1 Introduction

THE SCENE THAT PLAYED OUT on the television screens of Americans across the nation in April 1992 could have been taken straight out of a film noir on postapocalyptic Los Angeles. With law enforcement officials nowhere to be found, poor minority rioters were shown ravaging the unprotected stores of impoverished neighborhoods, pelting passing White motorists with stones and debris, and torching select establishments in angry reaction to the injustices of ghetto poverty and the American justice system. On the other end, gun-toting Korean immigrant merchants, in a desperate attempt to protect their lifetime investments, stood defiantly on the rooftops of buildings and dared looters to rob them of their American Dream. Unaffected outside observers mostly remember the riots as the event when African Americans took to the streets to protest the unjust exoneration of four White police officers caught on videotape beating up an unarmed Black motorist. For those who read a little deeper, the riots may also conjure up images of a Korean immigrant storeowner, Soon Ja Du, who shot a black teenage girl in a dispute over a bottle of orange juice. This was one version of the story that the news media would continue to replay in decontextualized soundbites of conflict, lawlessness, and chaos and one that would be contested in years to come. Yet as most pundits will assert, the reality, both past and present, is much more complex.

Whereas most Americans may vividly recall the days leading up to the 1992 civil unrest, Korean immigrants have had to overcome not only the shock of a past in ruins, but the heavy burden of a future to rebuild. Caught between the Black and Latino ghettoes of South Central Los Angeles and the la-la dreamland of Hollywood, the storefronts and mini-malls of Koreatown suffered the worst of the rioters' wrath, with Korean business owners losing

several hundred million dollars worth of property. However, numbers alone cannot convey the long history of struggle and sacrifice that had gone into building these businesses and the dreams that evaporated with their destruction. As renowned Korean American scholar, Elaine Kim (1993), tragically describes it, the 1992 upheavals became the day when Korean Americans relived their *han*, which is best translated as the "sorrow and anger that grows from the accumulated experiences of oppression." She laments:

> Seeing those buildings in flames and those anguished Korean faces, I had the terrible thought that there would be no belonging and that we were, just as I had always suspected, a people destined to carry our han around with us, wherever we went in the world. The destiny that had spelled centuries of extreme suffering from invasion, colonization, war, and national division had smuggled itself into the U.S. with our baggage. (215)

To survey the ever-expanding domain of Koreatown now, one can hardly imagine that the three days of rioting that hit the enclave community could have so completely overturned the lives of countless Korean store owners and their employees and caused many immigrants to overhaul their faith in the American Dream. The charred remains of looted stores, the furious explosion of century-old grievances and poverty unaddressed, the reverberating silence of law enforcement and government officials, and the soulful wails of dreams forsaken seem to be long forgotten as residents and business owners tend to the economic exigencies of day-to-day survival. From the dark pit of loss and despair grow the seeds of a new institutional empire—a dizzying array of restaurants, pool halls, hot spas, and golf ranges—that extend way beyond the boundaries that once contained them. Unlike its predecessor, the new Koreatown boasts strong roots in an ethnic community dispersed, at the same time it draws strength from the multiracial neighborhood around it. In the end, the resilient spirit of Korean immigrants built on centuries of oppression and domination in their ancestral land and the subsequent resurrection of new businesses and organizations in post-1992 Koreatown may appear to have wiped away most physical traces of the 1992 civil unrest, or "pok-dong" (riots) as more embittered Korean Americans call it.

But underneath the hustle and bustle of everyday life, the wounds run deep and the lessons are not so easily forgotten for Korean Americans, both young and old. Among other things, the events of 1992 preceded a broader transformation in the political consciousness and internal power structures of the

Korean American community. Having been left to defend themselves at the height of the crisis, Korean immigrants learned the painful lesson that blind dependency on the Seoul government in Korea, marked indifference to the society around them, and unconditional donations to local politicians would not earn them the respect and stature they needed to demand outside protection and prevent future calamities within the community. The series of politically tumultuous events thus mobilized the community into action and forced the leadership to reconsider its tenuous relationship with the outside world. In the aftermath, the immigrant and American-born Korean leadership have taken various steps to forge stronger relations with local government and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officials and gain better representation within the media. Responding to the heated confrontations with African Americans before and during the riots, Korean Americans have also begun to reacquaint themselves with the neighborhoods around them and acquire the skills to communicate and collaborate with their Black and Latino neighbors.

The conflicts between Korean merchants and Black patrons and the victimization of Korean immigrants during the riots made many Americans first aware of the presence of Korean Americans in their midst and, in the process, paved the way for new leaders and organizations to establish their presence in the American political scene. Korean American leaders have been able to command the full attention of their American counterparts and tap into strong networks of support that have enabled them to run for elected office or get appointed on local, state, and national levels. Between 1987 and 1992, a notable fifteen Korean Americans were included on electoral ballots from the city council to the House and the Senate, seven of whom were elected to office (Cha 1994). The most distinguished government positions to be offered to Korean Americans include the 1992 election of Jay Kim to Congress and President Bill Clinton's 1997 appointment of Angela Oh to the Advisory Board on the President's Initiative on Race.

Over time, Korean Americans have increasingly learned to carve their own ethnic niche within the arena of mainstream politics. Community-based organizations that could once barely afford to manage a full-time staff have been taking in millions of dollars of postriot funds to implement ambitious programs on youth leadership, economic development, and interracial cooperation. Where there was once silence, the mainstream media has now taken an avid interest in everything from the residential patterns of the Korean community to the proliferation of Koreatown enterprises to protest

campaigns within the enclave. Meanwhile, immigrant and American-born Koreans have joined ranks to launch massive voter registration drives and advocate for new redistricting plans that will consolidate the electoral power of a divided Koreatown. When all else fails, some of the more militant Korean Americans have found both the courage and the backing to mount aggressive but peaceful protest demonstrations against city hall, the media, the LAPD, and even fellow Korean Americans.

More recent events in international politics since September 11, 2001, have added fuel to collective activism among Korean Americans, young and old. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address declared an unofficial campaign against the "three axes of evil," including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The address represented the culmination of three decades of fluctuating tensions in U.S.-North Korea relations, ever since Korea had been divided in half after World War II. Although activism in homeland politics began long before these events, mounting tensions in U.S.-North Korea relations, increasing resentment of U.S. military occupation in South Korea, and the persistence of prodemocratic and labor rights movements in the ancestral land have raised Korean American consciousness of political activities abroad.

Political visibility and awareness has been accompanied by the rise of new political leadership better able to mediate the racially diversifying population of Koreatown and assert its position within mainstream society without losing sight of their coethnic[1] constituency. Aside from transforming the worldview of existing ethnic leadership, the internal disruptions have introduced organizational actors among the younger, English-speaking generation of Korean Americans who have been able to foster new relationships with mainstream institutions of power and create solid alliances with other racial and ethnic communities. Ethnic-based organizations like these that can bridge multiple communities of interest are becoming almost a necessity, especially for ethnic enclaves in multicultural cities that have been changing in a way that their early immigrant predecessors could never have imagined. In so doing, these newly emerging ethnic organizations have raised new possibilities for organizing the diversifying population of Koreatown and have completely transformed the fragmenting political landscapes of the broader ethnic community.

Nevertheless, calls for political action have posed as many challenges as they have opened up windows of opportunity. Rather than underlining the

community's collective solidarity amid crisis, organizational responses to these different issues have highlighted the complex nature of intergenerational tensions in ethnic power structures like this. This book is a study on the way these bridging ethnic organizations are able to cultivate ethnic political solidarity despite increasing residential dispersal, class polarization, and generational clashes within the ethnic community. As they integrate into American society, how do these Korean American organizations justify and maintain strong relations with the immigrant-dominated ethnic population? Who represents this steadily diversifying Korean American community and, conversely, whose interests do these organizations represent? Who are their friends and who are their enemies? What compelling interests or ideologies will bring the next generation of middle-class Korean Americans back to the ethnic community? What kind of relationships should they nurture with their African American and Latino neighbors? Should this be a story of growth and power or a story about social justice?

Straddling the Generational Divide

Indeed, the fate of ethnic communities in general may depend on bridging organizations like these that help to facilitate the transition from immigrant to ethnic-based mainstream politics. Numerous studies have shown that the long-term integration of immigrants is contingent upon the capacity of neighborhoods, workplaces, and institutional structures to create extensive networks with mainstream groups and institutions (Fernandez-Kelly 1995). Along with occupation and education, political action is one of the channels through which immigrants and their children enter into the organized structures of mainstream society. Organizations must reach out to noncoethnic organizations in order to gain access to new sources of information, resources, and other opportunities unavailable within the ethnic community, thus broadening their potential to enact social change. Such organizations also create bridges by providing the knowledge, resources, and networks necessary for socioeconomic mobility through culturally appropriate channels and instilling in their membership the cultural norms and values of "American society." And more importantly, outside institutional linkages also help ethnic organizations to establish their political presence within mainstream society.

The increasing embeddedness of ethnic community-based organizations into the institutional structures of American society raises new questions about the salience of ethnicity among future generations of Asian Americans.

Although theorists have recognized the continuing significance of racial political solidarity for Black and Latino communities, there have been few studies that have analyzed how post-1965 Asian immigrant communities are able to sustain ethnic political solidarity amid increasing generational cleavages, class polarization, and residential dispersal. The possibility of maintaining ethnic solidarity without residential concentration has become a particularly poignant one, considering the rapid pace at which Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian American groups have achieved socioeconomic mobility and spread out into diverse residential settings. There is growing literature on the role of mainstream politics in shaping the development and political integration of immigrant organizations into the host society,[2] but there are relatively few works that have looked at political organizations, relationships, and inequality *within* ethnic opportunity structures. In this light, ethnic community-based organizations may better help us to understand what happens with generational transitions in political leadership.

The main interest of this book lies in ethnic organizations primarily led and operated by the 1.5/second generations. These generations, respectively, refer to those children of immigrants who were either born in Korea and educated in the United States or were born and raised as Americans. Such organizations are to be differentiated from traditional ethnic organizations run by first generation immigrants, such as the Korean-American Federation, which dominated ethnic politics in the early years of Korean American history. Whereas the old ethnic organizations are almost exclusively comprised of Korean-speaking immigrants and have stronger ties with the homeland, new ethnic organizations are comprised primarily of English-speaking and bilingual 1.5/second generation members, who have adopted different strategies and ways of approaching issues in the Koreatown community. Furthermore, these types of organizations have taken on more significant roles in Asian America in recent years, as a result of demographic and structural shifts in post-1965 ethnic communities in the United States.[3] Because of their ties to both the ethnic community and mainstream society, these newly emerging organizations have played a crucial bridging function within ethnic organizational structures.

While immigrant organizations may take on some of these responsibilities, 1.5/second generation-led organizations are the more ideal conduits for such bridging social networks because of their greater English-speaking ability, cultural and political knowledge of mainstream bureaucratic systems, and

institutional ties to outside groups and organizations. Although bicultural in nature, not all 1.5/second generation organizations are necessarily "bridging organizations" since some groups may maintain themselves through funds and support networks garnered within the ethnic community, focus almost exclusively on coethnic staff and clientele, and function with little support from mainstream institutions. Alternatively, there are 1.5/second generation organizations that draw heavily on outside support networks and serve a racially mixed clientele, especially in diverse cities like Los Angeles. In contrast, all bridging organizations rely on both ethnic and mainstream institutions for some degree of support.

In particular, there are two ideal types of bridging organizations among the 1.5/second generation that unify communities whose residential, entrepreneurial, institutional, and social structures are not bounded by space. *Translocal ethnic organizations* are what we typically refer to as "national ethnic organizations" that have one corporate headquarters along with various membership and affiliate branches scattered in different cities throughout the nation. Although the different branches may solicit support from mainstream organizations, these types of organizations tend to depend less on local non-coethnic residents for their core membership and clientele and focus more of their efforts on bringing together coethnic members across local, regional, and national boundaries based on a conventional framework of ethnic political solidarity. Among other things, national organizations will share resources and sponsorship and hold conferences that bring together its multiple branches. Examples of translocal organizations within the Koreatown community include the Korean American Coalition (KAC); the National Korean American Service and Education Consortium (NAKASEC); and Korean Health, Education, Information and Research Center (KHEIR), all of which have Korean American membership branches in different locations.

In contrast, *geoethnic organizations* tend to construct more dynamic and flexible frameworks of ethnic solidarity that accommodate to the diversifying context of the geographically bounded enclave upon which they depend. These organizations do not usually have national branches or centralized corporate headquarters from which they can draw resources and support. As such, geoethnic organizations firmly maintain their core leadership and political culture within the ethnic community but may strategically expand their membership and clientele base to include other racial/ethnic populations in the local neighborhood. Although they do straddle both ideal types,

the two organizations in this research, the Korean Youth and Community Center (KYCC) and Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates (KIWA), have come to be considered geoethnic bridging organizations. For the purposes of convenience, I loosely use the term *bridging organizations* to refer to geoethnic organizations throughout the book.

Both KYCC and KIWA are relatively liberal 1.5/second generation Korean American organizations that took center stage in the politics of the ethnic community through ties with mainstream institutions after the 1992 civil unrest. This is where most of their similarities end. Aside from their prominent status within post-1992 Koreatown politics, the case studies were selected to represent two distinct organizational structures that have established strategically distinct relations with the immigrant elite and have thus relied on different bases of organizational support both within and outside the Korean American community. These organizations were not intended to be comparative case studies but to represent different ways in which 1.5/second generation bridging organizations have been politically integrated into ethnic power structures. Most of the liberal 1.5/second generation organizations in Koreatown generally fall in a continuum between these two organizations in terms of their relations with the immigrant leadership. This book will show how these new organizational frameworks of ethnic political solidarity offer important venues for organizing diverse segments of the Korean American and Koreatown community in a manner that most effectively enables them to achieve their political agenda.

The first case study, the KYCC, is a nonprofit social service agency that was originally established in 1975 to service economically disadvantaged youths and their families but has expanded its programs to encompass a variety of other health, advocacy, community, business, housing, and employment-related services. The organization is led by a strong executive board primarily (but not exclusively) comprised of Korean Americans and a long line of 1.5/second generation Korean American executive directors. The staff members are dominated by 1.5/second generation Korean Americans but with a growing body of non–Korean Americans, including non–Korean Asian Americans, African Americans, and Latinos. The clientele includes both Korean and Latinos from the Koreatown neighborhood, depending on the program. Located in the upper tiers of ethnic organizational structures, KYCC has made a name for itself among established organizations and the ethnic elite of Koreatown, as well as politicians and corporations in mainstream society. Despite occasional intergenerational conflicts on community-related issues, KYCC has

struggled to maintain relatively stable relations with immigrant community leaders and business owners through its governing board.

Founded in March 1992, the second organization, KIWA, has worked to organize, empower, and advocate for workers in the Koreatown community through legal assistance, protest demonstrations, educational seminars, and other political activities. The organization has maintained a semidemocratic governing structure of staff members, only partly dominated by 1.5/second generation Korean Americans along with a mix of non–Korean Asian Americans and Latinos, depending on the time period in question. So far, the executive directorship has been occupied by two 1.5 generation Korean American male leaders with a history of activism in leftist politics. Reflecting the demographics of Koreatown workers, the organization's clientele has a good balance of Korean immigrants and Latino immigrants. Although actively working with Korean immigrant workers in the community, the organization has been known to butt heads with immigrant powerholders because of its leftist stance on various social issues and publicized struggles against Korean business owners. As a result of tensions with the ethnic elite, KIWA has found alternative sources of support with progressive Korean American organizations, American labor unions, progressive racial and ethnic groups, and activist organizations in Korea and Mexico.

Residential Propinquity and Ethnic Solidarity

The processes of migration require that immigrants uproot themselves from the security of jobs, homes, families, and friends in their homelands and move to foreign societies that are oftentimes hostile to immigrants. Such social and economic shifts can have a dislocating effect on the emotional and material lives of new immigrants. Generally, most scholars agree that ethnic-based organizations are instrumental to the early stages of immigrant adaptation by re-creating a sociocultural environment that is friendly to incoming migrants; by establishing an institutionalized setting within which members can share information, resources, and other forms of assistance; and by offering a self-enclosed sanctuary away from the exclusionary practices of native groups. The institutional infrastructure of the enclave lays the foundations upon which immigrants and their children create and maintain strong ties with other members of the surrounding ethnic community. Hence, ethnic political solidarity itself is in many ways predicated on the common values and interests that arise from residential proximity and intersecting life chances.

Immigration scholars have long attested to the significance of institutional development in tempering the disruptive effects of immigration and hence consolidating the fates of ethnic groups in deteriorating urban neighborhoods. Drawing on the experiences of early-twentieth-century European immigrants, Robert E. Park and his colleagues from the Chicago School of Race and Ethnicity depicted urban spaces as emerging from a natural competition among different social groups that would ultimately assemble people with common social characteristics into distinct but interdependent ecological niches within the city. The scholars (Burgess 1925) viewed the city as "a mosaic of little worlds which touch but do not interpenetrate (40)," segregated partly by the desire of groups to maintain their own "moral order" through independent social and political organizations. Like the segregated ghettoes of native-born African Americans, immigrant enclaves were generally situated in dilapidated sections of the city, nestled in between the central business district and more racially integrated, middle-class neighborhoods on the fringes.

Ethnic enclaves were conceptualized as socially and spatially bound areas occupied by immigrants whose low-income status, residential segregation, and lack of effective modes of transportation rendered them highly dependent on the institutional structures of the local neighborhood in the early stages of migration. Unlike their African American counterparts, European immigrants were able to resurrect homeland social structures and shape their neighborhood surroundings in a way that sustained strong networks of support, preserved the cultural traditions of their homeland, and facilitated the adaptation and mobility of second generation youth. The immigrant colony was built like a "transplanted village," containing all the ethnic institutions that are integral to living in a society, including businesses, churches, media, and mutual aid organizations (Park 1950). Ethnic-based organizations offered immigrants a variety of social services and cultural resources, a space for building social relationships, and resources for finding jobs and housing within the spatial confines of the enclave.

These ethnic institutions are considered to be important vehicles for adaptation into the host society because of their capacity to provide ethnic support networks and culturally sensitive services that aid immigrants in adjusting to their new environment. Common values and interests emerging from shared economic situations, cultural isolation, and day-to-day interactions reaffirm a general sense of ethnic cohesion within the transplanted community. Im-

migrants and their children rely on this type of familiar support structure to find psychological fulfillment, social support, and overall security living in a physically declining urban neighborhood while gradually acculturating into a new society. For this reason, those populations that are part of ethnic communities with highly developed social and economic infrastructures are shown to be better adapted to their surrounding environment than those that lack any ties to an institutionally developed enclave.

However, assimilation scholars generally do not make a broader connection between the institutional development of an ethnic enclave and the persistence of ethnic solidarity among the children of immigrants. Because ethnic distinctions are based on the constraints imposed by economic marginality and social isolation, theorists have argued that residential mobility, acculturation, and racial intermixing will inevitably dissolve mutual interests and those relationships created within the ethnic enclave. Over time, the children of immigrants broaden their primary relationships with other racial/ethnic groups and become increasingly incorporated into the social cliques, clubs, and institutions of mainstream society (Gordon 1964). Those who achieve higher status are predicted to move out into better neighborhoods and relinquish their old ties for the promises of individual success (Massey 1985; Ward 1989).[4] Although ethnic groups may become part of the mainstream in their own way and at their own pace, ethnic differences along with their associated social ties and cultural traditions do eventually lose their relevance in the day-to-day lives of immigrants and their children, who choose to improve their individual situations within mainstream opportunity structures (Alba and Nee 2003). Once these groups move into outlying middle-class neighborhoods and begin to intermix equally with other racial groups, ethnic-specific problems faced by immigrants and their children will dissipate as the advantages of assimilation increase and future generations find more effective avenues of empowerment through mainstream American institutions.

Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of today's immigrant population has caused some scholars to give pause on earlier assumptions about the incorporation of ethnic groups into American society, primarily because they do not all start out on equal footing. Some immigrants migrate with substantial resources and skills, build vibrant enclave economies, and are well received by the host society, while less privileged others flee war-torn countries, lack sufficient capital, and are met with hostility because of their distinguishing physical features. Unlike early European immigrants, the children of Asian

and Latino immigrants today are also socialized into diverse neighborhood contexts—from middle-class White neighborhoods to ethnic enclaves to poor minority ghettos—and are thus exposed to different opportunity structures, ethnic support systems, and peer influences. Depending on the context of their migration and their incorporation into the host society, immigrants and their children may consequently find that ethnicity may be a personal option, a means to achieve upward mobility, or a source of social stigma (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). In other words, ethnic solidarity does not necessarily hinder the socioeconomic progress of second generation children; instead, preexisting ethnic networks and communities may be integral in off-setting some of the negative effects of acculturating into diverse neighborhood contexts.

To address these weaknesses, some scholars have begun to place greater emphasis on the ability of more resource-rich immigrant groups to respond to the structural conditions of the receiving society by creating alternative ladders of social mobility through the enclave economy. From this perspective, ethnic organizations have the capacity to facilitate the socioeconomic mobility of ethnic groups, compensate for structural deficiencies in the local neighborhood environment (for example, schools), and contribute to the long-term integration of future generations into mainstream society. Research suggests that the information, resources, and assistance derived from ethnic media, banks, churches, after-school programs, mutual aid associations, and businesses may actually help ethnic groups to overcome some of the disadvantages associated with marginal social status and residential isolation in low-income urban communities and eventually achieve middle-class status. In other words, institutions create new ethnic-based opportunity structures and hence alternative opportunities for mobility for both immigrants and their children.

These scholars contend that the ethnic enclave economy can offer a different mode of socioeconomic incorporation for immigrants, who experience cultural and structural disadvantages in mainstream labor markets (Light and Bonacich 1988; Portes and Stepick 1993; Zhou 1992). More specifically, new immigrants can seek greater financial returns for their skills, education, and knowledge in the long term by taking on jobs or owning small businesses in the ethnic enclave than through low-paying, dead-end jobs in the secondary labor market. The ethnic enclave economy also creates a crucial stepping stone for low-skilled workers by endowing them with invaluable training and coethnic support in exchange for their labor in ethnic-owned firms. From this

vantage point, the institutional vitality of the enclave contributes to the economic goals of its residents and is thus seen as a vehicle for socioeconomic mobility, above all else.

In turn, a community's level of social organization, or what Breton (1964) calls its "institutional completeness," facilitates the individual's interpersonal integration into the host society. The more equipped an ethnic community is able to provide for the fundamental needs of their members, the less likely those immigrants and their children will need to depend on social relationships outside their respective communities. By offering structural support for ethnic cohesion, immigrants within such institutionally developed communities are more likely to cultivate ethnic attachments and remain culturally distinct from outside groups, even as their secondary integration within the workplace, school, and political settings gradually encourages them to participate in the broader society.

Needless to say, the ability of immigrant populations to cultivate a strong institutional structure depends heavily on the resource base of the ethnic community. Ethnic enclave economies are semiautonomous, highly specialized, and capital-rich economies that provide valuable jobs, capital, and resources to members of the ethnic community. Because of the immense socioeconomic heterogeneity of post-1965 immigration, however, ethnic communities vary greatly in terms of their ability to sustain such economically active communities. Enclaves created by immigrants who came with substantial physical, financial, and human capital, such as the Cubans in Miami, the Koreans in Los Angeles, and the Chinese in New York, have dramatically converted declining urban neighborhoods into thriving ethnic economies. Other enclaves among low-income Mexican, Haitian, and Vietnamese populations that lack entrepreneurial and institutional development have not been as successful in comparison.

The state of the ethnic enclave economy determines the quantity, quality, and heterogeneity of institutions that arise in the neighborhood and, along with it, the ability of ethnic groups to advance their political interests. In turn, community-based organizations are integral components in the production and reproduction of cultural solidarity and ethnic-based networks that drive the ethnic economy. Strong social networks embedded in both the formal and informal institutions of the enclave aid immigrants in their struggle to find jobs, accumulate capital, and promote the economic goals of parents and the educational aspirations of immigrant children. These networks of organiza-

tions and informal relationships enable immigrant groups to live out their day-to-day lives within the confines of ethnic boundaries. Organizations may even help to institutionalize expanding networks that socially link sending communities in the homeland to migrant areas in the receiving society—thus encouraging the flow of not only people but also capital in the form of remittances overseas (Massey et al. 1987). Thus, the more developed the institutional structure of the ethnic enclave, the greater the potential for uplifting the members of the ethnic community.

To be sure, residential clustering and institutional completeness may provide the structural context for organizing and mobilizing around common political interests, but there are several problems with simply applying conventional theories on institutional assimilation to ethnic political solidarity among Koreatown organizations. For one, most studies on immigrant adaptation presume that the common ethnic and class-based (or "eth-class") interests of immigrants are best articulated and sustained within the residential context of the ethnic enclave neighborhood. Ethnic solidarity entails the presence of a spatially concentrated ethnic community from which members can draw resources, build institutions, and act on shared political interests. Without this, there is little reason to preserve ethnic organizations or ethnic political solidarity in general. In the early stages of adaptation, immigrant organizations may take shape around residential and eth-class-based interests, yet these models do not clearly explain why the children of immigrants might continue to stay politically involved in a community that is divided by class, ideological, and generational differences.

Related to this, most theories also assume that resource mobilization is the sole basis for building ethnic institutions—a focus that neglects the noninstrumental appeal of such collective expressions of solidarity. Although interests may certainly play a part in giving rise to such organizations, the purpose of the book is to explore the complexities of ethnic identity formation and the diverse experiences that may draw 1.5/second generations to ethnic community work. Clearly, the strategic ways bridging organizations approach ethnic political solidarity becomes more critical in the case of spatially dispersed populations that would otherwise have little inspiration to "return to the community." Organizations provide the institutional setting within which to shape and regulate the shared ideologies and cultures of affiliates around politicized frameworks of ethnicity, which in turn help to attract, retain, and mobilize the 1.5/second generation members.