



## Introduction

Contemporary thought never ceases “coming to terms” with Heidegger. It may think with him, or against him, but rarely without him. At stake is knowing—if only in a very global way—what it is that allows Heidegger’s work to occupy this position, commonly recognized today as indisputable.

This question warrants several responses, which we need to see in their progression. In the first place, inasmuch as it takes metaphysics in charge, the work of Heidegger specifically concerns the philosopher (or what remains of him today). It concerns the philosopher in several respects. First, Heidegger’s work allows the philosopher to reread the great texts of the tradition in light of the question that is in play in them, even if it is not properly developed therein. Thus, Heidegger makes possible a decisive renewal of the interpretation of philosophical texts. Second, beyond the diversity of these texts, to be focused on the question that shapes them beneath the surface [*souterrainement*] is to grasp them in their unity, until then unnoticed. This is what permits Heidegger to speak of metaphysics in the singular, of “the” metaphysics, and to grasp it as a coherent whole. Third, to circumscribe metaphysics in its unity is to be in the position to grasp it finally in its truth; that is, in one and the same movement to set forth its foundation and to reach its essence, till now unthought. Fourth, reaching the essence of metaphysics, however (if indeed it is this unthought character that constitutes metaphysics itself, at the same time as creating its unity), amounts to casting upon it a gaze that could not be

properly its own. And thereby opens the possibility, albeit a distant one, of a resolute “disengagement,” directed toward other possibilities, as yet unsuspected.<sup>1</sup>

In a word, the history of metaphysics is replayed in its diversity, referred back to its unity, and thought in its truth: these many gestures make up a single one, since they all come down to putting us in possession of a heritage that was ours, while remaining closed to us. In restoring to the philosopher his past, Heidegger allows him to recognize himself as a man of modernity (i.e., at the end of metaphysics) and to seek out, if gropingly, his new face as a thinker, which is perhaps his future if he is to have one. Such is *one* of the possible meanings of the Heideggerian enterprise, and it would already suffice to account for his prodigious impact on the landscape of contemporary thought.

But Heidegger goes much farther. What he aims at, beyond just metaphysics, is the truth of *Western history* in its entirety. This is in no way to say that, beside everything just presented here, something else would be implied. Simply, in Heidegger’s eyes, *in* that which was just presented, something else is implicit. To understand these relationships of implication we must return to the very term *metaphysics* in its Heideggerian usage. If initially it hardly differentiates itself from its current use, it thereafter becomes the object of a dual expansion: a semantic expansion (metaphysics will encompass domains that in early times remained external to it, until it reaches the point where it covers all the constitutive *dimensions* of the West). And a temporal expansion (metaphysics will spill over into periods that escaped it in its early days, until it reaches the point of covering the entirety of *Western history*). Once these two expansions are accomplished (and, each in their time, they are accomplished over the course of the work), we will have passed from the first project (aiming at the one metaphysics) to the second (aiming at the West), or, more precisely, the first project will henceforth signify the second one, and encompass it.

From the beginning of the next chapter, we shall have to follow step by step each of these expansions. For the moment, it is worth our while simply to highlight the movement by which Heidegger is led almost imperceptibly to transform his ambition. He who at first wanted to be the interpreter of a relatively determinate field (which hitherto one called the “history of philosophy,” when one still believed, precisely, in the existence of determinate fields) comes to embrace History in its totality, in its past, its present, and its possible future.

Facing this colossal enterprise, what indeed should be the task of the reader today, or more generally of those who attempt to think—in this age known as the “closure [*achèvement*] of metaphysics”—and to think after Heidegger?

## I. From One Book to the Other

The first task is undoubtedly a task of reading. Whether it is a matter of reviewing the major axes of the tradition or of opening new paths for research, one cannot seriously claim to stand in the contemporary space of thought if one deprives oneself any reference to the formidable commotion around Heidegger. The sole means for measuring this is to follow again with Heidegger those distressing paths that were cleared by his work.

This task is largely underway today, some sixty years after the publication of *Being and Time*. I myself contributed to it in an earlier study,<sup>2</sup> whose only ambition was to *read* Heidegger (which of course also means to make him readable), and to do so by taking up his work in its entirety from an angle that appeared privileged to me (since it permitted us, precisely, to embrace this entirety): the question of the origin.

Once this reading is finished (even if it is never truly finished), there remains another task. It consists in entering into debate with Heidegger, a debate that has no sense unless it stands resolutely apart from the polemic. Now, there is but one way to avoid this danger, which is to start *from the text*, understood as a text which we must open, from within, to questioning. To open it from the inside is to locate the points, even minor ones, which call for reflection, and to take them thematically as objects. To open the text from within is also to discern there what may be carried by it as inexplicit assertions, presuppositions, and, all in all, as an unthought [*d'impensée*]. Only through this patient labor can a larger discussion begin about the legitimacy itself of Heidegger's interpretation of our history.

As Heidegger has claimed to grasp the meaning of this history, from its origin to its end, our study proposes “to consider what Heidegger's attempt at thinking contributes to the task of understanding our history,”<sup>3</sup> to repeat here the words that were once those of Pöggeler. That is, our study intends to reopen the question posed by the same Pöggeler (who, for his part, responded positively to it): “Is his [Heidegger's] way of taking the

itinerary of Western thought in charge required by this thought or not?"<sup>4</sup>

To take seriously such a question, to attempt to work it out, at least in one of its forms, is the aim here. If I insist upon the necessity of a certain detachment (which would go without saying, in a different context), it is because of the highly specific terrain on which we are about to tread, the question of Heidegger and "Judaism." This is a thorny subject, about which sensibilities are more acute than elsewhere. Let us specify, clearly, once and for all, that the present work wants to serve no *cause*. If I come to adopt a critical position vis-à-vis some of Heidegger's assertions, it is in no way because I judge it salutary that Heidegger be subjected "finally" to critique. It is simply because, while engaged on a determinate path, I encountered questions that I was unable to resolve, and that seemed to me could not be resolved within the framework of Heidegger's interpretation of history, and I consequently decided to subject these questions to other interpretations.

In my earlier work, I had followed Heidegger as he traced the metaphysical tradition to its Presocratic beginning—himself led by his questioning in the direction of the unthought of which he remained a bearer. A drawn-out enterprise, since it was not a matter of a single leap, but of a multiform backward march wherein each of the great metaphysical determinations (concerning Being, language, truth, etc.) was referred back to the "fundamental word" that inaugurated it. It was in proceeding to unfold this multiplicity that Heidegger managed to set forth their secret unity: the Greek opening of Being, the original trace toward which all our history must be led back anew, in order to be elucidated by it. To go back to the fundamental words was thus to be prepared to recognize ourselves as what we have always been, albeit unconsciously: inheritors.

It was the whole problematic of the *Andenken* [memory] that I attempted to restore, making a point of neglecting none of the meanderings of the Heideggerian course, all the way to its conclusion. At the end of the enterprise, it appeared to me that, with the assumption of the Greek heritage, the question of our origin was far from being closed; rather, it seemed that the question was perhaps just opening, that it was opening, presently, in Heidegger's own text and starting from it. It was in the text, in effect, that the unsaid remained [*restait du non-dit*], that a certain question came ultimately to impose itself, became almost central, by dint of not being posed by Heidegger. In a word, it was the text itself that now posed a problem.

Therefore everything had to be taken up again in light of that so singularly absent question. To reread the Heideggerian oeuvre, no longer on the basis of the orientations it furnished, but according to another guiding thread: following the trace of a silence, seeking to understand how it functioned, by what means it perpetuated itself, and what that silence produced. Only then should Heidegger's own elaboration of the problem of the origin have some chance to appear in its true dimensions.

## II. The Question

When he poses the question of our provenance, Heidegger responds: we are the inheritors of Greece. By this we should understand that the injunction set down [*injonction déposée*] in the fundamental words of the first Greeks constitutes the inception of our history and, in this respect, still determines our present site.

Now, referring our sojourn in its entirety to just the Greek beginning implies that the biblical component (especially the Old Testament, and therefore the Hebraic one) of Western history may be taken as nonsignifying; that is, that it would not have the status of a beginning. And, in fact, Heidegger almost never refers to it, thereby attesting to the negligible character of what had been held, up until then, to be one of the sources of our identity.

It is important, here, not to invert the order of determinations. One believes often enough that it is because Heidegger was able to gauge, as none had done before him, the prodigious impact that the Greek beginning had on thought, that he was led to hold the Hebraic contribution to be negligible. Yet in reality, however decisive the Greek beginning may be, still it could not by itself lead to the erasure of all other determinations. If the Hebraic contribution is so massively excluded, it is not because no further "room" remained for its inscription, but because it had been from the first *forbidden to thinking* [*interdit de pensée*]. It was so excluded thanks to a double reduction, maintained from one end of the work to the other: the reduction of the Bible to the sole Neo-testamentary text (written in Greek), itself reduced to a pure experience, which is that of *faith*. Faith would be the sole object of Revelation, as well as the Bible's sole point of impact on the West. It is only on the ground of this fundamental postulate that Western thought could be said to be Greek in all its parts, including

those of its possibilities that the Greeks had not taken up.

From this springs Heidegger's comprehension of Christianity, which is entirely elucidated by two of its dimensions: faith (whose characteristic is to be foreign to the order of thought) and onto-theology (whose characteristic is to be reducible to Greek thought). That means that Christianity's only original trait (faith in the crucified God) in no way concerns thought, and that the trait by which Christianity participates in thought has nothing original in itself: it is never anything but an avatar of what the Greeks already thought, or at least sketched in advance. Yet that also means (i.e., it is only another translation of the same fundamental postulate) that the Hebraic dimension can be passed over in silence, since it has inaugurated nothing, not even within Christianity. The Hebraic dimension has marked neither thought (which is Greek), nor faith (which is Christic and Neo-testamentary).

Thus we arrive at a triple demarcation. First, one may well speak, if one wants, of a *Christian thought*, but it could not be taken for a significant component of the West, since it remains entirely the province [*ressort*] of Greek thought. Second, on the other hand, there could not exist, in any sense of the term, a *biblical thought* (even were it Neo-testamentary), nor even a biblical determination that could be brought to bear on thought, since the Bible only had its impact on Christianity's dimension of faith. The West would thus bear the double mark of the *biblical faith* and of *Greek thought*. Third, it cannot be a question of working back toward some sort of Hebraic source, regardless of whether it is a matter of faith or of thought. We must therefore correct the preceding assertion and say that the West carries the double mark of the *Christic faith* and of *Greek thought*, Christian theology being, for its part, an amalgamation of the two (one as prejudicial to the purity of the first as it is to the import of the second). However, the thinker who knows how to separate faith from thought has finally to do only with Greek thought—or, more rigorously, with the Greek determinations that influenced thought.

This general sketch—which I retrace in broad strokes here, and to which we shall return later in a more precise way—overturns all our received ideas.<sup>3</sup> What had seemed until then to go without saying was that Christianity, including its dimension as *thought*, had been constituted on the basis of two distinct sources: the Greek and the Hebraic sources. This meant that Christianity pointed back to two founding texts, and that the

Books of Exodus or Genesis were as essential to it as the *Iliad* or the *Posterior Analytics*. More broadly, it seemed to go without saying that the Bible constituted a complex universe, which had marked many facets of our identity and left traces in the entirety of our culture, well beyond just the experience of faith, and even beyond what Christianity had retained of it. Heidegger's position is thus manifestly paradoxical. Yet this paradox offers the double peculiarity not only of having been presented (by its author), but also received (by his readers), as its own contrary: namely, as *obvious*.

That it could indeed be presented this way is what its status as a pe-remptory postulate shows us. Through the reduction of the entirety of the biblical universe to the sole dimension of faith (Christic faith), the Hebraic source of thought is in no way invalidated by Heidegger, rather he *occults* it, to the point of leaving something like a *blank* space in his text. Now it is remarkable that this blank space had posed no problems for the different generations of readers who have followed each other around Heidegger's work. In truth, the blank space so little troubled these readers that this double paradox (the biblical heritage reduced to faith, and the West that is Greek) passes today for an assertion that should go without saying.

That means that we have been present at the reversal of reigning "certainties"; certainties as little questioned in one case as in the other. One used to speak, with an attractive pairing, of the "Judeo-Christian tradition," without it ever having been the object of a properly philosophical elucidation. One speaks today, with a voice not less unanimous, of the "history of metaphysics" and of the "Greek morning," as though these not only suffered no contestation, but even called for no examination. This disguising of the paradox as a certainty is what appears problematic to me.

In this concert of voices we nevertheless note one major exception: Paul Ricoeur.<sup>6</sup> After openly admitting his astonishment to Heidegger himself,<sup>7</sup> and without obtaining a clear answer, Ricoeur will reiterate his question twenty-five years later, in a short paragraph that I take the liberty of reproducing almost whole here—as it seems so capital to me.

What has often astonished me about Heidegger is that he would have systematically eluded, it seems, the confrontation with the block [*bloc*] of Hebraic thought. He sometimes reflected on the basis of the Gospels and of Christian theology, but always avoided the Hebraic cluster [*massif*], which is the absolute stranger to the Greek discourse. . . . This misprision [*méconnaissance*] seems to me to run parallel to Heidegger's incapacity to take a "step backward" in such a way that might per-

mit us to think adequately all the dimensions of the Western tradition. Does the task of rethinking the Christian tradition by way of a “step backward” not require that one recognize the radically Hebraic dimension of Christianity, which is first rooted in Judaism and only afterward in the Greek tradition? Why reflect only on Hölderlin and not on the Psalms, on Jeremiah? There lies my question.<sup>8</sup>

It is precisely this question that I propose to open to discussion, a discussion whose field we must define from the outset. It is in no way a question of playing the historian against the thinker, and of relying on some arbitrary “factual data” to problematize Heidegger’s assertions. Such data may well belong to the register of what Heidegger calls *Historie*, but they could not determine the order of his *Geschichte*.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the fact that Christianity was born “objectively” in the Hebraico-Roman milieu, in no way influences the line of thinking Heidegger proposes [*ligne de sens*]: what difference does it make to the thinker that there might have been a Jewish people and a Book, if these remained without posterity—or, more precisely, if *we* are not their inheritors? What value has their pure historic (*historisch*) existence, if the fundamental position in which we stand today can be interpreted—that is, referred back to its truth—without considering their intervention?

On this point one can only subscribe to Heidegger’s assertion. Not only is the historial not the historical, but the former receives no order from the latter. It is rather the *Geschichte*—once it is elucidated in its lines of force, hitherto secret—that can make possible another approach to *Historie*, that is, which can allow the approach to be established, not under the dictatorship of facts (which obligate only those who have already decided that it is from these facts that they will take their orders), but in light of a division of meaning [*partage de sens*]. In a word, the multiplicity of events is powerless to account for the “coming” [*avènement*] of a destiny, and thinking is something other than historiography.

Under these conditions, by what right, and especially, from what place, may we suspect that the Heideggerian text is marked by an omission? To this question I can only respond with another one: by what right and from what place can Heidegger speak of a “forgetting” inherent in metaphysics and, thereupon, of an unthought? The answer leaves no doubts: if it is legitimate to impute to metaphysics a forgetting of Being, then that is because Being gives itself continually *in* metaphysics, without being taken into consideration *by* metaphysics. In other words, it is because Being



is indeed *its* question (to the point where metaphysics is ultimately nothing other than the history of Being), without nevertheless being recognized and meditated in itself. In this case alone does the concept of the unthought find its relevance. Far from being the other of thought, its outside, the unthought constitutes its heart: that which thought carries with itself, that to which it untiringly bears witness, be it unconsciously.

Starting from the same perspective, I propose to question the eventuality of a forgetting within Heidegger's text. This forgetting could be confirmed only if it turned out that Heidegger himself was located in a line of descent that alone made his words possible and that nevertheless had not been discerned as such. My question is thus the following: can we find in Heidegger's text traces of a heritage that he did not recognize, a heritage that would thus function as the unthought of his text?

### III. Elements of Method

#### 1. *On the Hebraic Heritage*

To be apt to recognize in Heidegger's text references liable to be concealed there, we must naturally have some idea of the original, to which borrowings must be referred in order to be identified as such. That is to say, we require a foregoing knowledge, even partial, of what Paul Ricoeur called the "Hebraic cluster" [*massif hébraïque*]. This is, in itself, a gigantic and proliferating [*foisonnant*] cluster, in which we find inextricably interwoven a language (Hebrew), a text (Bible), a tradition of thinking and writing (Talmudic, midrashic, kabbalistic, etc., literatures), a religion (Judaism), and finally a people with its history and its myths. From what perspective should this cluster be called upon here?

To respond to such a question implies a triple choice:

1. The Hebraic heritage interests us here as a non-Greek component of our culture. Its legacy being constituted in its origin by a founding text, I could just as well have spoken of the biblical heritage. I preferred the qualifier *Hebraic* in order to give the analysis a support other than the Christian posterity of the Bible, which is a posterity in which the Hebraic component is inextricably mixed up with Greek influences. That means that the Jewish reading of the biblical text will constitute the principal support chosen here.

This choice would seem to indicate that the Judaic tradition succeeded in this wager of keeping the Hebraico-biblical heritage pure of any external influences, notably the Hellenistic ones. Yet to believe that would clearly be chimerical. Far from being simply juxtaposed, these different cultures are tied together by the most numerous interferences, even by entire zones of interpenetration. In the case under our attention, we know the most obvious points of contact: the few centuries surrounding the beginning of the Christian era, notably the first and second centuries C.E., during which the encounter between Hellenism, Judaism, and a nascent Christianity took place; the Middle Ages, still more complex since the Arabic influence is added to the encounter here; the modern age, finally, where Jewish culture opens largely to the outside world. Nothing of all this could be contested.

Despite these exchanges, one cannot deny that there is something like a *specificity* proper to each of the cultures in presence. It is this specificity that interests me. To limit myself to a few, trivial examples: it is clear that the God of the promise and of salvation owes more to Yahweh than to Jupiter or to Zeus, and no less clear that a theological concept such as the *causa sui* owes more to Aristotle than to Jeremiah. In a word, it is clear that beside the notions that obviously come from the Greeks, and whose origin we can discern in precise texts, other notions have their sources just as clearly in the Vetero-testamentary texts.

Given that, how could we ask Christianity to provide the framework for the division [*partage*] of these heritages, when it was constituted precisely, and from the outset, as the site of their synthesis? For the problem that interests us here, there was more to be awaited from the tradition that tried to draw simply from the Hebraic source and to assure its transmission. The “Hebraic cluster” will thus be examined on the basis of the Judaic tradition, inasmuch as it rests jointly on the Hebrew language and on the biblical text, and as it is perpetuated in the Jewish interpretation of this text: an interpretation, with its logic and its rhythm, that could encounter other influences without being thereby dissolved in them.

2. The first presupposition of this work is thus that the Hebraic heritage found itself preserved and transmitted—not in a pure way, to be sure, but perhaps purer than elsewhere—in Jewish memory. The second presupposition is that this heritage (like every heritage) is an indissociable fabric

made of *language* and *thought* (or, more generally, of experiences of the world); this is an indissociability that allows us to pass constantly from one to the other, and to rely notably on linguistic facts to deduce the specific relationship that a people maintains with its universe. That means that I am presupposing, more generally, that a language does not constitute an autonomous register that would refer only to itself and about which one could deduce nothing. I am presupposing that the differences separating two languages, for example, are not *merely* linguistic differences, but that they can function as indexes by which to measure divergences in thought; conversely, it is possible to return to the language, on the basis of the thought in question, to hear it resonating in a different manner. In brief, I am presupposing that a circulation is possible, and legitimate, between the different constitutive registers of a single cluster.

Such a presupposition can be challenged.<sup>10</sup> However, if it is compelling here, that is because it is already at work in the two corpuses on which we are calling: in the Jewish tradition as also in the Heideggerian problematic, language is never perceived as a separate domain, which would refer only to itself. Naturally, this convergence remains to be shown.<sup>11</sup> Yet it is so patent that even James Barr, the most virulent critic of the “circulation” between language and thought—bears witness to it in his own way: criticizing the excesses of biblical theology, he refers these to the “philosophical methods of Martin Heidegger,”<sup>12</sup> which he judges just as pernicious as “midrashic novels.”<sup>13</sup>

The dual purpose of this study thus invites us to adopt a determinate procedure: concerned to set forth the specificity of the Hebraic cluster, in order to confront it with Heidegger’s texts, I will take as my basis not just the Jewish reading of the Bible (first presupposition), but also the *principles* themselves of this reading (second presupposition). That is to say, to carry out this research I will act on the authority of the relationship the Hebrews maintained with their own language, and in the spirit of which Jews have not ceased, thereafter, questioning their own inaugural texts. These principles are all the more imperative in that they are also—as I will endeavor to show—the very ones adopted by Heidegger.

3. There remains a final point. Considering the Hebraic heritage as a signifying totality, I have not felt it necessary to establish clear-cut separations between its different components. I will therefore refer as much

to the classical rabbinic literature (Talmud and midrash), as to the mystical current (notably the Kabbalah). Not that one can erase everything that separates these, and which has so marked the work of, say, Emmanuel Lévinas;<sup>44</sup> but these components interest me here only as the divergent expressions of a single identity. In this sense, the Kabbalah is less an isolated branch than a magnifying mirror: it bears witness in its at times exacerbated way to elements already present in a diffuse fashion in classical Judaism. This is notably the case for the question of language. Now, if I happen to illustrate this with a narrative inspired by a mystical source, then it is with the presupposition that a certain relationship to language, more clearly legible in the Kabbalah, is nonetheless characteristic of the whole Hebraico-Judaic tradition. This whole, in what unity it has, is what shall be called on here.

It is fitting to specify the stakes of this appeal. The threefold presupposition just presented here should allow us to approach the properly Hebraic heritage, inasmuch as it marked the West by the same rights as did the Greco-Hellenistic contribution. However, it cannot here be a question of presenting this heritage for itself. Beside the fact that such a presentation would surpass the bounds of my competence, it would in no way serve the project of this book. My purpose, in effect, is not to establish a confrontation, under the pretence of an exhaustive study, between two distinct “corpuscles,” and not even to undertake an historic research into the “sources” of Heidegger’s work. It consists, rather, in establishing a list of the most patent proximities, in bringing to light a kind of shared space—if only to ask, then (though this is but one question among others, and perhaps not the most essential one), whether this shared space could not be explained in terms of lines of descent or filiation.

The Hebraic heritage must indeed intervene here (which is the reason why it would have to be comprehensively circumscribed), but exclusively *in its relation to Heidegger’s work*. It is a matter of bringing this heritage into play, as our reference text—that is, of taking, here and there, certain samplings from it [*ponctions*]<sup>45</sup>—with the sole goal of making this or that aspect of the Heideggerian problematic appear in a new light. My samplings lay claim to no specific erudition in the field of Jewish studies; rather, they stake a claim to something like a *vigilance* toward that which, having marked our culture and our identity, can be found in Heidegger’s

text without ever having been recognized as such. Perhaps it was ultimately this concern for vigilance alone that led me to seek, on the side of Jerusalem, what Heidegger invited us to find on the side of Athens.

## 2. *On the Texts of Heidegger*

My approach to Heidegger's work will follow two principles. In the first place, I will not attempt to enter into the details of the analyses; naturally, I will not avoid being led there sometimes, but that will not be my goal. Rather, my goal will be to present, in as synthetic a manner as possible, a few central questions, with a view to setting forth their lines of force. In this way certain motifs will be brought to light, which, if they were neither isolated nor enlarged, would remain caught up in the threads of the text and would thereby lose visibility.<sup>15</sup>

In the second place, if one seeks that which permeates a work without being named or recognized there, one will not be content with the author's explicit positions relative to the question at stake. Such positions, in effect, which seem to exhaust the problem, say nothing about what is elsewhere in play (it is not impossible, even, that one of their functions would be precisely to mask that there is an elsewhere in the text). I will thus cite Heidegger's text in a deliberately oblique manner. When I pose a question to the work, I will not only seek where Heidegger responds to it explicitly, but where and how the elements of his response "work" the text, even in those places where they are not noted as such.

In clear language: if we limited ourselves to what Heidegger *says* about the Hebraic heritage in order to follow its traces in his work, then our inquiry would be finished quickly. To be sure, we can enlarge the perspective by searching for bits of information in what Heidegger says about Christian theology. And I will not fail to do so.<sup>16</sup> But this can only be an element within a much vaster inquiry: for Heidegger's explicit elaboration of theological questions (or, of what he considers as *the* theological question) in no way exhausts that which, from theology, plays out in his work; simply, it is played out in other sites, under other aspects. It is these aspects that are worth listing and questioning. If Heidegger, who observed such a striking silence on the subject of the Hebraic cluster, is nevertheless in relation with it, then this relation is necessarily secret, caricatural. And

it is up to us to disentangle the double skein of the intrigue: we have to show the imprint of the Old Testament heritage on Heidegger's thought, and correlatively, we must show how Heidegger's thought dissimulates this heritage.<sup>17</sup>

But from whom do we get the possibility of such a reading, if not from Heidegger himself? To measure the impact of the Greek morning upon metaphysics, Heidegger did not question—in any case, not in the first place—what metaphysics has said explicitly about the Presocratics. He sought that which betrayed the secret presence and weight of a forgotten “morning,” in what metaphysics said about itself (that is, at the same time, by itself and about itself).

Out of fidelity to such a method, I will not take as my basis for this inquiry those themes that are unfailingly called forth the moment we approach the relation between Heidegger and what touches “religion,” proximally or distantly. Examples include the question of onto-theology, the relationship of Being to God, or the alternative faith or thinking. I will on the contrary engage in questions that are apparently foreign to the problem that interests us. It is only after having explored these questions that it will be possible to return to the elements that in Heidegger's work are destined to respond directly to our interrogation, elements that we will have the chance, thereafter, to read otherwise.<sup>18</sup> That is to say that the principle, consisting in questioning the text indirectly, shall lead me to adopt a course wholly made up of meanderings and detours. It is worth presenting that course here briefly.

#### IV. Outline

I will proceed in several stages. In Part I (“Readings”), I will present the elements of the debate, placing side by side certain positions adopted by Heidegger and those positions one may consider to be Hebraic. To situate the framework better, I will first recall the rule of reading or interpretation [*règle de lecture*] that allows Heidegger to make the separation, within the fundamental options of the West, between an experience said to be “originary” and conceptions called “derived” (Chapter 1). Once this rule is clearly set forth, we should no doubt be able to show that it structures the presentation of all the questions that Heidegger treats. Given the impossi-

bility of engaging myself in an exhaustive examination, I will consider two, particularly central, questions: the question of language (Chapter 2) and that of thinking (Chapter 3). I will then examine how Heidegger justifies attributing to the Greek text alone this experience called original, which will lead me to present his theory of interpretation (Chapter 4).

But over the course of these chapters I will also have shown that language, thinking, and interpretation are themselves the object, if not of conceptions, then at least of determinate experiences in the Hebraico-biblical tradition, and that these experiences present close analogies with those which Heidegger credits to the first Greek texts. The entirety of this first part shall lead us to ask whether that which Heidegger takes in charge in his own thinking, to which he assigns the status of the unthought in the Greek text, might not carry the imprint of another text and perhaps of another thinking, themselves never called forth as such.

In Part II ("Problems"), I will set forth—as the title indicates—the various problems raised by the convergence noted in the preceding chapters. I will do this as I attempt to open paths for their elaboration (certain of which will keep the status of hypotheses). Thus I will consider in Chapter 1 the question of Being—a question that apparently presents the greatest difference with the Hebraic positions, but which shall here be interrogated from the perspective of its renewal by Heidegger—and of the conditions for such a renewal. But if the impact of the Hebraic and Vetrotestamentary cluster can be detected in Heidegger's thought, even in those questions most properly his own (which seem also to be the most Greek), then it is appropriate to ask how this impact works in his texts, that is, through what paths is its transmission brought about? This question will lead me to interrogate the relationship of the young Heidegger to theology, such as it may appear in light of the first courses of Freiburg (Chapter 2). Once these different points of view are illuminated, it will be possible to open a larger debate about the place occupied by the Hebraic heritage in Western thought: a place to be delimited not independently of Heidegger's work, but, on the contrary, in terms of the use to which his work has put it (Chapter 3).

To close, we shall have to return to the Heideggerian reading of history, with which this study began, for a reading that can now appear in its problematic character ("Conclusion").