1 *Introduction*

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This volume reflects an effort to take stock of the field of Chinese foreign policy and to consider potential avenues of new research. It is a collaborative effort by scholars of different generations and many academic perspectives who share an interest in and commitment to explaining Chinese foreign policy and to using systematically gathered and analyzed evidence. It is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field of Chinese foreign policy, which is simply too large and diverse for one volume to be able to cover all the topics, draw on all the relevant theories, and include all the first-rate scholars in the field. Rather, scholars were chosen in an attempt to represent current research in Chinese foreign policy from multiple theoretical perspectives and methodologies and multiple academic generations. To some degree, the timing of the volume is also worth noting: it appears at a point in history when the integration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with regional and global economic and political institutions has never been greater, and when a narrowing range of tropes of unease about "rising China" are coming to dominate policy and pundit discourses both in the United States and elsewhere. Not only is there greater demand today for information about China's foreign policy, but scholars are able, in principle, to supply greater amounts of sophisticated analysis.

The chapters were first presented at a conference held at the John King Fairbank Center at Harvard University in December 2002.[1] The volume is organized into three subfields of Chinese foreign policy. Part I examines Chinese security policy, including Chinese use of force, policy toward conflicts of interests affecting war and peace, and China's strategy as a rising power. Owing to greater access to Chinese analysts, decision-makers, and documents, these chapters draw on a wider range of materials about the sources and effects of Chinese security policy than was available in the earlier days of the field.[2] Part II considers China as an actor in multilateral institutions and China's response to emerging global trends, including evolving conceptions

of sovereignty and the emergence of globalization. These topics are relatively new for the field,[3] reflecting the fact that since the late 1980s, China has advanced more rapidly into international institutional life than any other major state moving from a similar position of isolation. Part III presents new research on domestic-foreign linkages, considering the impact of trends in public opinion and of Chinese identity on China's policy toward major powers. This is a very new subfield, because access to public attitudes has been severely restricted in authoritarian China, and the impact of public opinion on foreign policy has never been considered relevant. With rapid urbanization, marketization, and the diversification of political, economic, and foreign policy preferences, this seems to be changing.[4]

The Study of Chinese Security Policy

Robert Ross examines the role of deterrence and use of force in Chinese foreign policy. His Chapter 2, "Comparative Deterrence: The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula," places these two theaters of deterrence in the context of the theoretical literature on effective deterrence and on the sources of unstable deterrence and unintended war, enabling comparative analysis of the two theaters and estimates of the likelihood of war in East Asia. Regarding Korea, Ross assesses North Korean deterrence of U.S. use of force for either regime change or denuclearization, and U.S.–South Korean deterrence of North Korean use of force for unification. Regarding the Taiwan Strait, he considers Chinese deterrence of a Taiwan declaration of independence, an "act of war," and U.S. deterrence of Chinese initiation of use of force for unification. Using deterrence theory and concepts of credibility, capability, and expected utility, he considers the effectiveness of mutual deterrence dynamics in each region. He also compares these two deterrence theaters regarding incentives for first strikes and the implications for crisis instability and unintended war. Ross argues that although there is effective mutual deterrence on both the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait so that the status quo is preferred to use of force by all of the otherwise revisionist states, the distinct weapons capabilities of the actors in each theater and the distinct geography of each theater create distinct crisis dynamics. He argues that these differences have made the Korean peninsula a more probable military threat than the Taiwan Strait since the end of the Cold War, and that the Korean peninsula will remain a more likely source of war than the Taiwan Strait.

Thomas Christensen's Chapter 3, "Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing's Use of Force," examines conditions under which China has used force since 1949. Working within international politics theories of preemptive and preventive war, Christensen applies the concept of "closing

windows" to provide a comprehensive explanation for all post-1949 cases of Chinese use of force. He argues that Chinese leaders have used force to achieve international political objectives, despite the absence of a clear "red-line" provocation, when they perceive a closing window for China to achieve its strategic objectives, to deter an adversary from becoming more aggressive, or to create favorable long-term strategic trends. Christensen also argues that domestic conditions have consistently contributed to Chinese use of force, not because domestic instability can contribute to Chinese threat perception but because Chinese leaders have seen use of force as an appropriate instrument to achieve their domestic political objectives. Christensen further establishes that Chinese leaders have used force to reverse a deteriorating international situation even when China faced a more powerful and committed adversary, suggesting that China may be an especially difficult state to deter. Christensen's analysis of the patterns in Chinese use of force suggests a relatively pessimistic outlook for relying on deterrence to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait. Based on past PRC behavior, he warns that although Taiwan might not offer a red-line provocation by declaring de jure independence, mere continued Taiwan movement toward de jure independence could produce sufficient Chinese concern about a closing window to elicit use of force, even should Chinese leaders expect intervention by superior U.S. forces.

John Garver's Chapter 4, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962," presents an analysis of Chinese use of force against India in 1962. This case study integrates many of the issues addressed by Ross and Christensen to explain a major Chinese use of force. Drawing on voluminous new materials, the chapter analyzes the sources of Chinese threat perception, Chinese deterrence strategy, and China's decision to use force. Following the works of Allen Whiting and Neville Maxwell, Garver concurs that India's border policy challenged China's territorial integrity and that the Chinese failure to deter Indian forward deployment across the McMahon Line reflected low Indian assessment of China's resolve to use force and the constraints of Indian domestic politics on Nehru's ability to moderate India's broader policy. But, in contrast to Whiting and Maxwell, Garver argues that China's subsequent use of force against India reflected not simply China's imperative to defend its territorial integrity but rather primarily reflected heightened Chinese threat assessment resulting from Mao Zedong's misperception that Indian border policy reflected Nehru's contribution to the CIA-assisted 1959 uprising in Tibet and his determination to promote Tibetan separatism. Psychologically, Mao was simply unable to grasp Nehru's actual moderate intention to promote Tibetan autonomy within Chinese sovereignty and the domestic situational constraints on Nehru's Tibet and border policies. Mao thus developed a worst-case assessment of Nehru's intentions. Garver concludes that although China's victory over India established Chinese resolve

and compelled India to adopt a more cautious China policy, Mao's misperception of Nehru's intentions also inflicted significant costs on China, including long-term hostility with a determined and more modern Indian army and development of anti-China Soviet-Indian cooperation.

Chapters 5 and 6 analyze Chinese policy toward two key issues affecting Chinese security—developments on the Korean peninsula and trends in Sino-Japanese relations. Avery Goldstein's Chapter 5, "Across the Yalu: China's Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World," examines contemporary Chinese policy toward the Korean conflict. He stresses that during the Cold War, ideology, territorial security, and alignment with Soviet power against U.S. capabilities dominated Chinese policy. In contrast, although in the post–Cold War era, U.S. power remains at the heart of PRC assessments of trends on the peninsula, in the absence of the option of alignment with a great power, Beijing has had to accommodate U.S. power, while seeking gradual development of greater Chinese capabilities and minimization of domestic political instability. These demands require Beijing to seek a peaceful international environment, including peace on the Korean peninsula, even as management of domestic instability and concern about U.S. capabilities require vigilance against U.S. policy and an enduring commitment to the survival of the North Korean government. This analytical indeterminacy requires development of a framework for forecasting the future of China's Korean policy. Goldstein develops four "stylized scenarios" and assesses each in terms of its implications for China's pursuit of its multiple interests on the Korean peninsula, especially vis-à-vis the United States. He then applies two conceptual frameworks to assess the likely course of Chinese policy among these four futures. First, he builds on Whiting's concepts of Chinese threat perception and deterrence behavior, stressing that linkage between internal instability and heightened PRC threat perception, on the one hand, and the role of force in diplomatic signaling in Chinese deterrence efforts, on the other, may affect crisis outcomes. Second, he considers the impact of China's Korean policy on U.S.-China management of the rise of China, stressing that the very indeterminacy in PRC policy creates space for a negotiated solution, which can facilitate a peaceful power transition.

Michael Yahuda's Chapter 6, "The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino-Japanese Relations," also adopts a conceptual approach to the trends in a bilateral Chinese foreign policy. He considers the impact of increasing Sino-Japanese economic interdependence on the trends in the bilateral relationship. Observing that Sino-Japanese relations have become more contentious just as economic cooperation has increased, contrary to the expectations of the international political economy literature, Yahuda considers what factors have been responsible for this countervailing trend. Like

Goldstein, he argues that the end of the Cold War in East Asia has transformed the security preferences of each country. In the absence of the constraints imposed by the Soviet Union, each country has developed more assertive and independent security policies. Simultaneously, each country has also been increasingly intolerant of the changes in the other's policies. Yahuda explains this development and the resulting tension in relations by observing each country's inability to appreciate the impact of its changing security policies, especially the growth in respective military capabilities, on the other's security, that is, its inability to appreciate the impact of the security dilemma in international politics, so that each develops a worst-case perspective on the other's intentions. He explains these mutual worst-case analyses by developments in domestic politics. Following Whiting's analysis of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s, he finds that anti-Japanese nationalism in Chinese education has fostered widespread Chinese misperceptions about Japanese behavior. Moreover, generational change in China and Japan has given rise to leaders with limited knowledge of the other's culture and society. The result is that security perspectives, informed by domestically informed misperceptions, have offset the potentially positive effects of increased economic interdependence.

Part I concludes with Deng Yong's Chapter 7, "Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory," which discusses China's management of its rising power status, considered in the context of Beijing's implicit appreciation of the impact of the security dilemma in international politics. Whereas Yahuda suggests that Chinese leaders are insensitive to the impact of Chinese policy on Japanese security, Deng argues that the Chinese leadership is aware that China's reputation in other countries can be a major factor in their assessments of Chinese intentions and in their corresponding response to China's rising capabilities. In particular, perceptions of a "China threat" can lead other countries to adopt belligerent policies toward China that might disrupt Beijing's ability to focus on economic development and to enhance Chinese security in a peaceful international environment. Thus, Chinese diplomacy has actively tried to neutralize China threat arguments. First, it accuses proponents of the China threat of having a Cold War mentality of containment, seeking to delegitimate China's critics. Second, it has tried to foster a benign image of itself. One aspect of this is China's public diplomacy to define its own reputation in world affairs. Deng explains that China's development of its "peaceful rise" diplomacy aims to undermine China threat arguments. Another aspect of its rising power diplomacy is its extensive participation in multilateral institutions, including in arms control and nonproliferation institutions. Deng concludes with the observation that China's recognition of the importance of reputation for security dilemma dynamics is indicative of the fundamen-

tal changes in Chinese foreign policy that have taken place since the Maoist era, when China primarily depended on a reputation for military resolve to influence the behavior of potential adversaries.

China and Globalization

Part I of this volume thus considers the impact of China's international strategic environment on Chinese policy. Part II is also concerned with China's response to its international environment, but the focus is on China's response to globalization, including the globalization of norms of limited sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and economic cooperation.

Allen Carlson's Chapter 8, "More Than Just Saying No: China's Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention Since Tiananmen," examines in depth perhaps the most sensitive challenge of globalization—China's gradual compromise of its long-term commitment to absolute sovereignty in response to its determined exposure to the deepening and increasingly global norm of humanitarian intervention. Although Carlson acknowledges the role of material interests in Chinese behavior, he explains the evolution in Chinese thinking on sovereignty by focusing on the susceptibility of Chinese foreign policy elites to international norms through "social learning." He argues that Chinese participation in international society has led to internalization of hitherto unacceptable ideas. His empirical work examines changes in Chinese attitudes toward sovereignty as they relate to the legitimacy of security and humanitarian international intervention in a state's domestic affairs. Carlson argues that even as interest calculations clearly drove China's initial moderation of its stand on absolute sovereignty in the early 1990s, China's changing policy also encouraged underlying ideational change among Chinese foreign policy elites that sustained and even deepened the trend in China toward acceptance of the concept of limited sovereignty well into the decade. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, despite enduring Chinese concern that Western democracies, in particular the United States, have used the concept of limited sovereignty to suit their narrow national interests, the global norm of humanitarian multilateral intervention in protection of human rights, expressed in the very language used by Western foreign policy elites, had become widespread in Chinese foreign policy circles, and Chinese government attitudes toward multilateral intervention had become increasingly flexible.

Margaret Pearson's Chapter 9, "China in Geneva: Lessons from China's Early Years in the World Trade Organization," turns to China and the global economy, in particular to Chinese participation in the WTO and its impact on global trade. Similar to Carlson's investigation of China's stance toward

the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention, Pearson examines China's stance toward the WTO's formal rules and informal norms in the early and critical period after December 2001. But whereas Carlson stresses growing Chinese socialization into evolving norms of sovereignty, Pearson, while open to the suggestion that China may become "socialized" into WTO norms, stresses that calculations of economic interest drive cooperative, norm-acceptant Chinese policy. Rather than actively promoting the revisionist agenda of developing countries, China works with the handful of states at the center of power in the WTO; it aligns with coalitions of developed states that promote policies favorable to greater PRC access to international markets, including the markets of developing countries. Thus, on agriculture issues, it has aligned with the United States to promote open markets. On textiles, although it opposes U.S. protectionist efforts, it has maintained a low profile, even when its preferences favor the interests of developing countries. Insofar as the WTO norms enable agenda stetting and negotiations to be dominated by the economic powers and their interest in maintaining the existing trade order, since 2000, China has avoided revisionist behavior and has accommodated itself to well-established WTO rules and norms. Underscoring Samuel Kim's observation that globalization and the development of so-called intermestic actors have undermined the policy-making authority of the central government, Pearson observes that China's ability to assume leadership in the WTO will depend on its ability to forge a consensus position among competing domestic interests prior to conducting negotiations with its international trading partners.

Samuel Kim's Chapter 10, "Chinese Foreign Policy Faces Globalization Challenges," steps back and addressees the big picture—the multiple challenges China faces as it engages globalization and the wide range of international institutions that are the agents of globalization. He observes that after many years of criticizing globalization as a threat to Chinese sovereignty and as a plot to foment domestic instability, by the early 1990s, Chinese leaders had acknowledged that both domestic stability and Chinese international security required China to participate in globalization, that China could not be a revisionist power. Since then, China has fully engaged economic, security, and political globalization. But Kim observes that whereas economic globalization and membership in the WTO have been relatively easy for China to manage, insofar as the growth of the Chinese economy, of exports, and of foreign investment have made China a winner in economic globalization, China has had to make important trade-offs in other sectors. For example, engagement with globalization has required China to come to terms with evolving norms of sovereignty. As a member of the UN Security Council, China has acceded to numerous multilateral security arrangements. It has also compromised its position on intervention

in a state's sovereign affairs, increasingly supporting UN peacekeeping operations since the late 1990s. Kim observes that whereas participation in globalization has enhanced Chinese national power and its ability to defend its external sovereignty, the associated weakening of national boundaries has simultaneously undermined China's internal sovereignty. Domestic groups with competing international interests, intermestic actors, require Chinese leaders to engage in domestic negotiations before they can successfully negotiate at the international level. Moreover, the central government's diminishing control over localities and of cross-border information flows poses a long-term challenge to political stability.

Domestic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy

The chapters in the second part of this volume argue that Chinese participation in globalization has necessarily eroded the boundary between China's domestic politics and its foreign policy. Part III directly addresses this issue and the domestic sources of China's international behavior. In particular, it seeks to assess the impact of the erosion of the Chinese central government's authority over society and the corresponding implications of the influence of mass attitudes on China's foreign policy.

Peter Gries's Chapter 11, "Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Relations," examines the role of "othering" in Chinese nationalism and thus its impact on China's involvement in international conflict, in particular in conflict with the United States. Like Carlson in Chapter 8, Gries acknowledges the important role of material interests in shaping foreign policy and also argues that a constructivist approach employing social identity theory can reveal the substance of Chinese nationalism and its contribution to conflict. Examining the writings of China's more vocal nationalists, Gries develops a "hard test" to argue that Chinese nationalism is not necessarily a source of Chinese belligerence. Following the research on social identity theory, he argues that China's in-group identity does not require a zero-sum policy framework that promotes hostility toward the out group, so that nationalism is an indeterminate source of competitive, conflict-prone attitudes toward the United States. Gries's case studies are the 1999 U.S.-China tension over the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 U.S.-China tension over the crash of a Chinese surveillance plane after its collision with an American EP-3 intelligence aircraft near Hainan Island. Whereas conflict over the embassy bombing continues to fester in China, the EP-3 incident was fully resolved. The difference, Gries explains, was that whereas U.S. policy in both cases undermined China's positive self-identity, in the latter case, creative ambiguity in U.S.-China diplomacy enabled both

sides to "save face," while enabling China to escape zero-sum dynamics in its nationalist out-group competition with the United States.

Iain Johnston's Chapter 12, "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion Toward the United States, 1998–2004," addresses broader themes in public attitudes toward key international actors and the potential long-term implications for China's role in international politics and its policy toward the United States. Taking advantage of a variety of social science methodologies and seven years of polling of Beijing-area residents, he presents the first randomly sampled, nongovernmental time-series analysis of Chinese public opinion on foreign policy issues, with controls for various socioeconomic and demographic variables. Johnston observes that repeated short-term mini crises in U.S.-China relations have contributed to a gradual decline of "warmth" toward the United States among Beijing residents. But Johnston's findings also suggest that wealth, education, and travel abroad may help offset these trends to some degree. Thus insofar as China's exposure to globalization contributes to the expansion of an educated middle class and to greater cross-border information flows resulting from travel and news reports about international politics, the foreign policy preferences of this group will tend to be relatively less anti-American and nationalistic. Moreover, greater income levels, education, and travel all tend to diminish Chinese tendencies toward "othering," in which a positive Chinese self-identity is paired with a negative characterization of the United States. Johnston acknowledges the many limitations in the polling data and the limited role that public opinion continues to have in Chinese policy-making. Yet his analysis since 1998 of the opinions of Beijing-area residents suggests that reduced central government control over society, including that resulting from globalization and democratization, may not necessarily lead to greater anti-American nationalism and heightened U.S.-China conflict.

Conclusions

The research in this volume should not be considered as either definitive or all-encompassing. Rather, it simply reflects an effort to consider the study of Chinese foreign policy from multiple dimensions, including different research agendas and diverse methodologies and research materials. It is the hope of all the contributors that the volume will be considered a gesture of their appreciation of the work of their predecessors, who first established the importance and viability of the field of Chinese foreign policy studies, and whose work contributed to the richness and sophistication of current research. They also hope that the volume may make a modest contribution to the future development of the field.

Notes

1. We are grateful to Elizabeth Economy, Joseph Fewsmith, Steven Goldstein, Roderick MacFarquhar, Alan Romberg, and Ezra Vogel for serving as discussants and for their valuable contributions to the conference and to the quality of the chapters in this book, as well as to David Zweig for sharing his research on China's reverse brain drain. We also wish to thank the Fairbank Center for providing the funding and administrative support for the conference, which was the Fairbank Center's way of honoring Allen S. Whiting, owing to the fact that he had been unable to deliver the prestigious Reischauer Lecture the year before.

2. The earlier literature on Chinese security behavior is too rich to cite here. But some of the pioneering work—research that tried to mainstream Chinese foreign policy behavior by applying standard analytical constructs such as deterrence theory, rational actor models of decision-making, and a realism-influenced focus on China's pursuit of power within different regional and global configurations of power and interest—include Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (1960; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Allen S. Whiting, *The Calculus of Chinese Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975); J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Huang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

3. In contrast to the work on Chinese security, there are very few pioneering works on which to build this new research. The most obvious of these are Samuel Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Gerald Chan, *China and International Organizations* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

4. This research is new in the sense that it tries to analyze the impact of ideology, historical memory, and collective identity in society, not primarily among the decision-making elites in the Chinese system. But this work, too, stands on the shoulders of giants in Chinese foreign policy, scholars who have taken ideational variables seriously in their own work. See Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) and "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," *China Quarterly*, no. 142 (June 1995): 295–316, www.people.fas .harvard.edu/~johnston/GOV2880/whiting.html (accessed 27 September 2005); Steven I. Levine, "Perception and Ideology in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," and Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations," both in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 30–46 and 224–65, respectively; and Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 65, 3 (1987): 501–23.