Introduction

This study explores the relationship between decolonization and postcolonial political outcomes.[1] To do so means not only having to overcome the ontologically suspect (but patriotically privileged) break between the colonial past and the postcolonial present; it also means bridging the gulf between an international arena where anarchy is said to prevail and a domestic zone assumed to be an endogenously ordered political space. There are no small disciplinary and political investments in keeping these domains—colonial/international and postcolonial/domestic—separate. Not transcending these conventional boundaries of time and space, however, I argue, makes it impossible to understand how international forces consequentially shaped the political possibilities available to newly arrived postcolonial subjects.

Decolonization was never just a demand for political freedoms "at home." It was always also a claim to fully recognized and legitimate membership in the existing "family of nations." For the first generation of soon-to-be postcolonial states and existing members of international society alike, this was a fraught and uncertain process. Colonial elites were all too aware that the Great Powers had long used racial and civilizational criteria to exclude legally sovereign and independent states such as Turkey and Siam from full international personhood. Imperial powers that dominated the contemporary international system feared the inclusion of former colonies for the potential disruption of their carefully crafted and structurally unequal global order. Colonies may unquestionably have had moral power on their side in their demands for freedom, but the intensity of that feeling did not equate to convincing the Great Powers that the time had come either to give up their colonial possessions or to move the international order toward a more just and democratically organized arrangement. The first generation of new entrants into the postwar international system thus faced the daunting prospect of establishing the terms for full international personhood—external sovereignty—with little historical precedent, while also remaining deeply aware that international recognition was being negotiated with powerful states deeply resistant to changing the status quo.

What was not questioned by new states was the absolute necessity of joining the contemporary international system, warts and all. Whether because pragmatism demanded it, in the form of access to much-needed loans, capital, food, technology, or resources, or because it was the only conceivable means through which reform of an unjust international order could be initiated, the call for political independence was also always a demand for international recognition. Yet the bitter truth is that the necessity of gaining and retaining external sovereignty was a poisoned chalice: in practice it meant learning that change in the international system was not going to come easily, if at all, and that long-established privileges were not going to be given up without a fight. However, what was barely appreciated at all, and this insight marks the point of departure for this study, was that the means to external sovereignty would also have far-reaching domestic political implications.

To rephrase in more specific terms: this is a book about India's encounter with the world as it sought to free itself of colonial rule and the effects of that encounter on postcolonial Indian citizenship. It highlights the struggles faced by the people of the "darker nations" in being recognized as full and legitimate members of the international system, the constraints they had to overcome, and the compromises they had to make to participate as fully fledged international persons.[2] But the story does not end there. This bruising encounter with the world also left an enduring mark in a "domestic" arena typically assumed to be distant from foreign affairs. In particular, the quality of postcolonial citizenship bears the scars of India's encounter with the world, stripping some Indian subjects of full participation in the newly formed nation-state and denying other Indian nationals the weight of state protections they had every right to expect. These political outcomes are neither occasional aberrations nor unintended products of poor policy making. Rather, I will argue, uneven and unequal forms of citizenship are structural features of the territorially bound nation-state.

In the process of explaining these two related outcomes, this book interrogates a number of assumptions familiar to students of international relations and foreign policy studies. The most basic is the assumption that what we mean by "foreign policies" are restricted to a set of bounded actions that take place beyond state borders. Foreign policy, in this book, is shown to have a direct impact in shaping the topos of political life within the "domestic" borders of the state. Rather than begin from a taken-for-granted difference between "domestic" and "foreign," as is commonplace, I follow the lead of Rob Walker, Sankaran Krishna, and David Campbell in arguing that

foreign policy is best understood as a boundary-making technology.[3] From this perspective, a firm separation of the foreign and the domestic is the desired *end* of a complex set of spatializing processes that are consolidated under the sign of foreign policy. Establishing the boundary between domestic and foreign is a modern state imperative; however, this distinction is never fixed or permanent but is constantly being reproduced through practices, performances, and regulations that seek to produce the "state effect" of an ontological difference between inside and outside.[4] But that is not all. This study also complements and extends the work of Indian historians and scholars of nationalism and domestic politics by opening up a domain of enquiry that has remained largely absent from their scholarship, the international arena. In this study, I will argue for the importance of understanding how new nations coped with the pressures of international forces insofar as they shaped unequal domestic political arrangements that still stand today as deeply sobering reminders of the limits of Indian democracy.

Understanding the international-historical context within which new states emerged, I argue, is the first step to understanding the "domestic" political and organizational choices made by new entrants to the international order. To understand these political outcomes, however, we cannot assume that we all know what is meant by the term *international.* My use of the term supplements conventional notions of the international as the space produced by interstate interactions with the presence and circulation of transnational forces, nonstate actors, ideas, material flows, and people and locates the emergence of international space in historical terms. I argue that a critical aspect of what we term *international relations* today is best understood as the efforts of states to monopolize extradomestic space for themselves, seeking to regulate and/or exclude these other forces and unrecognized actors. As the following section details, I propose that we need to understand the international as always a heterogeneous and unstable space of struggle.

The importance of seeing international space as a field of struggle follows from the claim that the meanings of political freedom for colonized peoples included demands to access, participate in, and shape the world beyond the domestic arena. Seeing the international in these terms also helps us localize a very different image of the "foreign" produced by state boundary-making practices. Once states seek to create hard borders between home and abroad—foreign policy—the foreign is typically produced as a site of fear and anxiety. But it cannot be forgotten that the international was, and remains, also a zone of novelty, potential, and attraction. (In other words,

difference may not always be a site of social abjection). We can only retain both meanings of the foreign—attraction and anxiety—if we start from the international as a heterogeneous and unstable space.

To sustain this view conceptually, I draw on the idea of scale as deployed by human geographers. Following the discussion of the "new international scale," I offer an outline of the book, highlighting the main arguments of each chapter. This book is effectively divided into two parts, the first two chapters addressing India's encounter with the world; the third and the fourth chapter exploring the outcomes of that encounter on "domestic" political life. If much of this study is devoted to offering a new perspective on foreign policy and territory, that is not all it offers. The practical, dare I even say "policy-relevant," consequences of this conceptual revision are spelled out in the conclusion. Appreciating "how India became territorial" leads, I argue, to an entirely new way of understanding two long-standing political problems that are structurally related: the difficulty of resolving interstate territorial disputes, and why Pakistan remains a foundational problem for Indian foreign policy.

The "Space" of the International

Rather than imagined as an ontologically stable zone that borders the domestic "level of analysis," the international should be understood as an emergent space of struggle. Such a view alters entirely the conventional historical narrative in the field of International Relations that views the early twentieth century as a period of gradual transition from the age of empire to the era of the nation-state. The decades-long process of the dissolution of most of the world's empires and the emergence of the nation-state as the preeminent political unit of our times must not be reduced to a misleading teleology of the replacement of one form of political organization by another, superior, one. What I want to highlight is the process of *struggle* between entrenched formations and new forces that created a space marked—both then and now—by the copresence of empires; semisovereign nations; fully and partially recognized states, people, transnational institutions, and corporations; and nongovernmental agencies. Together, these entities and institutions working across multiple geographic scales jointly constitute an international space, the boundaries of which are constantly undergoing change. To make sense of this argument requires drawing on a spatial concept very familiar to human geographers but still largely absent from international relations, namely, "scale."

Political scientists have long conceptualized the international in relation to "levels of analysis."[5] Such a formulation tacitly identifies with a governmentalized organization of territorial space by normalizing a discrete hierarchy of administrative units, from the smallest locality through the district and province, "up" to the largest, the nation-state. In the level of analysis schema, the international is deemed to be what lies beyond the nation-state level; for most IR scholars, the international is constituted through unequal power relations between nation-states, the highest form of modern political organization.[6] States constantly seek to normalize the logic of "levels of analysis" that makes, for example, the province, the district, and the village appear as natural and inevitable divisions of political space. This is no small task. It takes considerable effort and resources to marginalize the other social relations that cut across these "levels" to make this familiar division of space appear normative. Space, however, is not a synonym for "place" or "location," as is implied in commonly used phrases such as a description of Kashmir as a "space of conflict." Space is an outcome, not a prior foundational condition. Seen in this way, "Space no longer appears as a static platform of social relations, but rather as one of their constitutive dimensions, itself historically produced, reconfigured, and transformed."[7]

By contrast, critical geographers prefer to identify political spaces in terms of "scales," a formulation that makes it much easier to identify and explain the expression and mobility of power relations working across state administrative "levels," made visible through the everyday functioning of practices, institutions, ideas, and material flows.[8] Spaces are produced by the dialectic of "de- and reterritorialization" across multiple scales; scales, in turn, are emergent and dynamic spatial relations that are the "provisional geographical resolutions of power struggles."[9] Translating these definitions into what we mean by "international space" takes the meaning of the international from a fixed and bounded stage on which states play into a zone of struggle produced by processes of conflict that seek to shape, order, resist, and transform this space. Lost in this translation is the privileged position of the state. States now become actors seeking to shape international space and to regulate its content and boundaries through their resources and the power of their interactions. The "international" of International Relations is a regime.

Expressing the international in terms of the outcome of a multiscalar process is vital to understanding the rapidly changing shape of the space lying outside the bounds of territorially defined communities—the "domestic" arena—in the turbulent decades following the fin de siècle. But, before getting there, it is important to affirm that this is not an argument that proposes

that "international space" did not exist prior to the end of the nineteenth century. Far from it. An international arena had been very much an identifiable space since at least a century before, though of a size far smaller than it would become.[10] Prior international space was produced and regulated by a handful of states located in Europe and North America through a succession of collective agreements variously deemed "Peaces," "Concerts," and "Conventions" that sought to channel interstate interactions into directions such that the frequency of war was reduced and, when it did occur, was managed through rules that sought to reduce the devastation of combat, especially against civilians and nonbelligerents.[11] This interstate space was founded in the aftermath of the decline of the authority of the Holy See, during a period when hundreds of semisovereign political entities in Europe began to be absorbed into larger bodies; when diplomatic texts began to shape memory, obligations, and interactions between states; and when mercantile empires were giving way to direct and indirect forms of territorial rule over contiguous and overseas possessions.[12] Participants in early international space were far from uniform, a pattern that continues into the present. By the late nineteenth century, these would include more or less nationally constituted states such as Sweden; principalities in regions that would become Italy and Germany; metropolitan representatives of global empires, such as Britain or France; and declining imperial monarchies such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as rising immigrant settler republics such as the United States. But, also, this international space was shaped by the existence of transnational entities of which the most prominent was probably the International Committee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863, as well as the social movements such as the antislavery societies that successfully lobbied for the passing of the British Slavery Abolition Act of 1833.[13]

This profusion of novel, contradictory, and customary modes of interaction that made up international space was, during the nineteenth century, ordered and codified by the votaries of so-called positive international law, exemplified by such figures as the American Henry Wheaton, the Englishman John Westlake, and the German-American L. F. L. Oppenheim. This distinctive legal approach sought above all to regularize and regulate a limited international order by elevating sovereign states over other political entities, Euro-Americans over the colored races, and power over principle.[14] Their objective was to establish firm boundaries around and to define the rules of the international system; their method was a process of vigorous intellectual justification of selective amnesia, racial exclusion, and subservience to the might of military force. Ironically, their

greatest influence would come just when the prevailing international order was on the cusp of radical change brought about by the immense human conflagrations of the early twentieth century, namely, World War I and the social revolutions that led to the formation of the Soviet Union. It should also be noted in passing that disabling, albeit partially, the unequal and illiberal norms of positive international law would be among the most important early projects taken on by the United Nations due to pressures from what would become the nonaligned countries and movement.[15]

If international space is best defined at the end of the nineteenth century as a small and mutually reinforcing concert of Euro-American states, the walls surrounding this exclusive club soon began to crumble under the multiple onslaughts of transformative political events leading to mass mobilization of subordinated people on a scale never seen before. One "international" event in particular stands out for its global impact. For the rest of the world, and especially Asia, the space lying beyond the domestic took on new meaning with the news of the Japanese naval victory over Russian forces at Port Arthur in 1905. Notwithstanding Japan's own desires to emulate Western imperial glory, the event circulated as a racialized discourse: the first major victory of an Asian power over a Western one. The imputed meaning of this event gave heart to anticolonialists and nationalists across Asia and beyond; it seemed clearly to imply that the power of European states was not without limits.[16]

If the Japanese victory was symbolic of future change that was now imaginable as possible, these feelings were more than complemented by domestic social transformations taking place across Asia due to the impact of modern technologies that brought what were once imaginaries of the future into tangible experience. In a few short decades, asphalted highways, electric trams, steel bridges, electric light, photographs and moving pictures, bicycle and motorcycle clubs, sewing machines, irrigation canals, modern sewage systems, new medicines for old diseases, microscopes and fingerprints, radio waves and telephone lines became part of the, especially, urban landscape in colonial societies. Each of these technologies brought with it elements of a modern cosmopolitan habitus that made even the recent past appear hopelessly outmoded.[17] But, also, for colonial societies familiar with the deployment of foreign technologies as "the measure of man"[18] instrumentally reinforcing the political and economic distance between colonizer and colonized, technologies of consumption coming from new sites, notably the United States and Japan, represented a modernity that was for the first time recognizably plural. Symbolically and materially, colonial societies were

experiencing the boundary between the domestic and the external altogether differently. The international became, for the colonial subject, a zone of possibility as much as a source of military threat and political subjugation.

Although there is no question that particular domestic idioms of "tradition" and aesthetic practice would have to work overtime to come to terms with this invasion of experience,[19] such a reinscription of the domestic–foreign boundary meant that transformative change was not always seen primarily as alien or threatening, even if this possibility has been largely ignored by theorists of nationalism. Pheng Cheah's concept of "spectral promises" seeks to expand on this theme, imagining a transnational space not entirely dominated either by the nation or by capital, the limiting conditions of domestic and international life.[20] This welcoming of the new international space is also visible, ironically, in the emergence of new languages of political freedom typically couched as nationalism yet deeply inflected by the foreign. Benedict Anderson has reminded us how often core anticolonial nationalist texts were written and initially disseminated in a location external to the object of liberation.[21] So many of what we might call the first generation of nationalist ideologues—José Rizal, Sun Yat-Sen, Mohandas K. Gandhi, Tan Malaka, Jamal al-din Al-Afghani, to mention only a few of the best known—would politically come of age overseas and would find their overseas experience a vital resource in developing their critiques of colonial and imperial order. Writing in the context of Gandhi in South Africa, Faisal Devji goes so far as to say, "The struggles of minorities in diverse parts of the empire might serve to define what it meant to be Indian far better than anything that was possible in the mother country."[22] There were a number of reasons for these foreign epiphanies, including the opportunity of seeing the imperial racial order upended in various ways, the possibility of sharing and learning from stories, critiques, and theories from other like-minded souls across colonial lines, as well as the forging of new alliances with movements and organizations dedicated to the emancipation of subjugated peoples and an end to imperialism. These encounters were predicated on new means and possibilities of long distance travel, means that were now increasingly available and at lower cost, and possibilities shaped by class position, which also helps explain why radicals were disproportionately middle-class figures. In the last instance, however, claims on the international were also claims of entitlement to the universal, an unquestioned condition of political freedom.

Starting in the twentieth century, the variety of events and occasions that brought together people who had hitherto rarely had a chance to meet

and discuss their respective political fates was little short of extraordinary. While the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 has long exemplified the moment when interstate diplomacy was made subject to global public attention and even some scrutiny, it was hardly the only moment when nonstate political actors sought to draw international attention to their causes and plight.[23] An incomplete list of meetings that rejected the existing world order in some way would include the Universal Races Conference, London, 1911; the Baku Congress of Peoples of the East, 1920; the Bierville Peace Conference of 1926; and the 1927 anticolonial conference held in Brussels, which brought together 180 delegates from thirty-four countries and would lead to the formation of the Berlin-based League Against Imperialism.[24] It was at Baku, for instance, that the Indian Communist M. N. Roy first articulated his thesis on the dangers of supporting anticolonial nationalism in opposition to the Leninist line that saw bourgeois revolutions in the colonial world as potential tools in the global struggle against capitalism.[25] Regionally focused meetings included the first Pan-Asiatic Congress at Nagasaki in 1926; the Pan-Asiatic Conference in Shanghai in 1927; the All-Asia Education Conference, Benares, 1930; the All-Asia Women's Conference, Lahore, 1931; and the Pan-Asiatic Labour Congress, Colombo, 1934.[26] At these meetings, Asian nationalists were able to meet each other as well as supporters of their causes from Europe and the United States, offering them the ability to develop cosmopolitan critiques of imperialism that exceeded national boundaries and adopted an explicitly transnational scale.

As the scales, origins, and content of transnational and cross-border flows increased and multiplied in the new century, the social and economic landscapes of colonial and metropolitan worlds began to change markedly. On the one hand, metropolitan advances in areas as different as botanical knowledge, public health, urban sanitation, disease eradication, criminology, anthropology, fingerprinting, pharmaceuticals, and even educational curricula had long been a product of the monopolized imperial relationship with the colony.[27] Modern Western national consciousness itself could best be seen in relation to the imperial encounter, as Hannah Arendt would suggest: "The truth was that only far from home could a citizen of England, Germany or France be nothing but an Englishman, German, or Frenchman."[28] On the other hand, imperial boundaries that had kept metropole from colony and colonies from each other now began to break down under the pressures of rapidly moving global capital and a flood of new ideas that spoke to the illegitimacy of political and social relationships hitherto considered unquestionable. If what it meant to be a Spanish

Catholic had once been largely shaped by the decisions of colonial administrators in South America,[29] if the goods available in Indian shops were once almost entirely produced in Britain and its dependencies,[30] if no small part of French scientific knowledge was once shaped by its explorations and scientists working in its Indochina colonies,[31] none of these conditions was any longer obvious. The diminished ability to keep empires apart would most vividly (and for some, disturbingly) be expressed by colonial soldiers from Africa and Asia fighting in Europe during World War I. The proximity of these subalterns to the local populations they were defending would lead inevitably to the violation of one of the greatest taboos of colonial order, namely, the sexual barrier between white women and black men.[32]

Along with the dissolution of older political and economic boundaries; the increasing movement of people, goods, and ideas; and the growth of what we now call international civil society movements, other entities would take their place in defining the international. After World War I and the proclamation of a new liberal-global norm of national self-determination, a proliferation of new entities began to shape the new international scale. These included entirely new countries carved out of the defeated Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as novel political spaces variously called protectorates, dependencies, and territories, entities with considerably different degrees of formal and recognized sovereignty. Joining the still familiar, if constitutionally different, political entities now shaping the international scale were a new set of transnational institutions that emerged as a result of the formation of the League of Nations, the first genuinely transnational organization of states ever created.[33] In retrospect, the League may be less important for its failings as an institution devoted to promoting collective security and world peace and remembered more for the technical agencies created under its aegis, some of which are still part of the transnational landscape today. The International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization in particular would stand as transnational supplements to national governments in the provision of basic services and social infrastructure by offering novel biopolitical standards and know-how in an effort to enable all populations to reach minimum standards of working dignity, nutrition, and health.[34] Their experts and reports would influence and shape global standards and "best practices" in these and other areas, often with a strong bias for state-run organizations over the private sector, influenced heavily by a humanitarian and noncapitalist ethos. Moreover, the staffs of these organizations were not drawn solely from the Western world but also included personnel

from the colonies and newly independent nation-states, even if often at different rates of emolument.[35] A further set of transnational technical agencies offering international public goods, such as railway track gauges, wireless communications, posts and telegraphs, civil aviation, scientific terms, standards, and measurements continued to grow and become stronger during this period. Olympic Games and Nobel Prizes would each affirm the primacy of the nation-scale while also working to reinforce the idea of a scale beyond the state where national desires could receive expression. Finally, an International Court of Justice was created at the Hague: although the court, given its subordination to the states that created it, may have been relatively toothless in practice, it nonetheless reinforced the symbolic possibility of a Kantian cosmopolitan liberalism where the injustices of the past would receive redress. Even as these emergent political formations came to be more visible, victorious empires moved swiftly to expand, in some cases, and to consolidate their existing territorial possessions, in others. Some empires may have been defeated, but the remaining others took steps to ensure their continued existence, including by offering a larger quotient of political rights and entitlements to their subjugated populations.[36]

The link between a rapidly transforming international system and domestic political arrangements lies in the conceptual and spatial conjunction of nation, state, and territory. Historians may debate exactly when this moment became dominant; for my argument, it is sufficient to remember that this three-way intersection is a historical moment. From the point of view of the former colonial world, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 is generally accepted as the moment when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's call for national self-determination was broadly accepted as a universal standard for political freedom, even if it was not intended to address them at all. For the first time, aspirations to political freedom were defined solely in terms of—and limited to—membership of a sovereign, physically bounded territorial nation-state. At once, political projects around the world had no choice but to be redefined in these terms. To be free, subjugated peoples now had to meet the new standard of national self-determination: they had to conform to the identity of one people–one land–one state to be accepted as having a legitimate claim to political personhood. That meeting these standards was next to impossible; that nations were beyond unambiguous definition; that colonial administrative boundaries separated kin, peoples, and cultures; and that practically no existing state conformed to these strictures was hardly the point. From the point of view of those seeking to overcome political unfreedom, a new mandate had been proclaimed, however

imprecise and contradictory. As the history of the twentieth century makes only too clear, the imperative of national self-determination could become the contradictory justification for both the division of nations across more than one state as well as the creation of territorial states comprised of more than one nation.

National self-determination may have sounded to some as the apogee of an enlightened liberalism. To most others, even ostensible beneficiaries, this call immediately took on a far more ominous tone. Historian Mark Mazower records a resident of the Polish city of Lvi'v, speaking to an American visitor in 1919: "You see these little holes? We call them here 'Wilson's Points.' They have been made with machine guns; the big gaps have been made with hand grenades. We are now engaged in self-determination, and God knows what and when the end will be."[37] Colonies like India did not immediately descend into violent conflict, as did much of Eastern and Central Europe and Asia Minor after Wilson's call for self-determination, but the dilemmas facing colonial subjects seeking political independence were of no small order. First of all, multinational and diasporic—in other words, normal—countries like India hardly conformed to the impossible standard of one people–one land–one state. As we shall see in Chapter 2 of this volume, this gap between prescription and diagnosis led Indian nationalists into discursive convolutions trying both to meet and to reject the new prescriptions for political independence.

In the absence of any possibility of meeting the newly sanctified standard of national self-determination, colonial nationalists sought to redefine the prime criterion for independent statehood as unified political control over a defined piece of land, or territorial sovereignty. This eminently pragmatic move had grave unintended consequences. Once territorial sovereignty was established as the way out of the impossible one land–people–state trinity, the loss of state territory could become nothing less than the loss of state power. Defining the right to sovereignty through territorial control thus carried with it the seeds of two kinds of future conflict. The first may be summarized as territorial disputes between states; the second concerns the political effects of dividing territories internally. Foreign policy, the boundary-making technology that separates inside from outside, is, we realize, first and foremost a problem of territoriality.

Outline of the Study

I have already flagged a number of concepts and themes that are addressed in more detail in the following chapters. Regardless, the starting point for

this discussion is territory, the "hyphen," to borrow anthropologist Arjun Appadurai's apposite formulation, that both joins and divides nation and state, incompletely and ambivalently, with complex political consequences.[38] But territory is not just land, just as territory is not just terrain. Territory, geographer Stuart Elden argues, is "something that is both [land and terrain] and more than these."[39] Territory involves power: it is a political claim over land and terrain by social groups. Territoriality, as will be explained in more detail in the next chapter, is a spatial strategy that ties together space and society through political investments in particular places.[40] Territorial disputes, in other words, cannot be reduced to interstate competition over land or terrain. If territory were just about the natural resource of land, it would be possible—if not necessarily easy—to find forms of equivalence or compensation that would permit the exchange of lands between states to resolve outstanding territorial disputes. The difficulty of even imagining what such a trade might look like only reinforces the need to think of territory in more complex ways.

This task is undertaken in the first chapter. Beginning with a discussion of territorial sovereignty as it is conventionally understood in International Relations, we find that the core concepts of territory and territoriality receive little critical attention, to the considerable detriment of analysis. Drawing on work in human geography, the chapter then summarizes the scholarship that allows us to make sense of the complex interrelation of space and territory. To place these general concerns in concrete detail, the chapter then turns to a review of literature on the spaces of Indian nationalism. At once, the uneven character of the national landscape becomes clear, with territorial divisions separating the different Indian religious communities in the effort to define the nation. The following section turns to a discussion of foreign policy, understood as a state territorial practice seeking to stabilize the shifting meanings of territory. In their effort to distinguish national and state spaces unambiguously, foreign policy practices territorialize much more than land. The chapter closes with a discussion of the territorialization of women's bodies as a means to fix notions of national patriarchal honor and to compensate for the loss of land at the moment when the Indian state became sovereign.

The second chapter takes a more historical turn in addressing the character of the international system leading up to Indian independence. It takes as a starting point the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 insofar as it deals with questions of race and national self-determination. This historic conference also exposed as never before the racial underpinnings of the contemporary

international order, as even Japan, the only nonwhite Great Power, eventually came to realize. "India" played a double role at this conference. It was both an official delegate as well as an insurgent presence seeking entry to demand freedom from colonial rule. Indian efforts to garner support for its independence are contrasted with Ireland's effort to do the same, showing how the common idea of national self-determination produced very different discourses of freedom from Britain's biggest and closest colonies, respectively. Both tendencies lead to the same outcome. Claiming territorial sovereignty would turn out to be a necessary means by which to resolve the problems of incomplete international personhood and India's lack of conformity to the ideal type of nation-state. This discussion shows that international recognition—external sovereignty—is best understood as a rule that governs and conditions the entrance of new states into the international order. To meet the elusive conditions of international recognition, India would come to reterritorialize its national body to exclude persons of Indian origin living outside state borders.

Bringing the findings of both chapters together allows new insight into one of Asia's endemic problems, interstate territorial disputes. These disputes are both protracted and charged because they are about much more than a simple loss or gain of a property relation (territory as land) or a politico-strategic relation (terrain). The additional constraint begins from the emotional and affective meaning invested in territory deemed national by the state and its people. Territorial disputes become contentious when they involve the (loss or regain of) space of the nation. Territory seen as national space makes compensation for the loss of territory beyond the reach of normal diplomacy. The core problem with territorial loss is that it opens the door to an excavation of the relationship of state and nation. It exposes the nation as a historically contingent formation and brings into question the state's claim to represent this nation, now and in the past. Territorial disputes are, to borrow a Freudian metaphor, the spatial unconscious of the state: the return of this repressed historical memory brings back to life interred possibilities of other plausible political futures.

That said, what further complicates matters is that national space need not be fixed in time, be limited by standard cartographic categories, or even be materially identifiable. Disputes have broken out over islands that have temporarily emerged from river silt formations and volcanic eruptions, lands have been claimed on the basis of myth and legend, and imaginary homelands such as Lemuria are believed to lie under water.[41] Moreover, national space is unevenly distributed across state territories; that is, not all

land or terrain lying within state boundaries matters to the same extent. To make matters worse, not all state territories include space that belongs to the nation, and not all national spaces are controlled by the national state. Yet, with all this, it also cannot be forgotten that state territories have been given away in the past without necessitating the perceived loss of national space and without producing hostile popular nationalist reactions. For all their seeming intractability, territorial disputes can and have been resolved.

What this farrago of confused categories and contradictory relations adds up to is that the general phenomenon of territorial disputes cannot be understood via a forensic analysis of the origins of particular disputes. Such an approach, prominent in legal and diplomatic discourses, cannot explain why some territorial disputes become contentious and protracted and others do not. Nor do these approaches explain why some disputes can be resolved by the withdrawal of official state claims to lost lands, while others cannot. I have already pointed to the importance of the national investment in land and terrain as the complicating factor in understanding the meaning of territory; to understand how this territorial "surplus" became political space involves an entirely different approach.

Understanding territorial disputes begins by appreciating how the relationship between sovereignty and territory came to be so intertwined and naturalized such that not only is state sovereignty conflated with territorial control, but also how the loss of territory came to be identified as a crisis of state sovereignty. Given the highly emotive popular reaction to territorial disputes, understanding territorial disputes also requires understanding how some nationals come to identify so much with the territorial equation of state power that the intensity of their celebration of territorial gain can only be matched by the extent of their shock at the loss of territory, leading to its public representation as a form of state treason. Subjecting the territory–sovereignty equation to a critical historical examination, the object of the first chapter, allows us to see why some national territories matter and others do not and why some disputes become protracted while others do not. The historical contingency of the territory–sovereignty relation points to possible resolutions of this problem; it allows for the possibility of reimagining the relation of land, territory, nation, and state in ways other than the simple possessive equation characteristic of state territorial sovereignty.

The third and fourth chapters of this book turn to the spatial practices of foreign policy: how nation and state come to be joined through territory. India is a country where the boundaries of nation and state have never explicitly coincided. Given this unsettled starting point, the final objective

of the territorializing practices of foreign policy is to bind nation and state through territory such that there is a unique identification of a nation with a state and its territory. The particular foreign policy practices—how territorial sovereignty is made "on the ground"—addressed in this book are glossed as diaspora and geopolitics respectively. Diaspora is a state practice that separates the territorially bound nation from its overseas community. It produces "insiders without," namely, nationals who live beyond the state's territorial borders. Geopolitics is a practice that, in the process of creating state borders that are defensible and secure, results in the creation of "outsiders within," nonnationals who live within recognized state borders. Diaspora foreign policy practices changed radically before and after independence and are now in the process of changing again. The practices of postcolonial geopolitics turn out to be wholly consistent with imperial strategies of defending and extending colonial Indian territorial boundaries.

Foreign policy as *diaspora* traces the shifting boundary that divides the global Indian nation. Foreign policy at the moment of independence territorialized what was once a global nation into mutually exclusive political categories: citizens of territorial India and an overseas population without recourse to political rights and protections guaranteed by the Indian state. This division took place in spite of the close involvement of a globally dispersed diaspora with the struggle for Indian independence to assuage the fears of India's Asian neighbors, among other reasons. In recent years, the boundary between a territorial state and a global nation has been substantially relocated. The diaspora has now been brought much closer to India through new regimes of deterritorialized citizenship. These shifts are best explained by seeing the inscription of boundaries within the global Indian nation in terms of class and caste. If earlier representations of overseas Indians produced the *girmitiya*, economically poor and socially inferior, making it relatively easy for upper-caste elites to draw a line between "India" and them at the moment of independence, such a view did not hold by the end of the twentieth century. The overseas Indian could now be represented as an upper-caste, middle-class person who had left India for reasons of "discrimination" and loss of economic mobility. This social flight was produced by a socialistically inclined state and exacerbated by the expansion of political participation among India's "backward" castes and "untouchable" Dalits. A deeply conservative class-based and antidemocratic critique of "reservations," the Indian term for affirmative action, underwrites territorial India's return to its diaspora in the last two decades. With the economic success of Indians overseas it became possible to attempt

to restore the hierarchy of the Hindu social order through this "objective" proof that upper-caste talents were not dependent on inherited privilege. Nonresident Indians could now be celebrated as exemplars of the new global Indian, with India now understood in deterritorialized terms. What needs to be stressed is that what changed in the fifty years between Indian independence in 1947 and the end of the twentieth century is not "India" but dominant representations of India's diaspora.

Foreign policy as *geopolitics* also inscribes boundaries between state and nation, but very differently. India's territorial boundaries had long been in a state of flux due to a century of subordination to imperial strategic imperatives. Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the area of the territorial state repeatedly shifted, expanding as new territories were incorporated and contracting as other territories were granted autonomy from Calcutta and then New Delhi (for example, the Straits Settlements and Burma). These imperatives had led to the mapping of Indian territory in relation to a strategic logic that inscribed a hierarchy of spaces within the Indian state. There was a territorial heartland, the ultimate object of state protection, and extended strategic peripheries that included protectorates, dependencies, and suzerainties, bordered by unsettled frontiers and uncivilized "buffers." British Indian geopolitics, ostensibly a spatial catalogue of territorial divisions for national security, was reinforced by civilizational boundaries. The colonial gaze justified the systematic political exclusion and marginalization of residents of culturally liminal but geopolitically significant borderlands in terms of their alleged lack of civilization, creating a space of exception at the eastern limits of the country. With sovereignty in 1947, fluid imperial boundaries became the fixed borders of the nation-state. These borders now incorporated territories and peoples that could not be easily identified as culturally "Indian" and, who, moreover, soon came to define themselves in opposition to a predatory Indian nation-state. The exceptional status of the Northeast as a site of irreducible difference now works, perversely, to normalize the rest of India. Foreign policy as geopolitics created national boundaries *within* the Indian territorial state.

Seen as a boundary-making practice, foreign policy becomes central to our understanding of modern citizenship. Once territory becomes a necessary but historically contingent and unstable hyphen joining nation and state, foreign policy practices produce a sharply uneven domestic topos. The "body politic" comes to be internally divided and hierarchically organized through the spatialization of difference. Territorial practices created boundaries that produced permanent majorities and minorities and that

excluded populations from the national center on the basis of ethnicity, class, religion, gender, and putative civilizational status. Political difference is endemic to the particular intersection of territory and sovereignty that is hegemonic today under the sign of the nation-state. Unequal and uneven forms of citizenship, I argue, are structural features of the territorially bound nation-state.

This interpretation of Indian foreign policy offers important insights into the process of decolonization. The diaspora chapter demonstrates how the new nations of Southeast Asia had completely internalized the logic of national self-determination. That logic played itself out by normalizing the concepts of national homeland, demographic majority, and ethnic minority as structural features of new Asian nation-states. Overnight, amnesia overcame this region's long and polyglot histories of social inclusion, popular mobility, and cultural hybridity. Countries that had once represented social diversity in all respects now became redefined in oppositional terms: *bumiputra*, an autochthonous and unmarked majority, and others: distinct ethnic and cultural minorities. Minorities were understood to be of two kinds. Emigrants from large and powerful neighbors, who were too new to be assimilated to the nation-state; and indigenous "tribal" people, who were too old.

Placing together the findings from this discussion of diaspora and geopolitics offers us an altogether novel view of India's historically vexed relations with its closest neighbor, Pakistan. The Muslim-majority state of Pakistan that now interrupts colonial India's northwestern strategic frontier can be seen as the spatial intersection of both geopolitics and diaspora: in both cases, it also stands as their ultimate negation. The people of Pakistan are India's closest diaspora yet are also, because they are predominantly Muslim, an alien corpus that can never be incorporated into the national body. The Pakistani state occupies a territory that, due to its sovereignty, highlights the breakdown of the colonial geopolitical scheme that India long relied on for its military security by extending its frontiers far beyond its national heartland. The existence of Pakistan—people and territory—defies the logic of the structures that underpin the Indian nation-state's foreign policies of diaspora and geopolitics. That is why, unless India unterritorializes its way of thinking and seeing the world, Pakistan can never be seen as anything but a fundamental crisis. Pakistan's continued existence represents an ongoing contradiction of the territorially bound and imagined Indian nation-state.