ONE

OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMATIC

> No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the greatest misconceptions (to which it therefore actually falls a victim) as the Idea of Liberty. . . . When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength.
>
> **G. W. F. Hegel**

ALTHOUGH THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM is nearly universally praised, it is also highly abstract and thus deeply contested. The combination of these factors has given the term tremendous mobilizing force for competing political projects. Numerous critics and commentators of the French Revolution noted this (including Burke and Kant), but it was perhaps not until Hegel that it was given a full philosophical analysis. As the passage above attests, Hegel understood well that the idea of freedom was at once vague, powerful, and necessary. He also recognized that modern philosophy is thus burdened by the demands of freedom: the demand not only of its articulation but its realization. Unlike Classical thought, for instance, in which philosophy must first and foremost meet the demands of truth, modernity has imposed the additional expectation that thought be *liberating*. In a recent polemic, Peter Sloterdijk bemoans this historical transition, lamenting that "'knowledge is power.' This is the sentence that dug the grave of philosophy in the nineteenth century. . . . This sentence brings to an end the tradition of a knowledge that, as its name indicates, was an erotic theory—the love of truth and the truth through love (*Liebeswahrheit*). . . . Those who utter the sentence reveal the truth. However, with the utterance they want to achieve more than truth: They want to intervene in the game of power."[1] Setting aside Sloterdijk's longing for a prelapsarian philosophical love affair with truth unsullied by the problem of

power, perhaps we can invert this lament, turn it into a positive and future-oriented impulse. Can we read our desire to "achieve more than truth" as something other than a closure, as perhaps even an opening to new horizons?

If philosophic activity can no longer be confined to the rather solitary pursuit of truth, a modern focus on freedom is related to a certain resocialization of thought as well. Hence, increased preoccupation with freedom has been attended by a host of attacks upon what might be termed the philosophy of the constituting subject. A movement is observable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then, not only toward questions of freedom, but also away from an understanding of freedom as a *property* of the subject and more as a *practice* or a *relationship* (something one does rather than has). Once thought to designate the status of a small social and political elite, distinguishing them from the bulk of humanity who did not enjoy such standing (e.g., women, slaves, foreigners), the language of freedom was for many centuries necessarily stratified and nonreciprocal. Largely as a result of the upheavals of the nineteenth century, it is now possible, even commonsensical, for us to think of freedom as entailing a certain reciprocity and egalitarianism. To invoke perhaps the most famous and historically powerful iteration of this, unlike our predecessors, we can speak of freedom as an "association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."[2] Increasingly, then, the freedom we talk about is a situation brought about through an ongoing practical relationship with the world and others. It is not something to be found, but rather something to be created and maintained with others.[3]

Along with this shift in the political idiom of freedom has come a parallel transformation in metaphysical conceptions. One of the main ways in which this was most manifest in the twentieth century was through a turn to intersubjectivity. Instead of locating questions of freedom in the search for transcendental properties of the subject (i.e., consciousness, the categories of intuition, and the like), philosophers of intersubjectivity have sought to ground emancipatory praxis in the discursively mediated interaction between subjects. Such theories offer the insight that the identity and constitution of the subject is not determined a priori but rather is formed through intersubjective reciprocity between agents, an insight often traced back to Hegel. As such, the

move to intersubjectivity can be read as a contribution to both of the two general trajectories set out: it ties the question of truth to the question of freedom, but does so in a manner that circumvents problems associated with a philosophy of consciousness.

A recent, influential contribution to this line of inquiry is the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. Undoubtedly, Habermas's oeuvre represents one of the most ambitious and systematic attempts to overcome the philosophy of the constituting subject through recourse to a theory of communicative rationality that locates the transcendental condition for critique, not in consciousness, but in intersubjective discursive activity.[4] However, underlying much of the discussion to follow is a concern that, despite Habermas's important insights, no theory of intersubjective communicative rationality can bypass the disclosing function of the pre-reflective activities by which a "world" of intelligible entities (including the very "subjects" who may engage in a discourse ethics) come into view in the first place. In other words, the field of possible subjects with which one may engage is not, in the first instance, discovered discursively-intersubjectively but rather practically-holistically (i.e., practice is not reducible to language).[5]

While theories of intersubjectivity have garnered a great deal of attention with respect to their considerable contributions to post-Kantian practical philosophy, there is another alternative. The possibility that an ontological inquiry might provide another route beyond the philosophy of the constituting subject (and even an alternative to the philosophy of intersubjectivity) has been widely noted. Even as trenchant a critic of Heidegger as Habermas has praised the way in which Heidegger's "postmetaphysical historicizing" advances the "overcoming of the philosophy of subjectivity. . . . From today's standpoint, Heidegger's new beginning still presents probably the most profound turning point in German philosophy since Hegel."[6] However, despite the wide recognition that Heidegger's work has gained in terms of challenging the philosophy of subjectivity, the implications of this remain underdeveloped for practical philosophy. Hence, the questions posed here: To what extent might the movement of freedom in post-Kantian political philosophy be recast in *ontological* terms? What difference might this make to the range of practical vocabularies available to us, currently preoccupied as they are with issues of intersubjectivity? Two thinkers

who are indispensable for such an inquiry are Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault.

The choice to draw upon Heidegger in recasting freedom in ontological terms is rather straightforward. Heidegger is known not only for his insistence on ontology as the central preoccupation of philosophy, but also on the centrality of freedom to this form of analysis. Despite this insistence, and in contradistinction to the wealth of literature on freedom and transcendental subjectivity, or freedom and intersubjectivity, Heidegger's ontological thesis has not been fully explored in relation to the question of freedom. To date, no monograph devotes itself singularly to addressing the question: what did Heidegger understand by the term "freedom"? Or, more generally: what are the implications for thinking about questions of freedom after Heidegger's formulation of ontology? In fact, secondary literature on Heidegger and freedom is relatively hard to come by in either philosophy generally or political theory more specifically.[7] This lack of sustained reflection is surprising and requires rectification.

Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault to investigate this topic is a considerably less obvious move. Although Foucault did speak of his work as a "historical ontology" and of freedom as a kind of "ontological ground," nowhere in his writings does he devote himself to a sustained, straightforward discussion of what ontology means to him. And yet, a thinker's silence on a topic does not entail its absence as a structuring field. Animating the project of reading Foucault ontologically then is a conviction that—despite his occasional protestations—he cannot avoid such questions altogether. As Johanna Oksala puts this point, "If Foucault's thought does not contribute anything to ontological questioning, then neither does it ultimately contribute anything significant to political philosophy."[8] Since virtually the entire second half of this book is devoted to demonstrating the centrality of ontological considerations to Foucault's analysis of freedom, I will not rehearse the point here. Instead, I will merely direct readers to the bulk of the text as a defense of the importance of putting these two into direct conversation concerning this topic.

What is clear is that Heidegger and Foucault stand out as two of the most important and influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Each has spawned volumes of secondary literature and sparked fierce, po-

larizing debates, particularly as regards the relationship between philosophy and politics. And yet, to date there exists almost no work that presents a systematic and comprehensive engagement of the two in relation to one another. This book seeks to address this lacuna, but only indirectly. A different tack would focus on textual traces and personal connections. This kind of inquiry would no doubt place emphasis on Foucault's declaration at the end of his life that Heidegger was, for him, "the essential philosopher," one who determined his "entire philosophical development" (*FL*, 470; *DE2*, 1521–22). Taking up this (by no means self-evident) declaration as a textual and biographical problem is a legitimate and worthwhile project no doubt. However, this is not my primary interest or concern here. Instead, in a more general and tangential way, this book demonstrates that it is both interesting and important to read Heidegger and Foucault alongside and in relation to one another, particularly if we are to understand properly the shape of twentieth century continental thought. These two thinkers form the poles between which are stretched a great arc traversing twentieth-century European philosophy, beginning with fundamental ontology and ending in genealogical critique and an ethics of the "care of the self." One aim here is to convince that these two poles are, in fact, connected. For even if we are not entirely convinced by the answers these two specific thinkers offer, the questions they wrestled with remain unavoidable.

Despite this conceptual focus, however, in the pursuit of such theoretical questions, one cannot help but comment on the biographical details of how Foucault engaged with Heidegger. I return briefly to this question below (1.2) in order to situate the discussion that follows within the context of this secondary, exegetical problem. Before proceeding to this, however, a more detailed sketch of the theoretical problematic is required.

1.1. ONTOLOGY AND SITUATED FREEDOM

In the study that follows I attempt to trace how Heidegger and Foucault develop their respective analyses of freedom in relation to questions of ontology. Engaging with these two thinkers, I argue, allows us to develop an analysis of freedom understood not in terms of a property of the subject, nor as an intersubjective activity, but as a mode of Being-in-

the-world. More specifically, I argue that this kind of relationship and stylized mode of being seeks to disclose the mutual interrelatedness of (1) the acquisition of knowledge; (2) the appearance of a domain of entities about which knowledge claims can be made; and (3) the ethical transformation of the subject of knowledge. One discloses this interrelatedness through a working out of the possibilities projected within the worldly activities of disclosure that make a horizon of intelligibility possible and thus are the field on which self-recognition and subject-formation takes place. To be in a "free" relationship to this field or clearing is not, for Heidegger and Foucault, to detach oneself from it through an act of cognitive reflection. Rather, it is to cultivate a certain ethical attitude of awareness within the activities of disclosure that constitute the ontological ground of the field itself. It is, in a word, to take *care* of the field and, through this, of oneself.

Of course, the notion that the ethical transformation of the self in and through its worldly activities is linked to the acquisition of knowledge about the world did not begin with Heidegger and Foucault. Nor is it unique to them. In fact, as both authors suggest, their formulation of the question in this manner has antecedents in the nineteenth century. Hegel, Stirner, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche in particular might all be read with an eye to elucidating these connections. Given this longer heritage I have, at times, employed Charles Taylor's terminology of "situated freedom" to describe the formation developed here.[9] I borrow the term from Taylor not only because it evokes a historical link back to Hegel (through Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in particular), but also because for Taylor, *situated freedom* denoted a position between the largely negative notion of freedom as self-dependence and the positive notions of freedom centered around the expression of one's "true" self. As elaborated upon later in this work, the move to an ontological analysis of selfhood-in-action is an attempt to displace the aspiration to both autonomy and expressivism evoked by the prevailing language of positive versus negative liberty. Instead, in Taylor's words, "What is common to all the varied notions of situated freedom is that they see free activity as grounded in the *acceptance* of our defining situation. The struggle to be free . . . is powered by an affirmation of this defining situation as ours."[10] The notion of acceptance points to a second theme: finitude. For Heidegger and Foucault, the acceptance of fini-

tude—in the sense of acknowledging one's factical limitations in a particular worldly condition and the fact that absolute knowledge of self and world is not, even in principle, possible—does not entail the *end* of freedom, but rather its *beginning*, insofar as this acknowledgment provides the starting point for an ethical transformation of one's *mode* or *style* of being within these conditions. In concluding chapters, I will describe and defend this transformation as a *spiritual* one.

The reference above to autonomy and expressivism speaks to the need to articulate what we mean by situated freedom in relation to its historical alternatives. To better arrange the field on which this discussion takes place, it is helpful therefore to sketch some alternative discourses of freedom against which Heidegger and Foucault are working.

At the outset of this chapter, I mentioned that the discussion of freedom in Heidegger and Foucault is very much set against a larger backdrop of the philosophy of the constituting subject. This philosophical backdrop owes much to Descartes and Kant in particular, about whom we will have more to say in later chapters. For now, however, it is important to note the interrelationship between a certain conception of transcendental subjectivity and a corresponding understanding of freedom as autonomy, developed most fully and most influentially by Kant. In the brief outline that follows, I draw most extensively upon Kant, not because he is the exclusive contributor to the philosophical traditions I am attempting to sketch, but because Kant remains the single most important figure in relation to whom Heidegger and Foucault position their respective work on freedom.

The formulation of freedom as "autonomy" of the subject, against which a theory of situated freedom is developed, owes most to Kant. Kant's problematic of freedom might be outlined through a two-stage set of questions. The questions and their ramifications are: (1) How can a creature which is subject to finite conditions (i.e., of space and time) guarantee the universality of its claims to knowledge? Does not our finitude—being subject to empirical laws of physics, causality, time, and so on—serve to limit our capacity to generate truly universal claims such that knowledge itself is threatened? (2) Does not this undermining of our reason in its knowing capacity further undermine the possibility of free agency, given that such agency rests on the possibility of rational determination? If the rational determination of our will cannot

be demonstrated to be generated by a knowable set of universal conditions, then isn't our agency reduced to mere responsiveness to instinct or sensuous inclinations (i.e., to finite conditions)?

Kant's unique and ingenious response to this problematic—the "Copernican turn"—is to transcendentalize finitude. To "transcendentalize finitude" is to redefine the (empirical) limits of human understanding (the "limits of representation") as transcendental conditions, knowable by the subject. If our limitations of knowing can themselves not only be known, but be shown to be transcendental conditions for knowledge (as universal and necessary organizing categories for our faculties, i.e., time and space), then, as Béatrice Han-Pile reminds us, the "*a priori* study of our (limited) faculties becomes the starting point for construing the necessary form of our knowledge, thus outlining the conditions of possibility of truth itself."[11] The famed "Copernican turn" consisted, then, in overcoming human finitude by making it the necessary, transcendental condition for knowledge as such. Han-Pile writes,

> The empirical forms of our finitude (such as the passivity of our sensibility, the partiality of our will to sensible inclinations, and so forth) are not overcome in the obvious sense that they would be denied, or miraculously bypassed by the shift to a more advanced state of the human race. Kant's more subtle argument is that although it has to be acknowledged as empirically unsurpassable, human finitude should be redefined a priori and therefore understood *positively*, i.e., as what generates the scope of our possible knowledge and ultimately (because it outlines the possibility of rational determination itself) as the cornerstone of our freedom.[12]

It is this mention of "the cornerstone of our freedom" that draws the link to the discussion at hand so vividly. The philosophy of the transcendental and constituting subject, in this case finding its expression in Kant's analytic of finitude, gives the philosophical backing for an understanding of freedom centered on autonomy. Since it is the necessary form of our knowledge, generated by the mind, which creates the possibility of rational determination, this form of knowledge (this mind) stands in a transcendental relation to the field of action. The subject does not merely *reflect* reality in the mind passively (as with Locke's *tabula rasa*) but rather actively organizes and orders reality in

such a way as to make rational determination possible. The second stage in this analysis is to connect this transcendental function of the mind to positive freedom. Thus, in this model freedom is equated, not only with the transcendental subject (the free will which chooses), but also with the active removal of those external impediments to full self-determination. Whether these be societal obstacles "outside" the empirical subject, or nonrational features of the self (e.g., the passions), external determination of the will can represent only an impediment to the self-constituting and self-legislating subject. The idea of removing obstacles to self-determination is Kant's way of linking what are referred to now as "negative" and "positive" liberty. *Transcendental* freedom for Kant refers to the absolute spontaneity of the will and derives from the capacity for rational determination. This transcendental freedom is defined negatively, but it is the basis on which he can further advocate autonomy as a form of positive freedom that seeks the *conditions* in which the appropriate moral motivation can be created so as to guide rational determination of the will (acting from duty alone). In between these two notions of freedom, Kant posits the purposiveness of nature as a means of reconciling the two.[13]

Now, it is clear that both Heidegger and Foucault at least claim to be working against such a model of freedom as autonomous rational willing. What remains to be seen is whether, despite their protestations, they merely commit themselves to an amended version of the philosophy of the constituting subject—perhaps not in the name of autonomous rational will but, instead, self-determination through self-creation. My reading of the two will attempt to demonstrate their critical potential as alternatives to the prevailing (Kantian) tradition by demonstrating that the work of both is animated by an understanding of selfhood as ontologically grounded in pre-reflective practices with independent (i.e., nonassigned) ethical import (relations of "Care"). To commit oneself to an understanding of freedom as autonomy from such embodied relations would be nonsensical under this reading as it is the relations and practices themselves that provide the historical conditions of possibility for the exercise of agency.

Another important theoretical language against which this ontology of finitude and freedom is situated is what I will refer to here as *teleological* freedom. Again I will rely upon the formulation put forward by

Kant, not because his is the exclusive or definitive formulation of the language of purposiveness, but because his particular formulation was subsequently so influential on others (Hegel and Marx in particular), and because both Heidegger and Foucault make specific reference to it.

By "teleological freedom," I am referring to the recourse to a purposiveness in history as a means of reconciling the transcendental freedom of pure spontaneity with the positive freedom of a social condition in which self-determination can be realized. A teleological or developmental model in this sense is organized around three basic premises: (1) a claim regarding the fundamental structures of consciousness (or, in the post–linguistic turn era, of the structure of communication) that determine the horizon of the possible content of knowledge; (2) the generalizing claim that these deep structures are a universal property of the human species; and (3) that these structures of consciousness have an internal developmental logic. This model of freedom finds its expression in the developmental anthropologies throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including, most robustly, in Hegel and Marx, but it also has retained credence in the twentieth century, particularly through Habermas's theory of societal evolution.[14]

In the Kantian picture, it is an a priori possibility that the division between the noumenal and phenomenal accounts of causality and freedom be resolved through the unilinear progress of history in which humanity can come to reshape the empirical world through moral action to better correspond with the demands of *abstract freedom* exercised in the noumenal realm (i.e., with reason). Thus, a natural teleology of freedom is required to fully realize the abstract freedom of the noumenal self.

It is important to note that the attribution of teleological ends to nature and human activities is not an empirically verifiable truth. Teleology is a form of reflective judgment in which particular objects are judged without subsuming them under a determinate concept of the understanding.[15] Reflective judgments do not, for Kant, generate explanations that could be proved (or disproved); they produce only maxims for reflection. This does not mean, however, that the positing of a natural teleology is unjustified, since it is precisely when we are faced with radically contingent, unexpected objects of observation that we are authorized to consider that the "very contingency of the thing's form is a basis for regarding the product as if it had come about through

a causality that only reason can have."[16] Such contingent objects are the effects of an unknown causality, which Kant calls "purposiveness." Free will's efficacy in the empirical world is precisely such a contingent "eruption" that justifies recourse to purposiveness. Thus, as *The Critique of Judgment* is at pains to demonstrate, even it if is impossible to generate empirically verifiable knowledge claims about purposiveness, this does not signify a failure of judgment, but rather demonstrates its central role.

Thus, Kant posits a reflective judgment about a third kind of causality which can bridge the mechanical causality of the empirical world with the "special causality" of abstract freedom as experienced in the moral, noumenal realm. Only if mankind is itself the telos of nature—that is, that it is nature's design to produce self-legislating beings—can empirical, linear time be reconciled with abstract freedom. This telos then is world-historical progress guided by Providence. If it were not for a natural teleology that confirms humanity's ability to force the empirical world to conform to its moral commands, we would be at the mercy of "aimless random process, and the dismal reign of chance."[17] In such circumstances, the duty to obey self-legislated moral commands would lose its compulsory force and we would be doomed to the repetition of Sisyphean deeds.[18] Thus, for freedom to exist at all, we must posit—as a reflective judgment—a divine "moral author" who has set into motion a natural teleology of progress in which humans are working toward a kingdom of ends:[19] "a happiness of rational beings that harmoniously accompanies their compliance with moral laws."[20] The kingdom of ends holds out the eternal possibility that the abstract freedom of the noumenal realm may be realized even in the flow of mechanical, linear time.

Once we have posited the principle of natural teleology, we have an interpretive key to understanding the contingencies of history. Specifically, natural teleology becomes a *regulative ideal* that organizes and structures our experience of human history. This means, therefore, we can interpret world events such as revolutions, wars, and acts of seemingly purposeless violence as unintentional contributions to global progress toward universal enlightenment. This does not mean that such acts are morally right—far from it. But it does mean that they are in accordance with nature's purpose. Without a teleological interpretive

framework for world history, Kant argued, these events would appear as a meaningless collection of contingent facts—a pile of empirical data with no significant relation between them.

Thus, for Kant, a concrete, positive political and moral form can be deduced from the metaphysics of freedom. For Heidegger and Foucault, however, the teleological anthropology of man, particularly when wedded to a theory of transcendental subjectivity, is precisely the frame against which their own work is situated. This critical relationship holds as true for the modified Kantianism of, say, Habermas. In this recent reformulation, it is not the underlying structures of consciousness that serve as a regulative ideal for a model of corrective societal evolution, but rather the transcendental conditions of communicative rationality that provide the basis of intersubjective discourse.[21] Nevertheless, a corrective model of teleological development toward a more and more rational society (with its corresponding understanding of freedom as an end-state to be achieved, rather than an activity to be practiced) is the animating impulse behind such work, something both Heidegger and Foucault would call into question.

Against these first two models, then—the transcendental and the teleological—we have a third: situated freedom. The remainder of this book is an attempt to provide a philosophical explication of this sense of situated freedom by drawing on Heidegger and Foucault. Even at this early juncture, it is important to note that I do not view this understanding of freedom to be an exclusively nineteenth- or twentieth-century phenomenon, nor as a final stage in some grand linear narrative—from transcendental, to teleological, and, finally, to situated freedom. The languages of transcendental and teleological freedom are still very important and influential for interpreting freedom. Likewise, the language of situated freedom can be seen in the works of other thinkers in other times. What brings together these various thinkers and modes of interpretation in a "family resemblance" is their understanding of freedom as a practical relationship to one's situation such that latent possibilities within one's worldly activities are not foreclosed. To stand in a "free" relation to the world, to oneself and one's ethical commitments, is to know that one's standpoint does not exhaust the total range of meaningful, viable, and worthwhile possibilities. The acknowledgment of the finitude of one's own posi-

tion and perspective is further complicated when we unpack what it would mean to "know" such a thing as finitude. Internal to the story told by both Heidegger and Foucault is that to know something is not merely to grasp it conceptually or give a theoretical articulation of it. It is not a mode of knowing, but is, rather, more fundamentally a *mode of being*, a relation of *logos* and *bios*. The test of our comprehension of this claim is not our ability to rephrase it back in the form of theoretical claims. Rather, it is the extent to which we actually *embody* the truth of this receptivity, fragility, indeterminacy, and interconnectivity.[22] As Thomas Dumm phrases it, freedom is not "a category or zone." Rather, it is "a style of being in the world that depends on an awareness of how one cares for the world, or, to use George Kateb's phrase, how one has "an attachment to existence."[23]

Central to my thesis is that this "attachment" relationship implies a bringing together of ethical commitment, knowledge acquisition, and the disclosure of a domain of entities. As such, it can properly be referred to as an "ontological" understanding of freedom. There is considerable room for confusion here, however, since "ontology" can be given a diverse range of meanings. As Johanna Oksala notes, *ontology* commonly refers to "both the fundamental building blocks of reality and to the systematic study of them."[24] Here, I am using the term to denote a very specific *mode of analysis*, one that attempts to disclose a fundamental relationship to reality, but does so in a matter distinct from traditional metaphysics. Metaphysics is also a mode of analyzing reality, but it is a mode primarily concerned with understanding *what* constitutes reality. That is to say, as I am using the term (following Heidegger's lead), metaphysics enters into the question of Being by way of beings, that is, an analysis of those entities which count as "existing" and the property that so constitutes them as such. By contrast, ontology studies *how* reality comes to us. It forestalls the question of *what* things exist (or don't) in favor of an inquiry into the mode or manner in which the question arises to us in the first place. More specifically, in using the predicate *ontological*, I am referring to a form of analysis that attempts to grasp the basic background conditions for the horizon of intelligibility that governs our engagement with the world. In distinction to an investigation of "epistemology," ontology sees our basic understanding of the world (our *Weltanschauung*, or "worldview") as

an outgrowth of more basic pre-reflective practical involvement, the sets of activities in which we are always already engaged. An ontological analysis attempts to demonstrate that a claim to know something (an epistemological claim) already contains a backgrounded understanding about what *kinds* of entities there are to know, and an ethical stance—an existential commitment—toward these entities. When we engage in an "ontological form of critical analysis," we are attempting either: (1) to be reminded of this mutual interrelatedness and the fundamental conditions that make it possible (this would be a *fundamental* ontology); or (2) to foreground the work being done by specific pre-reflective activities to animate and legitimate a particular horizon of intelligibility (this would be a *historical* ontology). Central to my argument here is that there is a necessary interconnection between these two types of analyses, one that links the kind of work represented by, for instance, *Being and Time* (on the one hand) and *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (on the other). A basic claim animating the whole of this book is that while Heidegger engages primarily with the first kind of analysis (fundamental ontology), this leads to his claim that *historicity* is one of the fundamental features of world-disclosure. This means that, rather than subordinate the historical contingency of particular activities of disclosure to some general ontological necessity which can be grasped philosophically through deduction of its transcendental necessity, this historical contingency is *itself* taken to be fundamental. In this way, finitude is "ontologized." The conclusion of this line of reasoning is that no particular historical formation can be read as the necessary or universal condition for the possibility of social life per se. In this case, it is the notion that a certain morality can be derived from necessary and universal epistemological claims (more specifically, arguments regarding the structure of truth claims) that ontology seeks to displace.

Taken up from the other side, however, a historical ontology cannot proceed without a commitment at least minimally to *historicity* as a fundamental feature of world-disclosure. I will attempt to demonstrate this in Chapter Six, at least with respect to Foucault, by rendering more explicit what I take to be some of his ontological commitments. Investigating such commitments, I argue, does not consist in constructing a transcendental "theory" of historicity, but rather merely referencing the very *immanence* of our understandings of the world to our practi-