

## Memory and History in Globalization

Globalization presents two faces. Economically, it is capitalism's expanding cycle of development in the regions outside the capital concentrated metropolises. Politically, it is the continued exercise of imperial domination by the powerful capitalist nations over other nations and regions. What prompted this study of historical narrative and memory is certain historical orientations that have become more visible in the past two decades, tendencies that evolve around the fall of the Berlin Wall and the events of September 11, 2001. In the analysis of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, an imperial paradigm is emerging and set in motion with unprecedented acceleration, rhythm, violence, and momentum.<sup>1</sup> Empire refers to the sweeping idea of "a single power," a supranational sovereignty that presides over and polices conflicting powers in a unitary way. The imperial paradigm is not only about power and domination, but also projects new sets of moral authority and norms that everybody has to follow in order to live with the neighbors: it is "a new notion of right, or rather a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts."<sup>2</sup>

Although it seems prematurely utopian to have high expectations for a supranational juridical apparatus and universal ethical standards capable of maintaining the world order, it is nevertheless clear that, in the ever close interdependence among regions and nations, different histories and

trajectories are becoming less important in the global context.<sup>3</sup> The idea of universal history, fueled by the pressure to alter a culture's unique identity and to loosen the individual's local allegiance in favor of universal standards, is becoming increasingly urgent. There is a sense that the individual can no longer easily remain a member of a particular culture, a citizen of a particular nation, but has to be the citizen of the world, more in tune with universally recognized norms and rights in a global civil society. The much-celebrated difference, derived from native culture, the long *durée* of local history, tradition, custom, and memory, is in grave doubt. Universal history, or universal ethical orientation, seems to be an outside that no one can be protected from. As Hardt and Negri put it, "the domesticity of values, the shelters behind which they presented their moral substance, the limits that protect against the invading exteriority—all that disappears."<sup>4</sup> I do not think differences will disappear, and this book reconsiders local difference within global context by discussing productive tensions between memory and history.

What is troubling about the imperial paradigm, in its drive for universal norms and all-encompassing authority, is that it puts history in suspension. The emancipatory practices throughout modern history are written off in the transit to a new grand narrative. In the steady erosion of the Enlightenment narrative of emancipation, humanism, and freedom throughout the twentieth century, a new mythological narrative is triumphantly arriving on the scene. This is the narrative of capitalist modernization.<sup>5</sup> It tells its stories and projects everyone's future by suppressing alternative strata in vastly different historical trajectories. Under the labels of modernization, development, and democracy, this narrative was challenged for decades in the twentieth century, in a time of decolonization and independence movements. But with the recession of socialism and the accelerated spread of the capitalist economy since the late 1980s, this narrative has in recent years become the hegemonic paradigm for thinking and writing modern Chinese history both in the west and in China. In the shadows of impoverished everyday life and authoritarian politics of the past eras, the historical imagination in China has increasingly become enthralled to the glamorous prospect of global capital, the world market, middle-class prosperity, civil society, and endless economic development.<sup>6</sup> This narrative, as Arif Dirlik suggests, exercises its magic appeal by erasing not only memories of revolution, but also the memories of modernity's own complex and crisis-ridden vicissitudes of becoming.<sup>7</sup>

Earlier in the twentieth century, Walter Benjamin sought to dispel the historicist myth of technological progress, science, and rationality—the empty, homogeneous time of capitalist modernity—by brushing history against the grain. In the same spirit, I seek to brush history against the engrained historical discourse in modern China by evoking memories of alternative bypaths and substrata. A constant rearticulation of hidden memories and a vigilant awareness of alternatives are crucial to opening up diverse scenarios and prospects. Rearticulation of memory may prevent the historical imagination from hardening into some ahistorical one-way Main Street. I contend that in the era of globalization, history and memory, although at risk of being estranged into antiquated things of the museum and flattened into quaint spectacles in costume dramas, have emerged as a stronger countervailing resource. A historical consciousness that critiques the engrained historical narrative via memory will keep alive unfinished possibilities and unfulfilled dreams anticipating different lines of horizon—memories of the future. It will provide vital resources for local cultural expressions rooted in specific space-time and wage struggles in different sites against the new mythologies masquerading as History.

The creative configuration of memory seems to be one hope that cultural production will not be standardized into faceless duplicates of the transnational culture industry. But being creative does not mean creating novelties out of thin air; real creative acts are grounded in specific histories and geographies. Thus the effective response to the leveling trend of the new grand narrative is not the unquestioned embrace of progress and development, not militant resistance, nor the makeshift, stopgap hybridization, which is often a virtuoso patch-up work. Far from a shifty position or momentary tactic for survival, a coherent response must strive to make profound and meaningful connections with the past and tap local resources to stage ever-renewable cultural production in the present.

This book takes modern Chinese culture as a case but addresses the broader questions of history writing, traumatic memory, modernity, and globalization. I attempt to sketch a trajectory in which memory and history proceed in tension and unison. The historical dimension of this project focuses on the reconstruction of history and memory as mutually contradictory and complementary in Chinese culture's endeavor to become a modern nation-state. The central theme is how historical discourse—the discursive practices and imagination that reconstruct the past for the present—confronts, invokes, and uses memory.

It has been a commonplace to define memory as a structure of feeling inherent in traditional communities, as opposed to the accelerative thrust of modernity and the upsurge of historical consciousness. From Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Walter Benjamin to numerous theorists of modernity, one finds repeated enactment of the trope memory versus history, tradition versus modernity, past versus present.<sup>8</sup> Pierre Nora, the influential French historian, has given this trope a subtle interpretation immediately relevant to the contemporary scene. He suggests that the memory-history distinction stems from the rupture of modern society with traditional community. Memory and history have their respective social embodiments. Societies based on memory offer the *milieux de mémoire*, settings in which memory is immanent to everyday experience, whereas history inhabits the *lieux de mémoire*. The shift from *milieux*, enveloped in affective aura, to the more impersonal *lieux* (places), is indicative of the shift in social formation, corresponding to the transit from place to space, tradition to modernity, local to global.<sup>9</sup> Memory ensures that culture is lived in mundane, unconscious daily life, “in the warmth of tradition, in the muteness of custom, in the repetition of the ancestral.” Memory guarantees the transmission of culture from generation to generation on a personal and communal basis, without self-conscious designs to overhaul the entrenched institutions and mental habit. This memory-ensured continuity, laments Nora, is broken by the “acceleration of history,” by the surge of historical sensibility, which is what modern societies make of the past “they are condemned to forget because they are driven by change.”<sup>10</sup>

Clearly the milieu of memory still survives in obscure corners of modern society, but it is not its immediate concern. The thick aura of the milieu has thinned out into the disenchanting *lieux de mémoire*, places of memory. Memory represents a residual, enchanted form of communal life and structure of feeling. A phenomenon of “emotion and magic,” memory “thrives on vague, telescoping reminiscences, on hazy general impressions or specific symbolic details.” In contrast, history—modern historical discourse—calls for rational analysis and engages in demythologizing through cool-headed, “objective” critique. But history cannot divorce itself from memory or give up the need for memory. Although history belongs to the *lieux de mémoire* and eschews memory’s milieu of enchanted heritage, it retains “vestiges, the ultimate embodiments of a commemorative conscious-

ness that survives.”<sup>11</sup> This implies that history has an unstated yearning for memory in the very act of dismantling and critiquing it. Nora’s description of the tension and the link between history and memory can be used to briefly define what I call “critical historical consciousness.” Historical consciousness is the ever-intensified self-conscious discourse that criticizes the “natural,” embodied, inherited practice based on memory. Premised on the rupture with the past, history is forward-looking and change-driven.<sup>12</sup> The modern “teleological” historical narratives, be they revolutionary, capitalist, or neoliberal, fit this category. Yet memory, although subjected to historical critique, can also offer a countercritique. This critique will put a check, a “second thought,” on the “change for the sake of change” kind of senseless accelerations spurred by modern history. Modern history starts as a critique of tradition and memory, but memory often has to be the critique of critique, as when nostalgia expresses not the love of the past, but a vital vision against a reigning historical narrative in the present. It is not a matter of choosing one over the other. Rather, the point is to put the two components of temporality together and set them in dynamic motion. Thus we have a critical historical consciousness, which, caught in modern acceleration, is also capable of self-critique from the vantage point of its “other” and past: the milieu of memory.

When memory becomes an issue, this usually implies an “interesting time” when historical orientation is in doubt, a time of crossroads and upheaval. In the west the disturbance of memory went along with rapid social transformation, industrialization, urbanization, and the wholesale destruction of the agrarian system.<sup>13</sup> At the turn of the twentieth century Bergson, Jung, Freud, and Proust delved into memory to locate some anchoring amidst the swift changes. In modern China, the period of cultural crisis may have something in common with the period of memory crisis in the west. Around the turn of the century, the drastic pressures of social change also witnessed a reinvention of an integrated cultural past by way of remembrance. For instance, the discovery of the Confucian tradition as a timeless cultural repository by the school of national essence (*guocui*) at the turn of the twentieth century was repeated by the revival of “national learning” in the 1990s. But the “memory” of Confucianism does not repeat itself exactly. In the first instance it was a defense of the crumbling tradition as it came under assault by the radical reformers; in the 1990s, the memory was recast by a neoliberal discourse as consorting with global cap-

italism, so that the native cultural “essence,” instead of being an obstacle to modernization, is seen as having all along predestined the Chinese for capitalist development.<sup>14</sup> Starting from the mid-1980s, there has been a series of memory efforts to evoke some shapes of the past: the indictment of political atrocities, the search-for-roots movement, the nostalgic fever for Maoist and Red Guard legacies, and the renewed interest in memories of “warmer” days of socialist culture. In intellectual discourse and literature, one also finds a forceful turn toward personal or collective memory, serving as fragile vestiges of continuity, community, and self-identity.

For all the diversity of memory works, they seem to hint at something troubling: the difficulty of modern Chinese culture in adjusting to its past, and hence to the present, from which it needs to reenvision the future. They reveal a rupture in the collectively shared sense of time, a lack of consensus ensuring the figuration of past, present, and future. It signals a serious problem in the understanding of the past and its connection to the current reality as a living, continuous history.

I have described modern history as change driven and antitraditional. Yet this history also draws on collective memory and often it is not easy to distinguish the two. History may serve as a carrier for the preservation of the cultural past, claiming certain images of memory as its own. Historical writing in modern times selectively and arbitrarily uses and invents collective memory so as to ensure and justify the continuity of the emergent nation-state with its past.<sup>15</sup> In this light, history functions rather like cohesive and identity-forming cultural memory. With the help of memory, history assumes an unbroken continuity from past to present. On the other hand, history—the change-driven modern history—is by no means “friendly” to tradition and memory. Memory has its own historical unfolding, but in contrast with modern historical sensibility, it shows its tardiness and is not so prone to change. In pushing for change, history comes as a critique and revision of what cultural memory has taken for granted as natural, timeless, self-evident. In rewriting the past, history performs a critical interpretation on memory. In China historical discourse performs interpretations that are frequently antimemory and antitradition; these interpretations intervened time and again, in radical, revolutionary fashion, against the “obsolete” tradition anchored in cultural memory. The critiques of the deadweight of the past—the ossified cultural memory—in the May Fourth, socialist, and in reform periods are striking testaments.

Modern historiography, as Patrick Hutton notes, historicizes collective memory by rendering the latter into the service of the nation-state. Crucial to modern, nation-centered historiography are also ideological themes of progress, rationality, emancipation, and modernization. This grand narrative of modernity, a legacy of Europe from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the nineteenth-century rise of the modern state, has been called into question since the earlier twentieth century. Hutton has shown that postmodern critics and historians have intensified this critique in recent decades. No longer able to see memory as a "hidden ground of history," they tend to see memory and history as sharply opposed. Although they appeal to countermemories and counterhistories of the subaltern groups, minorities and women, postmodern historians do not set out to write another coherent historical narrative or give voice to the oppressed in traditional fashion. They do not hope to return to the "original" source of living memory repressed by History. They undertake instead to "describe the way in which the remembered past has been inscribed over time in memorial forms."<sup>16</sup> It seems as if what commands scholarly interest were how people were repressed, rather than how they combated repression. This entails a search for images and memory traces left from the past in their sheer materiality and an archeological attentiveness to the ways they are written into various narratives and discourses of power.

The postmodernist obsession to chase down every material sign of memory trace and inscription is exemplified by the misuse of Michel Foucault's genealogical method. This method does not project a new historical orientation. To imagine history anew and otherwise, rather than clinically examine its nitty-gritty decaying in the past, it is necessary to think of history not as a decomposable pile of arbitrary tricks, fragments, and debris, but as a source of memory and hope. In its genuine vitality, history is not an autopsy lab where a historian dissects corpses to find the predetermined causes in the anatomy of the dead. History is an imaginary horizon of what is possible. If the past is not reimagined as crisscrossed by forking paths of trajectories and road maps, intermittently shut down and reopened, both the present and future are magically sealed with death marks in the teleological end of lines culminating in liberal democracy.<sup>17</sup> Now, the horizon of the possible lags behind History and takes on a new name: memory. What the "science" of history has determined, Benjamin suggested, remembrance can modify and overthrow. The imaginary recon-

struction of history that resorts to memory “can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete.”<sup>18</sup> What this “theological” history implies is nevertheless very practical and everyday: history has not ended. It has unfulfilled dreams that need to be realized, and unassuaged pains and injustices that call for continuous historical action. Thus history is not just writing and imagining on paper, much less dissection on the operating table, but more importantly doing—doing things collectively in search of a more just, livable, sustainable society.

The dialectic tension between memory and history allows us to see a constant movement between memory and history. The goal of writing history in the May Fourth and socialist eras seemed to be the construction of an imaginary continuity, amidst sharp breaks, from past to present so as to legitimate the political project in the present. Since the 1980s, there have been at least two contradictory tendencies. A strong urge to herald the coming of modernization promises to put to rest the problems of historical practice and struggle and consign these to the invisible hand of the market.<sup>19</sup> The new mythology of the global market is vigorously contested by a strong pull toward the pole of memory (earlier history “aged” into memory). The interplay between history and memory seems to be getting into a tension between a forward-looking acceleration and a backward drag. The speedup clearly answers to the rallying call of the new myth of global developmentalism and the magic of world markets. The backward look, suspicious of the process of globalization, tries to resurrect, nostalgically and critically, a livable past against the end-of-history mythology.

Although the myth of modernization provides a premature closure to the lingering traumas of poverty, oppression, and suffering, the nostalgic turn seeks to resist and critique the current impacts, equally traumatic, of runaway modernization. The question of trauma thus has a significant role to play in the memory-history nexus. Trauma takes two forms in modern China. One is the latent memory of past catastrophes of imperialism and colonialism as well as atrocities of the authoritarian political order. The other is the ongoing shock of the damaged older lifeworlds under the impact of transnational capital and the massive commodification of social relations. Current scholarship sees trauma as a profound blow to the individual psyche and a shattering of the culture’s continuity. Traumatic events break the individual’s emotional attachment to the community and the



shared matrix of meaning and value that members of a culture need to “re-member” in order to have a minimum sense of coherency in social and personal life. This matrix enables us to tell stories, make sense of experience, and sustain a sense of continuity from past to present in history writing.<sup>20</sup> Trauma underlies the crisis of history writing.

As a well-received analytical category in human and social sciences, trauma studies has given deconstruction and poststructuralism a new lease of life through its emphasis on the paralysis of the traumatized psyche and the breakdowns of the previously established categories of meaning and narrative. Associated with this approach is the fascination with cultural discontinuity, the breakdown of narrative, psychic fragmentation, contingencies, the aesthetic of the abysmal sublime, and the critique and scrambling of all received categories. Although efforts have been made to lift trauma inquiry out of the psychic and clinical closet to address the politically vital issues of history writing, community building, identity, and collective memory, the positive connection between trauma and these larger issues remains unarticulated and unclear.<sup>21</sup>

Confronted with the dire consequences of runaway marketization and development, Chinese critics have begun to reflect more critically on the whole trajectory of Chinese modernity as traumatic encounters with imperialism, colonialism, and, in recent decades, the new powers of global capital. The “internal” political catastrophes of the Mao era have been construed as resulting from numerous hasty modernization campaigns to catch up and surpass the west. Although trauma is undoubtedly a hidden background that continues to shape our intellectual preference and ideological orientation, it needs to be reflected on, rather than simply assumed. The historical trauma has an insidious tendency to control and limit our conceptions of alternative temporalities and social formations. In an essay entitled “Surrounded by Traumatic Memory” (*Zai chuangshang jiyi de huaibao zhong*), Wang Xiaoming views the embrace of the new ideology of consumption and excessive individualism as an overreaction against the traumatic memory of revolution.<sup>22</sup> The frenzied pursuit of individual self-interest and material gains at the cost of political consciousness masks a hidden fear of anything associated with the memory of political engagement, collectivity, public life, society, nation, and history. In this light, the unquestioned acceptance of the liberal model and the market has as its hidden backdrop the “nightmares” and the “absence of freedom” in the

previous collectivity. Yet the pendulum swings too far the other way when the fresh traumas of unemployment, the polarization of the population, and the erosion of the social fabric in the recent decades appear to be shattering the hopes for the future of modernization. People begin to reminisce the better days of socialist culture and even the idyllic native village, with an equally uncritical repudiation of anything western and of anything associated with democratic society, civil rights, and individual freedom.

Fredric Jameson shows how trauma can confuse as well as enhance our historical understanding. Self-reflection on trauma may prevent the reification of a certain historical trajectory as a “natural,” universal way of life. Jameson cites the example of the radical generation of the 1960s in the United States. This generation, suffering from the trauma of the “excesses of individualism” of “normal” middle-class life in the Eisenhower years—which had been an excessive reaction to the collective mobilization of World War II—asserted new social solidarity and collective imagination in radical ferments. In contrast, the former soviet population in the recent decades was tired of the catastrophic existence of “huddling together” in collectivization and was “likely to develop a horror of togetherness” and a longing for individual privacy and bourgeois private life. The traumatic memory thus needs to be interpreted in rigorous historical fashion so as to avoid the reification of one pattern of values, here individualism and the bourgeois-liberal model, as necessarily superior to the other:

The symbolic effects of such historical and generational experience need to be reckoned in specific interpretative fashion, in order to forestall the return of the kind of naturalizing ideology for which collective effort works against the grain of human nature, people are naturally prone to a regression to private life, consumption and the market are more normal and attractive to human beings than the political and so forth.<sup>23</sup>

Traumatic memory, in this light, can be a dead weight of the past we react to excessively and unconsciously. On the other hand, keeping a critical distance from its negative impact may enable us to have an interpretative method—indeed, a critical historical understanding. This understanding traces a certain dominant historical imaginary to a traumatic source and considers its genesis in specific circumstances. The critical history that Nietzsche spoke about suggests a similar thought. The use of history, he said, is for men to perceive “the accidental nature of the forms in which they

see and insist on others seeing.”<sup>24</sup> As survivors of trauma, a generation of historians or critics may condemn the errors of trauma and think that they have escaped them, but they cannot escape the fact that they have sprung from them. Critical history does not deny or remain captive to trauma, but makes “an attempt to gain a past *a posteriori* from which we might spring, as against that from which we do spring.”<sup>25</sup> That is, by evoking nontraumatic visions of the past as new sources for getting over traumas, a distinction is made between the victim of trauma and the active agent of history. Defined as variable responses as well as creative redress to different traumatic situations, historical discourse would have less chances of becoming the mere repetition of the past or reified as the ultimate way to go.

Seminal research has been conducted on memory and representation of history in modern China.<sup>26</sup> Social scientists have gathered rich data and have provided fruitful sociological and anthropological accounts of the practices where official history comes into conflict with repressed memories. Some have focused on the ways ideological and political hegemony is linked to the mechanism of politically enforced amnesia.<sup>27</sup> Others have sought to write a social history of remembering by considering the popular, ritualistic practices that preserve unofficial remembrances.<sup>28</sup> These studies look primarily at the ritualistic and sociological aspect of memory practice. My study differs from them by taking a more humanistic approach. I examine memory practices by considering aesthetic forms of film, fiction, essays, and autobiography and by reexamining the historical imagination embedded in aesthetic discourse as psychic and narrative responses to traumatic memories.

This book is arranged in three parts and addresses three major tendencies in the interplay between history and memory. Rather than describe the historical trends in the memory-history nexus, I examine a number of resurfacing motifs and make metahistorical comments on them. The first part deals with the earlier conception of history in the new culture of May Fourth. Usually conceived in terms of the Enlightenment narrative of progress, rationality, and freedom, this narrative of national teleology came as a necessary response to colonialism, imperialism, and the decline of the traditional culture. By refusing to see its historical vision as teleologically determined and hegemonic, I seek to understand its emergence as a practical response to the urgent problems of the day. One of its political tasks is to explore the realistic historical trajectory and dispel the memory of aes-

thetic habit embedded in traditional fiction and theater. The critique of western modernity, the appropriation of the aesthetic category of the tragic, and the stirring of a “traumatic visibility” in the radical cinema are examples of this politically effective history. This history evokes the memories of the Enlightenment legacy as well as native folk cultural resources in envisioning China’s future.

The second trend, described in Part 2, offers a critical view of history as a crisis-ridden, traumatic experience rather than an upwardly moving narrative. Most pronounced in the post-Cultural Revolution, reforms era of the 1980s, this view enabled artists and critics to grapple with the recent catastrophic history and reach deeper into the remote recesses of tradition and memory. Their probe into the past produced a series of innovative works of film and literature. Instead of writing off trauma, they retain traces of traumatic experience in their works and resist the fantasy, fueled by melodrama, catharsis, and sentimentality, that the trauma will heal soon. This critical mode of history writing fosters a constant vigilance against the plotting of a grand narrative, undercuts the urge to tell an emotionally satisfying story, and pits the traumatic against a quick, facile recovery. It challenges the established identity and the dominant structure of meaning by unearthing unclaimed experiences and memory.

Three chapters in Part 3 focus on the work of memory that arose with the advent of consumer society and globalization throughout the 1990s. This decade of market liberalization, consumption, and the influx of global capital saw a waning of historical consciousness. Under the leveling effect of global trends history has been flattened into bloodless, depthless simulacra. A powerful effort, however, has been at work in contemporary Chinese literature, cinema, and public discourse to reenergize the critical historical consciousness and reenact intimate memory, often pitching upon the mythical and nostalgic. Cultural expressions strive to “find” a sublime history and intimate community. They sought to reenchant quotidian life and human relations dominated by relations of exchange and money. Both symptom and critique of the society of consumption and simulacra, this memory work is not exempt from the logic of the spectacle and remains a nostalgia not firmly grounded in memory. On the other hand, it expresses a desire to transcend the increasingly bleached and flattened social existence.

The first chapter focuses on Lu Xun’s early reflections on modernity

and tradition. I offer a sympathetic reading on what is often called the teleological narrative and analyze the articulation of hope in the “negative” portrayal of Chinese reality in Lu Xun. Chapter 2 examines the way the western concept of the tragic was translated, not just into Chinese drama criticism, but also into the discourse on history. With this altered concept intellectuals were able to reconsider the writing of history and to make sense of the past in a realistic and tragic manner. The chapter further considers the link between tragedy and realism and demonstrates the use of disruptive visuality in the modern medium of film in the 1930s. The radical cinema struggled to dispel traditional and modern aesthetic mystifications and promoted a political cinema in response to a crisis-ridden reality.

The next four chapters deal with the reconstruction of history in the wake of the Cultural Revolution in the 1980s through the early 1990s. This is a period of transition that put memory and history on the agenda for intense public discussion, generating a large number of literary and film texts. Chapter 3 analyzes the ways Chinese critics read and learn from Walter Benjamin, philosopher of shock and memory, and the ways the traumatic memory of western modernity resonates with the Chinese experience. It looks at the way official history was replaced by a memory work of trauma in the post-Cultural Revolutionary “wound literature” and in the endeavor known as “searching for the roots” and its new manifestations in the 1990s. Chapter 4 addresses the tension between memory and history and, through a reading of Wang Anyi’s fiction, traces a “return” to the mythical and traditional. Chapter 5 continues the theme of historical trauma by comparing films of the fourth and fifth generations. Although the Xie Jin mode, the exemplar of the fourth generation, aimed to salvage the wreckage of history through humanism and a cathartic melodramatic structure, the fifth generation retained traumatic memory in its work and created a new historical narrative. Chapter 6 discusses the changing role of the intellectual in transition from the 1980s to the 1990s. Through an analysis of Wang Anyi’s novella *The Story of Our Uncle* I demonstrate the shift from the epic narrative to what I call the essayistic structure of feeling. In this process the historically engaged intellectual changes into a self-serving careerist and aesthete, but he is unable to escape the burden of memory.

With the increasing flux of global capital, the expansion of the market economy, the commodification of culture, the universal history of

globalization became the triumphant keynote in the last decade. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of Part 3 deal with the issues of globalization through a reexamination of nostalgia. The integrated global economy links the mainland with Taiwan and Hong Kong. These two regions grappled with the problems of the local and the global that the mainland is beginning to confront. The three chapters look at cultural endeavors as responses to aggressive transnational capital. As residual forms of life are crumbling and the social fabric is breaking apart under expansive capital and exchange relations, authentic experience, personal identity, and community—what is left of the *milieux de mémoire*—are becoming harder to maintain. I analyze how literature and cultural production in these three areas strive to come to terms with the lure of commodity and capital while attempting to rescue authentic experience from their reifying effects. By invoking images of nostalgia, collective memory, and residual practices of everyday life, cultural production in the mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong try to keep alive the longing for alternative historical narrative in a global environment detrimental to cultural memory.