INTRODUCTION

OVER THE LAST DECADES, pious Muslims all over the world have been going through deep and contradictory transformations. Public attention has focused on some Muslims' turn to violence and their cry for military jihad, ignoring more widely shared changes among the population. A personal story of transformation exemplifies another experience. When I met Yasin in 2000, he was a forty-year-old radical Islamist shopkeeper. He had been one of the leaders of Islamist[1] street action in his poor urban district in the 1990s. This district, Sultanbeyli, was at the forefront of Islamization in Istanbul during that decade. Yasin frequently went to unregistered, radical mosques for Friday sermons. Visitors took off their shoes in front of his office (to keep the environment clean and ready for ritual observance). He performed daily prayers regularly, together with partners and customers. Yasin, along with his partners and friends, did not support the (mainstream Islamist) Virtue Party (FP), which he found too submissive, cowardly, somewhat nationalistic, and obedient to the state. He was deeply committed to global Islamic unity and saw the Turkish nation-state as an artificial impediment.

When I was a newcomer in his district, I told Yasin I had heard that there were many Nur students (or Nurcus)[2] in the district. He heartily laughed at this suggestion and said, "How can there be Nur students in a district where the Islamists are so strong?" Only an outsider like me could believe that there could be any followers of this pro-state, Turkish nationalist, pro-Western, and capitalist Islamic group in Sultanbeyli. My ignorance deeply embarrassed me.

When I visited Yasin again in 2006, he had started to attend the seminars of the Nurcus. He argued that this was the only Islamic movement that had a

"systematic" way of working and therefore would survive in the long run. Indeed, various Nurcu groups had become the most active circles in Sultanbeyli. Moreover, Yasin no longer went to radical, unregistered mosques, and he now said, "Confrontational environments are not good. We have to think with sound reason [*akl-ı selim olmamız lazım*]. This is better for every sector of society." Shoes were no longer removed outside his office and he had started to perform his daily prayers in the mosque across the street rather than in his workplace. He upheld the Turkish nation-state and said it served Islam better than any other state in the Middle East. He deeply regretted the past decade of activism and said:

> Back then, there was a movement against the system, but it had no real content. It was not based on science and knowledge. Now [pious] Muslims think much more systematically. They have a broader horizon. They also learned how to respect other people's rights. Imposing Islam is not right anyway. They have learned all of these and they are in a better position to rule the country.

He supported a recently established conservative party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an organization on much more favorable terms with the state than the FP. The AKP, which had come to power after the 2002 general elections, represented for him the emergent science-oriented, systematic, and tolerant Muslims. He also praised the AKP's economic policies, thanks to which his once humble business was booming. Yasin was still strictly observant. He did not miss his prayers. He still wore the loose pants that allowed him to pray during working hours. His clothes did not reveal the contours of his body, a sign of Islamic humility. He still had his rounded beard modeled after that of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, he had spatially separated ritual observance and work. He spoke in a less excited tone, more calmly, especially about politics and religion. He emphasized political calculation over political correctness.

This rationalization and partial secularization is emblematic of the change Islamists in Turkey are going through. By analyzing the transformation of Islamists in a previously radical district and the relationship of this change to the AKP, I will demonstrate how this rationalization of religion was not simply the end result of an inevitable world-historical trend (as a Weberian might think)[3] but an outcome of contingent political struggles.

MODERATE ISLAM: SPONTANEOUS RATIONALIZATION
OR HEGEMONIC STRATEGY?

Especially after the attacks of 9/11, public opinion in the West identified Islamic politics with radical challenges against the world system. Analysts pointed out a long history of revolutionary mobilization within national borders, which after the 1990s globalized into a world movement (Kepel 2002). This history was characterized by authoritarianism, social protectionism, and at least a rhetorical anticapitalism (Abrahamian 1991; Burke 1998; Fischer 1982; Zubaida 1989). However, in many parts of the Muslim world, Islamic politics started with such radicalism but evolved in a market-oriented, at least partially democratic, and sometimes even pro-Western direction. Scholars and policy makers have taken note of this alternative trend and labeled it "moderate Islam." While some have taken this as a completely distinct phenomenon, others have recognized that market-oriented Islamic politics in most cases have their roots in radical Islamism. Scholars have tended to treat this transformation of radical movements into prosystem movements as a healthy evolution, a learning process, adaptation, rationalization, cooperation, secularization, and democratization (Çavdar 2006; Çınar 2006; Esposito and Voll 1996; Moaddel 2004; Nasr 2005; Robinson 1997; Turam 2007). Instead, I treat this process as the *constitution of hegemony* and the *absorption of radicalism.*

There are certainly traditions of liberal and modernist religion in the Muslim world, especially starting from the nineteenth century on (Kurzman 1998; Moaddel 2005). However, the contemporary wave of moderate Islam cannot be taken as just another step toward this religion's ultimate liberalization. It is not continuity with these traditions that has empowered moderate Islam in countries such as Turkey.[4] It is rather the mobilization of broad sectors under the banner of radicalizing Islam, the subsequent defeat of radicalism, and the radicals' strategic (yet internalized) change of track after the defeat. These ex-radicals might be the heirs of the liberal Islam of the nineteenth century, but it is their previous radicalism and past experience with populist mobilization that allows them to naturalize modernized Islam among the masses. Without this defeated mobilization, moderate Islam would neither have its loyal followers nor its ardent leaders today.

In this book, I use the Gramscian concept of "passive revolution" to study this process of absorption. Passive revolution is one of the convoluted, and

sometimes unintended, ways by which the dominant sectors establish willing consent ("hegemony") for their rule. Different from classic revolutions (as in the French, Russian, and Chinese cases) where an emergent dominant class attempts to sweep away the old dominant classes and their institutions through mass mobilization, in a passive revolution popular sectors are mobilized with revolutionary discourses and strategies only to reinforce existing patterns of domination.[5] I contend that moderate Islam is the culmination of a long process of passive revolution as a result of which erstwhile radicals and their followers are brought into the fold of neoliberalism, secularism, and Western domination. Today, the effective leaders of moderate Islam are not those who have always been liberal Muslims, but they are those who have fought against neoliberalism, secularism, and U.S. hegemony for decades, only to deliver their experiences to the service of their past enemies in the end.

The analysis of moderate Islam also contributes to our understanding of transition to market economies. Critics of neoliberalism draw attention to the social sectors that it inevitably excludes. It follows that neoliberalization will lead to major clashes between the haves and have-nots, except when social conflict is violently repressed. As the regulation mechanisms of the twentieth century (such as the welfare state) are now discarded, what on earth can appease the wrath of the excluded? Some might pose identity politics as a way out (Harvey 2005). But what if whole populations were mobilized against neoliberalization only to be brought back under its spell? What if controlled popular initiative became the main political engine of neoliberalization? Passive revolution is indeed a viable, even if unstable, route to a market economy.

The goal of this book is not simply to analyze Islamic politics but to develop our understanding of sociopolitical radicalism in general. While the empirical material of this book is about a religious challenge against the system,[6] my more general interest is in how radical attacks against the reigning order come into being, how activists organize them in the process of changing their own and others' lives, and how the system survives after sustained challenges. In this regard, this is not a book solely about Islamism but about how revolutionary movements are mobilized and ultimately absorbed.

ABSORPTION OF AN ANTISECULAR CHALLENGE

Today, many in the Western as well as the Islamic world enthusiastically embrace the AKP. This party seems to be the only Islamic political actor that gets

the approval of both the West and Muslims worldwide. U.S. newspapers such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, prominent German newspapers such as *die Welt*, and officials of the European Union point it out to other Islamic movements as a democratic example to follow.[7] At the same time, while the party's Islamic acceptance is not universal (Çavdar 2006), Malaysia's most remarkable Islamic activist Anwar Ibrahim, as well as the Palestinian movement Hamas, declare that they take the AKP as their model. However, what is at stake in the AKP experience is not simply a marriage of Islam and secularism, of religion and democracy, of East and West, but the absorption of a radical challenge against the system, which we can only understand in the context of Turkish Islamism's development over the last century.

The last decades of the Ottoman Empire witnessed an Islamic movement organized in political parties, newspapers, magazines, and associations. After Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish Republic in 1923, all Islamic circles were disbanded. Let alone permitting any activism, the state suppressed basic Islamic education by unofficial actors in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1950s and 1960s, Islamic activists started to organize again in communities, informal networks, magazines, publication houses, and fringe political parties. It was at the end of the 1960s that they decisively came together under the roof of an Islamist mass party.

After Necmettin Erbakan's election to the parliament as an independent candidate, Islamists established the Milli Order Party (MNP). Even the title of the party, along with the name of its ideology (Milli Outlook), expressed a deep ambivalence. In early Islamic usage, *millet* (the noun for *milli*), a Kur'anic term, designated Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups. It referred in the Ottoman social system to religious communities with distinct administrative structures and legal systems (Lewis 1988). As there was nothing in local language to refer to "the nation," nationalists appropriated the term *milli* in the nineteenth century and started to use it as an equivalent of the word *national*. The Milli Outlook movement, born in the late 1960s, utilized the ambivalence of this term to appeal to the religious feelings of its audience in a country where the only officially legitimate collective identity had become Turkish nationality. Were the Islamists reproducing the already hegemonic nationalist ideology, or were they making use of the multivalance of the word *milli* to establish a radical Islamist line? Was this a system party or a revolutionary one? In the following decades, these questions plagued not only the guardians of the secular state but also Islamic activists who had doubts about the party's

ideological sincerity. The secularist courts closed the party down in 1971 and the party resurfaced under a new name, a pattern that was to be repeated several times in the next thirty-five years (see Table 2.1 for the Islamist parties' changing names and positions over the years).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the party again ambivalently and implicitly alluded to both Islamic traditions and modern social justice struggles with its new name, the Refah Party (RP). (Refah means prosperity or welfare.) Those who wanted to see Islam in the party read this word as a part of traditional Islamic vocabulary. Those who wanted to see in the party the promise of a new world—an exploding class of informal workers[8] and many converts from the Left—saw an insinuation of the welfare state in this new name. While for some the party's new platform (the Just Order, see Chapter 2) signified radical redistribution, for others it was a metaphor for Islamic law. While the party said it would develop a market economy, it also promised market regulation, redistribution, unionization, and the eradication of poverty.

Ambivalence had its misfortunes. Already in the early 1990s, pious entrepreneurs (represented by MÜSİAD, the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) raised eyebrows over what they saw to be impractical economic promises in the party's program, while some radical Islamist groups stayed away from the party, accusing it of a lack of clarity in its Islamic and egalitarian demands. Despite all this, the party appealed to broad masses during these decades. It had millions of members in the mid-1990s. Islamic lifestyles gained force with the party's ascent, as symbolized most of all with the increasing number of women who donned the veil.

After election victories in 1994 and 1995, the Islamist party had a chance to apply its program in the municipalities and a coalition government. The party's municipal efficiency increased its popularity. Although it is still questionable whether the party really constituted a challenge to the secular system, the secularist military interpreted its policies as a major threat and intervened to remove the RP at the end of the 1990s. After this intervention, the Islamist party underwent a few tumultuous years, at the end of which a new generation of leaders split the party to establish the AKP, while the old leaders founded the Felicity Party. The AKP leaders attempted to remove any ambivalence and market the party as a secular, pro-state, pro-Western, and procapitalist organization.

While the staunch secularists were still not convinced, liberal businessmen, intellectuals, and academics in Turkey—and many liberals in the West—became enthusiastic supporters. Interestingly, many informal workers and

Islamic activists believed, just like the rigid secularists, that there was conti-
nuity between the Islamist party and the AKP rather than a break; but they also
gave up the demand of an Islamic state. Combining the power of the new secular
supporters and the old Islamist supporters resulted in a major election victory in
2002 and a one-party government, which Turkey had not seen since 1991.

The economy boomed under the AKP government, and the party turned
out to be the most successful privatizer of public companies. Unemployment
and poverty peaked, but the informal workers remained unshakable sup-
porters. Many scholars and journalists have interpreted this process as one of
rationalization. However, the ambivalences in Turkish Islamism's history, the
indecisive mobilizations, and the still persisting contradictions lead me to
read this transition as a passive revolution. Islamism had mobilized activists
and workers, and the AKP appropriated this mobilization to reinforce neolib-
eralization in Turkey.

During five years of AKP rule, Islamist street action came to an end. The
ratio of people who said they want an Islamic state decreased from around 20
percent throughout the 1990s to 9 percent in 2006 (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006).
At the same time, practicing Muslim men who had not been allowed to oc-
cupy high offices before became a part of the ruling elite. Such a thorough
change in such a short period of time requires explanation. Why would street
action stop just when it could be most effective by making use of the emer-
gence of sympathetic elites? Why would Islamists abandon the demand of an
Islamic state? This book will reveal the dynamics of this massive social change
by studying how the AKP changed people's everyday lives and their relations
to politics.

The AKP government poses yet more conundrums for scholarly analysis.
The first three years of AKP rule were a liberal's dream. The party passed many
democratic reforms, recognized the existence of minorities hitherto rejected
by official discourse, and liberalized the political system. Consequently, the lib-
eral intelligentsia remained enthusiastic supporters of the party well into 2005.
The indecision of the intellectuals after that point is more readily interpreta-
ble, but the position of informal workers is confusing at first sight. While the
AKP slowed down democratic reforms by mid-2005, until the last days of its
first mandate it maintained market reforms. Despite increasing unemploy-
ment and poverty, there was no massive popular resistance to the govern-
ment—street action remained restricted to leftist unions, which were already
mobilized in the previous decades. The puzzle of this book is: Why did the

activists and popular sectors, who had until that point supported the religious and anti–free market platform of the Islamist party, wholeheartedly embrace the AKP government?

I argue that the pious business community has established hegemony, that is, it has made its vision the vision of pious popular sectors and activists, through the AKP. Almost all Islamists have come to the conservative position of the MÜSİAD: support for unfettered markets, integration with the international business community, deregulation, privatization, and emphasis on a conservative morality (deemed to be universal). They no longer emphasize what differentiates Islam from other religions and secularism.[9] Yet, this is not only MÜSİAD's hegemony but also that of the existing dominant sectors in Turkey and abroad.

The crux of the AKP's passive revolution was its uneven appropriation of Islamist strategies, which it put to the use of non-Islamist causes. This argument is based on the theoretical framework built in Chapter 1, where I hold that hegemony is established on the interface between civil society and political society. Over the preceding decades, Islamists had developed communities, informal networks, and associations that they linked to the political party to mobilize and politicize millions of people. That is, in the terminology of this book, they had been successful in linking "civil society" (networks that regulate everyday life, social space, and people's relation to the economy) to "political society" (leadership that constitutes authority and unity), at least initially. Yet, they failed in making the final leap of either integrating civil society and political society to the state or capturing the state through the combined movement of radical civil society and political society. The AKP, in turn, learned innovative ways of linking civil society and political society from past Islamist experience, yet at the same time made use of openings in the system to integrate the pious masses to the secular state.

So, does the AKP's success mean that Islamic radicalism is dead after the passive revolution? Not really. Earlier, Yasin was introduced as an "ex-radical." Yet, my interactions with him on other occasions raised doubts. A couple of times, when the military cornered the AKP government, he shared his misgivings with me: "In the 1980s, Sayyid Qutb's[10] writings had convinced us that nothing could be done via the political party. Then with the AKP, we saw that this was wrong. But now, I again started to think that Qutb might have been right." Several days after this conversation, when the storm abated, Yasin was again assured of the AKP's path. Many other people in the district fluctuated

similarly. Can radical Islamists make use of such oscillations in the future and again mount a challenge against the system?

Other observations suggest that one kind of Islamism stands little chance, but radicals are in the process of finding new ways. One spring afternoon in Yasin's office, several men collectively read an article about interreligious dialogue from an Islamist magazine. Each one read aloud half a page and then passed the magazine to the next reader. After they were done reading, they discussed the issues raised by the author. Toward the end of the discussion, Rasim (a forty-five-year-old publicly employed engineer with a thin mustache)[11] walked in. He had in his hand the brochure of the newly established Family Association, an organization that focused on strengthening Islamic culture among the youth. This association was affiliated with the X group (see Chapters 3 and 5), which had shifted from armed struggle to focusing on associations after the 1997 military intervention.[12] The group still desired an Islamic revolution, but its members now thought that this could not happen for several decades. They supported the AKP, which they believed would strengthen associations, but did not join the party as members.

While Rasim was trying to get some funding from Yasin for the association, Vecdi started to criticize the brochure as soon as he saw it, for it did not "have enough Islamic references in it, and [was] therefore subservient to the system." Vecdi was a member of the now weakened mainstream Islamist organization, the Felicity Party (SP), which was composed of Erbakan loyalists critical of the AKP's liberalized Islamic politics. Twenty-nine years old, he was a fiery, round-bearded, tall, and plump economics student at a provincial university. He knew nothing about the association and its affiliation. Rasim was angry but expressed his anger in very soft words: "One needs to speak with information, but you're expressing only groundless suspicions [*vehim*]." Vecdi walked out angrily, hastily came back in, and asked whether Rasim was engaged in this activity under the banner of the AKP. This time, Rasim just laughed and dismissed him. After that, Vecdi sat with us and tried to understand what the association was up to, while intermittently propagating the line of his party.

As was usual with political debates in Yasin's workplace, the conversation went on for hours. In the evening, a bearded, middle-aged man from the SP came and asked Yasin whether he would become a member. Yasin laughed and said: "First explain yourself to me. I cannot be a member for nothing. What do you want to do politically?" The man went back to the party headquarters, came back with a membership application, sat down, and said:

Euzubillahimineşşeytanirracim. Bismillahirahmanirrahim.[13] This struggle
  has been going on ever since Adam, peace be upon him.
Vecdi: No, don't stretch that far back in history, start with Muhammad.
Yasin (laughing again): You cannot form a unity even among yourselves,
  how can you invite me to the party? First reach a decision about where
  you want to start, and then come to me.

The middle-aged man was discouraged and left the room. In a second, the SP's
local president also came and shook our hands (a daily, ritualistic renewing
of links with district tradesmen that local politicians resort to) and then went
to the party headquarters. Vecdi followed the president. After they left, Rasim
criticized the organizational style of the SP:

They are still trying to do it with emotions. But people will no longer
  come to these words. People expect concrete solutions to their
  problems. They want a scientific approach.
Yasin: Everybody is curious about what politicians think about the
  economy. They want concrete solutions about the economy. You can
  no longer attract people only by religion. We are all Muslims anyway.

Here, the SP members and Rasim had clear positions. The former were carry-
ing out old-style, solemn Islamic politics (which is heavy on emotions and
religious references), while the latter was engaging in what I will later analyze
as a "war of position" against the secular system. Yasin, no longer affiliated to
any organization but the AKP, disclosed many radical aspirations. But, de-
spite his emphasis on being "systematic" (acting based on broad and long-
term projects informed by science and knowledge), he had no program or plan
for realizing these. Whether those like Yasin will indeed remain within the
fold or one day again rise up against the system ultimately depends on the
struggles between and within the SP, the AKP, and radical Islamic circles. In
this text, I analyze the historical determinants as well as the emerging param-
eters of these struggles.

AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF ISLAMISM

I studied the transition from Islamism to (economically) liberal and (cultur-
ally) conservative Islam in a squatter-majority district. Sultanbeyli, on the
eastern border of Istanbul, was an arch-experiment for Turkish Islamists.
Leftist movements have tried local experiments and diffused them as models
before. A particularly apt comparison is to the Brazilian Left's model commu-

nity of Porto Alegre. Just as Porto Alegre became the model to follow for left-ists, Sultanbeyli set the example of an Islamist locality all over Turkey and beyond. Porto Alegre was a paragon of redistribution and participatory de-mocracy, Sultanbeyli of Islamic purification and redistribution. Contrary to the trajectory of Porto Alegre, Sultanbeyli became the model of vice for pious Muslims as the pious traveled ideologically from populism to neoliberalism. While studying Porto Alegre reveals the gains and limits of participatory de-mocracy for new leftist politics (Baiocchi 2005), studying Sultanbeyli uncov-ers the basic dynamics of the massive transition from Islamic radicalism to free market conservatism.

I first analyzed Islamic politics in Sultanbeyli between 2000 and 2002. Back then, Islamic politics were identified with the mainstream Islamist party FP, which had total control of the Sultanbeyli municipality. The AKP had neither come to power in Turkey nor established a functioning headquarters in the district. I taught at a secular primary school in 2000 and 2001, which allowed me to build contacts in neighborhoods, political parties, the munici-pality, and mosques. Even though I was honest about collecting data for my project, I also came to be known as a teacher of the district—*hoca* in the ver-nacular, which people in Turkey use to refer to teachers, imams, and spiritual leaders. Being a hoca allowed me to build trust, partially balancing the suspi-cions raised by my status as a student at a U.S. university.

My research at this time revolved around the question of how Islamists interacted with the urban poor. Through participant observation at the local municipality, the local headquarters of political parties, mosques, coffee-houses, religious teahouses, homes, associations, educational institutions (secu-lar schools, clerical schools, theological seminaries [*medreses*], and Kur'an schools), rallies, street protests, and other Islamic activities in the district from the summer of 2000 to the summer of 2002, I collected material on reli-gious beliefs, rituals, and interactions between Islamic activists and the people. I supplemented this ethnographic experience with fifty semi-structured, in-depth interviews.

By 2006, Sultanbeyli had become the ideal place for studying different patterns of Islamization over the decades (including the transition from Isla-mism to conservatism). In the 2002 general elections and 2004 municipal elections, which both occurred after my first visit to the district, the area's pop-ulation shifted from support for Islamist parties to the AKP. Once the fortress of Islamism nationwide, it eventually ended up as just another conservative

district. This was the local expression of a massive nationwide transformation (the entrenchment of democratic, pious Muslim rule), arguably comparable in significance to the change Turkey underwent in the 1920s.[14] This led me to revisit the district and collect data on politics and religion at the same sites to unravel the meaning of this transformation. In this part of the study, while focusing again on participant observation, I collected an additional forty semi-structured, in-depth interviews.

In line with the argument of this book, I have focused on the minute details of everyday life in their relations to politics and religion to study the establishment of hegemony. Therefore, participant observation constitutes the core of the text. Together with this theoretical lens that led me to participant observation, methodological discussions regarding the extended case method also inspired me to carry out an ethnography rather than a large-N study. The latter would allow generalizability rather than theory reconstruction (Burawoy et al. 1991), which is the goal of this book. The extended case method emphasizes researcher engagement over detachment, process and context over reliability and replicability, and theory reconstruction over representativeness (Burawoy 1998). It is based on observing how the same norms and rules are employed differently over time and in different situations, extending out from the micro to the macro, and observing how locals relate to outside forces and how external, global forces impose themselves upon the locals, who in turn resist and/or negotiate these forces (Burawoy 2000, 2003). The extended case method enables the researcher to draw conclusions about general processes even when the unit of analysis is only one case, as she starts with weak spots, gaps, and anomalies in theoretical knowledge and uses her field notes to reconstruct (rather than invent) theory (Baiocchi 2005, 165).

One such theoretical gap this book hopes to fill concerns the politics of absorption. My revisit to Sultanbeyli uncovered a sort of social change that is not adequately understood, either by scholars or by the larger public. To the unsuspecting eye, the de-Islamization in Sultanbeyli could appear as a "cooptation" of Islamists such as Yasin or their "rationalization." When people switch from radical to centrist ideologies, scholars and journalists usually resort to these tropes. However, the conversion from Islamism to conservatism I observed in Sultanbeyli was much more complex than that. True, Islamists no longer challenged the system head-on, but their participation also transformed institutions without overthrowing the existing elite and the secular system. Our political vocabulary can hardly make sense of this kind of change.

Therefore, public opinion (both in Turkey and in the West) was caught in a simple dichotomy: Are the Turkish Islamists hiding their real agenda or have they really changed and become regular conservatives?[15] The theory of passive revolution developed throughout this book will demonstrate that this is the wrong question to pose.

As stated above, the extended case method also emphasizes the uniqueness of cases rather than their representativeness. Sultanbeyli is informative not because it is a microcosm of Turkey (let alone the Islamic world) but because it was significant in the heyday of Islamism due to its role as a model, and it has now lost that status with the absorption of Islamism. Subsequently, the district has displayed different trends when compared to other Islamic strongholds such as Istanbul's historic district Fatih, the Central Anatolian city Konya, and newly Islamizing provincial cities in western Anatolia such as Denizli. Sultanbeyli contrasts with these cases by virtue of undergoing Islamization when the movement was expanding in the 1980s and 1990s (unlike the already Islamic Fatih and Konya and the erstwhile secular Denizli) and then de-Islamizing but remaining conservative when the movement started to emphasize conservatism over Islam (as opposed to Fatih and Konya where everyday life changed only slightly and Denizli,[16] which is now becoming more religiously conservative). The logic of focusing on this unique case is to reconstruct theory rather than tell a representative story that is meant to exhaust all Islamic experience.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

While the first and last chapters of the book put the transition from Islamism to conservatism in theoretical and comparative perspective, the chapters in between provide detailed historical and ethnographic accounts of this change. In Chapter 1, the theoretical models that scholars have generally used in analyzing Islamic politics are discussed. The shortfalls of these analyses have to do with the problematic theoretical tools used. I propose a hegemonic theory of politics as an alternative to modernization, political economic, social movement, and civil society approaches to Islamism. By discussing and rethinking concepts such as hegemony, civil society, political society, and passive revolution, this chapter points out what the theory of hegemony can gain from integrating theories of everyday life, space, and authority.

Chapter 2 contains an outline of the way the secular state and Islamic challenge in Turkey have historically developed based on the theoretical framework

of Chapter 1. This chapter, as well as the other empirical chapters of the book, is structured as an analysis of how political society (with its political leadership, constitution of authority patterns, and visions of political unity) and civil society (with its regulation of everyday life, social space, and relations to the economy) change from one episode of the republic to the next, and from one hegemonic project to the other. The chapter sets the global, national, and historical context for the ethnographic analysis to follow.

Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the development of political society and civil society in Sultanbeyli in their interaction with Islamism's transformations, from the 1980s until 2002. Chapter 3 is an analysis of political society's role in the rise and fall of the Islamist movement. I study in this chapter the political leadership, authority structures, and visions of political unity that the Islamists counterposed to those of the secularists. The Islamist political party and the municipality under its control started to take over the tasks of the state (legal negotiation, welfare provision, etc.), thereby instituting "dual power" in the district—a situation where alternative institutions of power constitute an incipient second state alongside the existing one. Their partial success in this endeavor was based on an immense political organization (temporarily) interwoven with civil society and the zeal of the absorbed radicals. Yet, the Islamist leaders could not offer proper visions and practices of unity to the district's residents and could not overcome the Turkish-Kurdish divide. This proved to be Islamism's soft underbelly.

Chapter 4 focuses on civil society and traces changes in everyday life, use of social space, and relations to the economy in Sultanbeyli between the 1980s and 2002. It aims to demonstrate how Islamist associations, networks, and parties regulated people's lives, attempting to institute alternative lifestyles, places, and economic relations. The common theme of this chapter is "integral (*tevhidi*) religion," an all-encompassing Islam (which the Islamists wanted to render the "normal way of things," but failed).

The following two chapters discuss how neoliberal conservatism appropriated bits and pieces of Islamic political society and civil society after 2002 to reinstitute the linkages of economy, civil society, political society, and the state. Chapter 5 studies how the AKP destroyed the remnants of dual power in Sultanbeyli to peacefully relink society and state. The chapter demonstrates that both this relinkage, and the neoliberals' successful naturalization of capitalism, was an outcome of the absorption of Islamist cadres and strategies into the AKP. However, two challenges still troubled the passive revolution: (1)

the AKP could not build unity across the ethnic chasm, and (2) while some previous radicals had more or less quit Islamism, and those who hung onto old-style Islamism were quite ineffective, there were innovative radical groups that made use of democratization to rebuild "integral religion."

Chapter 6 is about the AKP's creative combinations of de-Islamization with Islamization in lifestyles, space, and the economy. These combinations successfully naturalized market relations among broad sectors. Emphasizing the role of political society, Chapters 4 and 6 stress that political leadership was quite active in civil society and interacted with it to regulate everyday life, space, and people's relations to the economy.

The Conclusion explores how the proposed model of hegemonic politics can be used to study other cases of Islamism. The theorization of passive revolution, embarked on in Chapter 1, is finalized through these analyses. The chapter compares Turkey with Egypt and Iran. It shows how variations in the way political society has developed can account for their different regimes. Due to differences in hegemonic strategies, only the Turkish Islamic mobilization culminated in a passive revolution.