

## PREFACE

Despite the plentiful evidence of lively political contestation and challenges to constituted power, nothing in the first edition of this book was intended to or could have predicted the insurrectionary movements that erupted in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to Egypt and the rest of the Arab world throughout 2011. This should not be considered unusual. Predictions in the social sciences are incorrect as often as they are correct, and such prognostication is not their most useful preoccupation. Even the organizers of the mass demonstrations that led to the unceremonious ouster of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak did not anticipate the extent of their success. As the second edition of this book goes to press two years later, it is still too soon to judge if these massive explosions of popular anger against decades of autocratic rule, corruption, systematic abuse of human rights, and economic deprivation will be consolidated as democratic regimes providing “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice”—as one of the movement’s most popular slogans demanded. De Tocqueville’s remark about the French Revolution is apt: “elle dure encore” (it still continues).

With Saudi assistance, the movement for a constitutional monarchy in Bahrain was brutally repressed. But in mid-2012 popular demonstrations revived, albeit with a more pronounced Shi’i character than a year earlier. In Saudi Arabia itself, oppositional mobilization was preempted by massive state expenditures. In late 2012, opposition to hereditary rule in Kuwait and Jordan crossed previously established red lines. In Algeria, the movement for democracy stalled. A mild constitutional reform left the Moroccan monarchy with most of its powers intact. Islamists, albeit ones prepared to collaborate with the king, won a plurality in the parliamentary elections of late 2011, and for the first time the parliament, not the king, selected the prime minister. Despite the emergence of a revolutionary movement, a similar compromise leaving most elements of the old regime in place was negotiated in Yemen under the patron-

age of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Libya experienced the most thorough regime change and held reasonably democratic elections. But the government is far from having established a monopoly of force throughout the entire country. In Syria, the outcome of the increasingly violent confrontation between the regime and the opposition is uncertain.

In Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the revolutionary movements were indigenous creations, but foreign intervention became a potent factor. In Tunisia and Egypt the uprisings were entirely home grown. The latter two held free elections that brought Islamists to power, but they provoked violent confrontations by claiming a mandate beyond what was justified by their electoral pluralities. The new governments' utter failure to address the social and economic discontent that undermined the legitimacy of the old regimes rapidly diminished their popularity.

These movements differ not only in their outcomes as of this writing. Perhaps analytically more important is the "eruption of the unexpected" in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Bahrain in contrast to movements deploying routine repertoires of contention in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, and Kuwait, again, as of this writing. This variety does not diminish the utility of speaking of a "revolutionary movement for democracy and social justice" that enveloped the Arab world in 2011 on a scale comparable to Latin America in the 1820s and Europe in 1848 and 1989. While the Arab movement could not be anticipated, the pre-2011 histories and contexts of mobilization and contestation examined in this book are essential to understanding these political and social processes.

The editors and authors of this book believe that the value of social science is primarily in its capacity to understand the past, which is and always will be contested. Good scholarship about the past may also help us understand the present. The most dramatic political development in the Middle East since the 1970s—the 1979 Iranian revolution—was completely unpredicted. On New Year's Eve 1977, a little more than a year before the shah was compelled to leave Iran by the most broad-based revolutionary movement in the twentieth-century Middle East, President Jimmy Carter toasted him at a state dinner in Tehran saying, "Under the shah's brilliant leadership, Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world." No Western social scientist could claim to have been any more prescient. A month before the fall of the shah, the Hoover Institution published a lavish and admiring volume entitled *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, edited by the late George Lenczowski, with a full-color portrait of the shah as its frontispiece.

Rather than prediction, the continuity between the contents of the first edition of this book and the new chapters on Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen and the updates and revisions of the chapters on Egypt and Morocco in the current edition is their emphasis on the fine-grained dynamics of contentious mobilizations of secular movements of the working classes, the intelligentsia, unemployed degree holders, human rights and democracy activists, and unexpected forms of Islamist mobilization (and demobilization). Islamists were not necessarily the most active oppositional forces throughout the 2000s. Their historical longevity, superior organization, mobilizational capacity, populist appeal, and a certain “revolutionary fatigue” allowed them to reap the harvest of the revolutionary movements. Ultimately, our processual, dynamic, and historicized approach to social movements, mobilization, and contestation in hostile and repressive contexts focusing on precise contexts, informal social networks, and repertoires of contentious practices, offers a method of analyzing the emergence and development of collective action that contributes to understanding the events in the Arab world in a more substantive manner than instant analysis focusing on Facebook, the domino effect, and, more recently, the “Islamist hijacking” of democratic movements.

Like any successful mobilization, the preparation of this book relied on the support of both institutions and people. The idea for the project emerged during a seminar funded by the Ford Foundation and hosted by the Middle East Studies Center of the American University in Cairo during the academic year 2007–2008. Jack Brown was the graduate assistant for that seminar. The editors then organized a workshop entitled “Social Movements in the Middle East and North Africa: Shouldn’t We Go a Step Further?” at the Tenth Annual Mediterranean Research Meeting of the European University Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at Montecatini Terme, Italy, March 25–28, 2009. We thank the scientific coordinators of that event, Imco Brouwer and Aleksandra Djajic-Horvath, for providing the opportunity to assemble most of the authors in this volume for an intense and productive discussion. Monique Cavallari, Angela Conte, Laura Jurisevic, Valerio Pappalardo, and Elisabetta Spagnoli—members of the staff of the Schuman Centre—were very helpful during the meeting. We would like to thank warmly Najat Abdulhaq, Diana Keown Allan, Abdelilah Bouasria, Kevin Koehler, Henri Onodera, Nicola Pratt, and Jana Warkotsch for their valuable contributions to the workshop and their thoughtful insights and comments on the papers at Montecatini Terme. Funding for the translations of the chapters by Amin Allal and Laurent Bonnefoy and

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Two leading scholars of Social Movement Theory, Doug McAdam and Sidney G. Tarrow, read drafts of parts of this book and shared their incomparable knowledge of the field and its internal history. They were extraordinarily generous with us—investing considerable time and encouraging our project even though we have not been uncritical of some of their work. Their exemplary scholarly and human graciousness is matched only by their well-deserved eminence and outstanding contributions to social science.

We thank the anonymous reviewers for Stanford University Press for engaging with the ambitions of this volume. Their comments and criticisms improved and sharpened our arguments.

The index to the second edition was prepared by Vladimir Troyansky.

From our earliest correspondence on the idea for this book and its second edition, Kate Wahl at Stanford University Press has shown an encouraging and highly professional interest in the project. She has been supportive at all stages of its elaboration. Mariana Raykov was the able and cheerful production editor for both editions of the book.

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