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Introduction

On a September evening in 1995, in a dimmed auditorium in Tokyo, I sat listening to a benefit concert sponsored by an organization supporting Song Shin-do, the sole Korean former comfort woman living in Japan to have filed claims against the Japanese government. Midway through the performance, the band receded into the background, as first Song and then a former comfort woman from Korea, Yi Yŏng-su, rose to dance and sing to a rendition of the Korean folk song "Arirang." Soon Yi was on stage alone. Before long, her singing gave way to storytelling. At one point in her narration of her experience of having been forced to sexually service members of the Japanese military, she suddenly wailed "Mother!" in Japanese. The tension in the auditorium was palpable.

Earlier that same day, I had attended a court appearance by Song Shin-do in her suit against the Japanese state. Next I followed along with a group of people, mostly women, to a small room where her lawyers gave a debriefing. The court proceedings were predictably stiff, filled as they were with legal jargon. The explanatory session, in contrast, was lively, and I found myself in immediate agreement with the objective of the case as presented by Song's lawyers: to force the government to acknowledge the right of individuals to make claims against the state for crimes perpe-

trated against them. The concert was the culminating event of a day many had spent carefully planning. When I left the concert hall, I went to a coffee shop with a number of the planners, and as I listened to them, they talked about any number of things, including the remarkable experience of Yi's storytelling. When I finally went home, I continued to ponder how the darkness, the music, and the audience of supporters—many of them Zainichi Koreans, people of Korean descent residing in Japan—had enabled Yi to communicate the depth of her pain in a manner not possible in either of the other forums.[1] I lamented the limited efficacy of legal and political struggles for compensation and apology in helping these victims to overcome their agony. At the same time, I marveled at what this occasion might have made possible for Yi, and indeed for everyone in the auditorium that night.

THE ISSUES

This is a book about the emergence of, and transformations in, discourses of ethnic identity in the literature of Koreans in Japan from the mid-1960s through 2000. I begin with this anecdote rather than with a more standard review of what has been written on the subject because the issues it raises help me to explain why I take the complicated and somewhat unusual approach of weaving together readings of literature and grassroots legal movements in my analysis. I do so in an effort to understand ethnic identity as something experienced in a manner that is deeply internal, psychological, and individual and radically public, political, and communitarian. I begin by highlighting three points revealed in the above story, each of which relates to the intertwined nature of discourses of politics and fiction. Next I step back to say a bit more about who Zainichi Koreans are and how they fit with academic discourses about ethnic diversity in Japan and elsewhere. I expand upon the three points, and I conclude with a brief outline of the chapters to follow.

The first issue that the above story elucidates for us is that Zainichi Koreans' legal activism, although often focused on a particular case, has invariably held goals extending beyond the specific issue at hand, and that even as far as the given matter is concerned, has had important ramifications that reach beyond the courts themselves. Lawsuits like this one

aimed to obtain both monetary compensation and apology for individual comfort women, as mentioned above. At the same time, their lawyers also held the explicit objective of convincing the state to recognize the right of individuals to make claims against it. In addition, this anecdote points to the fact that the legal battles have significant impact regardless of their outcome. For one thing, they and the broader movements surrounding them have attracted media attention and thus have had the ability to expand mainstream awareness of Zainichi concerns. In addition, and crucial for my project, the organizing for these causes has provided a vehicle for individual members of the Korean community to meet one another and sympathetic Japanese (such as those who ferried me along to the trial, concert, and coffee) and in so doing, to transform their sense of who they are. In others, legal movements transform both groups and the people who constitute them.

The next issue this episode highlights is the importance, for both the speaker and the audience, of the telling of life stories. One of my main concerns in this book is to show the pivotal place of the narration of personal experience in both the literary works and legal struggles of Resident Koreans. The lives of those people, real or fictional, often have been taken to stand in for the whole, as is so often the case for representatives of minority groups. The events of their lives, particularly those events somehow shaped by their stance toward their ethnicity, then sparked vibrant discussion over the meanings of being Korean in Japan. As such, I feel that a consideration of Zainichi Korean identity over the past thirty-odd years needs to take into account the specific stories that have come into the public realm and been tossed about together in it. To help me understand the possible significance of this occurrence, I draw upon a growing body of work on narrative, storytelling, and the world of law in the United States. I also take into consideration the specific conditions — economic, cultural, and political — that may have made a focus on identity so popular in late twentieth-century Japan.

Finally, this anecdote draws our attention to the place of sexuality and gender in Resident Korean politics and literature. The comfort woman movement, which began in the 1990s, was the first political struggle addressing sexual and gender discrimination and the first to attract women to activism in droves. In contrast, women began writing as early as the

1970s, and gender and sexuality have always been central to both men and women's literary imaginations of ethnicity. If we read this fiction as decidedly based in reality, or as a peephole into social life, as most readers have, it surely suggests to us that Zainichi women have been dually oppressed—as Koreans and as women. My goal, however, is to get beyond this point. I therefore examine the repeated metaphorical uses of gender and sexuality: pure woman as symbolic of beautiful nation, raped woman as metaphor of oppressed nation, reproduction of children as preservation of culture, heterosexual union with a Japanese as assimilation into Japanese culture, and so on. I then want to ask if ethnicity is always gendered (and sexualized) for Resident Koreans only in the literary imagination. Or, perhaps, do such ideas affect the way that Zainichi people of different genders and sexualities relate to the majority Japanese culture? Are they more or less inclined to want to belong, to become active citizens (in the broadest sense of the term) in that society?

WHO ARE RESIDENT KOREANS?

Zainichi Koreans are not only Japan's only significant immigrant minority but the only substantial population that is a direct legacy of Japan's overseas empire: Japan colonized Korea between 1910 and 1945. Their numbers are uncertain. Official estimates hover around 650,000, but this figure includes only people who are citizens of South Korea or whose foreign registration cards designate their nationality as "Korean," a status comparable to North Korean citizenship.[2] The actual number, however, may be closer to a million. The discrepancy derives from the fact that the government does not keep statistics on the ethnic background of its citizens, and large numbers of people who are either wholly or partly ethnically Korean have obtained Japanese citizenship through naturalization, marriage, or having one parent who is a citizen.[3]

Even at one million, however, Koreans would constitute less than 1 percent of Japan's entire population. If this is a statistically insignificant figure, the community is nonetheless of considerable symbolic importance. It is still one of Japan's largest ethnic minorities (second only to people of Okinawan ancestry, whom some consider ethnically distinct) and, as mentioned, its only major immigrant population. In addition,

although there has been a recent influx from South Korea, the majority of this one million are the descendants of people who came to Japan when Korea was colonized by Japan, and thus Resident Koreans serve as a signal reminder of Japan's militarist past.

One of the most fraught matters for Resident Koreans — unlike Okinawans or Ainu, the ethnic group native to Japan's northernmost island, Hokkaido — is that of citizenship.[4] Under colonial rule, Koreans were citizens of the Japanese empire — second-class citizens (legally and otherwise), but citizens nonetheless. Although the majority of Resident Koreans are descendants of these people, as the above statistics testify, most are not legally Japanese, for Japan grants citizenship based not on place of birth (jus solis) but on parentage (jus sanguinis), and no special dispensation has been given to this community.[5] The laws governing their status, therefore, are less a legacy of colonialism than a sign of the Japanese state's effort to forget this blemish on its past.

At the end of the war, there were roughly two million Koreans in Japan, many of whom had been drafted as laborers to work in mines, munitions factories, and so on; others had been pushed off the land they had farmed and had migrated in search of employment.[6] The vast majority of these Koreans returned to the Korean peninsula as soon as it became possible; roughly 600,000 stayed.[7] Between 1945 and 1952, under the U.S. Occupation of Japan, Koreans' legal status was ambiguous: under the Alien Registration Ordinance passed in 1947 they were designated as "Korean" and were supposed to register as aliens and to carry identification papers, yet they were still considered legally Japanese.[8] It was not until 1952, when the United States and Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and when this ordinance became an official law, that they were unequivocally stripped of their Japanese citizenship.[9]

In fact, although Koreans were allowed to remain in Japan, they had no right to live in Japan legally until 1965, when Japan and South Korea entered into formal diplomatic relations. Even at this point, however, because South Korean citizenship was a prerequisite for the new category of "permanent resident" and many felt either sympathy with North Korea or animosity toward South Korea and thus refused to apply for South Korean citizenship, the right to live in Japan was secured for only a portion of the population.

In addition, these terms applied only to colonial-era immigrants and their offspring, leaving the legal status of subsequent generations to be decided twenty-five years later, that is to say, by 1991. The problem of the status of non–South Korean citizens was finally resolved in 1982. In 1979, Japan ratified the International Human Rights Convention, and in 1981, the Convention on Refugees. In 1982, in order to bring its domestic laws into accordance with these conventions, it passed a new Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which allowed stateless Koreans, such as those with the "Korea" designation, to obtain "general permanent resident" status, and in so doing gave them access to a range of state benefits, including pensions and welfare benefits for children.[10] In 1991, Japan and South Korea passed an addendum to the 1965 treaty agreeing that the right to permanent residence should be extended to those of subsequent generations. Then, in the same year, Japan enacted a new law granting all Resident Koreans — who, as we have seen, had previously been classified under different categories — the new united status of "special permanent residence."[11]

This series of laws reveals something of the postwar Japanese state's attitude toward the presence of people of Korean heritage. Persistent legal exclusion shaped the way that Koreans in Japan defined themselves and the kinds of political rights that they demanded. Although Resident Koreans fought for rights to welfare benefits, rights to live in public housing, and against certain requirements of the Alien Registration Law (in particular its fingerprinting requirement, as we will see in Chapter 4), they did not demand Japanese citizenship itself.[12] In the late 1990s, however, as the process became less of an ordeal, increasing numbers of people began to apply for naturalization. At the same time, however, among the most vibrant struggles were those by noncitizens asserting that they should be allowed to hold government jobs at the management level and to stand for and vote in local elections.[13] In part as a result of this legal history, Resident Koreans have been reluctant to take on Japanese citizenship. One can only speculate whether things might have been different if Japan had offered former colonial subjects citizenship in 1952.

There are of course other reasons for Koreans' perception of naturalization as a form of betrayal. As in Japan, people in Korea have placed a high value on blood relations and have commonly equated citizenship

with ethnicity and race. In addition, in contrast to Germany, for example (this is a common comparison), Japan has been negligent about teaching the postwar generation about its militarist past, including its colonial rule of Korea. Finally, there is the matter of the division of the Korean peninsula, which not only left this diasporic population split in two but encouraged an intensified sense of longing for a utopian wholeness that could be, if only the country were one again.

Several organizations emerged in the early post-1945 era, but for most of its history, the two dominant groups of the Resident Korean Community have been the Zainihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai (Chaeil Chosŏnin Ch'ongryŏnhaphoe in Korean; General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), usually known as simply Sōren (Ch'ongryŏn), and the Zainihon Daikanminkoku Mindan (Chaeilbon Taehanminguk Mindan; Korean Residents Union in Japan), abbreviated Mindan.[14] The former, begun in 1955, successor to several other left-leaning groups founded as early as 1945, sees itself as an "overseas" organization of North Korea; Mindan, in existence since 1946, is composed of South Korean citizens (although membership is not mandatory).[15] Sōren was the more influential by far. Between 1959 and 1967, it helped more than 80,000 Koreans "repatriate" to North Korea.[16] It also educated and employed a significant portion of Resident Koreans: it has its own schools from kindergarten through university, as well as its own publishing house, newspapers, and banks.[17]

Although these organizations played a pivotal role for Zainichi Koreans in the first several decades after the war, Sōren's membership was beginning to decline at the date I begin my study, and Ri Kaisei, the author I examine in the next chapter, was one of those whom the association lost. The attrition rate seems to have increased as information about the true state of affairs in North Korea began to trickle into Japan and out into the world at large. In addition, many who had long been dismayed by South Korea's string of dictatorships began to feel hope in the 1980s as first the student movement, and then a broader democracy movement, burgeoned. These changes, together with the improved living conditions resulting from an improved economy, led many Resident Korean and Japanese students to develop interest in Korean culture and to visit South Korea for travel and study. By the end point of my enquiry, with news of starvation and atrocities in North Korea, Sōren's schools, although trying

to adapt to the times by changing their curriculum, were losing students; its banks were failing, and it was losing members in droves. Indeed, as we shall see, group affiliation in general was on the decline, and with it, an identity shaped by the ideologies of these state-linked organizations.

CHALLENGING THE MYTH OF JAPANESE HOMOGENEITY

By the end of the twentieth century, when I sat in the Tokyo auditorium, what it meant to be Korean in Japan was radically different from what it had meant in 1965, the starting point of my enquiry. This was true not only because of the changes in legal status that I have just outlined. Despite the recession following the economic soar of the 1980s, Japan in the 1990s was still one of the world's most affluent countries, and its problems were those afflicting such nations. Among those included a falling birthrate, an aging population, and a well-educated populace for the most part unwilling to engage in manual labor. This confluence of circumstances led the authorities to overlook an influx of illegal immigrant laborers from Asia (including Korea) and the Middle East, and to make it legal for Nikkeijin (people of Japanese descent) to work in Japan, resulting in the arrival of additional workers from Latin American countries, notably Brazil and Peru. United Nations data suggest that in order to keep the working age population stable through 2050, Japan would need to add approximately 33 million immigrants.[18] As Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu points out, this would make roughly 30 percent of the population foreign-born, and would require the Japanese government (and society) to radically alter policies and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants.[19]

Given such conditions, it is unsurprising that the attitude toward Resident Koreans, sometimes specifically identified as "oldcomers," had shifted. Multiculturalism and diversity, even in the comparatively linguistically, culturally, and ethnically homogeneous nation of Japan, became buzzwords. Academics both inside and outside Japan authored tomes about Okinawans, Ainu, a former outcaste class often referred to in English as Burakumin ("people of the villages"), Japanese-Brazilian return immigrants, and of course, Zainichi Koreans.[20] Many of these works

point out that Japan is more diverse than has typically been acknowledged, and that the ideology of homogeneity purveyed by Japan's state and culture has been oppressive to both its minorities and the Japanese themselves. They also made comparisons with, and drew on models based on the experience of, groups in similar positions outside of Japan.

ZAINICHI KOREANS AS IMMIGRANT ETHNIC, RACIAL MINORITY, AND/OR POSTCOLONIAL POPULATION

That they would do so is unsurprising. The fate of Resident Koreans is important not only for those wishing to understand Japan, but also for those concerned with immigrants, minorities, or so-called postcolonial populations everywhere. Unlike the United States, or even France, Japan is not the home to many immigrants and has not developed a narrative of how one might become Japanese in the way one becomes American or French. Yet the parallels are numerous, and this difference might productively serve to show how mainstream ideology can affect the experience of immigrants.

In a postdoctoral fellowship interview I participated in shortly after I had drafted the first version of this book, a scholar of American literature noted that she thought the creative work of Zainichi Koreans sounded as if it had followed a path analogous to that of Italian, Jewish, and other European immigrants to the United States. She observed that they had engaged in a comparable twisting of literary language and form, in comparable political and cultural resistance to mainstream society, but had ultimately ended up trying to maintain distinctiveness while staking a claim for a place within the national culture. I did not do a good job of responding to her insights, and her comments have stayed with me since. There are certain affinities that I would be foolish to ignore. Like European immigrants to the United States, Korean immigrants can " pass" in Japan. In addition, Resident Koreans have similarly tried to strike a balance between affirming distinct politics, culture, and rituals, and assimilating into the Japanese world around them.

Yet much is obscured by highlighting these affinities. As mentioned above, the society to which Koreans came was nothing like the United States. Not only has there been no immigrant, melting pot, or salad bowl

myth, but, as mentioned, citizenship has been based on blood rather than birthplace, naturalization laws have been famously discriminatory, and Koreans immigrated to Japan as subjects of its empire — an immigration voluntary only in the strictest understanding of that term. The place Koreans came from, too, was signally homogeneous and held nearly identical views of blood and belonging.

Once again, this is not to say that Zainichi Koreans do not, in their lives and their literature, follow a trajectory through conflict to assimilation as has been argued is the case for the experience of European immigrants to the United States, but rather to suggest that this mode of analysis itself is problematic.[21] As Michael Omi and Howard Winant point out in the book that has now become a must-read for all students of race and ethnicity in the United States, *Racial Formation in the United States*, the so-called ethnicity paradigm has a number of significant flaws. One of these is that a form of the paradigm that they call the " bootstraps model" posits that groups do better or less well (that is, integrate/assimilate or do not) according to the " norms" and " circumstances" of the group: " If Chicanos don't do well in school, this cannot even hypothetically, be due to low-quality education; it has instead to do with Chicano values."[22] There is no room for considering not only the unequal distribution of resources, but also their potential cause: discrimination. A second criticism they make is of the fact that such models assume that all minority groups — be they classified what we normally think of as racial (for example, black Americans) or ethnic (for example, Irish) — are seen as equivalent. They acknowledge that the " ethnicity paradigm" has often described blacks' experience as being distinct from other ethnic groups, but " there is something awkward, something one-dimensional, about ethnicity theory's version of Black exceptionalism."[23] Not only is there no recognition of the ethnic diversity among blacks, but, as they go on to argue, other nonwhite immigrants to the United States have been racialized in much the same way that blacks are; hence we speak of Asian Americans, Latin Americans, and Native Americans, brushing aside the significant diversity within these groups.[24]

In the case of Japan, although recent immigrants from Arab countries are racialized, those from Korea are distinguished from those from China just as in the United States, Irish immigrants were distinguished from

English immigrants. What I want to take from Omi and Winant is not so much their specific observation about race, however, because it does not aid us in analyzing the case of Resident Koreans. What does help me is their observation that the dynamic of integration (or nonintegration) of any minority group depends on a myriad of factors including, but not limited to, the host society's attitudes toward that group, the group's internal history, structural factors such as the economy, and finally the relationship between the given group and other such groups within and outside of the country.

This brings me to one of the main points that I want to make here: Zainichi Koreans themselves have at times compared themselves to different oppressed groups around the globe, as we shall see. Several times during my research, people (including the writer Ri Kaisei, whom I discuss in the next chapter) asked me about my own ethnic background, and made "aha!" comments when I mentioned that I am part ethnically Jewish. They then would recount some experience they had reading Jewish literature or history. The critic Suh Kyung-sik, who kindly befriended me during my time in Japan, has written about the Italian Jewish holocaust survivor Primo Levi and was interested in the fact that one of my sisters had studied Italian and was a fan of Levi's writing. He also has a sustained concern for the plight of Palestinians. Kim Ch'ang-saeng, whom I discuss in Chapter 4, talked to me about reading African American writers. As I mention in Chapter 3, the Resident Korean Christian Church, largely through the fostering of Yi In-ha, a Korean-born minister, became involved with the African American church and drew on ideas from the U.S. civil rights movement. Although Christianity never took root in Japan, in Korea, the situation was radically different, and through figures like Yi In-ha, progressive Christian ideas and the support available through church networks trickled into the Zainichi community.

Given the fact that so many Resident Koreans liken their own experience to that of minorities elsewhere (not to mention in Japan), it would be imprudent for me to brush aside such comparisons. In fact, I am intrigued by the way that the people I met and the people I write about do so, and I feel that this part of the story needs to be included. Zainichi Koreans' sense of self has been influenced by what they read and watch

and hear, which in late twentieth-century Japan, is so vast in scope it is impossible to track.

When I began the research for this project in the early 1990s, ideas about postcolonialism were in vogue in the American academy. These ideas had originated in the expansion of English literature to include Commonwealth literature — that is to say, writings in English by people who were residents of places formerly parts of the British empire. Before long, scholars expanded their scope to examine the literature of populations everywhere who were affected by the legacies of colonialism — both colonizers and colonized. In the mid-1990s, when I went to Japan, however, the term had not yet caught on despite its potential applicability. By late in the decade, it was everywhere, and we find in print scholars of Zainichi literature like Ri Takanori advocating the use of the term for Resident Koreans.[25] In 2002, at the Association for Asian Studies, respondent Lisa Yoneyama asked me and my copanelists why we had not taken up the body of work on the subject or used this term to help us describe Resident Korean culture. On occasion, I do use this term, and I do draw on postcolonial criticism. In fact, I think those who study postcolonialism will have much to gain from learning about Koreans in Japan.

Postcolonialist critics frequently have portrayed the world as divided into two distinct camps: the white, Christian, Euro-American, quick-to-modernize colonizers, and everyone else. This scheme may work fine for understanding the modernizing process of much of the world, but Japan does not fit into it so well. Japan, although it too is a colonial power, has sometimes been lumped together with those oppressed by imperialist modernity. As Iwabuchi Kōichi points out, in his book *Culture and Imperialism* Edward Said refers to Japan "predominantly as a non-Western, quasi–Third World nation which has been a victim of Western (American) cultural domination."[26] Surely this is because the Japanese, like the Koreans (and others) they oppressed, are nonwhite and traditionally non-Christian, and they came to modernity and capitalism later than other imperialist states. It was only after the threat of being colonized by the United States that Japan embarked on its own imperial ventures. The relationship between Japan and Korea, in other words, has long been triangulated by the "west" generally and the United States specifically. We

must be careful, then, not to overlook the equally important influence on Zainichi Koreans of that country more usually thought of as imperialist, both culturally and politically: the United States. It does not loom as large or as negatively as Japan itself, but as for other residents of the islands, it is a towering presence. At the same time, we must not lump the experience of Koreans, Zainichi or otherwise, together with Japanese. Japan was an imperialist state, and the legacies of that fact persist to this day. For these reasons, postcolonial theories alone will not suffice to explain the diverse ways in which Koreans and Japan have defined themselves both politically and culturally.

What is invaluable for me in postcolonial criticism is that it attempts to locate individual human agency, and that it does so, in many cases, by examining literary and other texts produced by oppressed peoples. Following Edward Said's *Orientalism* and Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, most scholars have acknowledged the importance of discourse in the nation's, and the empire's, ability to rule. As a consequence, scholars writing about ethnic and/or postcolonial minorities have championed the place that narratives—and particularly fictional narratives of alternative identities—have both in making possible and in challenging the dominant political forms of the modern era, nation-state, and empire. This book focuses on literary works that do just that: propose and produce identities that counter the hegemonic ideology of the Japanese nation.

On the other hand, intense focus on literary works can sometimes make it appear that these texts alone monopolize national discourse, or worse, that discourse alone controls the functioning of the political world, even when the critic believes no such thing. Although I believe firmly in the power of literature (and discourse more generally), I want to situate my analysis of it in relationship to what I see as a distinct, extradiscursive reality to which language, and even literature, can help give us access. In this book, I therefore strive to show that Resident Koreans' literary works forced a redefinition of the place of this minority within the Japanese nation, but not on their own. I want to show instead that this literature is important because it has worked in a symbiotic relationship with political discourse and action, often through the legal sys-

tem, to effect a change in this community's legal status as defined by the postwar Japanese state.

POLITICS AND LITERATURE, LAW AND LIFE STORIES

I now finally return to the issues I raised in the beginning of the chapter. The first two of these—the broad meanings of legal activism for members of the community and the importance of individual life narratives—meld together here into a single concrete point. The stories of individual people stand out everywhere: in literary works, trial transcripts, the newsletters of grassroots struggles, and books about all of these. Those stories, and the multitude of abstract ideas associated with them, including legal reasoning, come together to paint an intricate but remarkable coherent mural of the diverse ways that Resident Koreans formed identities in the decades I examine. I first learned of Resident Koreans through the newspaper and was outraged by the political oppression I read about, often in the form of stories about individuals. However, as I invariably do when I want to learn about a foreign place or a different time, I went to literature. And as is so often the case, it helped me understand how the individuals whose experiences diverged so much from my own had made sense of their own world. Although studying literature is what I do for a living, I still read for more basic reasons—for pleasure, in search of knowledge, to help me unravel the quagmire of life. I want to keep in mind that these are among the reasons ordinary folk pick up volumes of fiction and poetry. I strive for an analysis that does not forget this sort of passionate engagement with literature.

If I myself had first read Zainichi fiction to learn, as I began to do research, I discovered that contemporary readers, both Japanese and Resident Korean, had done so as well. As a consequence, in the time period I examine, there is a striking amount of mutual influence between the literary and the political, particularly in the form of legal struggles for civil rights. Literature played a key role, I argue, in enabling these people to recognize their own agency. Fiction allowed Koreans to see their lives as having meaning, even beauty; it gave Japanese insight into how it felt to contend with prejudice. Legal struggles fed off such literature: lawyers not only called fiction writers as expert witnesses but learned to use the

narrative structure of fiction, telling life stories with emotional conviction in order to persuade the judge of the claims of litigants. Literature fed off legal battles in turn: writers turned legal material into literary themes and manipulated pithy phrases used by legal activists. By toying, twisting, and misusing words and linguistic forms, they undermined the seeming immutability of the laws and practices that refused to recognize Koreans' right to live in Japan. If literary texts refer to and make points about economic, social, and political belonging, the political documents not only refer to specific authors but use strategies found in their narratives — particularly that of telling the individual life story — to argue their case. The mutual influence between these realms is stunning.

Although it is surely possible to find ways that literature and politics feed off one another in any place and at any time, in this instance, the two are particularly closely intertwined. I return here for a moment to the central assumption of the postcolonial theorists. In my own words, it is thus: imperialist states used discourse to bolster material methods of control, and the legacies of discursive control are still alive today despite the dismantling of colonial governments. As a consequence of the complicated intertwining of material and discursive control, for postcolonial peoples to become truly liberated, they must engage in activism of the body and of language. It is natural, then, that for Resident Koreans, who as a postcolonial (immigrant minority) people have been oppressed by both state policies *and* the national culture, would find literature and grassroots activism to be of a piece.

When I examine the literature of the Resident Korean community in the pages that follow, I do so with great concern with how certain individuals came to see themselves as having historical agency. It is as important to understand why and how people acted politically as it is to know that they did so. Therefore as I trace the legal activism of the community, I analyze the rich texts which opened people's eyes to, in Herbert Marcuse's words, the "imperative: 'things must change.'"[27] More specifically, I try to unearth the concrete ways in which literature enables people to see that what seem like fixed structures — for example, institutions — are in fact mutable. I take to heart the insight of Raymond Williams that "art is never itself in the past tense" because it takes on new meanings every time people read it, and because it affirms and reaffirms

the primacy of personal life, in which change is of the element.[28] In addition — and this point overlaps with Marcuse's ideas — there is potential in the fact that literature often concerns itself with " experiences to which the fixed forms do not speak at all."[29] This is true because the aesthetic " is in large part a protest against the forcing of all experience into instrumentality ('utility'), and of all things into commodities."[30]

I see just such a dynamic at work in the history I examine. As I mentioned when explaining the anecdote with which I began this chapter, individual life stories are a preeminent feature of Zainichi literature and, perhaps more surprisingly, grassroots politics. Williams's assertion helps me to suggest how literary works may have roused people to activism. Delving into the growing body of texts exploring the place of narrative within the law then furnishes us with reasoning for why legal activists may have decided to bring literary strategies into the political arena.[31] A number of scholars, for example, observe that the telling of human stories has been used effectively by minority populations in particular, but that more generally it has been useful for " countermajoritarian argument . . . [as] a way of saying, you cannot understand until you have listened to our story."[32] In the chapters to follow, I will show how Zainichi activists used such a strategy, perhaps having learned from this style of argumentation as used by minorities in the United States, but certainly also having taken note of the communicative power of the fiction and autobiography of fellow Resident Koreans.

GENDER AND SEXUALITY

There are of course multiple discrepancies between the narratives of fiction and those of politics. This fact is most evident when we examine the place of gender and sexuality in each. As I mentioned above, until recently, women and their concerns seldom appeared in political activism, histories of the community, or discussions of ethnic identity. In contrast, women have always played a central role in literature. Their representation is often interwoven with that of sexuality, in the form of reproduction, prostitution, masochism, rape, masturbation, and incest. In my analysis of specific works, therefore, not women broadly speaking, but

women's sexuality, a sexuality devoid of pleasure and often warped by violence, comes to the fore.

Both men and women use instances of sexuality metaphorically. For example, they may use rape to stand in for the oppression of the Korean people, or childbearing to refer to the reproduction of Korean culture. At the same time, writers of both genders have tended to base their fiction on real-life experience; however, men write as witnesses to their mother's experiences, whereas women write of their own. In political realms, where men's voices long predominated, we find a similar trend. To the extent that sexuality as served as metaphor rather than representation of the real, it has had the effect of making Zainichi women's particular oppression as women invisible. Even today some male politicians continue to deploy the discourse of women's victimization as a sign of the general oppression of Koreans under colonial rule. However, they do so in a changed context. As a result, both the shifts in global discourses of sexual crimes and the disclosure of historic, state-sponsored brutality against women activists have found tools for understanding and naming this violence and seeking legal amends.

In doing so, however, women are not engaging in Zainichi activism in the same way that men did. The abstract Zainichi Korean — both in discussions of identity and in concrete legal struggles — generally has been ungendered. What this most often really means — as has been pointed out by feminists in the United States beginning in the 1970s of African Americans and other minorities — is that it is male. In the case of the fictional narratives I examine, however, this is not the case; the protagonist is always a man or a woman, usually matching the gender of the author. On the most literal level, the characters relate to Japanese or Zainichi culture in ways determined by their gender; metaphorically and thematically, too, as mentioned above, works can be divided on gender lines.

This is not at all surprising, for women surely are subject to different legal, economic, and cultural treatment within both Japanese and (Resident) Korean societies. Men and women have different stakes in participating in or excluding themselves from both. Men stand to gain from becoming part of Japan's powerhouse economy, for example; women do not to the same degree. Women have less to lose by giving up all associ-

ated with Korea, for women's position in Korean culture is usually thought to be even more subordinate than in Japanese. It behooves us to keep this fact in mind as we ponder the ways that Resident Koreans choose to join or reject affiliation with various groups.

THE CHAPTERS

My account is roughly chronological. In the next chapter, I analyze the literature of Ri Kaisei, who in 1971 was the first non-Japanese writer to win the prominent Akutagawa prize. I juxtapose his fiction with debates surrounding a crime by a man named Kim Hŭi-ro in 1968, which was made a spectacle of and catapulted Zainichi Koreans into the mainstream Japanese media. Both Ri's work and Kim's defense, in which Ri and other intellectuals participated, are obsessed with the question of the way people's perception is shaped by language. Each proposes that the Japanese language denies Koreans dignity because of the nuances associated with the words used to describe them. Ri thus infuses his fiction with the Creole of first-generation immigrants and traditional Korean oral literary forms. Members of Kim's defense cite Frantz Fanon to make the argument that Koreans will only be able to become subjects and not objects of history when they use Korean names and learn Korean language and history. In order for this to be possible, they argue, both Resident Koreans and Japan must change. Of particular interest to me is the extent to which the model of subjectivity they propose is gendered.

In the third chapter, I consider a pair of stories by Kin Kakuei, a contemporary of Ri's, and a battle against employment discrimination often called the first citizens' movement by Koreans in Japan. Both Kin's fiction and this struggle confront the stark reality faced by this community: they are neither purely Korean nor purely Japanese and are condemned to face discrimination from both sides. Each asserts the importance of becoming full-fledged members of Japanese society but at the same time attempts to challenge its developmentalist system of values.

Two women based in Osaka, Chong Ch'u-wŏl and Kim Ch'ang-saeng, who have published from the 1970s through the present, are the subject of the fourth chapter. Their work explicitly and implicitly comments on the best-known Resident Korean grassroots movement, which in 1986

succeeded in winning the repeal of a fingerprinting requirement stipulated in the Alien Registration Law. Many Koreans saw the fingerprinting system as a symbol of the state's view of Koreans as potential criminals who needed monitoring, not as equal participants in a democratic society. Although the movement attracted international attention, its core philosophy was one of local action, and employees of the local government offices where fingerprints were taken joined the fight. These women's texts likewise focus on the local, specifically on women in Ikaino, the Korean neighborhood in Osaka. Both the antifingerprinting movement and their work honor individual experience and propose ways to identify in Japan but not with Japan the nation.

In the fifth chapter, I turn to the fiction of Yi Yang-ji. I analyze her texts in relation not to a social movement but to two general trends: first, that within Japanese mainstream literature toward a focus on interiority; second, that within the Resident Korean community toward a self-definition based on culture rather than politics. In particular, I concentrate on Yi's literary appropriation of Korean shamanism and her portrayal of characters who challenge prevalent ideologies of women's sexuality by engaging in sex for money, receiving financial support from married lovers, and rejecting motherhood. I do note also the frequency in her work of references to the way people are shaped by the way that educational systems teach them about history, a poignant fact given the prominence during the 1980s of Ienaga Saburō's lawsuits trying to persuade the state to accept his history textbooks, which frankly recounted Japanese aggression in Asia.

In the final chapter, I contemplate the preoccupation with trauma in 1990s Japan. I examine the fiction of Yū Miri and debates surrounding the inclusion of the history of comfort women in middle school textbooks. I propose that Yū's reluctance to engage in debates about the comfort women and her refusal to claim either Resident Koreanness or feminism as a primary identification are central to understanding her texts. Reading her with these facts in mind discourages us from assuming that her fiction, which often treats dysfunctional families and child sexual trauma, is necessarily a commentary on the discrimination faced by the Resident Korean family or on women's oppression as a result of their gender. We then see that her work instead proposes that much of the real vio-

lence and oppression in Japanese society are rather the result of decades of striving for economic growth.

The chronological history I present does, as I mentioned, track changes in Resident Korean self-definition that parallel the model of ethnic immigrants. I wish to remind the reader once again to pay heed also to what differs from such cases elsewhere: the specificities of the economic, political, and social histories of Japan and Korea, which have so deeply conditioned the manner in which Zainichi Koreans have been able to conceive of themselves as individuals, of their minority community, and of the relationship of each to the many broader communities in which they live.