Introduction: Women in Global Migration

IT WAS IN THE QUIET evening after a tropical rain shower. We were relaxing in Rena's modest house in a small village when she glanced affectionately at her son and said softly, "I will never leave him again." She had just come back to the Philippines after working in Hong Kong for twelve years. Although she had some college education, she had chosen to work as a domestic worker[1] for a Hong Kong family because of the higher and more stable wages. "I thought my family would need more money for our son's future," she told me. However, Rena's life had gone into upheaval as soon as she left home. Her husband Jose, who had been against her migrating, passed away only eight months later. "He had an accident earlier, but his health got worse after I left. He was lonely and missed me badly. I missed him, too." Rena also lost her parents while away. "I regret that I went to Hong Kong, but what can I do now?" Left with her only son Paolo, she seemed determined to stay in the Philippines and put her life back together. Yet only a few years later, I found her back in Hong Kong as a domestic worker again. She had not been able to find a stable job in the Philippines, and had to leave her home again to support her son and herself.

Rena is one of the world's 175 million migrants—a number that has been increasing rapidly.[2] Migration has emerged as a critical global issue, one that now touches almost every corner of the world. Most countries are no longer categorized as destinations, origins, or points of transit, but rather as some combination of those three. Migration's socioeconomic, political, and cultural impact on societies has become enormous; so have the implications for states, for civil society, and for the individuals involved. Heeding the complexity and growing challenges that migration entails, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has declared migration a priority issue for the international community.[3]

Rena's case reflects one of the distinctive characteristics of global migration today—the feminization of migratory populations around the world. The forces of globalization are increasing the demand for cheap and docile migrant female labor in all regions. Between 1960 and 2000, the number of migrant women around the world increased more than twofold, from 35 million to 85 million; by 2000, women constituted 48.6 percent of the world's migrants.[4] Contrary to the traditional image, migration is no longer a solely male phenomenon. More and more women are migrating not as dependents of a father or husband but as autonomous workers. Men have always worked overseas to support their families back home; now women are choosing to do the same. More women are becoming breadwinners, migrating abroad on their own in order to support a family from far away.

Global restructuring of economy is playing a significant role in this change in a number of ways. First, it is pushing more middle-class women in wealthier countries to enter the labor market and thereby increasing the demand for female migrant caregivers. Around the world over the past few decades, the number of double-income households has been growing. Traditionally secure "male" jobs are becoming more precarious as a consequence of deregulation, corporate restructuring, and contracting out. Some women have been forced into the labor market by their partner's economic insecurity and by their shared desire to maintain a middle-class lifestyle.

Second, the pressures of work have been increasing in recent years so that many professionals are now working more overtime. Some have to take night shifts or early morning shifts as their workplace extends its operation hours due to growing business competition. Many families have become "time-starved," carrying great burdens and having difficulties balancing both family and work.[5] Because of the shortage of public child-care facilities and of time to do household chores, dual-income families are now relying on migrant nannies and housekeepers to take care of the children and to keep the home in order.

Third, the global economy is generating a class of "new rich" not only in the industrialized world, but also in semi-industrialized and developing countries. These people have benefited from international business expansion and can afford to pursue more affluent and comfortable lives. They seek migrant domestic workers and nannies who can provide better care for their homes and children. Live-in migrant caregivers also work on call 24 hours a day whenever a need arises. Their care is preferred to institutional care because of its personal attentiveness, long hours, and affordability.

Fourth, populations in many industrialized countries are aging, and this has increased the need for nurses and other caregivers for the elderly. Some nurses and caregivers are men, but especially in Asia, most in this occupa-

tional category are women.[6] The United States and the United Kingdom, for instance, are accepting many female nurses from the Philippines. Canada now allows many Asian migrant women to enter the country through its Live-in Caregiver Program; these women provide care for a child or a disabled or elderly person and also do some household work.[7]

All of this points to a care gap between state welfare services and the actual needs of working families.[8] Welfare states have been eroding worldwide; the care provisions of these countries are no longer able to keep pace with their aging populations and with the growing need for quality child care. In many countries, female migrant labor has become the answer to this shortfall. As many scholars have already pointed out, using terms such as "nanny chain," "global care chain," [9] and "international division of reproductive labor," [10] global economic restructuring has increased the worldwide demand for migrant domestic workers who often serve as both caregivers and housekeepers. At one time, this trend was visible only in industrialized countries; today, globalization is reaching beyond the industrialized world to affect middle- and low-income countries.

Migrant women are also in high demand in the global manufacturing sector. Globalization has started a "race to the bottom"; that is, countries around the world are now competing to provide corporations with the cheapest and most docile labor. This global competition has created a large niche for female migrant labor. Many corporations—especially those which cannot afford to relocate or outsource overseas—have found migrant women to be the most "qualified" workers in this regard. More and more migrant women are being incorporated into the production system—into "global commodity chains" [11] or, more recently, "global value chains," which include entire value-added activities leading to goods and services.[12] In the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) [13] and even in some developing countries, export-led industries are recruiting a large number of migrant women from neighboring countries. For instance, many Filipino women are now working in factories in Taiwan, and Indonesian women are doing the same in Malaysia. Most importantly, an increasing number of migrant women are working in other developing countries that are at a similar economic level. For instance, some Sri Lankan women are working in factories in countries such as the Maldives because they cannot find work nearer home.

All of these facts together suggest that the international division of labor by gender is becoming increasingly complex. In the past, the international gender division of labor simply incorporated Third World women into export manufacturing in their own countries; these women produced goods for consumers in the industrialized world.[14] Today, the international gender division of labor is integrating migrant women into various segments of

value chains; through their labor, these women are now serving "the global new rich" in industrialized, semi-industrialized, and even some developing countries. In this sense, the international migration of women now involves a tremendously complex system of inequalities, not only between the North and the South, but also within the South itself. This poses a new challenge when it comes to understanding and responding to the international gender division of labor.

Finally, the global "sex industry" that has been developed by international criminal networks is creating a demand for migrant women. In Japan, where the sex industry accounts for about 1 percent of the GNP, more than 150,000 migrant women work in the sector.[15] Many of them come from the Philippines and Thailand, but an increasing number of women from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other parts of Asia have been arriving in recent years.[16] Some enter Japan legally as "entertainers," but many others enter through illegal channels. This situation is not limited to industrialized countries. Many developing countries in Asia employ migrant women in the sex sector: 20,000–30,000 Burmese in Thailand; 100,000 Nepalese in India; and 200,000 Bangladeshis in Pakistan.[17] Many of these women are the victims of human trafficking and irregular migration.

Women and Migration in Asia: The Puzzles

This book will examine women's migration in Asia[18] by focusing on temporary flows of a legal nature. Temporary migration, which up to this point has received less attention than permanent migration, now forms a large component of international migration both in Asia and elsewhere in the world. The popular perception is that permanent migration[19] from Asia to industrialized countries is quite significant; in fact, temporary migration within Asia is much larger in terms of sheer numbers. Since the 1970s, as a consequence of rapid economic growth, many Asian countries have been adopting temporary migration schemes, accepting a larger number of migrants from other parts of the region. The industrialized countries, especially in North America, have been accepting a large number of Asian immigrants, but in terms of annual intake, far more Asian migrants are ending up in other Asian countries. In part, this reflects industrialized countries' restrictive policies toward low-skilled and unskilled workers.[20] For instance, ten times as many Filipino migrants go to other Asian countries as go to North America: 582,584 Filipinos migrated to Asian countries as temporary migrants in 2001, whereas only 51,308 migrated to the United States and Canada as permanent migrants.[21]

Another reason why I have focused my research on Asia is that the fem-

TABLE I.I
Temporary Migration from Selected Asian Countries, Circa 2002

Country	GDP per capita (US$)	UNEMPLOY-MENT (%)		ANNUAL OUTFLOWS OF MIGRANTS (THOUSANDS)			Women's Share in Migration Outflows (%)	Total Stock of Migrants (millions)
		Male	Female	Men	Women	Total		
Sending Countries								
Philippines	4,170	9.4[a]	10.3[a]	189.8	453.5	682.3	69.2	7.6
Sri Lanka	3,570	8.7	12.8	70.7	133.0	203.7[1]	65.3	1.0
Indonesia	3,230	n.a.	n.a.	116.8	363.6	480.4	75.7	1.4
Non-Sending Countries								
Bangladesh	1,700	3.2[b]	3.3[b]	266.9[d]	0.8[d]	267.7[d]	0.3[d]	2.5
India	2,670	4.3[b]	4.3[b]	333.5	34.2	367.7	9.3	3.1[b]
Pakistan	1,940	6.7	16.5	104.2[d]	0.2[d]	104.4[d]	0.2[d]	n.a.

NOTES: n.a. = not available. a = 2001; b = 2000; c = 1999; d = 1998. 1 = provisional; 2 = In Gulf States only.

SOURCES: AMC and MFA (2003); ILO (2004); SLBFE (2004); UNDP (2004); Zachariah et al. (2002). Gender-differentiated data on annual outflows from India are the high-end estimates arrived at by using the gender composition of emigrants from Kerala.

inization of migration has been especially salient in this region. The number of migrant Asian women has increased significantly since the late 1970s; Asia is now both a major destination for female migrant labor *and* a source of that labor to the world. Between 1978 and 2002, the proportion of women among emigrants rose from 17 to 65 percent in Sri Lanka, from 15 to 69 percent in the Philippines, and from 41 to 76 percent in Indonesia. It is estimated that more than 4 million Asian migrant women were working in the region in 2002.[22] These figures refer only to legal migrants and would be much higher if irregular migrants[23] were included.

When I was at the International Labour Organization and coauthoring a report on the migration of Asian women,[24] I noticed a strange pattern to female migration vis-à-vis male migration. Men emigrated from almost all developing countries across the region, yet most migrant women tended to originate in only a few countries: the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. There were some migrant women from Thailand, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh, but their numbers were relatively small even though all countries shared major "push factors" such as high unemployment, low wages, and poverty, which tend to induce emigration. According to neoclassical economic theory, individuals move in search of higher wages from regions where labor is relatively abundant and capital is scarce to regions with labor shortages and capital surpluses.[25] This seemed to hold for male migration, but not for female migration. As Table 1.1 indicates, *more men emigrate from low-income countries (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan), but more women emigrate from better-off countries (the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia).*

Poverty has indeed driven many women to emigrate—numerous studies have illustrated this.[26] Yet few women have emigrated from Bangladesh, which is one of the poorest countries in the world. If economic hardship is the main driver of migration, why do so few women migrate from low-income countries? Poverty may well be the principal cause of international female migration at the individual level, but it does not explain cross-national differences in migration patterns within the region.

Furthermore, the data do not support the conventional economic assumption that high unemployment rates lead to migration. In Pakistan, as seen in Table 1.1, the unemployment rate among women is more than twice the rate among men. However, very few Pakistani women migrate overseas: they comprise only 0.2 percent of emigration flows from Pakistan. In Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the unemployment rates are also higher among women than among men; yet in those countries, the gender difference in unemployment rates is much narrower than in emigration rates. In sum, then, unemployment does not always result in female migration. The international labor market always has a demand for female workers; even so, many poor women in low-income countries in Asia are not responding to that demand.

The emerging patterns of female migration in Asia also pose a challenge to structuralist theories that explain patterns of international migration in terms of a country's role in the international division of labor. Dual labor market theory, for instance, views international migration as a form of exploitation of the "periphery" nations by the "core" nations in the international system. Piore asserted that international migration is caused not only by "push" factors (such as low wages and high unemployment) in peripheral countries, but rather mainly by "pull" factors (such as a chronic need for foreign workers to perform menial jobs) in core countries.[27] However, neither this approach nor the world systems theory can explain why most women in middle- and low-income developing Asia are pulled into the middle-income countries within the region rather than into the high-income countries of the West. Some argue that most poor people cannot afford the high fees they must pay in order to migrate to the West. In recent years, however, more and more poor have been migrating abroad through "salary deduction schemes" that do not require the payment of high migration fees prior to departure. An increasing number of poor women in the Philippines and Sri Lanka are now emigrating by means of such schemes. However, many women in other developing countries are not willing to take that same option.

Even though there is a strong demand for migrant women in the international labor market, the vast majority of low-income women in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India are still not responding to that demand. Some might

suggest that religion is the reason; that is, Muslim and Hindu women do not work overseas because they are discouraged from wage employment even in their own countries. However, this is largely a myth. Some Muslim countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan) send few migrant women overseas, but others (Indonesia and the Philippine island of Mindanao where Muslims dominate) are major sources of migrant women. India is 80 percent Hindu, yet Indian women have been participating in the labor force at roughly the same rate as Filipino women.[28] Despite that fact, very few Indian women emigrate on their own to work abroad. Religion seems to constrain female employment in some countries but does not explain women's migration pattern in all countries.

The puzzle of cross-national patterns leads us to seek a fundamental cause for international female migration. As Table 1.1 suggests clearly, poverty and unemployment are not the only determinants. What, then, are the true determinants of large-scale female migration? Before we answer this question, it would perhaps be useful to review how scholars have approached the topic of international female migration.

Gender and Migration: Overview

Many scholars have been examining the causes of international migration for a long time. However, the gender dimension rarely received much attention before the 1980s. Most research reflected the long-held assumption that migration is a male phenomenon. Furthermore, most countries have not collected gender-related statistics on migration.[29] In the 1960s, after family reunification became a key principle of immigration policies in many industrialized countries, scholars began to include women in their analyses as part of family migration. Yet women were still treated as dependents of male immigrants and not as significant contributors to the economy. Some studies added gender-differentiating variables yet continued to focus on associational migration by including "women's marriage probabilities" in their migration models.[30]

Some scholars started paying attention to women's rural–urban migration in the 1980s, and these studies were gradually expanded to include international female migration.[31] Nevertheless, gender had still not been integrated into mainstream migration theories. Traditional approaches such as neoclassical economic theory and structurist theory (both mentioned earlier) focus sharply on macrolevel push–pull factors such as wage differentials and labor demand and supply. Such approaches are mostly gender-blind; they assume either that migration is a male phenomenon or that the causes of migration are the same for women as they are for men.

More recent approaches have also been rather slow in mainstreaming gender into migration theories. Network theorists focus on the concrete interpersonal ties of migrants, seeing these as important triggers for migration.[32] This theory has been supported by many empirical studies;[33] however, it has treated networks as gender-neutral until recently. More scholars have begun to address the resource implications of gendered networks *within* destination countries.[34] Yet the gendered impact of networks on migration flows has still been understudied. The work of Curran and Rivero-Fuentes is a wonderful starting point in this regard: they found that in Mexico, social ties induced *international* migration of men and women equally but had no impact on the *internal* migration of men.[35] The gender implications of social networks will require further analysis.

With network theory, it is rather difficult to explain the differences in migration patterns—for example, why and how such networks were developed between certain countries but not between others. In this regard, the theory of migration systems is useful in explaining how such networks developed through historical, geographical, and political ties between countries that had existed long before large-scale migration started.[36] However, such close ties did not always exist between major countries of origin and destination in Asia, as seen in the example of the Philippines and Saudi Arabia before the 1970s. In general, the network approach can tell us much about how migration flows expanded, but not about how they originally started.

The new economics theory provides different insights: it incorporates a microlevel context by examining "household strategies."[37] According to this theory, a household assesses its members' reproductive and productive abilities and then strategically organizes its labor to maximize its collective income.[38] Many scholars have recognized that it is useful to consider both households and individuals, but many also question the theory's basic assumption that households are neutral and autonomous actors.

Some household strategists have shifted their analytical focus to power dynamics and patriarchal ideology within households—both of these affect the mechanisms of migration decision-making.[39] By doing so, they have elucidated the ways in which women and men are molded by the intrahousehold power hierarchy and by wider sociocultural expectations concerning gender roles. Other scholars have been more critical of the household strategy approach, arguing that a household does not necessarily act collectively, nor does it always maximize the interests of its members.[40] In their view, household members often pursue their own individual interests, such as earning money for their own education or gaining independence from family

control. In her study of Mexican migrants, Hondagneu-Sotelo found that the independent migration of young women is accepted as a rite of passage for their independence, not as a sacrifice for the family.[41]

A clear definition of household roles is difficult to establish, since a household can represent not only a space for collective well-being but also a locus of struggle in which the members' interests clash within the web of power relations.[42] Moreover, perspectives on marital status and the life stages of women are missing from the household strategy approach. My research and other case studies indicate that young single women tend to migrate for their own individual self-fulfillment and independence, whereas older and married women migrate to support the family and to finance the children's education.[43] The degrees of patriarchy and sexual division of labor within households are not necessarily static; they are capable of changing over time along with women's life stages.

It is still difficult to theorize international female migration, yet it is an exciting development that more scholars have begun to study migrant women since the mid-1990s. In particular, we have seen the burgeoning of research on the international migration of Asian women. Constable provided rich ethnographic accounts of Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong, examining their problems as well as their own interpretations of the migration experience.[44] She offered new insights for migration research by shedding light on women's agency and subjectivity. Parreñas linked agency-level research on Filipina migrant women in Los Angeles and Rome to a broader context—the international division of reproductive labor.[45] Gamburd focused on a migrants' home country, Sri Lanka, by examining the communities and families left behind and by interviewing former migrant women who had come back after working in the Middle East.[46] Her rich ethnography illustrated how migration has transformed migrant women, their families, and their communities. Chin conducted rigorous analyses on Asian domestic workers in Malaysia from a political economy perspective.[47] By focusing on the role of the state, she presented fascinating analyses on how Third World women were being incorporated into the international labor market through state modernization strategies.

All of these studies have significantly advanced our understanding of international female migration, especially the experiences of migrant women and the nature of the international political economy that pulls Third World women into domestic service around the world. Yet my questions about *cross-national migration patterns* and *the causal mechanisms of international female migration* remain unanswered. The few studies available on multiple countries[48] have been compilations of excellent case studies by different authors,

but these studies did not use the same variables to systematically compare and contrast the cases to extract the common factors that induced female migration. The work of Parreñas[49] was perhaps the first major comparative research on female migration, but her research focused on the receiving side, and it can be complemented by analyses of the sending side. Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Filipina and other Asian women (and men) migrate *within* Asia, not to North America and Europe. Thus it is important to expand research beyond the Western hemisphere and to incorporate "South–South migration" into the picture, especially since its flow is now much more significant than North–South migration. Furthermore, on the basis of my preliminary work at the ILO,[50] I recognize the importance of the state and the international community, as well as the differential impact of the global economy on migration. The suprastate and macropolitical factors, in particular, need to be taken into account in analyses of international female migration.

Integrative Approach to Female Migration

The aim of this book is to explain the causal mechanism of cross-national patterns of international female migration through an integrative approach. As Goss and Lindquist suggest, there have been many attempts to achieve a comprehensive understanding of migration.[51] These attempts do not comprise a unified theory; rather, they are reflected in a variety of theories that identify the connecting elements between the macro and micro levels, such as households, networks, and institutions. Although they focus on the different entities, these approaches share a common aim, which is to link "different levels of social organization, analyze simultaneously the origin and destinations, and consider both historical and contemporary processes."[52] My goal is to build my research on these approaches, while developing their framework further by integrating the gender dimension of migration.

My integrative approach examines various factors not only in migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries,[53] but also those in the countries from which relatively few migrant women emigrate, which I label "non-sending countries" for analytical purposes. As macrocausal analysts have argued, to fully understand the causal mechanisms of social phenomena, one must adopt (1) the "method of agreement," which examines a set of cases with a similar outcome and attempts to identify common causal factors (assuming that similar outcomes have a similar cause); and (2) the "method of difference," which compares two sets of cases with similar conditions and a dissimilar outcomes and then identifies at least one dissimilar condition to account for the difference.[54] I will adopt both of these methods for three

comparisons. First, for *within-group comparisons* of major migrant-sending countries (such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia), the method of agreement will be used to ascertain which factors have led to the feminization of migration in these countries. The same method will be applied to compare "non-sending countries" (Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India), the point being to seek common threads that discourage female migration. By contrast, for *between-group analyses* on "sending countries" and "non-sending countries," the method of difference will be adopted to highlight the elements that set them apart.

Essentially, my integrative approach will compare country cases. However, given the complexity of the phenomenon, it will adopt a multilevel analysis. Specifically, it will examine the following four levels: suprastate (global), macro-state, meso-society, and micro-individual. At the suprastate level, I will examine the impact of globalization on women's employment, changes in the international labor market, international relations, and the lack of an international migration regime. Although some migration scholars have already pointed out that global restructuring has incorporated Third World women into the low-paying service sectors in industrialized countries,[55] more careful analyses will be required if we are to understand why many more Asian migrant women go to the middle-income countries in the same region than to the United States and Europe. Furthermore, it is important to note that globalization is not a monolithic force that affects all Third World women in the same manner. The impact of globalization varies in different countries because its processes involve different economic, political, and social interventions. In fact, globalization has been criticized for excluding many countries and people in the developing world.[56] Therefore, it is necessary to examine the differential impact of globalization on female migration—in particular, why globalization is pushing many women in some countries, but not in others, to migrate.

Another suprastate factor that affects policies for female migration is the lack of an effective international legal framework—an "international migration regime"—to protect migrant workers abroad. The existing international protection mechanism is working poorly because many receiving countries are unwilling to commitment themselves to it. In light of this, in order to protect their own citizens, many developing countries have adjusted their own emigration policies. These policies have taken various forms; some are extremely protective and restrict female migration, whereas others are relatively open. Chapters 3 and 4 will review how various countries have developed their emigration policies, and discuss the factors that account for these differences.

MACRO LEVEL: THE ROLE OF THE STATE

At the macro level, I will analyze the role of the state[57] in international female migration. International migration matters greatly to the state on both receiving and sending ends because it involves crucial economic and political interests that the state is compelled to act upon. Through their immigration policies, destination states determine the skill levels and socio-economic characteristics of incoming workers. Many scholars have already acknowledged the importance of immigration policies,[58] and some of them have explained the differences in these policies as a function of a nation's self-definition or self-understanding as established over a long time.[59]

Nevertheless, there have been few in-depth studies dealing with states on *the sending side.* This is partly because scholars generally assume that countries of origin have virtually no leverage. Migration is viewed as a demand-driven phenomenon, and it is assumed that the only role developing states can play is to promote and facilitate labor export. Some scholars have pointed to the negative consequences of state economic policies on rural populations in the Third World as a determinant of migration;[60] yet as the data above suggest, levels of poverty and unemployment do not by themselves lead automatically to large outflows of female labor. Only in the past decade have studies on emigration policies begun to emerge.[61] These studies have focused mainly on the contents of policies; cross-national differences in emigration policies have rarely received much attention.[62] The mainstream migration theories have largely ignored the gender dimensions of emigration policies.

This book takes an integrative approach in an effort to elucidate how migrant-sending countries—both as states and as societies—affect gender-differentiated migration outcomes. In particular, I intend to explain the variations in state responses toward the international migration of women. Although it is true that migration is a demand-driven phenomenon, workers in developing countries do not respond to this demand in the same manner, and this is especially the case with female migration. As far as traditional male migration is concerned, no state discourages or prohibits it; in fact, many states promote male migration or adopt a laissez-faire approach to it. However, the policies of states vary, sometimes strongly, with regard to female migration. As will be discussed later, the state tends to exert control over women through emigration restrictions or bans. I call these "value-driven emigration policies," since such restrictions for women signify an underlying social value: namely, that women need to be protected by the state—more so than men. I hypothesize that these value-driven emigration policies, which crystallize various sociocultural, political, and institutional factors, influence the flows of female migration in Asia.

MICRO LEVEL: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

At the micro level, I will examine women's autonomy and decision-making power. The role of individuals is important because the formulation of policies does not necessarily guarantee blind compliance by the citizenry. For instance, state efforts to ban female migration in the Philippines failed because some women kept migrating abroad through unofficial channels. Conversely, attempts to promote female migration in other countries did not succeed because women were not interested in migrating. Therefore, in addition to macro policy factors, microlevel analyses of individuals and households are also necessary to uncover the true determinants of female migration. In particular, this study tries to emphasize the importance of women's autonomy and decision-making power within households. Female migration is not a simple outcome of pull–push factors or global restructuring; rather, it is a complex process in which women themselves actively participate and on which they carefully reflect. Examining the role of women's autonomy and decision-making power will constitute an important component of the integrative approach I am taking.

Here, I should briefly discuss households. In my samples for Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, most migrant women belonged to a household that consisted of a nuclear family, and their financial obligations and responsibilities were largely contained within it. By contrast, Filipina migrant women often sent money and gifts from overseas not only to their parents and children but also to grandparents, siblings, nephews, nieces, and in-laws. These people did not necessarily belong to the same "household," understood here as a shared residential unit. In analyzing women's migration behavior, therefore, we must look beyond households and recognize the role played by the extended family and sometimes even the community. This study will incorporate the impact of gender roles within households on women's decision-making and the influence of family members, friends, and neighbors in the microlevel analyses.

MACRO–MICRO LINK: SOCIAL LEGITIMACY

This study will present a concept of "social legitimacy" as a heuristic tool for linking globalization forces with state policies and individual autonomy. I define social legitimacy as a particular set of social norms—norms that accept women's wage employment and geographical mobility and that establish an environment conducive to international female migration. The historical legacy of women's wage employment (for example, the incorporation of female labor into colonial agricultural estates) has tended to prepare society to accept women's economic activities outside the home; in this way, it has helped extend social legitimacy to female labor migration.

A country's integration into the global economy through export-oriented industrialization policies and the resulting increase in foreign direct investment also contribute strongly to the emergence of social legitimacy for international female migration. This is because these things increase women's rural–urban mobility by creating jobs in urban manufacturing sectors. However, my idea veers from the existing literature which maintains that women's internal mobility directly increases the number of migrant women by creating a potential migrant labor reserve in free trade zones.[63] I argue instead that *women's increasing rural–urban mobility transforms the gender norms within communities*; furthermore, *this transformation itself lends social legitimacy to international female migration*. I will examine how women's rural–urban mobility has changed community norms and helped establish a more acceptable environment for women to migrate to foreign countries. In doing so, I will illustrate the impact that globalization has had on the experience of Third World women with internal and international migration.

In summary, the patterns and causal mechanisms of female migration can be explained by the "integrative approach" which examines (1) the impact of globalization, (2) the absence of an international migration regime, (3) gendered policies for immigration and emigration, (4) women's autonomy within households, and (5) the social legitimacy of international female migration. I reiterate here that I will limit this study to the legal migration of women. Irregular migration and human trafficking have been increasing, and both now pose a difficult challenge to the international community. I have decided, however, to exclude these particular types of migration from my research. The lack of reliable data is one reason; a more important reason is that both phenomena involve factors such as criminal networks, border controls, and law enforcement, which might require a different type of research from the sort that I have conducted. My research findings can be applied to a particular form of irregular migration but are not generalizable to the entire phenomenon.

Data

Most of the data in this book were collected during my fieldwork in nine Asian countries (Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates) and one Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong) in 1999 and 2000. I have supplemented these data with additional data on other countries that I gathered while working at the ILO between 1993 and 1996 and in 2002–03. I will be using both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data are based on my interviews with 249 individuals, including 116 migrant women, 22

"non-migrants," and 111 key informants in state offices, recruitment agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and research institutions. Where useful or necessary, I will also be using quantitative data on macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP per capita, unemployment rates, women's labor participation rate, and levels of FDI) as well as demographic profiles of migrant women.

Regarding the immigration policies of receiving countries in Asia, I will mainly be comparing the data on Japan, two newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong and Singapore), and the Gulf States (mainly Kuwait and United Arab Emirates).[64] I have divided the main destination countries in the region into these three groups because each reflects distinctive immigration patterns and economic development processes. The gender dimensions of immigration outcomes will be highlighted in the analyses.

Regarding the emigration policies of "senders" and "non-senders," I will be focusing on the Philippines and Sri Lanka (senders) as well as Bangladesh (non-sender), because each of these countries represents a certain pattern of state response to female migration: Sri Lanka is the most lenient, the Philippines moderate, and Bangladesh the most restrictive. Most states have adopted similar emigration policies for men; the same countries vary in their responses to female migration. To highlight the differences between the two groups, this part of the study will be supplemented by additional data from one "sender" (Indonesia) and two "non-senders" (India and Pakistan).

For this policy analysis, I have obtained and will use various sources, including interview data, policy documents, and other secondary information. The policy documents include Executive Orders, ministerial ordinances, memorandums exchanged within state agencies, government reports, and so on. The institutional analyses will be based on interviews with politicians, NGOs, recruitment agencies, international organizations, other interest groups, and officials in various ministries (foreign affairs, labor, justice, and so on).

The microlevel analyses in this study are based on my interviews with 116 migrant women. Since most of the respondents from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh could not speak English well, I conducted interviews with them through interpreters. Some were working abroad during my fieldwork; others had already returned to their home countries. This study incorporates data from an additional 22 women who were either "attempted migrants" (those who tried unsuccessfully to emigrate) or "non-migrants" (those who had not taken any actions toward migration). The interviews with the latter were especially important for identifying the factors influencing individual decisions.

In general, it is extremely difficult to conduct a systematic survey of mi-

grant workers based on random sampling, because in no country is there a list that comprehensively covers the entire migrant population, be it male or female. Given this situation, and given the general paucity of data on female migration in developing countries in particular, all the respondents were identified through the "snowball sampling" method. I followed this practice in conjunction with participant observation.

I conducted 55 interviews with Filipino women: 15 with "returnees" in the Philippines and 40 with migrants still working abroad at the time of interview (14 in Hong Kong and 26 in the United Arab Emirates). I also conducted 50 interviews with Sri Lankan women: 21 with returnees and 29 with migrants working in Hong Kong. Most of these migrant women were domestic workers, but some were entertainers, caregivers, factory workers, or office clerks. I interviewed a few male migrants as well, although I did not include them in my sample because there were so few of them.

My approach to Bangladeshi women had to be adjusted to reflect the ban on migration of unskilled women that was in place at the time of my fieldwork, as well as the fact that there are far fewer Bangladeshi migrant women compared with Filipina and Sri Lankan women. I interviewed 33 women in total: 11 returned migrants and 22 non-migrants. The latter included two women who were about to leave the country, seven who had paid fees to migrate but had been defrauded by a recruitment agent, four who were interested in migration but had not taken actions yet, and nine who had no interest in migration, at least at the time of interview.

Interviews varied in length. Most of them lasted between sixty and ninety minutes. Sometimes I interviewed the same person two or three times in order to gather more in-depth information. To protect the privacy of the migrant women, I use fictitious names for all respondents who appear in this book.

FIELD INTERVIEWS: IDENTIFYING RESPONDENTS

During my fieldwork, I was fortunate to have access to ILO offices as my contact points. Although I was on study leave, my colleagues in each country office were kind enough to help me make appointments with state officials, NGO staff, and academics. State officials in various countries whom I met through my work with the ILO also helped me in my research. This enabled me to identify key informants for interviews. However, identifying migrant women was quite difficult and time-consuming. As noted earlier, none of the countries in this study kept a comprehensive list of migrants. Some state agencies kept lists of registered migrants, but most such lists were kept confidential. And I was told that even with such a list, it would be difficult to identify respondents because those on the list might be still overseas

or have changed their residence without reporting to the agency. Furthermore, the addresses on those lists were scattered throughout the country, so it would have been almost impossible for me to draw a random sample from it and visit interviewees.

Faced with these constraints, in the Philippines, I first interviewed a few former migrant women who were working as domestic workers at my friends' houses in Manila. After this, I asked migration NGOs[65] for help identifying former migrant women. Some migration NGOs hold pre-departure orientation courses for future migrant workers every week. I monitored one of these and interviewed a group of women who already had some migration experience. Through one NGO, I met Rena, a former migrant domestic worker in Hong Kong. We became friends after going through a long interview session, and she was kind enough to take me to her home village, three hours north of Manila. Many of her friends there were like her—they had emigrated and returned. I visited that village twice, staying at her house and interviewing returned migrants in her neighborhood.

A Sri Lankan NGO, the Migrant Services Centre (MSC), helped me greatly in identifying migrant women. The MSC also holds regular pre-departure orientation sessions for prospective migrant women. I attended one of these, where I conducted participant observation; later on, I also interviewed some of the participants. The MSC also showed me one of their projects in Kegalle, four or five hours northwest of Colombo, where many former migrant women were learning to run their own small businesses so that they would not need to migrate abroad again. I met a group of about twenty "returnee" women at their monthly meeting there; after that, I visited the homes of those who were willing to be interviewed again.

In Hong Kong—one of the most popular destinations for Asian migrant women—I interviewed migrants working "on site." Finding respondents here was relatively easy because most migrant women are given every Sunday off and gather in public spaces. Each ethnic group has its own favorite place to hang out—Filipinas in Statue Square in the heart of downtown, Sri Lankans in Kowloon Park, and Indonesians in Victoria Park. On Sundays I went to these spots and interviewed migrant women. As I had heard and read about it many times, these were indeed massive gatherings. In Statue Square, well over a thousand Filipino women were filling the entire space and its neighboring areas. Like many of the migrant women, I spread a newspaper on the ground; from my new "office," I interviewed those who were sitting around me or passing near. Besides attending these Sunday outings, I visited church-based shelters and legal aid offices for migrant women. In these places, I interviewed mostly Filipina and Sri Lankan domestic workers who were in trouble or who had run away from their employers af-

ter experiencing violence, sexual abuse, or other problems. During my stay in Hong Kong, I also interviewed some employers and recruitment agencies.

In the United Arab Emirates—another popular destination for migrants—it was extremely difficult to identify and interview migrant women from Asia. In most countries in the Middle East, unskilled migrant women are given no days off and are not allowed to go outside alone. This means there is no place where migrant women gather on the weekends the way they do in Hong Kong. Faced with this constraint, I visited the embassies and consulates instead. From my earlier research, I knew that the diplomatic missions of major migrant-sending countries had shelters for migrant women inside their compounds. With the help of my friends in the Philippine government, I was able to interview migrant women in two shelters— one in the Philippine embassy in Abu Dhabi, the other in the Philippine consulate in Dubai. I also visited the embassies of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, but interviewing migrant women was not possible in any of them.

Conclusion

This book examines cross-national patterns and causal mechanisms of international female migration that have received relatively little attention in the literature on migration. Its "integrative approach" compares migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries and also looks at non-sending countries, the goal being to identify the factors that encourage and discourage female migration. This approach involves analysis at four different levels: suprastate, state, societal, and individual. The suprastate factor—more specifically, the globalization of production and services—has dramatically changed the lives of Third World women. The lack of an international legal framework for protecting migrant workers is another important element to be considered in analyses of emigration policies. The role of the state is crucial; even when there is a high demand in the international labor market, states often try to prevent women from working overseas. However, the enforcement power of states is hardly absolute; they cannot entirely dictate individual behavior. This means that we must also analyze women's decision-making processes and social environment that affects them. An integrative approach based on these multiple levels of analysis will help us understand the causal mechanisms of female migration and answer this question: Why does the feminization of migration occur in some countries but not others?

In the next chapter I focus on the role of migrant-receiving countries in Asia and explain how the demand for migrant women emerged and how immigration policies have evolved to accommodate that demand. In particular, I will elucidate the ways in which different types of economic develop-

ment have resulted in the different types of labor demand and variations in immigration policies for migrant women. After this, Chapter 3 addresses the role of migrant-sending countries and examines "value-driven" emigration policies. It reveals how policies for women's migration differ from those for men, and why. Chapter 4 examines the factors affecting emigration policies for women and how they yield cross-national differences in migration outcomes. The importance of the colonial legacy, civil society, and state identity, and the symbolic politics of gender, will be highlighted. Chapter 5 focuses on individual migrant women. Based on the interview data, it presents the "face" of migrant women: who they are, why they do or do not migrate, and how some of them fall into traps that keep them away from home. Chapter 6 examines the social environment that surrounds women in developing countries. In particular, it suggests that "social legitimacy" is a crucial element for fostering female migration on a large scale. It discusses how social legitimacy for women's migration is developed, enhanced, and sometimes undermined. The final chapter then sums up the findings and addresses some of the critical political implications, including the challenges facing states and the international community.