Introduction

Throughout the early twenty-first century, debates over the relationship between Islam and the West have fundamentally influenced the way Europeans and Americans think about religion. The notion of a clash of civilizations figures in the writing of popular pundits as a category of analysis, while their detractors condemn the use of the phrase for creating the very conflict its proponents purport to describe. Whether affirmed or rejected, claims of religious and civilizational confrontation continue to shape the politics of secularism on a global scale. In Europe, a growing number of politicians and public intellectuals argue that secularism has become the very essence of what it means to be European. According to many of the same individuals, Islam is the antithesis of everything Europe represents because it never experienced its own process of secularization.

As a small minority, European Jews are marginal actors in this imagined clash of civilizations. Yet, in practice, they remain central to European debates over the place of religion in civil society: They both serve as constant points of reference and are among the most vocal commentators on the subject of secularism and Islam in Europe today. Often regarded as Europe's constitutive (if now domesticated) outsiders, European Jews are frequently asked to speak about how to "assimilate" Europe's more recent immigrant populations. Despite the invitations they receive to serve as expert voices in such situations, as a demographically small minority with a checkered past in Europe, Jews continue to face particular challenges as they participate in public debates over religion, secularism, and universalism in European society. Their responses reflect their peculiar position as partial outsiders in contemporary Europe. On the simplest level, European Jewish commentators oscillate

between two positions: Many express their dedication to fighting Islamophobia—which they consider uncomfortably close to historical forms of antisemitism—while others find in European secularist fears of Islam the opportunity to build broader alliances with Christian and secular Europeans against Islamic fundamentalism. No matter where they stand, Jews' political identity in Europe is of necessity shaped by ideas about religion and politics that have emerged in response to debates about another religious minority.

This book explores the origins of these dilemmas and suggests that they are inherent to the challenges secularist debates have posed for minorities from their inception. Warnings of an impending clash of cultures also shaped religious politics in nineteenth-century Europe and gave birth to many of our current expectations about the proper place of religion in society. Employing stereotypes that may remind us of today's debates over Europe's relationship with Islam, European liberals of the long nineteenth century regularly portrayed the Catholic Church as the ultimate anti-modern power and Catholicism as a religion that turned its believers into docile and dependent followers of church leaders.[1] Like Jews, Catholics and the Catholic clergy often appeared in the accounts of their opponents as both effeminate and politically dangerous because of their transnational solidarities—as the antithesis of the patriotic educated male who symbolized the ideal political subject. As a result, the formative period of modern Jewish thought and politics overlapped with a period of growing battles between self-declared progressives, on the one hand, and the Catholic Church and its defenders, on the other.

Politically active Jews in the nineteenth century consequently faced challenges similar to those confronting European Jews in the new millennium. As in today's constructed conflict between the West and Islam, Jews were a highly visible third party in the nineteenth-century culture wars between liberals and Catholics; as today, they had a stake in the very notion of such a confrontation. They could either embrace or critique the idea of a liberal–Catholic conflict, but it was nearly impossible for them to remain neutral. Their position depended largely on their answers to a dilemma that resembles the one many Jews face today: Were anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism comparable to anti-Judaism and thus objectionable? Or did they offer Jews a means of finally defeating an institution that they believed to be a central enemy of Jewish equality, namely the Catholic Church?

Jews' responses to this dilemma were not predetermined. Many of the most influential Jewish authors and politicians of nineteenth-century Europe nonetheless clearly saw an opportunity in anticlerical politics and explained their place in the world in terms of their opposition to the Catholic Church or Catholicism. The rhetoric of anticlericalism (as it is commonly called in France) and anti-Catholicism (as it is commonly called in Germany) profoundly affected the way that Jews and non-Jews went about exhibiting their religiosity, organizing religion, representing it to the state, and explaining it theoretically. As today, Jews were affected by these debates even when they did not endorse the notion of a full-fledged clash of civilizations. Although anti-Catholicism represented neither an all-encompassing Jewish worldview nor a defining feature of the Jewishness of its proponents, it was a major part of the cultural milieu of modern Jewish intellectuals in both France and Germany. As such, criticism of the Catholic Church and its clergy significantly shaped the political environment that French and German Jews encountered during the first century of their transformation into citizens. Although it rarely appears in popular or scholarly portrayals of European Jewish history, anti-Catholic anticlericalism constituted a foundational element of modern Jewish politics—with enduring consequences.

This book traces how different Jewish individuals in modern Germany and France employed anti-Catholicism to articulate their own visions of modernity, national belonging, and proper forms of religion. It analyzes a range of moments in which anticlericalism allowed Jews to address major social, political, and intellectual issues of their day, moving from the Enlightenment and revolutionary politics of the late eighteenth century to the rise of mass political movements and parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. At the same time, it is an entangled history of German and French Jewry, which highlights shared elements in their political rhetoric and approach to religion across the national boundaries that divided them.

Beyond the Marginal Jew

By analyzing the polemics that one politically marginalized group employed against another, the study of modern Jewish anti-Catholicism

offers an opportunity to rethink the categories most often used to address marginality in Jewish history and in the study of minorities more generally. Indeed, while there exist traditions of studying Jews in relation to other immigrant, ethnic, national, or racial groups in the historiography of American Jewry as well as that of the Jews of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires, historians of Jews in modern Western and Central Europe have tended instead to analyze Jews' social positions in terms of the dichotomous categories of majority and minority. This dichotomy appears in different forms—as Germans and Jews, the French and the Jews, Christians and Jews, or non-Jews and Jews—yet ultimately such pairings are formulated to understand how Jews related to an unmarked "center."[2] Recent discussions of Jewish integration, assimilation, and acculturation have offered ever more nuanced ways of understanding how Jews dealt with their exclusion from various centers, but they have rarely challenged the notion that the principal dilemma of nineteenth-century European Jews was their relationship with a "mainstream" or dominant society.

This model of Jewish integration as a story of center–margin relations makes sense in certain contexts, but for much of nineteenth-century Germany and France it explains little about Jews' experiences on the level of national politics. Jewish authors, activists, and politicians all confronted fragmented political arenas and societies. German Jews faced not simply an abstract, monolithic German nationalism but rather different sets of liberal, conservative Protestant, and Catholic nationalisms. French Jews, for their part, acted in a political sphere in which liberals and republicans disagreed with conservative Catholics over how to define the French nation. Jews might have been outsiders in a Christian state in both cases, but they could also behave like insiders in the more complicated constellations of nineteenth-century European religious and political conflicts. In Germany, for example, educated Jewish men could identify with the hegemonic views of middle-class Protestant men on questions of the place of religion in society, thereby distancing themselves from traits liberals condemned, such as effeminacy, irrationality, religiosity without decorum, and Catholic "fanaticism."[3] When positioned in relation to a multiplicity of other nonhegemonic groups, Jews appear as more than simple pariahs or parvenus.[4]

Jewish anti-Catholicism offers one example of this complex set of relations between different nonhegemonic groups. It thus challenges

any simple narratives of Jewish marginalization by a clear and homogenous center. In this respect, Jewish critiques of the Catholic Church might be compared to the more widely studied phenomenon of Jewish orientalism, in which Jews acted as insiders to Western scholarship in their attempt to unlock the secrets of an unknowing yet precious East.[5] Even more than Western and Central European Jews' interest in things oriental, however, Jews' comments on Catholicism challenge our sense of center and periphery, inside and outside, power and powerlessness.[6] In the case of the Orient, the direction of the gaze from Europe and the asymmetry of access to powerful institutions are clear. Jews studying the Orient engaged with phenomena that had no political influence over them. This is not true for the Catholic Church, which, on the one hand, was liberalism's favorite proximate enemy yet remained, on the other hand, one of Europe's most powerful institutions. German political Catholics and the Catholic Church might have appeared as marginal in rhetorical terms, yet in a number of contexts they maintained significant social and political power. In France, the Catholic Church and political Catholicism laid claims to embodying French culture and nationhood. In both countries, Jewish polemics against the Catholic Church targeted an institution that was both systematically written out of the narrative of modernity by the Jews' liberal allies and an active force shaping these debates and the modern world. Like few other phenomena, Jewish anti-Catholicism and anticlericalism thus test our assumptions about dichotomous categories of power in modern Europe. The question of who is the political insider was itself part of the debate between Jewish and Catholic polemicists.

A more three-dimensional map of Jewish politics invites us to rethink a long-standing notion of Jewish history popular in a new guise in studies informed by the postcolonial turn: The idea that Jews inhabit a privileged position as outsiders, which allows them to recognize or resist the pathologies of modernity.[7] Although such scholarship focuses our attention on important traditions of Jewish dissent, it tells only part of the larger story of European Jewish modernity. Jews were not only the foil for the modern European nation but also—often uncritical—producers of nation-state discourses in which the nation's Others were not only Jews but also Catholics. Jewish writers such as Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) and Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), whom scholars within and beyond Jewish studies regularly invoke as models for

resistance to the homogenizing forces of modernity, also reproduced liberal tropes about modernity's Others, albeit in a minoritarian key.

Making Jewish Anticlericalism Visible

Explaining Jewish experiences as the acts of precarious insiders operating within a fragmented political landscape draws attention to debates and challenges that other studies have noted but often relegated to the sidelines. Scholarship has tended to render Jewish criticism of the Catholic Church invisible in large part because scholars have considered the phenomenon an uncomfortable or politically fraught topic. This is largely due to the fact that Jewish anti-Catholicism first emerged as a subject of discussion among antisemites during the late nineteenth century. Although antisemites of all denominations made reference to the phenomenon, Catholic antisemites in particular used Jewish anti-Catholicism to legitimize their anti-Jewish *ressentiment* as merely a reaction to Jewish hatred. Understandably, few scholars have wanted to risk placing themselves within this tradition by accusing the victims of modern antisemitism of hating their persecutors first and thus having caused their own persecution.[8]

To absolve Jews from the accusation of hating Catholicism, nineteenth-century Jewish apologists as well as certain recent historians have depicted the comments of Jews who spoke against the Catholic Church as a mere reaction to Catholic antisemitism.[9] This position represents the mirror opposite of the arguments of nineteenth-century Catholic antisemites who claimed that their antisemitism was purely a reaction to Jewish anti-Catholicism. It also rests on the same fallacy: Just as Catholic discourses on Jews were not simply a result of Jewish hostility, Jewish comments on Catholicism were not simply a result of Catholic antisemitism.

Seeing in Jewish anti-Catholicism only defensiveness, moreover, denies political agency to Jewish actors and thus excludes them from all theoretical discussions about the nature of secularism and liberal citizenship. Studies of the anti-Catholicism of German Protestants, for example, point us to the paradoxical fact that nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism—which many today would identify as a prejudiced and illiberal position—was an inherent part of modern German liberalism.[10]

The suggestion that Jewish anticlerical polemicists were simply react-
ing to the provocations of the Catholic Church therefore presupposes
that the foundational paradoxes of liberal modernity did not also apply
to Jews. Instead, I argue, recognizing the paradoxes of minoritarian
secularism elucidates some of the most important tensions that existed
within different liberal projects in modern Europe.

Exploring the implications of Jewish anti-Catholicism as part of a
broader study of the makeup and consequences of liberal political para-
digms need not entail an endorsement of the antisemites' claim that
Jews had a penchant for aggressive anti-Catholicism. Scholars have
rightly insisted that categories like "prejudice" do not adequately de-
scribe the motivations of Jewish critics of Catholics and Catholicism.
For the most part, modern Jewish anti-Catholic polemicists were not
interested in stigmatizing, pathologizing, racializing, or excluding
Catholics from society. Such aims would in any case have been mis-
placed among members of a small demographic minority still strug-
gling to attain civil rights and social acceptance. It is, however, possible
to agree with historians like Olaf Blaschke, who argue that—contrary to
the accusations of Catholic antisemites—modern European Jews were
rarely hateful or radical secularists, while simultaneously seeking to un-
derstand why, when, and how they found anticlericalism appealing.[11]
For nineteenth-century antisemites, the question was only *whether* and
to what degree Jews were anti-Catholic or anticlerical. We need not re-
produce this question, which antisemites and their interlocutors have
asked to prove or disprove Jewish complicity in their own persecution.
Instead, I suggest, we should rather focus on *why* and *how* modern Eu-
ropean Jews spoke against Catholicism and the Catholic Church.

By raising these questions and treating Jewish anticlericalism as a
key to understanding the politics of modern secularism, my approach
differs from those taken by previous studies that have dealt with the
subject. While I largely concur with the empirical conclusions of the
works of Jacob Toury, Uriel Tal, Lisa Leff, Zvi Jonathan Kaplan, and
Jeffrey Haus, who have all discussed Jewish anti-Catholicism in ei-
ther Germany or France, I depart from their basic understanding of
the phenomenon.[12] Jews' anti-Catholicism was not simply an expres-
sion of their distaste for the Catholic Church, or merely the result of
their pragmatic support for specific laws that limited clerical influence

in society. Anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism were infused with a decidedly rhetorical quality: They consisted of popular images, terms, and narratives that invoked particular expectations of proper religiosity and formed part of political languages (to use J. G. A. Pocock's term) that shaped practices and experiences far beyond the confines of high politics.[13] Jewish anticlericalism appears not only in overtly anti-Catholic statements but also in minor references and asides, such as when Jews denounced antisemites for being "medieval," a term that invoked a host of narratives about the Catholic Dark Ages and humanity's struggle to free itself from the stranglehold of the church. What is more, anti-Catholic polemics were, in many cases, not even aimed directly against Catholicism. Jewish reformers often found it expedient to use popular epithets drawn from anti-Catholic campaigns to attack their Orthodox Jewish opponents. Thus we find examples of self-declared Jewish progressives denouncing their rivals as Jewish Jesuits or insulting Jewish Orthodox leaders as Jewish popes. In the German case, Jewish intellectuals criticized Protestant nationalists for pursuing "Catholicizing" forms of politics in their use of religious images and emotional appeals. Just as we can recognize the insult *Talmudism* (in the sense of using sophistry) as drawing on anti-Jewish traditions, we should similarly recognize terms like *Jesuitic* and *medieval* as forming part of an anti-Catholic repertoire, regardless of the identity of the individuals they targeted. Such references to Catholicism, the Catholic clergy, or Jesuits as a symbol or insult speaks to the way different European Jews articulated their ideas about emancipation, decency, autonomy, gender roles, and sensuality in a self-declared liberal culture war of progress versus reaction. Indeed, for many Jews, anti-Catholicism structured their sense of historical time, with a medieval, unemancipated "before" and a modern, increasingly emancipated "now." Jewish anti-Catholicism was not simply a reflection of Jewish–Catholic relations but a political language—revolving around ideas of privatized religion, good citizenship, and progress—that continues to define politics today.

Anticlericalism and the Polemics of Secularism

Focusing on the rhetorical quality of anticlericalism and its role as a political language also addresses a number of undertheorized aspects

in the study of secularism. Many recent works in religious studies and anthropology—in contrast to scholarship on Jewish and European history—define secularism not as the opposite of religiosity but rather as a form of engagement with it, or—in the words of Gauri Viswanathan—as a "condition pertaining to the practice of religion."[14] Drawing inspiration from Viswanathan's approach as well as that of Talal Asad, I employ the term *secularism* to refer to a set of expectations about the practice of religion that affirm religion's role in the body politic and in society within strictly circumscribed boundaries.[15] This approach recognizes that different individuals articulate these expectations not only in legal terms but also through various forms of social pressure and in assumptions about proper and productive behavior. Contrary to its usage in many works of German, French, and Jewish history, I do not define secularism as a set of antireligious doctrines. Antireligious secularism was just one of many forms that secularist expectations took, and one that became prominent only in the last third of the nineteenth century.[16] My understanding of secularism encompasses instead what others have referred to primarily as middle-class religiosity. It is indebted largely to George L. Mosse's understanding of decency as a middle-class virtue that regulates, among other things, how individuals live their religion and organize their religious life.[17]

My work also departs from many studies of secularism in that I stress the importance of polemics—and anticlerical polemics in particular—over political principles. Anticlerical polemics are a useful guide to secularism because theoretical and philosophical approaches to secularism have varied widely, to the point of being clearly contradictory.[18] Geoffrey Brahm Levey, for example, has recently illuminated the tension between two different models of secularism: that of the neutral state and that of the nation-state.[19] The first approach consists of a set of models that scholars often trace back to early modern jurists and philosophers such as Samuel Pufendorf and John Locke. This version of secularism aimed to overcome conflicts within territories inhabited by Catholics and Protestants by removing the state from theological debates.[20] The increasing power of Europe's centralizing states since the seventeenth century thus went hand in hand with the rhetoric of self-constriction: According to this version of secularism, the state might assume authority in the earthly realm, yet its powers in religious realms had to remain limited. This form of secularism implied a particular type of separation

of public and private spheres predicated on the state's self-limitation to public and worldly concerns.[21]

The second model of secularism emerged in the eighteenth century with new approaches to the state and the nation. The ideal of a strong centralizing state and of the nation-state in Europe presupposed certain cultural similarities between its members, which were to be fostered through education. Early nationalists and political economists in the service of the state began to differentiate between what they decided were the productive and unproductive elements of religion within a stable and prosperous social order. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conviction that an obligatory form of civil religion was necessary to sustain the ideal state is only the most radical version of this approach.[22] More pragmatic renditions of the same idea are also recognizable in the efforts of eighteenth-century German representatives of police science.[23] In this new form, religion and religious texts became part of debates over the bonds that held society together.

While the first model of privatized religion required states to abdicate their influence over religious matters, the second nation-state model made religion a potential field of new interventionist state policies. Many Protestant conservatives in Germany and Catholic conservatives in France began to call for a religiously homogenous nation, while liberals and republicans put forward their own versions of state involvement in religious affairs. Retaining their rhetoric of opposition to intolerance and fanaticism, various republicans and liberals alike demanded that the state take over the education of the nation's youth to instill universal civic values. As they did so, they were influenced by their view that Christianity constituted a part of national culture as well as the bedrock of secular morality (*morale laïque*).[24]

Many nineteenth-century debates between liberals and their detractors revolved around these two seemingly irreconcilable models, both of which formed part of the larger phenomenon that scholars today call secularism. Both models have figured prominently in liberal political traditions despite the fact that they often contradicted one another, and both continue to appear in today's growing literature celebrating or critiquing modern secularism in turn. It is therefore futile to speak of one pure form of secularism based on distinctions between different theoretical approaches; in practice, there are only people who lay claim to cer-

tain models that have been called secularism at different junctures, and, more often than not, only in retrospect. It might be tempting to label as secularism only the neutral state model—with its emphasis on separation of church and state—as Geoffrey Brahm Levey and others writing within an Anglo-American tradition have done. Doing so would, however, mean that the myriad liberal and republican politicians who established state schools that taught secularized Christian ethics to combat the Catholic Church's influence on education would be excluded from our definition of secularism.[25] Indeed, according to the separationist interpretation of secularism, the vast majority of German and French politicians of the modern period do not appear as secularists. Such an omission becomes particularly problematic in the context of continental Europe. In the German-French sphere, separation demands were at times more typical of the Catholic side in conflicts with liberals and republicans.[26] Indeed, liberal and conservative Catholics alike called for religious freedom in an attempt to defend the Catholic Church's role in primary and secondary education.[27] Mainstream liberals, by contrast, often wanted the state to police religious groups rather than give more autonomy to the church within the state. The separationist definition of secularism thus implies that conservative Catholics were secularists, whereas state-centered liberals were antisecularists. Such a description would have been counterintuitive to nineteenth-century observers and is hardly intelligible in current scholarly debates.

How then to reconcile these differences? How can we make the term *secularism* productive for anything but the most localized investigation when its apparent meanings have so little in common? Does it even make sense to use the term *secularism* in the singular? In the pages that follow I propose that we move beyond a discussion of principles to start addressing these questions, while at the same time remaining cognizant of the import of political structures. Principles are crucial for political thought but are, by themselves, not helpful for understanding either everyday political divisions or the often unspoken assumptions behind political debates. The culture wars of nineteenth-century Europe that fueled the development of secularist understandings of religion were not an exercise in political philosophy. Rather, I argue, polemics determined modern Europeans' views on religion and politics at least as much as theoretical considerations. Liberals did not first believe that

close-knit religious groups undermined the nation-state only to seren-
dipitously discover Jesuits who they decided fit this description, for ex-
ample. In practice, Enlightenment thinkers and liberals adopted both
their anti-Jesuitism and their more abstract ideas about proper forms of
religiosity at the same time.

Polemics, in other words, made secularism. The two theoretical
models of secularism have this in common: They are both the result
of the insults directed against those whom liberals came to describe as
"fanatics"—a key term of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debates
on religion.[28] Once understood as polemical and rhetorical positions
that shaped people's outlooks on the nature of religion and politics,
anticlericalism and anti-Catholicism become constitutive elements of
any history of secularism. Put another way, we can recognize distinct
positions in the conflicts surrounding religion less through different
speakers' abstract invocations of political theory than in the specific and
even pedestrian polemics they employed against those they qualified as
the enemies of "true" religion. Thus, when I use the term *secularism* in
the pages that follow, I do so to refer to the set of expectations about
proper religion that have always treated particular religious groups as a
model while treating other religious groups as a foil.

The potential and the obstacles that *polemical secularism* has posed
for minorities since its inception come into relief if we recall its two-
pronged concern with minorities. Gruesome depictions of the persecu-
tion of believers by fanatical priests and, later, by the defenders of the
religion of reason—whom religious thinkers denounced as "fanatics of
antifanaticism" beginning as early as the French Revolution—created
interest in the fate of various marginalized religious groups.[29] Indeed,
the stories that illustrated Enlightenment and liberal notions of prog-
ress regularly involved religious minorities. When liberals condemned
the Inquisition's persecution of witches, heretics, and converted Jews
or decried the Catholic Church's mistreatment of Jews and Protestants
during the medieval and early modern periods, they distanced them-
selves from an institution they believed had no place in the modern
age. In this sense, anti-Catholicism became dependent on references to
those groups that had suffered under the church. Indeed, it is hardly a
coincidence that Voltaire's most memorable polemics against the Cath-

olic Church were his horrifying rendering of the torture and brutal execution of the Protestant Jean Calas.[30]

At the same time, religious minorities were also the targets of secularist critiques of fanaticism. The secularists' promise was that those they regarded as fanatics, whether Catholics or Jews, would be neutralized in a secularist political order, either because religion would remain outside of political debates in a well-regulated society or because the state would eventually reform its retrograde populations through its educational and cultural policies.

As the principal non-Christian religious minority in Germany and France, Jews confronted both those aspects of secularist discourse that idealized minorities as victims of fanaticism and those that denounced them as enemies of the nation and progress. Jews' own rhetoric similarly reflected both aspects of secularist polemics: Invoking middle-class expectations about proper religiosity, they criticized secularist pressures when such pressures adversely affected their own status but also endorsed polemics that affected other religious groups. Jewish anti-Catholicism thus provides a unique perspective on the versatility and trade-offs that modern secularism has offered to religious minorities. It also illuminates the challenges and opportunities Jews faced as they employed a political language in which they served merely as one foil among many for debates on religion.

Rethinking Secularism and Nationalism in Germany and France

Recognizing Jewish criticism of Catholic antimodernism as examples of polemical secularism also reveals crucial intersections between Germany and France thus bringing together the often disparate historiographies of these two countries in the modern period. While scholars now suggest that the European path to secularization may have been the exception rather than the rule, Germany, France, and a handful of other European states remain a crucial part of current debates over secularism because these countries continue to be the (sometimes unspoken) models for abstract discussions of secular paths to modernity.[31] More precisely, France and Germany often stand in for two distinct

paradigms of secularism. In David Martin's seminal attempt at classifying secularism, France becomes the prototype of the "Latin" model: In his rendering, French secularists pursued an antireligious agenda and sought to remove religion from the public sphere through their fight against a unified and dominant Catholic Church.[32] For Martin, as for many nineteenth-century German theorists since the romantic period, Germany represented an opposite "Protestant" model of a more conciliatory path. According to this view, progressives in the North German states were willing to accord church-based religiosity a role in the making of a peaceful and well-regulated society. Liberal Germans in the long nineteenth century were, according to various portrayals, the children of the Religious Enlightenment recently described by David Sorkin, while the French appear more often as the inheritors of the atheist Radical Enlightenment posited by Jonathan Israel.[33] Yet, for nineteenth-century intellectuals, Germany was also the country of the *Kulturkampf*, the mostly legal and political struggle between the state and the liberals against the power of the Catholic Church. While reformers and conservatives across Europe could point to France as a model for the consequences of militant unbelief in politics, Germany— like Gladstone's England—became a classic example of secularism under conditions of denominational conflict.

The use of Germany and France as models is perhaps even more important for scholarship on nationalism. Since Hans Kohn's foundational work in the 1940s, political scientists have treated France and Germany as opposite paradigms for civic and ethnic forms of nationalism.[34] Such approaches suggest that the French created a state-centered, voluntaristic nation, whereas the Germans' focus on culture and origins exemplified an ethnocentric model, as Rogers Brubaker has famously described it.[35] Taken together, these models portray Germans as preoccupied with the creation of an ethnic nation in which religion, understood as a cultural phenomenon, became a legitimate element in nation building. In fact, nineteenth-century commentators and later scholars alike have continued to accuse German nationalists of adopting a confessional, and particularly Protestant, view of the nation. Others have assumed, by contrast, that French believers in a political nation were prone to opposing all religious establishments and thus embraced antireligious politics.