urban life with every passing year."<sup>33</sup> The First World War and its disruptive legacies no doubt perpetuated this obsession with the city. Total war brought mass death on a scale that was unprecedented. Over 2 million soldiers were killed on the battlefield, and the nearly eight hundred thousand injured men who returned became a constant reminder of the cost for the young male generation and their families. On the home front, exhaustion, malnutrition, and epidemics led to an estimated three hundred thousand civilian fatalities, not including those who perished in the 1918–19 flu epidemic.<sup>34</sup> In bringing a general collapse of traditional institutions of authority, the war worsened the long-standing sense of social crisis among moderates and conservatives. In the revolutionary phase that began late in the war, Germans on the home front directly experienced the rapid breakdown of established hierarchical relationships of authority—adults over youth, men over women and children, bourgeoisie over proletariat, party leaders over rank and file, the state over civil society.

The trauma of mass death and rapid social and political transformation greatly intensified preexisting fears that the moral, physical,

and social health of the nation was in danger. In the Weimar Republic chronic structural weakness in the economy, political instability, and the wounded sense of national pride further deepened popular anxieties about the nation's well-being. As Detlev Peukert put it, the one certainty about the Weimar years is that they were fraught with *uncertainty*:

The hectic sequence of events, the depths of the crisis shocks, and the innovative power of the social-cultural and political changes were not marginal; they were central characteristics of the epoch. From them grew an underlying sense of insecurity and absence of bearings—of changes in the framework of everyday life and of the calling into question of traditional generational and gender roles. Insecurity was the mark of the epoch.<sup>35</sup>

Ironically, insecurities that often hindered the popular acceptance of democracy could be more freely expressed than ever before within the democratic context of civic pluralism. Cultural representations of the metropolis in the 1920s therefore remained just as ambivalent as they had been before the war. Berlin in particular came to symbolize for many the uninhibited spirit of a restless modernity. Some, particularly those who might well have been shunned as outsiders in a smaller town, idealized the capital as a liberating Eldorado. Conservative moralists, on the other hand, fiercely attacked Berlin as a new Sodom. Most typical, however, was an attitude in which fears and hopes were intermingled.<sup>36</sup> For example, the most famous Weimar vision of the urban future, Fritz Lang's 1927 movie *Metropolis*, begins by representing the city as a dystopia of class exploitation and technological dehumanization. Yet the film concludes with a reassertion of human control over technology and a utopian promise of social harmony.

The Nazi movement that took power in 1933 was fully within the mainstream of concerns about the health and future of the nation. Despite their extreme critique of the city as the fount of liberal and "Jewish" modernity and their professed commitment to the peasantry at the expense of the metropolis, the Nazis were just as oriented to the industrial city as their predecessors were. Prior to taking Germany to war in 1939, Hitler's regime put into practice its own racist diagnoses and uniquely brutal "therapies." In their prewar efforts to bring homogeneity, health, and military prowess to the "racial-national community," the Nazis focused much of their energy on "cleansing" the city and its inhabitants.

My overarching goal in this study is to investigate how nature and modernity became intertwined in early twentieth-century German cul-

ture. The organizations at hand left many published and archival sources. Desiring support from both the populace and the state bureaucracies, naturist leaders and publicists produced a veritable avalanche of periodicals, pamphlets, books, requests for funding, and statements of intent. I take a twofold approach in analyzing these documents. One guiding theme is the organizational history of naturist movements, with attention paid to questions of sociological composition, the building of institutional frameworks, and the everyday practices that were intended to bring people into contact with rural nature.

My second main focus is the ideological history of hiking, nudism, and conservation. I trace the ways in which leaders and spokespersons collectively developed *ideal narratives of turning to nature*. Even though these ideal narratives were mutable and diverse, each followed a basic pattern. Each narrative began with a detailed diagnosis of a particular social crisis (or crises). The next step involved advocating and describing ideal ways of turning to nature. Each narrative concluded with a vision of improvement for the individual, for the membership of the organization, and ultimately for the entire nation.

Some additional general points should be made about these ideal narratives. First, naturists asserted that the nation was suffering primarily because of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Those developments had alienated the German people from rural nature. Furthermore, naturists nearly always expressed this theme of alienation through the language of health. Their concept of health was holistic, for they saw physical, mental, moral, and political health as intertwined. In other words, naturist diagnoses of Germany's crises were always also warnings about failing health. However, by taking the form of narratives that offered ways toward a better future, naturist discourse was forward looking in its attitude toward modern life.

Second, narratives of turning to nature were intertwined with notions of social identity. Class, gender, and generation were unstable identities in early twentieth-century Germany. The benefits of turning to nature promised by naturist writers included the stabilization and strengthening of these social categories. Class formation, for instance, was of great importance to naturists. For Social Democratic hiking and nudist leaders, the working class needed to reach a higher degree of collective solidarity. For middle-class naturists, the educated bourgeoisie had to be strengthened in order to maintain their respectability and status as cultural leaders.

Third, theories of human nature played a large role in these narratives. Socialist nudists, for example, wanted to guide German workers toward liberation from what they saw as the outdated and unnatural tradition of shame about the naked body. There was a sufficient store of reason in human nature, they argued, to enable people to control any sexual drives that might surface during group nudity. But for the enemies of nudism, the problem was that human reason could never prevail over desire. Thus, any unconventional attempt to liberate the body would open the Pandora's box of rampant sexuality.

Fourth, at the same time that leading naturists were creating ideal narratives of the turn to nature, they were also generating their own specific visions of the natural world itself. There was a dialectical relationship between naturist ideologies of human progress and nature itself. All naturist ideologues represented nature as a realm in which their followers could improve their health in a holistic way. But the ultimate, higher goals of turning to nature varied among the different movements; and these goals were reflected in differing visions of nature. Socialist movements, for example, desired a more rational and just society. They envisioned nature as a realm governed by rational laws that, if observed and adopted by human beings, would lead to greater justice.

There is nothing unusual about this process of constructing nature through culture. People have often conceived of a "nature" that corresponded to their own goals and desires. This is one way in which human beings have appropriated the nonhuman material world, and different groups within any given historical context have developed competing visions of nature. As the environmental historian William Cronon writes, "[B]ecause people differ in their beliefs, because their visions of the true, the good, and the beautiful are not always the same, they inevitably differ as well in their understanding of what nature means and how it should be used—because nature is so often the place where we go searching for the fulfillment of our desires."<sup>37</sup> Historians have uncovered how cultural representations of landscapes and natural phenomena came to legitimize social inequality and imperialism in such varied settings as Britain, France, the Americas, Asia, and Australia. They have shown how essentialist concepts of "the natural" have been used to buttress self-aggrandizing claims about gender, racial, and sexual identities. Environmental historians have also demonstrated that visions of nature both reflect and further motivate human exploitation of the environment.<sup>38</sup> Naturist movements in early



twentieth-century Germany, then, are yet another example of the age-old process of appropriating the natural world by means of culture.

German naturists' concepts of nature were nearly always anthropocentric, for the nature that they envisioned existed primarily to help human beings progress. Moreover, they lacked the preoccupation with "untouched" wilderness that characterized American initiatives like the Sierra Club, simply because there was very little such wilderness left in Germany by 1900. Aside from the wilder parts of the Alps, the landscape was thoroughly populated, characterized by agriculture, cultivated woodlands, and rapidly growing urban areas. In terms of location and membership, naturist organizations were primarily urban in character. Theirs was a reformist project, and they made no attempt to wrench the nation backward toward the preindustrial past. They were maneuvering within an increasingly industrial society, striving to forge a path toward a brighter future. The naturist goal was both pastoral and thoroughly modern. The turn to nature, they hoped, would bring about harmony between the industrial city and the rural countryside.

This book is divided into three parts, each dealing with a sector within organized naturism. Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) focuses on naturism within the Social Democratic labor movement subculture. Chapter 1 investigates socialist nudism, tracing how the nudists attempted to counter attacks from conservative politicians and moralists. Influenced by the contemporary discourse of sex reform, the nudists defended themselves by fashioning a narrative of turning to nature in which group nudity would lead to a more rational sexuality.

Chapter 2 addresses the socialist Tourist Association "Friends of Nature" (*Touristenverein "Die Naturfreunde"*), a mass organization for working-class hiking. Founded in Austria in 1898, the *Naturfreunde* had by 1914 won a following among German workers. The German membership reached a high point of some 116,000 during the 1920s. The *Naturfreunde* offered urban workers the opportunity for physical and mental recuperation, as well as a new kind of class solidarity in rural nature and a sharp critique of capitalist exploitation. The leaders of this movement attempted to anchor progressive republican values in the minds of the working class through the turn to nature. Their notion of "social hiking" demanded that workers look at other working people within both the rural and the urban landscape in a socialist way, observing and learning about the everyday injustices of capitalist society. This effort to use hiking as a way to

raise political consciousness did not, however, preclude a reverent attitude toward nature among the *Naturfreunde*, which manifested itself in both an ethos and an actual practice of conservation.

Both the nudist movement and the *Naturfreunde* reached the zenith of their popularity during the Weimar era, spreading naturist ideas to tens of thousands of industrial workers. Soon after the Nazis came to power in 1933, they outlawed socialist hiking and socialist nudism as antipathetic to the “racial-national community” (*Volksgemeinschaft*). This was in part due to the regime’s general hatred of socialism and in part to its understanding of how attractive naturist activities had become to many Germans. Although the new regime encouraged politically innocuous hiking for workers through its “Strength Through Joy” program, it heavily circumscribed even the “politically correct” remnants of the small bourgeois nudist movement.

Part II (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) concerns the youth hiking movement, focusing primarily on organizations of the educated middle class. Chapter 3 is a case study in the late Wilhelmine conflict between the generations over the human nature of the adolescent and the best path to adult citizenship. On one side of this struggle over Germany’s bourgeois youth were educated adolescents and young adults in the Rambler (*Wandervogel*) movement, who were seeking liberation from the institutions of adult control through group hiking. On the other side were adult “youth cultivators” (*Jugendpfleger*), a growing group of educators and professional youth specialists, who aimed to guide Germany’s teenagers along the path toward rational and self-disciplined citizenship. The two sides clashed for the first time in 1913–14 over the theme of adolescent sexuality; and in the course of a nationwide moral panic over the allegedly irrational nature of adolescence, hiking itself came under critical scrutiny. One result was that youth cultivators came to see the appropriation and retooling of the *Wandervogel* hiking tradition as necessary in order to win the consent of young people to their project of discipline.

Chapter 4 shows that fears of a “crisis of youth” persisted in the wake of the war and revolution. It traces how youth cultivators tried to turn hiking to the purpose of teaching adolescents self-discipline. They successfully won state and civic support for youth hiking, propagating the activity through such organizations as the National Federation of Youth Hostels. Recognizing the need to win the consent of as many young people as possible, they incorporated into their project some of the liberationist ideas that

had been so central to the *Wandervogel* hiking tradition. In so doing they ensured that organized youth hiking never lost its aura of individuality and autonomy, the disciplinary intent of youth cultivation notwithstanding.

Chapter 5 concerns the problems of both youth cultivation and youth hiking that arose in the late Weimar years of economic depression and political strife. It traces how after 1933 the Nazi youth organization tried to turn hiking into a method of “steeling” young people. The Hitler Youth soon realized, however, that *Wandervogel*-style hiking was fundamentally at odds with their totalitarian goals. By 1937 the Hitler Youth had purged all remnants of the early hiking tradition, replacing them with regimented camps and marching for the purpose of premilitary training. However, some young people clung to their vision of nature as a realm of liberty and persisted in illegal “wild hiking” in defiance of the regime.

Part III (Chapter 6) is a study of organized conservation (*Naturschutz*), a movement largely dominated by educated middle-class male elites. *Naturschutz* ideology was intertwined with the concept of *Heimat* from the beginning. This gave the movement a pronounced cultural and aesthetic bent in the Second Empire. During the 1920s leading conservationists attempted with only limited success to popularize their project among young people and industrial workers, whom they saw as dangerously impulsive and “rootless.” After 1925 many conservationists placed racial nationalism at the center of their discussions of the landscape. They also demonstrated a marked willingness to compromise with industrial engineers in order to “create new beauties in the landscape where old ones are destroyed.” Most leaders in the conservation movement welcomed the Nazi takeover, hoping that Hitler would both restore social order and use the state to enforce conservation on a national scale. The regime’s promulgation of the first national conservation law in 1935 clinched the conservationists’ support, and they embarked on a phase of intense activism. Although the Nazis themselves were not genuinely “green” in their thinking—Hitler’s goals of economic autarky and war preparation were fundamentally at odds with protecting the rural environment—the conservationists’ active support of the regime ultimately intensified their own racism and made some of them complicit in the regime’s crimes during the war.

The concluding chapter draws together the varied threads of German naturism, summarizing the similarities and differences between the pre-1933 movements. It also addresses the question of continuities between Wilhelmine-, Weimar-, and Nazi-era naturism. Both pre-1933 and Nazi

naturism shared the aim of defining and solving social crises. However, the Nazis divested naturism of all its liberationist and critical impulses, perverting it to the purpose of exerting physical and psychological control over the population. Far from subscribing to a reverent, romantic vision of the natural world, most Nazi ideologues had a reductive, social darwinist concept of nature. Hitler called nature “the cruel queen of all wisdom” and saw himself as her executor.<sup>39</sup> The Nazis referred to this deterministic vision of nature in their efforts to justify the murderous “cleansing” of the racial-national community. In another sense Hitler recognized early in the war that popular enjoyment of nature might serve as something of a compensation for “Aryan” Germans. In a decree of the Reich Forestry Department on July 9, 1940, the Führer let it be known that he wanted all “woods, conservation areas, parks, and landscape areas of particular beauty that are popular destinations for hikes and outings” to remain open to the public.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, the everyday policies of the regime regarding nature enjoyment were relentlessly totalitarian. The state heavily regulated adult hiking with the Strength Through Joy program and forbade all independent youth hiking in favor of marching in the Hitler Youth. Nudists and conservationists were tolerated as long as they clearly supported the regime’s racist goals. The Nazi turn to nature, combining “natural law” ideas to justify genocide with the systematic control of everyday activities in nature, gutted the naturist tradition of all its emancipatory potential.

The fact that a minority of naturist thinkers and functionaries were willing to cast their lot with the Nazi regime discredited organized naturism for years after the war, rendering it “beyond the pale” in the eyes of most historians. This is unfortunate, for the history of naturist ideology and practice from the turn of the century to the beginning of the Second World War reveals in microcosm some of the ways in which Germans perceived modernity, confronted their fears, and imagined ways toward a better future. Naturists shared with most other critics of urban-industrial life a desire not to turn the clock back on modernity but to find a way toward a society that would be able to overcome its problems. Their path toward that future society lay in nature.