Overview

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution, Manfred Wörner, then Secretary General of NATO, reportedly asked President Vaclav Havel what was the most urgent problem of the post-revolutionary period. Havel allegedly replied: "I do not know how we are going to run this country. We have two options: we can rely on Communists, who do have some useful experience but are not politically reliable; or we can entrust key positions to former dissidents, who are reliable but lack the knowledge necessary in order to lead the country. If we opt for the second solution, we are going to need a lot of help and advice from Western experts."[1]

Today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, we tend to assume that the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe "naturally" adopted Western-style liberal democratic norms and institutions following their liberation from Soviet influence. That image, however, overlooks the complexity of the process of (re)building post-Communist polities, and marginalizes—or at least provides an excessively simplified view of—the role played by international institutions in that process. In this book, I analyze the practices enacted by NATO in Central/Eastern Europe, and demonstrate the alliance's systematic involvement in the construction of Western-defined liberal democratic norms and institutions in former Communist countries. This is important because it reveals that the social relationships created in the process of interaction between NATO and actors from Central/Eastern Europe were significantly different from our conventional wisdom regarding the behavior of a military alliance vis-à-vis potential new allies. It also demonstrates that the nature and dynamics of power exercised by NATO departed significantly from the prevailing conception of (coercive) power characteristic of international relations.

Contrary to the view of an essentially domestic process of reform,

NATO was involved in the politics of shaping legal and institutional arrangements in countries of the former Communist bloc, particularly in the area of defense. Through systematic interactions with political elites from Central and Eastern Europe, NATO helped shape definitions of appropriate liberal democratic identity in those states. The organization was involved in disseminating a particular set of norms governing civil-military relations, and contributed to the construction of corresponding institutions in former Communist countries. NATO representatives participated, on several occasions, in the drafting of liberal defense legislation aimed at redefining the mandates of each security institution and establishing a new set of relations between the military establishment, the executive power, and the legislature. They also acted as guides in the process of restructuring the defense and interior ministries of several ex-Communist states, and provided advice regarding the establishment of institutional arrangements that allow for greater civilian involvement in the process of decision making in the area of defense.

In some cases, the liberal, pro-West elites of Central and Eastern European countries encountered domestic opposition as they were trying to implement NATO-prescribed reforms. Particularly problematic were the bureaucratic structures of key ministries and a series of conservative parliamentary groups, which opposed some of those reforms, fearing that change would undermine their power. There were several instances in which, when faced with such obstacles, Eastern European decision makers appealed to NATO for help, asking the alliance to exercise pressure on reluctant domestic actors to abandon their opposition to reform. Furthermore, in some cases at the request of Central and Eastern European decision makers, NATO advisers came to be involved in the formulation of the Annual National Plans that are at the heart of the program called Membership Action Plan (MAP). Created in the aftermath of the Washington Summit of 1999, MAP requires aspirants to a potential second wave of NATO enlargement to present to the organization detailed evaluations of their situation, as well as future programs of reform in the political, economic, and defense areas. Within the framework of MAP, NATO officials have guided Eastern European decision makers in the process of identifying necessary reforms and formulating specific plans to carry out those reforms.

How are we to make sense of NATO's involvement in such activities? For many theorists and practitioners of international relations, the name "NATO" is synonymous with a military alliance.[2] But how can an alliance participate in what is essentially a process of crafting key domestic arrangements in former Communist states? This book's central claim is that, far from acting as a mere geostrategic arrangement, NATO has been involved in a broad set of activities aimed at promoting the construction

of a particular kind of liberal state identity in Central and Eastern Europe.

The idea that NATO promotes liberal values in the former Communist states of Europe is explicitly recognized by the allies. Its key decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has repeatedly argued that NATO represents "an agent of change," which plays an important part in building "structures of security and stability on the continent."[3] To this end, NATO acts to "spread the values of freedom and democracy" to Eastern Europe by "encouraging former socialist states" to make "the right decisions" concerning the values, norms, and institutions they adopt in the post–Cold War era.[4] But this overlooks the comprehensive way in which the organization has interacted with Central and Eastern European political actors. The notion that NATO "*encourages* Eastern Europeans to choose the right institutions" suggests that decisions concerning the nature of future state identities are made entirely in the domestic arenas of those states. On this view, while NATO may encourage or discourage certain political outcomes, it is essentially external to processes through which such outcomes are decided.

With particular emphasis on the first decade of the post–Cold War period, I argue that NATO has been deeply involved in the process of constructing domestic choices. The organization has systematically sought to socialize Central and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined liberal-democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.[5] This process of state-crafting via the socialization of Central/Eastern European actors constitutes the problem focus of this book. I explain the conditions that enabled this process; I analyze its main features, focusing in particular on specific types of socialization practices used by the organization, and then I examine the impact of NATO's involvement in Central and Eastern European states.

Through an empirical analysis of NATO's involvement in Central and Eastern Europe, this study demonstrates that the alliance has performed important tasks conventionally attributed to domestic actors. Through its involvement in the identification and promotion of "correct" domestic legal and institutional arrangements, and the education of Central and Eastern European elites—and sometimes even publics—into accepting those arrangements, NATO played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and Eastern Europe to (re)draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of national identity and interests. Critical political theorists have convincingly argued that the construction and reproduction of liberal democratic polities involves a series of activities aimed at socializing citizens into adopting a particular set of norms and institutions and embracing a particular understanding of national identity, while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and institutions

as inherently flawed.[6] In this book, I analyze some of these socialization practices associated with attempts at building liberal democracies—in this context, in the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe—and I show that, contrary to conventional International Relations theory, an international security organization like NATO has been deeply involved in such practices.

A study of NATO's involvement in the process of state-crafting is especially important given that the effort to promote liberal democratic norms and participate in the construction of new laws and institutions in ex-Communist states is central to the way in which NATO pursues security and stability in post–Cold War Europe. Therefore, a close analysis of this process enables us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and role of NATO in the contemporary world.

NATO AND THE 'INSIDE' MODE OF PURSUING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

To understand the involvement of NATO in the process of state-crafting, it is important to examine the context in which the organization came to play this role. I argue that several conditions were particularly relevant to the movement of NATO decision-makers toward identity-building practices in the former Communist states of Europe. In a broad perspective, there is the constitutive structure of the international system, which provides a menu of two possible modes of pursuing international security. The main principle of international organization, sovereignty, enables an *outside* set of solutions that involve geostrategic arrangements (e.g., power balancing) among sovereign entities that inhabit the international system. But the principle of sovereignty also enables an *inside* mode of pursuing security, according to which, stability in the world is to be achieved primarily by promoting (what are perceived to be) "good," stable, and peaceful institutions within states. Rather than place sovereign entities within restrictive international structures, the *inside* solution aims at promoting rational and ethical institutions and political processes within sovereign entities. The notion involved here is that states that embody such institutions are, at once, a source of domestic stability and international peace.

Within this repertoire of options, following the end of the Cold War, NATO came to place a special emphasis on the *inside* mode of pursuing security in the Euro-Atlantic area. To understand this strategy, one needs to take into account the particular set of understandings regarding the new security environment that came to prevail within the Atlantic al-

liance. From the perspective of NATO decision makers, the specific dangers to allied security characteristic of the post–Cold War period rendered the first (geostrategic) option largely ineffective and required a heavy reliance on a particular instantiation of the *inside* solution. This is not to say that the *outside* option has completely disappeared from the repertoire of NATO. But at the end of the Cold War, Western leaders agreed that the main source of danger was not a conventional type of military confrontation with an enemy state. Rather, it was a new and far more diffuse set of threats that was causing anxiety among NATO decision makers. The awareness of the new set of dangers was reflected in *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*: "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe."[7]

The end of the Cold War generated a dramatic disruption of the established politics of international security. Instead of a clearly defined enemy that could be contained within spatial structures, the West was now confronted with a plurality of transitional states, which were seen as, at once, potential friends and possible sources of threat to the Atlantic community. In the new European environment it was no longer possible to contain the enemy in the *outside* realm, for there were no fixed inimical states. Depending on the structure of their polities, all of the former Communist states were regarded as partners and possible members of—or, conversely, sources of instability to—the Western world. Linked to this, as we shall see in the next chapters, was a prevailing view within NATO that Eastern Bloc countries *could* become Western-style liberal democratic polities, that elites and publics in those countries *could* be socialized into adopting liberal norms and institutions. Accordingly, an approach that stressed the international socialization of Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-based liberal democratic norms appeared reasonable to NATO decision makers.[8]

In brief, at the end of the Cold War, the international promotion of Western-based liberal democratic norms in Central/Eastern Europe was regarded within NATO as both an important recipe for enhancing Euro-Atlantic security and as a viable project (given the view of changeable Central/Eastern European polities). Furthermore, NATO was regarded by its decision makers as an expert guide in the process of international norm projection, by virtue of its identity as not just a military alliance but also an institutional embodiment of the Western community founded upon liberal democratic norms and values. NATO officials repeatedly re-

ferred to the organization's founding charter, and to a series of Cold War
documents and activities, to not only guide its own process of renewal
but also to justify its involvement in the promotion of Western-based lib-
eral democratic ideas into the former Communist space.[9] Indeed, soon af-
ter the end of the Cold War, NATO initiated a series of practices designed
to project Western-defined liberal democratic norms of governance into
Central and Eastern Europe.

Before going any further, it might be useful to explain who are the ac-
tors involved in the formulation of NATO policies. The key decisions
concerning NATO policies are made in the North Atlantic Council. The
continuity of the Atlantic Council is ensured by weekly meetings of na-
tional Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) and Deputy Permanent
Representatives; these meetings are chaired by NATO's Secretary Gen-
eral. From time to time, the Atlantic Council also meets at the level of
heads of government, or at the level of defense and foreign ministers. In
addition, there are preparatory meetings as well as a series of informal in-
teractions among various members of national delegations and between
national delegates and the international staff, which, in many cases,
shape the agendas of council meetings. The Permanent Representatives
act on the basis of instructions from national governments, but as they
regularly inform their leaders of developments within NATO they partic-
ipate in shaping the latter's understandings of possibilities for action as
well as constraints generated by the prevailing trends of thinking within
the Atlantic Council. The national delegations work in close cooperation
with senior members of the international staff, who provide analyses of
relevant political and military developments, as well as advice on appro-
priate policies and ways to implement those policies.

Extensive interviews in Brussels reveal that national delegates to
NATO, together with senior international staff, form a community of
speakers: they share a broad set of views that help them to make sense of
the world and decide how to act in pursuit of international stability and
security.[10] This is not to say that there are no disagreements among deci-
sion makers concerning what should be done and how it should be done.
Political actors do disagree, and they do occasionally try to manipulate
those understandings so as to justify a particular solution. But those ac-
tions occur within a framework of shared interpretations of reality, which
enables agreement among allied policymakers on reasonable goals and ac-
ceptable strategies for pursuing those goals. Those same collective mean-
ings enable various NATO actors to define the boundaries of acceptable
arguments, and thus to structure their debates and articulate their griev-
ances in a manner conducive to arguing and seeking a consensus.[11]

For example, debates and decision-making processes concerning en-

largement occurred within the framework of shared understandings
about the importance of protecting and promoting the constitutive norms
of the Western community of liberal-democratic values embodied in
NATO: democracy, liberal human rights, and the rule of law.[12] NATO
actors also shared an understanding of the complex, diffuse dangers to
that community, and a view that only states that respected its constitutive
norms were entitled to join the organization.[13] Within the framework of
such understandings, however, allied decision makers did, in several in-
stances, disagree over the question of whether particular candidates were
sufficiently committed to liberal democratic norms to be eligible for ad-
mission in NATO.

THE DOUBLE LOGIC OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

In exploring the way in which both the *inside* and *outside* modes of pur-
suing international security are embodied in NATO, let us start with the
international constitutive structure that enables these solutions. As con-
structivist International Relations theorists have argued, the principle of
sovereignty plays a key constitutive role in the modern international sys-
tem.[14] As the principle of differentiation between the units populating
the modern world, sovereignty conveys special connotations of exclu-
siveness and possessiveness.[15]

The emergence of sovereignty as the key principle of international or-
ganization meant that states—as the main politico-administrative units of
the modern world—came to embody particular forms of property and
authority.[16] Most importantly, within clearly demarcated territorial
boundaries, sovereigns acquired the right to issue and enforce definitions
and rules regarding the proper organization of the political community.[17]
Those rules, which applied universally to individuals inhabiting the state,
effectively drew the boundaries between normal and unacceptable prin-
ciples of political and socioeconomic life.

As a consequence of the triumph of sovereignty, the modern period
gave rise to the promise of peace, order, and progress within political
communities where everyone was subject to sovereign rule. But the cre-
ation of pacified political communities simultaneously re-created the
problem of insecurity at the level of the state system, since there was no
overarching authority to enforce order among the sovereigns endowed
with particular—sometimes competing—wills and interests. The problem
revolved around the tension between the universal system (the world)
and the particular entities (sovereign states) inhabiting it.

The principle of sovereignty entails two possible solutions to this problem, both of which are reflected in modern political thought and practice.[18] There is an *outside* solution, which emphasizes geostrategic arrangements among sovereign units operating in an arena devoid of central authority. This solution is often presented—particularly in neorealist theories of international relations—as the only possible way of pursuing international security. In their view, given the tragic but inescapable verities of international relations, sovereigns have little freedom of choice in their interactions. The notion that underlies this solution is that anarchy is less intolerable at the level of states than it is at the level of individuals in a "state of nature."[19] At the international level, freedom combines with the inevitable inequality of states to give rise to such spatial arrangements as international domination by powerful state(s) and balances of power. The international system will, by necessity, be the arena where alliances form, break down, and re-form on the basis of new configurations of material power. Particular geostrategic arrangements come and go, but the dynamic governing their formation remains unchanged in a realm that lacks an overarching authority.[20]

But the principle of sovereignty, which constitutes particular units in a universal system, enables yet another mode of pursuing international security. It might be possible to achieve orderly and peaceful interaction among particular sovereign states if a way could be found to (re)shape entities in such a way that they would become peaceful, predictable, and trustworthy participants in international interactions. The tension between a universal system and entities endowed with particular wills would thus be resolved by having those particular states internalize a universally valid set of rules. This solution assumes that particular domestic structures—those that are built around "good" values and institutions—will generate stability and peace among states that possess such structures. Accordingly, it sets out to create conditions under which states would come to be governed by such rational and ethical values and norms.[21]

At the same time as it constitutes the possibility of pursuing the *inside* approach, the principle of sovereignty also has regulative effects on its implementation.[22] Through its injunction regarding non-intervention by external actors in the domestic affairs of states, this principle was designed to protect the right of sovereigns to build "good" institutions of governance. In the theory of international relations, the *inside* mode of pursuing security and world order is particularly associated with the work of Immanuel Kant.[23] The Kantian solution to international insecurity takes the form of a peaceful federation of states. But that federation can only be achieved via *inside* politics, for members of the pacific federation must become liberal republics.[24]

In modern international politics, state policymakers have used both modes of pursuing security. The *inside* approach, while sometimes forgotten by theorists of international relations, has played an important role by providing decision makers with an additional option on the menu of possible ways of pursuing security. This approach, involving the construction and protection of domestic institutions regarded as progressive and peace generating, found expression in the activities of NATO throughout its history. But the *inside*, Kantian-inspired mode of pursuing security has acquired unprecedented importance to the organization in the particular context of the post–Cold War world.

In establishing, enlarging, and transforming NATO, Western decision makers were enacting a particular conception of the identity of their community and the historically specific nature of threats to that community. In that context, the politics of *inside*—aimed at the protection and promotion of a community of liberal democratic values—was always an important dimension of NATO, and placed limitations on the geostrategic policies acceptable to the alliance. As the next chapter shows, historical records of the Cold War period refute potential claims that the *inside* dimension only mattered when NATO did not have any serious *outside* concerns.

Norms of appropriate processes of decision making in the Euro-Atlantic community also enabled the European allies to exercise a degree of influence within NATO that cannot be accounted for by reference to the material capabilities that West European states possessed.[25] Contrary to Waltz's expectations, on several issues that the U.S. regarded as key to international security, "weak" European allies successfully mobilized the rules of consultation and consensual decision making to persuade decision makers in Washington to give up, or modify, their preferred solutions.

In the post–Cold War period, again, particular understandings shared by NATO's decision makers regarding the nature of the new security environment shaped the *inside* policies adopted by the institution. North Atlantic Council decision makers formulated security policies with reference to an intersubjective framework that included definitions of the identity of friends to the Western community as well as potentially dangerous states. Danger was associated not with the possession of material resources by given states but with their "inappropriate" political identity. The following chapters examine the ways in which the collective normative framework of allied representatives shaped their definitions of the appropriate role of NATO vis-à-vis the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Those understandings enabled NATO decision makers to agree on a particular set of liberal democratic norms that the organization was to project into the former Communist countries through a wide set of socialization practices.

INTERNATIONAL NORM PROJECTION
AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIALIZATION

Drawing on insights from sociologists and social psychologists, I understand socialization as the process of inducting newcomers into the norms and rules governing a given community or social group.[26] From the constructivist perspective adopted in this book, successful socialization results in the adoption of new norms, and the (re)definition of identity and interest in conformity to those norms. The new norms come to be taken for granted—accepted because they are recognized as "normal."[27]

I argue that NATO has been especially involved in socializing Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-defined norms in the area of security, including norms governing the relationships among different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defense policies, and the relationship between the state and civil society. This occurred in a situation in which NATO decision makers regarded the principle and institutions of democratic control over the military, and, more broadly, liberal-democratic civil-military relations, as key to the rebuilding of ex-Communist polities—and as an issue area in which NATO possessed considerable expertise.[28] In assessing the eligibility of candidates to enlargement, NATO did consider normative performance in other areas (e.g., market reform and the protection of national minorities). But it tended to rely on the monitoring and socialization practices conducted by other institutions—for instance, relying on OSCE and Council of Europe reports to assess the legislative and institutional evolution of candidates in protecting the rights of individuals belonging to national minorities—and on information derived from the EU assessments to evaluate the progress made by the Central and Eastern Europeans in establishing functioning market economies.[29]

By contrast, in the field of security, there was agreement among NATO decision makers that their organization was key for the education of Central and Eastern Europeans. As we shall see, NATO has been involved in systematic, often successful, efforts at projecting a series of security-related norms into the former Communist states of Europe. These included:

Transparency and accountability in the area of defense, involving effective parliamentary oversight of the military, media scrutiny, the definition of members of security forces as "citizens in uniform" endowed with civic rights and responsibilities, and the formation of a community of civilian defense experts.

The division of powers within the state, involving checks and balances designed to limit the power of any particular agency in the formulation of defense policies.

Peacetime government oversight of general staffs and military command-
ers through civilian defense ministries.

In addition, NATO has sought to project into Central and Eastern
European countries liberal norms and rules of international behavior, in
particular involving peaceful settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and
democracy and human rights promotion in the international arena.

By virtue of its involvement in the eastern projection of these norms,
NATO is a particularly interesting case for a study on international so-
cialization. Thus, what is involved here is the role played by an interna-
tional institution in drawing the boundary between acceptable and unac-
ceptable modes of behavior, and establishing legal and institutional
arrangements that protect and reinforce that symbolic boundary in an
area (security) conventionally regarded as key to the survival and free-
dom of the state, and, hence, as the exclusive domain of sovereign au-
thorities.

As noted above, modern sovereignty works by affirming an ontology
of separation, of inclusion and exclusion (*inside* and *outside*) that enables
a capacity to draw the boundary between the normal and the excep-
tional, the acceptable and the unacceptable in the life of the polity. In the
modern era, a key power of the state is the power to make a certain in-
terpretation of reality count. Thus, a key role in the production of do-
mestic order is played by the reification of meaning through the state's ca-
pacity to issue interpretations of reality that are recognized as legitimate
by its citizens. The power to reify meaning involves not only the capacity
to define what is acceptable and unacceptable, but also to implement that
definition by embedding it in a series of laws and institutions and by so-
cializing citizens to take those categories for granted—in other words, by
constructing the common sense of citizens. In that sense, by virtue of its
ability to make certain interpretations of reality count, the modern state
can be said to be the holder of a monopoly of symbolic violence.[30]

The modern state produces official classifications of reality; it pro-
duces and institutionalizes an "official point of view" which performs
several key functions in society. To begin with, the official discourse per-
forms a diagnostic, "an act of knowledge that begets recognition," and
that assigns particular identities to individuals and defines the key char-
acteristics of different objects. Second, at the administrative level, the of-
ficial discourse works via rules and prescriptions that instruct people
what to do given who they are. Finally, the official discourse also inter-
prets and records what people have actually done (e.g., via police
records).[31] These classifications of reality are embedded in institutions
and reproduced through the practices of individuals that have been so-
cialized into a particular set of dispositions for thinking and acting (*habi-*

tus) within the boundaries of the "official point of view" in different
fields of society. In the long term, *habitus*, which is cultivated in individ-
uals through systematic pedagogic practices, contributes to the reproduc-
tion of a specific social order through processes of self-censorship and
self-limitation on the part of individuals. Thus, the system of meanings
and dispositions associated with a particular habitus becomes part of the
taken-for-granted "rules of the game" by which everyone else in a given
social context acts. A group habitus has the effect of producing among
those who share it a "common-sense world, whose immediate self-evi-
dence is accompanied by the objectivity provided by consensus on the
meaning of practices and the world."[32] In the context of liberal demo-
cratic societies, *habitus* is especially important for maintaining and re-
producing social order, for the norms of democracy and extensive indi-
vidual freedoms require the formation of self-disciplined individuals able
and willing to exercise those freedoms in a "responsible" way which does
not undermine the key institutions of their society. As Mitchell Dean has
explained, "Liberalism is as much concerned with the appropriate nor-
malizing practices to shape the exercise of the citizens' political freedom
as it is with guaranteeing their rights and liberties."[33]

In most of the Central and Eastern European countries, the revolu-
tions of 1989 brought about a breakdown of old structures of authority
and de-legitimized the Communist "official point of view" and the insti-
tutions in which that point of view was embedded. In turn, this led to de-
bates and political struggles over the redefinition of reality, as various
groups sought to make different interpretations of reality count. As we
shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, while it might be tempting to think that the
Central and Eastern Europeans simply adopted Western norms and rules
and built a new official discourse around those norms, the situation was
more ambiguous, not least because in the post–Cold War era there per-
sisted numerous—and fairly strong—groups, in particular, Communists
and nationalists, who refused to identify with the values and institutions
of the West and put forward different interpretations of the identity of
their countries. On that basis, they proposed different symbolic bound-
aries between the normal and the exceptional, the acceptable and unac-
ceptable ways of governing their polity, gave different diagnostics of the
problems, priorities, aims, and strategies of post-Communist reconstruc-
tion, and provided different interpretations of the "normal" relationships
of their countries with the outside world. Moreover, even the groups and
parties that advocated the construction of liberal democratic polities of-
ten defined liberal democracy in ways that were seen as incorrect and un-
acceptable by the NATO allies.

In that context of fluidity, NATO became involved in re-constituting

Central and Eastern European polities through its efforts of promoting a liberal democratic set of classifications of reality, involving a particular, Western-defined boundary between acceptable and unacceptable modes of thinking and acting, elevating those classifications to the status of the "official point of view" and building new legal and institutional arrangements aimed at protecting and reproducing it. This systematic involvement in the (re)construction of Central and East European polities was facilitated by the fact that many pro-liberal elites in the former Communist bloc recognized NATO as a key institution of the Western community with which they identified, and, as such, as an authoritative, trustworthy source of expertise in the area of security. NATO carried out systematic practices of socialization of Central and Eastern European elites and societal actors into a particular set of norms associated with the liberal democratic identity, guiding them in the process of institutionalizing those norms, and helping them gain precedence over alternative (nationalist and communist) norms put forward by different domestic groups. In essence, NATO has played an important role in crafting liberal democratic polities in the former Eastern Bloc of Europe.

There were several types of socialization practices—teaching, persuasion, and role-playing—that played important roles in the process of international state-crafting carried out by NATO. Although it is useful to treat these as analytically distinct categories, it is also important to pay attention to the ways in which they often overlap in practice. Chapter 3 explains the meaning and dynamics of those types of socialization practices, and Chapters 4 and 5 examine their actual application and effects in post–Cold War interactions between NATO and Central and Eastern Europeans. As we shall see, in many cases—though not always—those practices of socialization did affect definitions of state identity and interests held by Central and Eastern European socializees.

In this book, state identities refer to prevailing national ideas of collective distinctiveness and purpose.[34] These ideas, by defining the key characteristics of a given polity, shape both its domestic politics (since they are tied to a particular set of norms and principles of governance that are recognized as consistent with "who we are") and its foreign policy (since through an identification of national distinctiveness vis-à-vis other states in the international system, definitions of state identity position the self relative to other countries and enable decision makers to identify friends and enemies in the international arena). Useful indicators of change in the definition of national identity include the emergence of new intersubjective ideas about the key characteristics of the given polity (e.g., new understandings of the collective self, the purpose of its basic institutions, and the nature of "correct" norms of governance) and a new

conception of the relationship between the national self and the outside world (such as a rearticulation of the self's particular position—identification with, similarity to, difference from, or even opposition to various international others, and the purpose of the self in the context of interactions with those different others).

NATO became involved in the socialization of Central/Eastern European actors in a special historical context, marked by what could be defined as the hegemonic power of liberal democratic norms. At the end of the Cold War, Western-based liberal democratic norms were enjoying growing—and increasingly institutionalized—recognition in the international arena as the universally valid model of governance. In fact, as Chris Reus-Smit has pointed out, the past decades have witnessed the progressive embedding of "modern ideals of legitimate statehood in the normative fabric of international society, extending the influence of such values from the constitution of basic institutional practices to the prescription of state–society relations."[35] From this perspective, the end of the Cold War was important as a moment that further strengthened principles of (liberal) human rights and democracy as central to the definition of legitimate statehood.[36]

As Ian Clark, among others, has argued, principles of international legitimacy that revolve around liberal human rights, democracy, and a commitment to economic liberalism and collective security were substantially reaffirmed following the collapse of Communism.[37] At the end of the Cold War, those norms became "agents of admission to the inner international society, justifying the changes that had been made via the post–Cold War settlement."[38] In the post–Cold War period, the vision of legitimate governance revolving around norms of democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law came to be enshrined in U.N. documents, as well as in declarations and charters adopted by various regional organizations (e.g., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States).

Under these circumstances, one might argue that given the normative and material power of liberal democracy, it was predictable that decision makers of transitional Central and Eastern European states would adopt those norms, not least because they were interested in avoiding the sanctions and reaping the benefits offered by the international actors promoting Western-based, liberal democratic norms.[39] In a similar vein, it could

be argued, following a realist logic, that NATO was important to Central/Eastern Europeans because, after the end of the Cold War, it represented the key forum for organizing their relations to the only remaining superpower, the United States. Those countries, it could further be argued, needed American military protection and economic support. On this view, by virtue of its freedom to offer—or withhold the offer of—membership, NATO had the power to shape the behavior of those candidates to enlargement. Theo Farrell succinctly captured this perspective when he argued: "Power and interests, in the form of coercion and inducement, can play a particularly important role in international norm diffusion. A contemporary example of this is the adoption of Western norms of military professionalism by post communist states desperate to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[40]

However, a close analysis of the political situation in countries of the former Eastern Bloc shows that in the area of security a surprisingly large number of domestic actors did not want to build Western-style liberal democracy, and were far from being convinced that NATO membership would be beneficial to their countries. Interestingly, even those Central and Eastern European actors that did set out to build liberal democracy in their countries initially departed from Western understandings of what liberal democracy meant. The following chapters demonstrate that there was a tension between the definitions of the identity of the liberal democratic polity—and hence the views of correct norms, institutions, and reform goals in the area of defense—put forward by NATO on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by pro-liberal actors from Central and Eastern Europe, specifically from the Czech Republic and Romania. As we shall see, in many cases, definitions of identity and interest held by Czech and Romanian actors changed in important ways following interactions with NATO representatives.

NATO's response to that situation consisted of a complex mix of pedagogic practices, often conducted in cooperation with domestic reformers, aimed at redefining the definitions of identity and otherness as well as the conceptions of interests (by reconceptualizing the "self" in "self-interest") held by the citizens of ex-Communist countries. As a result, NATO often played an important, albeit almost always invisible, role in shaping domestic debates concerning the desirable future trajectory of those countries and their "normal" relationships vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic community. Those pedagogic practices were sometimes accompanied by instrumental incentives targeting the most convinced opponents to Western-prescribed reforms—that is, those actors regarded as too deeply embedded in alternative communities of values to be (re)socialized by NATO.

The complexity of social relationships between NATO and Central/ Eastern Europeans suggests that, to understand the role played by the organization in the former Communist countries, one needs to examine the power of the organization to act as a legitimate normative guide regarding modes of being and acting that are consistent with the norms of liberal democracy.[41] In this case, a study of the influence exercised by NATO over Central and Eastern Europeans has to consider not simply resources but the particular way in which the alliance mobilized those resources in the exercise of a subtle but persistent form of power.[42] Key here is an understanding of power not in individualist terms (defined as resources distributed among various units) but from the intersubjective perspective of power as competence. On the competence model, the ability to exercise social influence is not inherently attributed to the resources possessed by a given entity. Rather, the power of actors depends on the recognition of their role of influence by other participants in social interactions.[43]

NATO's ability to provide authoritative definitions of the legitimate meaning of liberal democratic identity, and more specifically, the correct norms and institutions of security that corresponded to that definition, was a reflection of the substantial symbolic power exercised by NATO vis-à-vis the pro-West elites of Central and Eastern Europe. That power was grounded in the latter's recognition of NATO as not just a military alliance but a key institution of the Western community with which Central/Eastern European reformers identified. As such, NATO was recognized as an authoritative source of knowledge about, and a forum for the recognition of, liberal democratic identity. As an expression of that recognition, in several cases, Central and Eastern European actors relied on NATO's normative guidance to an extent that went beyond the requirements, and, indeed, the expectations, of the organization.

The nature of the relationship between NATO and Central/Eastern European actors departed in important ways from the realist logic outlined above. What was key to this relationship was not so much the material power yielded by the allies—either collectively, or by the United States within the framework of the alliance. Rather, it was a powerful sense of identification with the Western community that informed the prevailing interpretation of NATO's material strength in the Czech Republic and Romania. From the point of view of Czech and Romanian elites, the view of NATO as an institution of the community of values with which they identified made it seem inconceivable that the allies would use their material strength to exploit the relatively weak former Communist states. This made the allied material power appear friendly, rather than a source of threat. It was by virtue of their recognition of

NATO as an institutional expression of the West that pro-reform Central and Eastern European decision makers and societal actors trusted the organization not to abuse its power, but, rather, to provide appropriate normative guidance in helping them to become Western-style liberal democratic leaders and to build liberal democratic polities. To see that the material strength of NATO allies is not always regarded as benign, let us consider the way in which other countries (e.g., many Arab states) would have reacted to NATO's guidance, the presence of American and other Western troops on their territory, or requests to support wars waged by NATO countries. By contrast, many Central and Eastern Europeans accepted extensive NATO guidance in the post-Communist reconstruction of their countries, in some cases transferring to the alliance key sovereign functions, such as the formulation of defense policies.

Vis-à-vis a series of Central and Eastern European actors, NATO benefited from substantial authority by virtue of its identity. That, however, meant that in order to maintain that authority the organization could not violate fundamental liberal democratic norms around which it defined itself. For instance, NATO could not impose its choices upon the democratically elected governments of Central/Eastern European countries, and it could not adopt a "closed-door policy" vis-à-vis candidates that demonstrated compliance with Western-defined liberal democratic norms.

Looking at the socializees' side of the equation, what was involved in interactions with NATO went far beyond the instrumental pursuit of a predefined goal—membership in the organization. In particular, centrist, pro-reform political actors from several Central/Eastern European countries regarded themselves as the leaders of a process of building a particular state identity and "returning" their countries to Europe.[44] Reformers from countries like the Czech Republic and Romania wanted to gain NATO membership, it is true, but they wanted this not simply as an instrumental reward per se (e.g., as a security guarantee against Russia). In fact, as we shall see in the next chapters, those actors who sought most actively to gain NATO membership for their countries were, often, also those who were least worried about conventional security threats. Accession to NATO, however, was regarded by Central and Eastern European reformers as part of a broader process of "returning" to Europe and taking "their place in the Euro-Atlantic community." That was an essentially social, dialogical process of identity (re)construction in which, as the key security institution of the Western community, NATO was able to influence Central/Eastern European reformers' definitions of correct liberal democratic norms and to change their ideas regarding the goals of the reform process in their countries. In other words, in the particular cases

studied in this book, international socialization was a process with con-
stitutive effects, affecting the identity of subjects being socialized.[45] Inter-
estingly, NATO was able to exercise that kind of influence over actors
from the former Communist bloc even in some instances in which it
could not use significant carrots or sticks.

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOCIALIZATION PRACTICES ENACTED BY NATO

It is perhaps reasonable to assume that any study about the internation-
al projection of ideas and norms is bound to raise questions about the
extent to which ideational factors can "cause" targeted actors to behave
in particular ways. I suggest that it is not impossible to provide explana-
tions of the ways in which ideas influence choices and actual behavior. In
order to do so, however, we need to depart from the mechanical model
of causality that was, for so long, applied not only in the natural sciences
but also in the social sciences. Placing itself in the constructivist camp,
this book understands the social world as an intersubjective universe in
which actors define their identities and interests in relation to others and
operate as members of social groups within the framework of shared
understandings that enable them to make sense of the world, identify
reasonable courses of actions, and justify those actions in terms intelligi-
ble to their community.

As Friedrich Kratochwil has argued, analyses of the social world must
start from a recognition that "no hammer hitting a lever, no springs, no
billiard balls are involved here."[46] Rather, building on Weber's account of
the differences between the natural and the social domains, the search for
causality entails "building a bridge which allows us to get from 'here' to
'there.'"[47] One does that by providing an analysis in terms of purposes
and goals, or by invoking "the relevant rule that provides the missing el-
ement," showing the reasons which motivated actors to act in a certain
way.[48] An account of causes for action in the social world involves re-
constructing the situation, seeking to view it from the point of view of the
actors, and imputing purposes and values in an attempt to arrive at the
motives that informed a particular cause of action.

From this perspective, it is possible to argue that practices of interna-
tional socialization can have an impact on the definitions of identity and
interest of socializees, providing them with reasons to act in certain ways
and to reject alternative courses of action. Thus, if successful, the social-
izing agency (in this case, NATO) will provide targeted subjects with new
rules of appropriate action consistent with the liberal democratic identity.

More broadly, it will provide them with a new worldview according to which a particular set of goals are reasonable, whereas alternative rules of governance and definitions of the goals of post-Communist reconstruction appear inherently flawed and potentially dangerous. For instance, according to NATO teachings, the establishment of a certain set of Western-prescribed liberal norms and institutions in the area of defense is "the right thing to do"—it is part of becoming a modern democracy, hence it is what emerging democratic polities like the former Communist states must do. By contrast, from the point of view of NATO representatives, defining the goals of reconstruction in terms of building an independent military power, that is, strengthening the army and placing it outside political checks and constraints (say, in the name of strengthening the state) would be wrong. On this view, such norms, policies, and institutions are inconsistent with the liberal democratic identity, and any attempt to promote them can only mean the move toward an—allegedly inferior—state identity, reminiscent of the authoritarian past of countries from the former Communist bloc.

As a conceptual starting point for the analysis of NATO's involvement in the process of identity building via practices of socialization in Central/Eastern Europe, I rely on insights into symbolic interactionism developed by social psychologists and sociologists and recently borrowed by constructivist International Relations scholars, most notably Alexander Wendt.[49] Starting from the assumption that identity construction occurs within historically specific cultures and has an inherently relational dimension, Wendt sets out to explain the process through which actors acquire definitions of identity in interactions with specific significant others. Key to his account is the process through which actors learn to see themselves as a reflection of how they are appraised by those significant others.

Building on Wendt's use of the social psychology of symbolic interactions, I suggest that, in exploring social processes of identity formation, particularly in the cases of "novices" joining an existing community, it is useful to mobilize George Herbert Mead's concept of generalized other. The notion involved here is that novices—in my case, actors of the former Communist countries—must be educated into adopting the perspective and norms of a certain generalized other.[50] The generalized other represents the organized structure of attitudes—incorporating a particular set of intersubjective understandings—prevailing in a given social context. This is the structure of attitudes that actors in that community adopt in the course of engaging in social behavior. It is the point of view of the generalized other that provides actors with a perspective on the world and a definition of social problems, as well as possible solutions to those problems. In the social universe, a particular generalized

other embodies just one viewpoint; but that viewpoint is often presented as universally valid.

The generalized other becomes an instrument through which society influences the behavior of its individual members. This influence is, in part, exercised in the course of processes of identity formation, where an important role is often played by reference groups. These are the agents that embody the viewpoint of the generalized other and convey to novices *normal* ways of understanding and behaving in the world. In our case, it is useful to speak of the generalized other in reference to the Western liberal perspective of the world that prevails within NATO and informs collective views held by its decision makers. NATO can be seen as an institutionalized Western reference group seeking to socialize Central and Eastern Europeans into adopting Western-defined "normal" ways of thinking and acting consistent with the identity of liberal democratic actors.

Wendt's account of symbolic interactions provides us with important insights into the relational aspects of identity construction. It helps us understand that in many situations the decisions and actual behavior of actors reflects not utilitarian cost/benefit analyses of individuals whose identities and interests are defined in abstraction from social interactions, but broader concerns related to the enactment of identity according to the norms that prevail in a given social environment. Yet this is also an account that tends to marginalize some important aspects of the self/other interactions in international politics. Wendt does not explore the processes, and the power involved in those processes, through which a particular generalized other and its corresponding normative framework come to be accepted by international "novices" as the relevant generalized other. Relatedly, he does not extend his analysis to encompass actual practices through which a socializing agency (or a reference group acting on behalf of the generalized other) disseminates norms of appropriate behavior to targeted subjects. As Friedrich Kratochwil argued, "to show the mechanisms at work" in such processes of international socialization, one needs to look at the "hidden power" operating in those specific contexts.[51] Kratochwil suggests that, to examine that power, it might be useful to draw either on Foucault's concept of disciplinary power or on Bourdieu's analysis of the construction of *habitus*.

This book seeks to take Wendt's analysis of international socialization a step further, by explaining types of socialization practices and the power involved in them. I argue that, to understand the role played by NATO in Central and Eastern Europe it is useful to examine its power to construct the "common sense" of Central and Eastern European actors.[52] This power relies on the ability of the organization to act as legitimate teacher of modes of being and acting that are consistent with the identity of "true" liberal democracies.

The analysis developed here builds on the argument put forward by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in their analysis of security communities. According to them, power cannot be reduced to an understanding of the ability of a strong state to "nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance." It must also be understood "as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the 'we-feeling' and practices of states."[53] And, in Adler's words, "The ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to commit themselves to those rules, because [those] rules are now part of the self-understandings of the players, is, perhaps, the most subtle and effective form of power."[54] More broadly, to use Barnett and Duvall's analytical categories, this book shows that, far from simply applying power through behavioral relations (in interactions with preconstituted subjects), NATO has also exercised power via the social relations of constitution of Central and East European subjectivity.[55]

International organizations, Adler and Barnett have argued, play an important role in the process of social learning. In fact, "organizations, in this important respect, are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps even 'teach' others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are. Because identities are created and reproduced on the basis of knowledge that people have of themselves and others, learning processes that occur within and are promoted by institutions can lead actors to develop positive reciprocal expectations and thus identify with each other."[56] In my study of practices enacted by NATO, I build on Adler and Barnett's account by analyzing the socialization practices through which international education is carried out, examining the conditions that facilitate the success of those practices and exploring some of their implications.

SELECTION OF CASES

Historical Aspect of Case Selection

Two aspects of case selection are relevant to my study. First, there is a historical dimension: to explain the contemporary role of NATO, it is necessary to pay close attention to its evolution during the Cold War. I argue that since it was founded NATO has never been merely an alliance. From its creation, the organization has always been involved in processes aimed at promoting liberal values and institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area. This historical dimension is examined in Chapter 2, which analyzes the concern with the *inside* mode of pursuing security that was shared by

NATO's "founding fathers." It then examines the interaction between the *inside* and *outside* solutions in the course of activities carried out by NATO during the Cold War period. In the context of the increasingly militarized confrontation with the Soviet Union, the *inside* dimension came to be subordinated to the demands of *outside* security arrangements, but it never completely disappeared.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO relied on its history of pursuing security at the level of *inside* to reinvent itself and to justify its continued relevance in the new context. In the early 1990s, there was widespread agreement among NATO decision makers that this was a time of rapid change, a time marked by the emergence of new, more diffuse sets of threats that could not be effectively dealt with through a strategy of containment. In a situation in which they needed to improvise responses to that fluid security environment, NATO decision makers returned to the organization's past as a guide to the future. In particular, they invoked and built on principles that were present in the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as ideas developed in various Cold War Reports on the Atlantic Community in order to formulate a new strategic concept. In the collective voice of the alliance: "We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty."[57]

To examine the double role of NATO in European security, I begin by examining several aspects of the historical evolution of the organization. First, there is the foundational period (1947–early 1949), which is important for analyzing the collective intentions of the founders of the institution. In establishing NATO, Western decision makers were seeking to create a security system that would protect Western states from within and would contribute to the construction of a Western security community, at the same time as it secured those states against Soviet military threats. Second, this book explores some of the actual activities in which NATO was involved during the Cold War. Particularly relevant are the dynamics of Cold War enlargement of the organization: to Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), and Spain (1982). A comparative analysis of Cold War and post–Cold War dynamics of enlargement reveals an interesting evolution in the nature of considerations that led NATO decision makers to embark on a policy of expansion. During the Cold War, decisions to enlarge were primarily motivated by *outside*, geostrategic considerations. It was a concern with the strategic value of Greece and Turkey, Germany, and Spain that led the allies to decide that it was desirable to grant NATO membership to those countries.

However, even in a context marked by the prevalence of geostrategic considerations, *inside* security concerns continued to play a significant

role in the process of decision making related to Cold War enlargements of NATO. In the case of both Germany and Spain, their geostrategic potential was the necessary but not the sufficient condition for attaining membership in the Atlantic alliance. In both cases, what made accession acceptable to all NATO allies was the fact that the candidates were countries whose regimes showed a commitment to the values and principles of liberalism and democracy. More problematic was the case of Greece and Turkey, which were widely seen as "outsiders" to the Euro-Atlantic community of values. Their inclusion into the structures of NATO in 1952 was widely regarded as a compromise demanded by the value of their geographic location in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. Yet, this was a compromise that, as many NATO members pointed out at the time, threatened to undermine the Euro-Atlantic community of liberal democratic values embodied in NATO. As a way to compensate for the increasing importance of the geostrategic dimension of the organization, its decision makers initiated a series of activities meant to contribute to the consolidation of a liberal democratic community throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Post–Cold War Period: NATO's Assessments
of New Problems and Possible Solutions

In Chapter 3, I focus on events and processes that reveal the evolution of NATO's reliance on the *inside* solution relative to the *outside* mode of pursuing security. This part of the book begins with a study of the conditions in which this evolution occurred. As mentioned above, NATO's growing involvement in identity-building practices cannot be understood in abstraction from collective understandings of allied decision makers regarding the nature of the post–Cold War world. Particularly relevant is the moment immediately following the end of the Cold War (1990–91) and the period associated with the formulation of security objectives at the time when the issue of enlargement first appeared on NATO's political agenda (1994). In both moments, NATO decision makers collectively regarded the establishment of liberal democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe as key to European stability and peace in the new era. The new set of shared views of the nature of the European security environment was reflected in the formulation of a new strategy for NATO. This was coupled with plans for a restructuring of the alliance's armed forces so as to render them more flexible and mobile—in a situation in which such qualities were perceived as crucial if NATO was to deal effectively with problems of internal instability.

*Practices of Socialization: The Czech Republic
and Romania*

To help construct liberal democratic state identities in the former
Communist bloc, NATO decision makers initiated a series of socializa-
tion practices. From the moment that the issue of enlargement first
appeared on the political agenda of NATO, there has been a dramatic
proliferation of interactions between the organization and Central and
Eastern European actors, which was justified by NATO by reference to
the goal of improving cooperation between the West and the former East
and preparing candidates for potential future admission to the alliance.
This is an important development, for it provides an opportunity to
study a large number of activities involving NATO actors and Central
and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites.[58] These
occurred within forums as diverse as the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, the North Atlantic Assembly, and individ-
ual accession dialogues between NATO and Central and Eastern
European representatives. The wealth of interactions between NATO
officials and actors from Central and Eastern Europe makes it easier to
enrich this study by examining a variety of activities, carried out in
diverse settings and involving different sets of actors.[59] On the basis of
empirical evidence, I hope to demonstrate that NATO has, indeed, car-
ried out socialization processes in a variety of forums.

Many of the consultations, legal instruments, seminars, and work-
shops organized within the framework of NATO involved representatives
from all Central and Eastern European states. Accordingly, by examining
the dynamics of those activities, one can gain important insights into the
nature of interaction between NATO and actors from the ex-Communist
states in general. Certain consultations, educational activities, and legal
instruments, however, involved only NATO and individual Eastern Eu-
ropean states. With respect to those kinds of interactions, some choices
had to be made.

In analyzing the socialization practices enacted by NATO, my empir-
ical focus, in Chapters 4 and 5, is on two cases: the Czech Republic and
Romania, respectively, in the first decade of the post–Cold War era. This
allows me to compare NATO's interaction with a country (the Czech Re-
public) that was granted membership in the organization in the first
round of enlargement, and its interaction with a state (Romania) that
was excluded from the first wave of enlargement. It is important to in-
clude more than just one country in order to avoid the potential criticism
that NATO's socialization practices were an isolated occurrence, possi-

bly due to a special relationship with the country involved. At the same time, a comparative study enables me to examine the extent to which NATO took seriously its self-definition as an institution that is open only to states committed to the norms of liberal democracy. Thus, through an analysis of the North Atlantic Council's evaluations of the Czech Republic and Romania it is easier to assess the extent to which NATO focused on the enactment of liberal democratic reforms in setting conditions for, and subsequently evaluating the eligibility of, particular candidate states. Finally, a comparative analysis involving a country that was included in the first wave of enlargement and one that was excluded enables us to examine the evolution of NATO's involvement in the former Communist bloc. In light of the lessons learned in the process of incorporating the first wave of newcomers (when it became clear to NATO officials that the process of transition to Western-style democracy in Central Europe was much more complex and, in some ways, more difficult than anticipated, and that the Central European elites were in need of even more guidance than the allies had expected to provide), NATO changed its policy vis-à-vis second-wave candidates. In the first wave, many of the liberal democratic reforms prescribed by the allies were carried out—under NATO guidance—after the decision to take in the three countries, regarded as the most advanced from the former Eastern Bloc, had been made. By contrast, with respect to second-wave candidates, the allies established a comprehensive system of monitoring and guidance aimed at promoting change and assessing the candidates' records prior to inviting them to join NATO. Under these circumstances, second-wave countries faced the dilemma of having to carry out comprehensive reforms and adopt a series of costly courses of action (e.g., support for NATO missions and wars abroad) without any guarantee that they would receive the reward of membership. The differences in the structure of rewards for first-wave and second-wave admissions notwithstanding, NATO carried out similar socialization practices in both the Czech Republic and Romania, and those practices did have a powerful impact on both countries.

The Czech Republic is a revealing choice from among the three countries admitted to NATO in 1999. When discussions of NATO enlargement began, Vaclav Havel's country was widely regarded as one of the most advanced on the road to liberalization and democratization. It is useful to examine some of those pedagogical practices carried out within the framework of NATO enlargement because they reveal that, even in the apparently unproblematic case of the Western-like Czech Republic, there was a significant Western effort to teach Czech actors to be "good" liberal actors. One could easily argue—and, indeed, it has been argued—

that the interaction between NATO and the Czech Republic was minimal: the Western alliance simply rewarded the Czechs for their domestic choices by including them in the Euro-Atlantic club. As we shall see, however, that was not the case. NATO was systematically involved in the promotion of a particular set of liberal democratic norms and institutions in the Czech Republic, and in the projection of a particular view of the Czech role in the world. One might further assume that no socialization was possible after the Czech Republic received the main "carrot" that the allies could offer: membership in the NATO club. Contrary to this view, as we shall see, NATO representatives continued to carry out socialization practices—in many instances, with a significant degree of success.

From the second group of candidates to NATO membership, my focus is on Romania. Of all the countries excluded at the Madrid Summit, Romania was one of the countries, if not *the* country, that came the closest to being admitted. It is thus valuable to examine the reasons for the exclusion of this controversial candidate, and to analyze the nature of interaction between NATO and Romanian actors both before and after the Madrid Summit. As we shall see, NATO carried out a comprehensive set of socialization practices, and enjoyed a reasonable degree of success. In many cases, Romanian actors accepted, even proactively sought, NATO's guidance in reforming their country, even though, as mentioned above, they had no guarantee that Romania would be included in NATO as a reward for their reform efforts. Linked to this, Romania is an interesting case because, as a frontline state during the Kosovo crisis, it was adversely affected by the Western blockade on the Danube and by a series of other measures taken by NATO in the course of the conflict. Yet, in spite of the obvious and very tangible costs associated with that course of action, the Romanian government supported Western military action and continued to consult and work very closely with NATO officials, both during and after the Kosovo war. I show that, to understand that course of action, it is important to take into account the identity politics in which Romanian decision makers were involved and, as part of that, the role played by NATO in the reconstitution of Romanian state identity.

Regarding the selection of episodes of interaction between NATO and Czech and Romanian actors, I have focused on issues that were particularly problematic from the point of view of NATO—hence, areas in which change was perceived as necessary. A close analysis of those issues should shed light on the nature (and intensity) of NATO's efforts to promote change in Central/Eastern Europe.

DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

I seek to avoid serious biases in my data by following a strategy of empirical "triangulation."[60] The idea behind triangulation is to balance various evidentiary sources obtained through a combination of methods in an effort to obtain a systematic corroboration of the arguments.[61] The particular combination that I use in my study involves in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a variety of NATO actors—both members of national delegations and the international staff, as well as Czechs and Romanians who interacted with NATO officials; participant-observation in a couple of educational practices organized by NATO; and an analysis of a series of documents both from the Cold War and the post–Cold War periods.

To analyze the texts, I relied on discourse analysis—a systematic method of analysis that uses techniques developed mainly by students of literary criticism in order to examine the relevant actors' understandings of the problems they were facing and of the possible solutions to those problems.[62] As mentioned above, this book conceptualizes the social world as an intersubjective universe, in which the search for causality involves an analysis of the reasons that motivated actors—qua members of social groups operating within a given framework of shared meanings—to act in a certain way. It is therefore important to capture the nature of shared understandings that shape the actors' understandings of the world and inform their definition of reasonable actions in particular circumstances. As Mark Lichbach has pointed out, this means that we need to read the discourses formulated by the actors we are interested in, in an attempt to capture the intersubjective culture in which they are moving.[63] This is why the method of discourse analysis is important.[64] Discourse analysis sheds light on the ways in which political actors identify and differentiate various objects and subjects inhabiting the environment in which they act, the attributes and qualities that actors associate with those subjects, and the ways in which they relate them to other subjects and objects.[65] That is, through discourse analysis, we learn how particular subjects and objects are defined within given intersubjective contexts, and how particular sets of relationships are established between those subjects and objects, making certain attitudes and actions vis-à-vis certain subjects seem appropriate while others appear inconceivable.[66] For instance, in examining the establishment and evolution of NATO during the Cold War, discourse analysis can help us shed light on the allies' shared understanding of themselves as members of a community of values, which informed the decision to establish a security organization that

was more than a conventional alliance and proscribed certain kinds of actions within NATO. Similarly, in the post–Cold War era, discourse analysis can help us understand how NATO actors and the Central and Eastern Europeans interpreted the world, and defined themselves and each other in a way that made it seem reasonable, even normal, for them to participate in activities of learning and persuasion versus merely providing and responding to a set of instrumental incentives.

I rely in particular on techniques such as narrative and predicate analysis to examine different texts (written or verbal) that instantiate a particular discourse. *Predicate analysis* involves a study of the verbs, adverbs, and adjectives that attach to nouns.[67] Predications of a noun construct different objects and subjects, defining them as a particular kind of thing/actor, with specific features and capacities. In addition, one also needs to pay attention to *subject positioning* in a given set of texts. Thus, discourses do not just endow subjects/objects with particular attributes; they also establish relationships between these subjects, as defined by the qualities attributed to them. Drawing on the linguistic theory of de Saussure, students of discourse analysis often point out that what defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the relationships (e.g., similarity, opposition, or identity) which position that subject in relation to other kinds of subjects.

Drawing on the work of Bruce Lincoln, I also rely on *narrative analysis* to examine the way in which the boundaries of communities are legitimized so that such communities are symbolically brought into existence through the invocation of selected moments of the past. By referring to particular sets of ancestors common to all the members of the community being invoked, and through recounting allegedly formative moments of the past, stories legitimize a specific evolution of certain actors; they make that evolution seem natural.[68] I also examine the way in which, through *presuppositions,* a discourse acts to create background knowledge and in so doing constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true. One can use a syntagmatic analysis to capture what seems to be a key microtechnique of presupposition: the repetition of lexical terms.[69] Repetition of certain lexical terms is sometimes used to create discourse coherence in a text and/or to show that various speakers endorse a particular representation of reality. As a complement to presupposition, there is also, at the level of the sentence, *naturalization,* which examines the way in which texts represent reality as a given that speaks for itself and "naturally" gives rise to certain consequences.[70]

In selecting the texts to which I applied discourse analysis, I follow Barry Buzan's advice that analysis should be conducted on central texts,

for, as he pointed out, "if a discourse is operative in a given community, it is expected to materialize in those texts whenever the debate is sufficiently important."[71] I have tried to use three broad criteria for text selection. To begin with, I sought to use texts issued by actors with authority to define a situation and to identify problems and challenges (e.g., texts that capture the views of NATO's decision makers about the nature of post–Cold War security threats in the Euro-Atlantic area). In addition, I examined texts characterized by a clear definition of identities and reasonable courses of action given those identities. Finally, I looked for texts issued in politically significant contexts (i.e., moments likely to have important implications in terms of interpreting the world and formulating strategies for shaping that world).[72] In an attempt to capture the discursive categories through which the actors I am interested in interpreted the world, defined themselves and others, and identified reasonable courses of action, I sought to include in my analysis not only texts that might be seen as instances of "cheap talk" (e.g., press statements), but also units of discourse that were formulated in more private venues (e.g., semi-confidential or confidential documents), and/or in situations that carried clear political implications (e.g., strategic documents).

Some texts fulfill all criteria—such as, for instance, the (now declassified) NATO confidential reports issued during the Cold War. In several of those reports the representatives of member states articulated their vision of the alliance as the institutional expression of a community of values, identified the enemy the allies were confronting, and stressed the importance of policies aimed at strengthening that community and protecting it from *inside* as well as *outside* threats. Other texts, however, do not meet all these criteria of text selection. For example, some of the pieces of legislation prescribed by NATO to the Central/East European candidates do not contain clear statements of identity. Nevertheless, these are important texts because they were issued by authoritative actors, clearly identified reasonable courses of action, and played an important role in (re)constituting the Central/East European polities around liberal democratic norms. By combining an analysis of these documents with other texts, which contain clearer definitions of identity, we gain a broader understanding of the ways in which NATO has been involved in defining and helping to implement a liberal democratic identity in post-Communist polities.

Regarding interviewing, I am aware that this method raises questions about the reliability of interviewers and interviewees. To reduce these problems, I interviewed actors that played different roles in the interactions between NATO and Central/Eastern Europeans. I treated statements as evidence only when the information they contained was cor-

roborated by at least one other source occupying a different position in practices of socialization (e.g., for statements regarding the nature and impact of NATO teachings on actors from the Czech Republic and Romania, I only took into account statements made by at least one NATO teacher and confirmed by at least a couple of Czech and Romanian students). Regarding the problem of the reliability of the interviewer, I tried to import as little as possible of any particular discursive framing into the questions.

The data for the historical chapter come from archival records of debates among NATO founders surrounding the proposed role of the new organization (1948–49), as well as debates within the Atlantic Council and private exchanges among Western leaders on the issue of admission of new members to NATO during the Cold War. I supplemented this information with data drawn from books on NATO written by historians. For the first analytical moment of my post–Cold War analysis, which focuses on NATO's assessments of new security risks in Europe, I combine a discourse analysis of North Atlantic Council documents with interviews with participants in council debates (both NATO officials and member-state representatives). Moving on to conditions of admission to NATO, I gathered the evidence for this section from documents issued by the North Atlantic Council and from some reports of discussions among NATO decision makers on the conditions that candidate states ought to fulfill in order to be considered eligible for admission to the organization. This textual evidence was combined with data obtained from interviews with NATO officials who were involved in the process of deciding the conditions of accession to the organization.

For an analysis of actual processes of socialization carried out within NATO-sponsored forums, I needed to gather data about various formal and informal consultations, seminars, and workshops in order to shed light on the norms and principles prescribed in the course of those activities. Also relevant are the techniques used to prescribe them, as well as the conditions that enabled the use of those tactics. To gather this kind of data, I used: in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a sample of students and teachers in NATO seminars as well as participants in formal accession dialogues and informal consultations between NATO and representatives of the Czech Republic and Romania; participant-observation in a couple of seminars and symposia organized within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO; and analysis of the reports of a few seminars and consultations.

A study that examines the process of state-crafting through socialization is more interesting if it also pays attention to some of the effects of socialization. The question is, does this process matter at all? Does it have

an impact on Central and Eastern European socializees? One can think of different dimensions and degrees of success of socialization practices.[73] To begin with, one can speak of success to the extent that socializees consistently inscribe international norms in their political discourse. In that case, subjects (re)formulate their political programs so as to conform to all or some of the normative prescriptions formulated by the socializing agency. I suggest that a change in political discourse can be used as a useful indicator of change in the definitions of identity and interests held by socializees.[74] This is particularly the case in situations in which, following socialization practices, socializees inscribe the norms prescribed by international institutions in their political discourse, reformulate their goals accordingly, and then articulate the new discourse vis-à-vis diverse audiences in different contexts, including contexts with significant policy implications (e.g., parliamentary debates).

Critics might argue that this is not enough to demonstrate that a significant change has occurred at the level of the private beliefs/attitudes of socializees. Yet, as it has already been argued, using different methods to obtain evidence about the views articulated by the relevant political actors in various public and private contexts is an important step toward shedding light on their ideas regarding their identity and goals.[75] After all, the rationalist argument of cheap talk revolves around the problem of inconsistency in the views put forward vis-à-vis different audiences. Therefore, a demonstration of consistency should help establish that a change in political discourse reflects more than "cheap talk."

It is impossible to establish with certainty the nature of private beliefs held by people, but I suggest that this is less of a problem than it may first appear to be. Since this is a study in political science rather than psychology, what we are interested in are the ideas held and promoted by people qua political actors. While it remains impossible to absolutely refute the potential argument that a study such as this one does not "get inside individuals' heads" to establish whether belief change has occurred, one can point out that accessing the private beliefs of individuals is not needed in order to establish that, in their enactment of political identity, NATO socializees did change their beliefs and attitudes. At the very least, in order to maintain their legitimacy and credibility both in the domestic and international arenas, those actors had to articulate a political discourse and identify and pursue policies that did not contradict the basic norms and principles of those redefined identities.

One can take this assessment of the success of socialization a step further and examine the extent to which socializees who redefined their views regarding proper goals to be pursued in the reform process also acted on these new ideas. It is reasonable to argue that, to the extent that

socialization is successful and the socializees internalize the new norms, coming to take them for granted, there will be a certain consistency between their speech and their actions. Thus, not only would socializees redefine their views of proper norms and institutions to govern civil-military relations, but they would also try to promote those norms. For instance, in the case of socializees that have decision-making power, they would seek to embed the new norms in the legal and institutional fabrics of their societies.

As a first indicator of the results of socialization, I examine shifts in the political discourse of elites in the Czech Republic and Romania. The goal is to capture possible shifts in that discourse in the direction of (or away from) conformity with norms prescribed by NATO and to examine some of the reasons for those transformations. As a second indicator of the success of international political socialization, I examine efforts by Czech and Romanian political elites to institutionalize the norms prescribed by NATO. For this part of my research project, I engage in a reading of the text of pieces of defense and security legislation and the institutional reforms promoted by those actors. Also, through interviews and media reports, I shed light on the general context, particularly the expected costs and benefits, in which the political elites of the two countries sought to enact liberal changes.

In a broader perspective, the effect of socialization practices can be studied not only by looking at the socializees themselves but also analyzing the extent to which the impact on those socializees translated into changes at the level of state policies and institutions. Chapters 4 and 5 of this book show that in some instances the successful socialization of Czech/Romanian actors translated into changes in the constitution of their states (e.g., in some cases, Czech/Romanian policymakers succeeded in embedding NATO's normative prescriptions into the legal and institutional fabric of their societies).

But one should not assume that successful socialization of elites and selected societal actors necessarily translates into changes at the level of the state. As noted above, it is reasonable to argue that successfully socialized actors would *try* to promote the internationally prescribed norms in their societies. But there is no reason to believe that such attempts are always successful. Cortell and Davis have argued that a series of domestic factors affect the degree to which domestic actors' appropriation of international norms leads to changes in state behavior.[76] Particularly important are the domestic salience of norms (i.e., the degree to which an international norm is perceived as legitimate in the domestic arena) and the organization of decision-making authority within the state (the degree of centralization of decision-making processes and the relationship be-

tween state and civil society). In the context of this study, the fact that the executives tended to be quite influential in the field of security meant that, in several instances, NATO-socialized decision makers were able to carry out a series of reforms aimed at implementing internationally prescribed norms in the area of defense. Indeed, in the case of Romania in particular, the pro-reform government that came to power in 1996 resorted to so many executive orders in an attempt to bypass domestic opponents and pass the legislation prescribed by NATO that they were often accused of governing in a non-democratic manner. There were, however, a series of instances, both in the Czech Republic and in Romania, where the implementation of international norms was delayed or obstructed by strong domestic opponents.

As regards the domestic salience of norms, we shall see that the persistence of attitudes and practices inherited from the Communist era in certain Czech and Romanian circles obstructed the implementation of new norms. For instance, although Romanian and Czech reformers passed a series of laws aimed at improving civilian-military cooperation in the formulation of defense policies, a persisting culture of mistrust between the military and civilian defense experts meant that actual defense practices continued, for a long time, to be inconsistent with the new laws. The problems of norm implementation experienced by the Czech Republic and Romania are powerful reminders that the transmission of international ideas to particular states is always mediated by the domestic politics and structures of those states.