1 Introduction

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IN AUGUST 2001, during a vacation in Maine, I was thinking about a paradox. The United States of America, the country most strongly fostering globalization in the economic terms of the free market, is on many counts pursuing other policies that are antiglobal in their essence. Thus, the most powerful actor on the global stage seems resolutely determined not to live in the world it is helping to create through globalization.

Questions kept bounding forth: What are the roots in America's past that might explain this paradox? What are the pulls and the pushes toward and away from the country's participation in the new global society? What are the parts of globalization that America embraces and rejects? And what changes have occurred in the relationship of attraction and repulsion? Answering such questions meant going deep into the American past while also achieving a better understanding of globalization and its history than seemed readily at hand. This was exactly the task undertaken for the past decade by some of my colleagues and me under the heading of the New Global History (NGH) Initiative.[1] Could the questions about the paradox and the historical inquiry into present-day globalization fruitfully be brought together?

At Yale University in 2001, there was a newly created Center for the Study of Globalization. Its director was Strobe Talbott, former deputy secretary of state in the Clinton administration. We had talked earlier about a possible collaboration between his center and the NGH Initiative. I shared my reflections with him and asked whether this might be a proper topic for our joint efforts. He replied in the affirmative.

Then came September 11, 2001. The events of that day highlighted the importance of the project. America was made poignantly aware that it was, like it or not, part of the global society it was helping to bring about. That event pushed the George W. Bush administration into a partial reversal of its position of disengaging from the world, put forward when it first took power. Now it found itself deliberately on a path to what many have called "empire." In turn, our project was no longer merely a scholarly inquiry. It took on tones of urgency and political significance. It is in this overall context that the authors represented in this book set out to fulfill their assignments.

The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and the NGH Initiative held a joint conference that ran for three and a half days, from October 30 to November 2, 2003. About thirty scholars and policy people participated, with about a third presenting papers, a similar number commenting on them, and the remainder participating in the general discussion. The framework was provided by the NGH Initiative and its previous work.

The NGH Initiative starts from the contemporary phenomenon of globalization, seen as a process, and seeks to understand it from an interdisciplinary, historical perspective. The starting point for the initiative resides in a number of basic facts of our times: a step into space, with its view of "Spaceship Earth"; satellites, making instantaneous communication possible; multinationals; human rights; nuclear weapons; environmental problems; and so forth. These factors, and others like them, transcend national boundaries, though not doing away with the nation-state, and interrelate with one another in unprecedented synchronicity and synergy. One result is a proposed new periodization, a "global epoch," which some date from the 1950s, others from the 1970s.

1

In field after field, efforts have gotten underway in the past few decades to grapple with globalization. Economic historians early on sought to reduce the phenomenon to the expansion of markets. International relations people either disregarded it at first or tried to tuck it into their field in terms of their concerns with governance and security. Sociologists and anthropologists emphasized the roles of social relations and of culture, respectively. Some crossovers took place, for example, by combining the perspectives of international relations, religion, and sociology. Policymakers and planners, of course, recognized the subject as important and tended to approach it from a practical and instrumental viewpoint.

What stands out is the use of disciplinary scissors to cut up the topic into arguably appropriate pieces. The diverse students of globalization tend to exist as if on separate planets. Open any journal of economic history, international relations, sociology, or anthropology, for example, and you will find scores of articles on globalization, but they always have their own preferred set of terms, their own references, their own central foci that are very much unlike those of other disciplines in the social sciences.

Where in all of this do we find the discipline, per se, of history? The fact is that Clio, the muse of history, seems to have been a latecomer. Most history is rooted in national history, which discourages an interest in globalization. We must add, of course, that so are all the other social science disciplines, whose origins date in general from the late eighteenth century in the West, at the time when industrialized national and nationalistic societies began to dominate the scene. It is not, therefore, that history is unique in being challenged by the emergence of present-day globalization, requiring its practitioners to rethink some of its most basic conceptions; its uniqueness lies in the fact that the very organization of the field in the last few centuries has been pronouncedly in terms of the nation-state. Much of history's activity, in fact, during this time has been to serve the state and provide an ideological past and a sense of identity confirming its exemplary nationhood. American history has been a shining example of this sort of service.

Yet history, particularly American history, has experienced the globalization currents that have been foaming around the nation-state. To touch briefly on what is more developed in Chapter 2, the first series of shocks took the form, after the end of World War II, of a retreat from the Eurocentric view that had hitherto prevailed. World history gradually became a recognizable and acceptable subject. Somewhat ill-defined and with an unclear research agenda, it nevertheless tries to use a wide-angle lens that sees more than just national histories. Its preferred subjects are civilizations and empires, or else less formally arranged groups of people subject to transcending forces such as disease or climate change. At its outermost reach, it often uses the synonyms "global" and "universal" for "world."

This is a stretch, but in the right direction. This direction was further developed by what is best called global history, where the particular strands in world history that are concerned with what can be called globalization are singled out for study. In global history, one could go back to the hunter-gatherers thousands of years ago and their drifting across the globe, and then to more

recent concentrated bursts such as the Silk Road, the age of discovery in the Renaissance, or more contemporary instances such as the nineteenth-century British Empire. Such work places the present phase of globalization in proper perspective.

One result has been that American history has not been immune from globalization. Increasingly, American historians have been urged to place their country's origins in a globalizing frame, first shaped in the fifteenth-century discoveries; in the economic movements of the eighteenth century, especially slavery and the plantation system; in an Atlantic setting; and so on into the imperialism of the nineteenth century and the world wars of the twentieth century. A "revolution" has been hovering over American studies, preparatory to plunging them into the world of globalization.[2]

This is the situation surrounding the paradox at the core of this volume. The world's most powerful global actor *is* slowly becoming aware that, from its beginning, it has been part of the rest of the world, that now it is a primary actor in helping to create a globalized society, and that it needs to adjust to life in it. This awareness, I am arguing, is mirrored in the state of the discipline of history, forced to readjust its nationalist image and to see itself in a broader context. Neither the country nor the discipline is entirely happy—in fact, often quite the opposite. It is not only "traditional" societies that are uneasy about facing the upsetting processes of globalization but also the so-called most advanced nation in the world. In this context, history is the one social science that potentially can take a holistic view of what is happening, transcending the boundaries of economics, sociology, anthropology, and so forth. Thus, history, having been part of the problem, can now also see itself as an emancipating force.

2

What is the globalization of which we speak? The first point to make is that it is a highly politicized term, invoking much passion and making "cool" scholarship difficult. The next thing to say is that it is a very complex and complicated process, manifesting itself differently over time. The last thing to add in this preliminary pass at its definition is that it is a contested term. Though I will offer a number of different definitions, the essential definition of globalization lies exactly in its contestation, the arguments that swirl about its nature and meaning.

As I have noted, historians of globalization see it as having moved through various phases over time. Accepting this as true, some historians (among

whom I number myself) have sought to focus on the study of present-day globalization. Defined as emerging in post–World War II developments, this globalization requires us to put forth a new periodization: ours is a "global epoch." As suggested earlier, it also presents us with dating problems: when does it manifest itself in recognizable terms? The 1950s? The 1970s? The 1990s?

But what is this "it," globalization? A few preliminary references can help us here. In conventional economic and political discourse, globalization equals the extension of the free market. To accept this definition as globalization *tout court* is, however, to accept the artificial boundaries of the existing disciplines. It is to embrace the view that, in actuality, economics is divorced from, for example, politics and culture. It is to buy into the very neoclassical ideology that serves to buttress the free market and to promote the self-interested drive of certain countries, a group in which the USA is *primus inter pares*.

Other definitions are needed. A typical one from international relations focuses on the global public domain. Thus, one scholar says, "I define the new global public domain as an institutionalized arena of discourse, contestation, and action organized around the production of global public goods. . . . It differs from anything in the past that might resemble it in its dynamic density, and by operating in real time."[3] The author argues in a sophisticated manner that it is the interplay of economic and political actors that make for this newly conceived domain, thus joining the discourses of the economic and political disciplines.

"Transnational" (instead of "multinational") is a preferred term in both international relations and sociology. Along with "cosmopolitanism," it is often used instead of the term "globalization." Yet sociologists have been pioneers in studying the globalization phenomenon in its own terms. With their focus on social relations, they offer the following as a typical definition of globalization: "a process of increased density and frequency of international or global interactions relative to local or national ones." In this instance, its causes are identified as "the increased power of global capital markets; the rise of new information and communication technologies; and the rise of a new hegemon which creates the conditions for increased trade."[4]

This introduction is not the place for a full discussion of the multiple definitions and meanings of globalization. Those given are simply to indicate the range of disciplinary efforts—a tasting, so to speak. One historian offers a very simple definition, given with one foot in world history. In this view, globalization is "a progressive increase in the scale of social processes from a local or regional to a world level."[5] Moving on from this terse statement, we can

tentatively emphasize that at the heart of globalization is the transcending of established boundaries and borders of time, space, and territory, an increasing interdependence and interaction of peoples and, my own favorite, an emerging consciousness of what is happening—that is, an awareness of the global community that is being created and an interest in shaping that emergence in certain directions.

Within history, an interdisciplinary research agenda can center around specific elements, some already mentioned, in the coming about of present-day globalization: the step into space of the human species, satellites and their resultant communication possibilities, the compression of space and time, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations operating across national boundaries, nuclear meltdowns and military threats doing the same, and environmental impacts on a global scale. A host of other factors are ripe subjects: human rights, the United Nations, world music, global consumerism, and so forth. The result is a globalization that must be studied holistically. To do this is, in fact, the assignment of the NGH Initiative, joined with all the other efforts in various disciplines.

3

In studying globalization, we must always be aware that it is a process (not a thing) that is neither teleological nor deterministic. These are canards frequently leveled against it. Though there are strong currents pushing in the direction of some form of globalization, that form, indeed its very existence, is very much in play. There have been previous surges and retreats in globalization. One frequently remarked upon is the decline of globalization as the British Empire spawned rivals in the late nineteenth century. Another is the era of protectionism that set in at the time of the Great Depression in the 1930s, a development that itself added to the severity of the economic malaise. There is a whole set of scenarios that could be set forth as to how present-day globalization could falter, stumble, and perhaps come to a halt. Similarly, even if globalization largely continues in its present path, what shape, or rather shapes, it will take is by no means determined. In fact, this book is a disquisition on one part of that exact problem.

Contingency and human agency, along with natural causes (e.g., climate, ecology) and unintended consequences, must be the watchwords of anyone trying to understand globalization (as indeed any other aspect of history). So, too, must an awareness of the different evaluations that attach to the process be constantly in mind. For some it brings liberation, for others a new kind

of servitude; for some a broadening of horizons, for others a destruction of stability and traditions. Occurring in many forms, anti-globalization is a constituent part of globalization.

With all this understood, I want now to turn to a part of the origins and then to a part of the results of globalization. Though the Cold War is touched on briefly in a number of the chapters in this book, not one of them is devoted to the subject. Yet that is the necessary condition for the emergence of the USA as the global hegemon at the beginning of the new millennium. This is, of course, hardly a new conclusion. Numerous books and articles have detailed how the Soviet Union and the USA, for a number of decades, each sought to make its version of a "one world" dominant. Much of American foreign policy was devoted to the containment of its Soviet opponent, a policy that resulted in the support of many unsavory regimes so as to keep them out of the camp of the greater tyranny, as it was viewed, and that had numerous side effects. Prime examples are Vietnam and Afghanistan, with the latter producing American-supported *mujahideen* who later turned their weapons against their patrons in a resultant surge of global Islamism.

Thus, the Cold War is a necessary background for our understanding of the paradox at the core of our book. It is not in itself, as traditionally treated, a part of that paradox. Hence, it does not have a separate chapter in this volume. If it were to have had such a treatment, it would have been in terms of the way the Cold War served as one of the factors in the coming of globalization per se. The emphasis would be on the production of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, satellites, the step out into space, and other such factors heralding the emergence of present-day globalization. In other words, the Cold War would be treated as a factor of globalization rather than mainly as a topic in international relations.[6]

I also want to mention a result of globalization that is taken for granted by many of the contributors to this volume but has not been given a chapter to itself. It is the subject of global society. That some sort of global society has been emerging is integral to the paradox in which America, the creator, turns its back on its creation while also trying to shape it in its own image. Mostly, the shape of society desired by many, especially idealistic, students of globalization (among whom I number myself, as a pragmatic idealist) goes under the heading of global civil society. It stresses institutions whose aim is justice and peace, such as the International Criminal Court and the UN, and talks optimistically about global consciousness and global identity.

At its best, global civil society is treated as both a vision and an emerging reality of sorts.[7] The vision, however, must never be confused with the reality,

which is a mixed bag of imperfect actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the complex, confused world that is depicted for us by toilers in the heated field of international relations. Yet there is no question that the vision has power—it becomes an actor, so to speak, in the globalization process—a power that is seen as threatening to both "traditional" societies and "advanced" societies such as the USA. Here is the crux of the great struggle today over questions of nationhood, sovereignty, religion, "settled" boundaries, and the transcending power of globalizing forces. Here is where we find our particular paradox played out in terms of the foremost economic globalizer (though this can be exaggerated; there are other globalizing powers), which happens also to be, potentially, the greatest threat to globalization as tending to a global civil society.

The global, it must be recognized, is always local. Virtual space seems to call this statement into question, displacing place. So it does to a limited extent. But overwhelmingly it is the local where the processes of globalization are grounded both in political and phenomenological terms, that is, daily lives. For example, the global free market may call for unlimited movement of capital, and, in theory, labor. In practice, protectionists clamor for restrictions, and nationalists claim restrictions on immigration. Global civil society may hold out the vision of the transcendence of particularistic ties, but the still-existing national and traditional definitions of these connections generally prevail. In short, globalization is a struggle, an often harsh conflict, whose outcome is always uncertain.

This struggle hovers over the chapters that follow. Up to now I have been suggesting a framework for the treatment of the paradox of the USA and globalization, viewing it as a local happening within the broader process of globalization. This is the "logic" behind the book. The chapters will try to fulfill some of the expectations behind that logic, to describe and analyze some of the ways in which the USA has both played a role in and reacted against emerging present-day globalization. The chapters will deal with both pushes and pulls, with the forces of attraction and repulsion. The results will not be uniform but a mix of productive agreements and disagreements around core concerns.

I

The chapters in this book are organized into three main groups. Following this introduction, there are two chapters discussing the nature of globalization and its possible equation with Americanization. Then there are two chapters

focused on the USA and its historical past. These are followed by four chapters that are more concerned with present U.S. policy and attitudes. One of these chapters is on religion and another on media, both viewed as cultural elements of globalization. These are followed by a chapter on the military and then a penultimate one on the effects of 9/11, especially in regard to the question of American empire. All the chapters take up part of the paradox that is central to this book. At the end, not unexpectedly, I try my hand at a conclusion. Such is the overall structure of the book. Now, I offer some idea of each chapter—not an abstract but an interpretation and a comment on it—and how it contributes to the whole.

Martin Shaw starts from the basic insight that political changes were always crucial to globalization. Where so many others have stressed economics, he emphasizes the nation-state as an actor even as it must now be seen in the transcending terms of globalization. Foremost in this regard is the USA. Giving thought to the role of the Cold War in making America the contemporary hegemon, Shaw presents his discussion in the form of a meditation on the term "global" and its valences, ranging from world to global history. His own elegant approach is as a historical sociologist. Emphasizing that a transformation has taken place from the previously dominant international system, he accepts that a "rupture" (my word) of sorts has occurred and argues that social scientists must adjust their theories accordingly. Where others have stressed the role of NGOs, Shaw takes the broader subject of a world *political* system as the theater for America's role in the "new world order."

A minor paradox stands behind our larger paradox in Akira Iriye's chapter. For many Americans, globalization equals Americanization, which they see as a good thing. For many non-Americans who nevertheless accept the equation, globalization as Americanization is a threat, destroying local cultures and identities as well as economies. A little reflection in this regard suggests that Americanization can be perilously close to imperialism. Iriye is highly sophisticated in his analysis of Americanization, showing how it has changed over time: he tells us that in the first half of the twentieth century, it did place its stamp on globalization in a pronounced and mostly benign manner, especially if one accepts its equation with modernity. By the second half of the century, this was no longer the case, with the Cold War being the defining difference. Realists triumphed over idealists, for example, pushing the international interests in justice and peace to the side in favor of "national" interests. Yet the rhetoric, as well as some of the reality, of justice and peace continued to sound,

leading to the paradox of Americanization broadening into globalization, but with a disparity between the two.

Where Shaw defined globalization in terms of a developing political system, Iriye's understanding of globalization is one centrally concerned with peace, justice, and international cooperation. Though this echoes Shaw, it introduces a subtle difference, connecting to a vision of global civil society, which, for Shaw, is only one possible outcome. Both, however, clearly see the advantages of moving from a traditional international perspective to that of a global one.

In the next two chapters, the historical past is examined from differing but complementary angles. We can see these chapters as variations on a common theme: the ambivalence of American nationalism. Originally, the theme was to have had three variations: Michael Adas was to have contributed a chapter titled "Wary Vanguard: Sources of American Attraction and Resistance to Globalization" to this section. Indeed, he made a presentation at the conference itself, using an extensive outline. Unfortunately, personal considerations kept him from submitting a complete essay for the volume. The outline, however, was so full and suggestive, and his presentation contributed so much to the ideas of the other participants, that we are going to take the unusual step of summarizing it here. What Adas did primarily was to stress the contradictions in the relations between the USA and the rest of the world. Like Iriye, Adas examines some of the ways Americanization became globalization, emphasizing free markets and democracy. From the beginning, however, the colony-nation was ambivalent. Against the image of America as the beacon of light, the city on a hill, that "city" also saw itself as exceptional and against entangling alliances. It tended toward Manichean views—good and evil sharply separated—and was deeply Puritan and religious. From the beginning, it also showed an inclination to unilateral interferences, invigorated by a "can do" attitude. A parochialism and isolationism rooted in the past persisted and grew in the present, fostered by a sense of mission. The commercialized media reinforced Americans' sense of superiority, uniqueness, and ignorance of other societies. Even when proclaiming global rules and aims, the USA was hypercritical about its own behavior and frequently flouted them. Local politics tended to cloud over global citizenship. No wonder then that resentment grew over globalization as Americanization, especially in the Muslim world, Africa, and Latin America. For large numbers of people in these regions, the American version of globalization looked remarkably like an American empire.

David Reynolds focuses on the nineteenth century but looks both backward and forward. He argues that the USA is a product of one phase of globalization, in the eighteenth century, with the British Empire and the slave trade figuring prominently in its formation. Though at first reaching only to the Mississippi River, the new nation, driven by technology, had continental aspirations "from sea to shining sea." Such a large territory was threatened by forces of dissolution—the Civil War made real the possibility of the country breaking apart—and needed desperately to establish an identity for its pluralistic immigrants. This identity, Reynolds argues, was achieved by antithesis. This could take the form of not being black, communist, and so on; not being this "other" lay at the heart of American nationalism. By the twentieth century, the nation, itself a product of earlier globalization, was "producing" globalization through the export of its products and also of its culture, emphasizing rugged individualism. Defining globalization as "integration by expansion," Reynolds sees a "historically distinct" phase emerging from the U.S. experience. Thus, he offers another version of Iriye's treatment of Americanization and an alternative to Shaw's emphasis on the political (instead stressing the technological), while being in agreement with both that present-day globalization should be seen as a new phase in a process stretching over at least three centuries. And, like Adas, he sees persistent features, even as there is change, in the American character.

Ian Tyrrell seems to work in the opposite direction from Reynolds, emphasizing the departures from global society. He explores them in terms of such elements as American exceptionalism, evangelism, and patriotism. Thus, he analyzes extensively the claim to exceptionalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, aligns it with the anticolonial tradition in American culture, describes the way evangelism internally inoculates the USA against evil through moral uplift while also reaching out into the world externally, and then shows how patriotism becomes the glue holding together a disparate population. America, he contends, is exempt in its own mind from class analysis and becomes so first by embracing the frontier myth and then the myth of equal opportunity. Nevertheless, there were and are ideals rooted in American exceptionalism—for example, those of freedom, liberty, and democracy—that could serve as a model for others and hence come to play a globalizing role. Though more an ideology than a historical fact, according to Tyrrell, American exceptionalism can be seen as a pull to globalization as well as a push

away. In sum, he sees the USA as a prime participant in what he calls an "uneven global integration."

Taken together, Tyrrell and Reynolds (as well as Adas) offer a contrapuntal treatment of the way the USA has played an ambivalent tune in regard to the attractions and repulsions that mark its engagement with globalization. The gaze of these scholars has been mainly on the historical past, though they adumbrate the way that past persists into the present.

The last four chapters of this book, as remarked earlier, while often also glancing farther backward, are mostly concerned with the more recent past. Though in the previous chapters religion has figured as a subtext, N. J. Demerath III takes it as his main text in his chapter, claiming it as central to any account of globalization. Treating religion as a matter of imports and exports—a nice balance to the usual focus on economic goods—Demerath builds on his study of fourteen nations an extensive analysis of religion as both promoting globalization and opposing it. Surprisingly, however, he treats religion in America as more a matter of import than export, starting with the Puritans and continuing with present-day immigration that has made the country more Christian, though no longer of the established kind. Even more surprising, he insists that globalization is dependent on increased secularization—it is, in fact, a precondition. Yet, globalization seems to lead to greater religious conflict. Thus, American religion is also an ambivalent phenomenon. Though wide-ranging, much of Demerath's chapter is devoted to evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity. He looks at the way this kind of religion authorizes aggressive American policies. Differentiating cultural globalization from structural, or economic, globalization, he argues that the assumption that the former is preceded by the latter is false. (I would argue that the sharp division between religion and economics is itself false.) In any case, religion, acting as both a brake and a lubricant to the globalization process, brings people of different religions into possible conflict as well as contact. In the end, the chapter leaves us with the problem of globalization bringing about heightened religiosity that then spreads to the political arena.

Culture, though linked to economics and politics, is the central factor in Demerath's account. So it is in the chapter by Roberta Pearson and Nicola Simpson Khullar. Their topic is the role of media in globalization and specifically America's "cultural imperialism," that is, the spread of its culture across the globe. In this revisiting of the theme of Americanization, Pearson and Simpson Khullar frame their treatment in terms of the "culture industry" (Adorno

is not mentioned, but it was originally his idea), noting the domination of six transnational media corporations (three American) and the way in which they promote globalization when it benefits them but stifle it when it seeks to enter their home market. One result, germane to our overall theme, is that America is largely shut off formally from foreign influences, yet those influences can be traced in the early history of film, with Hollywood first borrowing from the Italians, then thrusting its own wares on the world, and only in recent times again borrowing, especially from the British. Again, the chapter sounds the note of import-export, dealing, however, more with the influence of European, especially British, media on American films and TV rather than vice versa and with the crisscrossing of culture and economics in the spread of globalization.

Ian Roxborough defines globalization as "a diffusion of cultural norms and as increased transnational economic integration" and reminds us that it does not happen on its own but must be underpinned in large part by the political and military weight of a dominant power or powers. The ability to project military power globally is a measure of success. He handles this issue in terms of American strategic doctrine, its basic concerns being identification of the enemy, the creation of ordering institutions, and the capacity to "control the periphery." In these terms, Roxborough addresses the central paradox of the volume: the U.S. role in and resistance to globalization. As he tells us, U.S. military doctrine insists on a unique projection of force globally that allows for no real rival. Plans call for this supremacy to be maintained far into the future. The Cold War had one clear enemy: the Soviet Union. When it was vanquished, the Manichean need took the form of a search for a new principal enemy, with China the prime candidate, but then was derailed by the rise of Islamist radicalism. The result was a need for two different strategies and forces. In the case of terrorism, however, the enemy was a nonstate actor; this has called for an effort in local control on a global scale and thus intimations of empire. With much comparison to Great Britain as a previous global hegemon, Roxborough's is a rich treatment of our topic—I have hardly touched on the details—that raises forcefully the question of whether politics dictate the military policies or vice versa. The challenge, of course, is to study how they intertwine, along with the cultural and economic forces at play.

With James Kurth's chapter, we come to grips directly with America's most recent past and 9/11. Where Roxborough sees empire as an unintentional outcome of military doctrine, Kurth argues that "some kind of empire was a

necessary condition for the globalization of a century ago" (p. 148), and, not unexpectedly, of this "American Century." Kurth claims that the American Empire, however, is unique in history in that it has no significant challenger. On another front, Kurth and Roxborough can be seen as entering into contention: For the former, the professional military are by disposition and tradition "nationalists" and thus in tension with the policymakers who are "globalists." In the latter camp, Kurth places both neoconservatives and neoliberals. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to overset the traditional military with his Revolution in Military Affairs must be read as part of the American turn to global and imperial purposes. Unfortunately, it does not seem to work against the new enemy, radical Islam, and its terrorist strategies and tactics. This face of Islam is, Kurth argues, a natural reaction to its situation as a "loser" in globalization. In a dialectical relationship to American-inspired globalization, radical Islam becomes the prime case for antiglobalization. In Kurth's view, by ignoring the "local," America's reach for empire is doomed to failure. Globalization, a world revolution, is left in a quandary. The morass in Iraq may come to represent "an end to any kind of globalization at all," with American empire itself a fad. Such seems to be Kurth's black-hued conclusion. However, we must ask whether in conflating globalization and empire (which means the USA), as he apparently does, Kurth here is ignoring the holistic nature of globalization and its many players and factors.

II

Each chapter must be read for itself. In my account of them, I have given an interpretation of sorts rather than an abstract or summary. Where possible, I have sought to indicate the agreements and disagreements explicit or implicit in the chapters, to draw out the flavor of the actual and potential dialogue. Though all the authors seem to accept the existence of globalization as a major break of sorts in history, and, not surprisingly, exhibit a willingness to look at both the USA and globalization in terms of the paradox of pushes and pulls, attraction and repulsion, they sometimes differ greatly in choosing the aspects on which to center their attention. The same is true in regard to their attitudes toward the overall subject.

The authors come from a variety of disciplines: history, political science, international relations, media studies. This partly explains the differences of emphasis that they place on their analyses of globalization. Fortunately, a common language rather than a rhetoric of discipline has mainly prevailed,

honed further by the exchange of views both during and after the 2003 conference. It can also be said that the writers, and the other participants at the conference, were selected with an eye to representation and an awareness of political inclinations. These ranged from liberals to conservatives and neoliberals to neoconservatives, with a few falling outside this spectrum. Whatever their politics, however, all are committed to the service of scholarship and respect for the views of others.

The topic itself, with its focus on the USA, would seem to carry an implicit contradiction to the idea of globalization. It might be felt that an air of Anglocentrism hovers over the enterprise, made stronger by the fact that the writers come from only four countries—America, Australia, Canada, and Britain—though other countries were represented among the participants. Surely it would be interesting to have had papers from Chinese, Indian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American scholars. It is nice to think, however, that scholarship is global and that the results probably differ little (although political judgment might vary). In fact, I would argue, the subject of study is best seen as a "local" instance of the globalizing challenge displaying "universal" features.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the USA is not any local example but the most powerful player on the contemporary global stage. As such, its solution to its particular paradox is of greater-than-ordinary importance and will have the broadest possible ramifications. Moreover, as suggested, its struggles are those of all countries in the global epoch in which we live. How does one deal with the globalizing process as the world moves from a nation-state orientation (though still persisting strongly) to a more global one? How to handle questions of sovereignty and security? Of economic interdependence of an unprecedented sort, and the need for protection of one's workers and economic sectors such as agriculture or business? Of the threat of global terrorism?

Or is the USA, in fact, unique in both having and dealing with the paradox of pushes and pulls to the degree that we have seen outlined in all of our chapters? Is the very nature of the American identity, rooted in its "exceptional" history and experience, basically in conflict with a movement to global identity? Or in putting things this way am I succumbing to the Manichean insistence on either-or, black and white, when the real question is how to reconcile a national identity with a global one? The chapters that follow will help us in answering such questions.