## FOREWORD BY SIDNEY D. DRELL

The Open Skies Treaty is one of the better-kept secrets of the world of international arms control and confidence-building. Not many are aware of the fact that the United States can fly an unarmed military reconnaissance airplane anywhere over Russia and thirty-two other treaty signatory nations with only twenty-four hours' notice of the intended flight plan. Similarly, the Russian Federation has a reciprocal right to conduct aerial photography flights over the United States and other treaty members. More than a thousand of these reconnaissance flights have been flown over Europe, Russia, Canada, and the United States since the Open Skies Treaty was negotiated. All missions are jointly manned by personnel of both nations—the observed and the observer—and the information gained by the agreed upon and equal sensors is shared with any treaty signatory nation who asks for it. The treaty stipulates the maximum ground resolution of the images obtained by the cameras. At visible wavelengths this is roughly comparable to that obtained by commercial satellites. It also allows for thermal infrared sensors for nighttime viewing, and coherent synthetic aperture radar viewing for all-weather activity monitoring and detecting militarily significant changes in deployments of conventional forces.

President Eisenhower first proposed cooperative aerial monitoring overflights to the Soviet Union in 1955 during the height of the Cold War as a means of building confidence and reducing the dangers of surprise or unintended conflict. Immediately and forcefully rejected by the Soviet Union when first proposed, Open Skies lay dormant until the waning days of the Cold War and the negotiation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limiting the deployments of conventional military forces in Europe.

At that point, in 1989, the considerable value of cooperative aerial monitoring as a confidence-building measure that would test the Soviet Union's commitment to openness and transparency was appreciated by President George H. W. Bush. He was strongly supported and encouraged by Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney, who also urged expansion of the idea beyond the United States and the Soviet Union to include all the nations in the NATO and Warsaw Pact communities. It was also appreciated by the then Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. This led to an intense negotiation period starting in 1989 and culminating in a treaty signed in 1992 that finally entered into force in 2002, following its ratification by the Duma of the Russian Federation.

It is natural to ask why there would be great interest in Open Skies. It has been operating quietly for the past eleven years, pretty much in the shadow of more sophisticated national technical means of monitoring activities potentially threatening to our national security. Unlike 1955, when President Eisenhower first proposed it, there now exist globe-circling reconnaissance satellites of very high sophistication and broad capabilities providing much information of what countries are doing with their military forces, and in particular with their strategic nuclear weapons. And so one asks, What does Open Skies contribute? The basic answer is that aircraft can cover targets in ways that satellites cannot, taking into account local weather patterns, and they are available to all nations, not just the few that can presently support satellite programs. Perhaps most important, Open Skies flights are cooperative; unlike satellites, they require the consent and active cooperation of the state being overflown. There is thus an important political benefit in terms of encouraging a much greater degree of openness and transparency in relations between states, which contributes to confidence. That said, the technical capabilities of the sensors presently included on Open Skies aircraft are quite limited. Unless the sensors evolve to include more advanced technologies and higher resolution, there is a danger that Open Skies will become less and less relevant. But with vision and leadership, the Open Skies Treaty could evolve to provide substantial long-term benefits in many fields. These include the adaptation of the present regime to help meet the challenge of the verification of future agreements to greatly limit the number of nuclear weapons in the world and other WMD, key U.S. foreign policy objectives. Open Skies provides for short-notice unrestricted territorial access for aircraft, which—if agreement could be reached to equip them with

more modern technology for obtaining higher-resolution images, and also with atmospheric collection options that sample and collect particulates (data that simply cannot be detected from satellites)—could play a huge role in future efforts to verify steep reductions in WMD.

Expanding the number of signatory nations beyond the current thirty-four in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or creating similar regimes in other regions, will lay an important foundation for the technical verification challenge ahead. Cooperative Aerial Monitoring (CAM) has an ongoing role in the future, for both confidence-building and data collection. Particularly in conjunction with other treaty verification elements, CAM can provide information that is difficult to obtain any other way. Cooperative Aerial Monitoring can be expanded to include verification of compliance with a number of issues currently under discussion, such as a cut-off on the production of nuclear fuel for military systems and the accounting for all nuclear weapons-grade material in the world, which is now part of an ongoing agenda involving many countries and will be strengthened by having an ability to collect atmospheric samples. An expanded regime of cooperative aerial monitoring can also help to verify agreements banning chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore, at the political level, the ability for cooperative sharing of information, which is now entering into a more active phase, will benefit greatly by building on an expanded Open Skies as an existing model. It is a gateway to a world with greater reliance on cooperative means to raise confidence in controlling possible arms races, avoid conflict, and, one day perhaps, get rid of all nuclear weapons. There are also possible uses for cooperative aerial monitoring beyond those associated with arms control and military confidence-building. The health of our environment is a matter of increasing concern and urgency. Future agreements on environmental matters may require some form of cooperative monitoring, and the lessons of Open Skies, and perhaps even the regime itself, will be very relevant here.

It is fortunate that Dr. Peter Jones, an astute and highly experienced Canadian political scientist and former arms control negotiator, has written a book that lays out for us the unique complications of negotiating a multilateral cooperative treaty to meet and prepare for new challenges. This is an enduring and successful example of transparency and cooperative confidence-building and provides an important framework for broader verification measures, which are likely to become more comprehensive as we move to a future with fewer and fewer arms. Peter Jones was deeply involved in the negotiations of

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the Open Skies Treaty from the very beginning, for six years from 1989 to 1995, and has subsequently been involved in exploratory discussions to develop the idea of cooperative aerial monitoring and other confidence-building measures in other troubled regions of the world. This book is a powerful font of valuable information on how the Open Skies negotiations ultimately succeeded. For anyone interested in how Open Skies was negotiated, but also more broadly, in how a complex international negotiation actually works, this is an outstanding account and analysis of how this treaty was brought to realization. I found this book a very informative read; important for guidance as one looks ahead to a world with more cooperative monitoring, and a valuable record of what it takes to succeed in negotiations of this type that, it can be hoped, will be pursued in the future.

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