Introduction

Margot and I stepped off the Parisian public bus and began speed-walking past barely opened shops and roses nodding in well-groomed yards.[1] Neither of us wanted to miss the school bell; I needed permission to sit in on a new class, and she dreaded another impatient note home to her parents. Although only 15 years old and tiny for her age, her red Converse sneakers set a merciless pace I had trouble matching. As usual, she had coordinated her sneakers with a form-fitting hooded sweatshirt, tight jeans, large hoop earrings, and a giant Jewish star pendant—a modest version of the "uniform" worn by many of the students at her Jewish day school.

Margot and I had gotten to know each other over the previous few months. Her government-funded suburban religious school was one of several in which I was doing fieldwork in and around Paris. She was a friendly and voluble, if somewhat socially marginalized, high school student. In the hallways between classes, in the lunchroom, and on the bus we sometimes shared when returning to Paris, she dished out school gossip, complained about teachers and the administration, recounted past vacations, and shared her fears and aspirations.

That morning I was doing the talking. The weekend before, I had attended a well-publicized, if controversial, demonstration against anti-Semitism in Paris. Newspapers had reported a relatively low turnout; I had been surprised by the preponderance of middle-aged adults, particularly given the disproportionate impact anti-Semitism seemed to have on Jewish teenagers and young adults.[2] So I breathlessly asked Margot questions while we ran. Had she gone to the demonstration? What did she think about it?

"No, I didn't go," she said with a laugh. "I'm a racist, so I can't go to an antiracist rally, can I?"

"What do you mean," I stuttered. "I mean what do you mean when you say you are a racist?"

"It means I hate Arabs."

For a number of reasons, this conversation should have been surprising, even paradoxical. In the first place, why was Margot so ready to proclaim her "hatred" for an entire ethno-religious minority? To a considerable extent, French Jewish politics after World War II emphasized the indivisibility of racism and anti-Semitism (Mandel forthcoming). In the 1970s and 1980s, even when Jews were not directly affected by racist, often anti-Arab violence, Jewish newspapers and magazines reminded their readers of Jews' moral obligation to oppose any and all forms of exclusion (e.g., Grunewald 1980c, 1983, 1985b; Smolarski 1986; chapter 2).[3] Any form of racism, so the argument went, was motivated by the same nefarious nationalist logic and would—sooner or later—negatively impact Jews. Even when it became clear that French Muslims and Jews did not see eye-to-eye on Israeli or French foreign politics, some very visible Jewish pundits continued to insist on combating the shared ideology behind racism and anti-Semitism. In a March 1980 editorial titled "La nécessaire solidarité avec les travailleurs immigrés" (The necessity of solidarity with immigrant workers), the editor of the major Jewish weekly *Tribune Juive* upbraided Jewish organizations that were not respecting the biblical injunction to remember the stranger. He wrote:

> I know that the overwhelming majority of immigrant workers . . . are Arabs, Maghrebi citizens who support the Arab Umma and have a perspective on Israel that is, for us, untenable. But . . . is it not possible for French Jews, who are assimilated to Israeli Jews, to open a dialogue . . . with these men, women, and children who are in such difficult straits? Can we not show that the aberrant image of Zionists sketched by Arab propagandists and even often by Jews does not correspond to reality? In addition, is it not our mission here in France, when faced with hundreds of thousands of workers from the Maghreb, who are in constant contact with their families and friends on the other side of the Mediterranean, to build bridges and begin a dialogue? (Grunewald 1980c:4)

Similarly, in 1983, Eric Ghebali, the newly elected president of the largest Jewish students' union Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF), noted: "Even if it has become standard to unconditionally support the democratically elected government of Israel, the UEJF will show its commitment to Israel and peace through a Jewish-Arab *rapprochement*, particularly through cultural activities that will bring Jewish and Arab students together" (Ghebali 1983:16). Given this history, why did Margot sever anti-Arab racism from anti-Semitism? And why did she openly and unabashedly call herself a "racist"?

Second, although Margot clearly distinguished herself from those she called "Arabs," a blanket term often used to refer to anyone presumed to be Muslim or of North African origin, her position in France's schema of categorical identities—Frenchness, Jewishness, Arabness—was hardly clear. Like the vast majority of her day school classmates, Margot was what French Jews call *Sephardi*, the daughter and granddaughter of North African immigrants. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, approximately 55,000 Tunisian, 50,000 Moroccan, and 125,000 Algerian Jews immigrated to France (Bensimon 1972:2; Laskier 1983a:342; Taieb 1989:57).[4] Again like her classmates, Margot hailed from an upwardly mobile family, but she lived in a mixed-income, geographically peripheral Parisian neighborhood. As a result, unlike most *Ashkenazim*, or long-established European Jews, she shared street corners, apartment buildings, and bus lines with the children and grandchildren of other relatively recent immigrants, particularly Arab Muslims. With grandparents and even parents who still spoke Arabic at home, she was also far more likely to share cultural practices, culinary habits, musical repertoires, and even aesthetics with other North Africans than with Ashkenazim or other bourgeois Parisians.

For many French Jews and non-Jews, Margot was thus not only a Jew, she was also an Arab Jew, a subject position that both bifurcated Jewishness and blurred the boundaries between Arabness and Jewishness. As a result, she, like many of her classmates, had been taken for "Arab," insulted as a "dirty Jew," and dismissed by some of her (not always Ashkenazi) Jewish teachers as ignorant, low-class, and materialistic. If the French generally presumed that Jewishness and Arabness were mutually exclusive, categorical identities, such a neat separation was not so obvious from Margot's vantage point. So why, given the

ambiguity of Margot's position in France and her obvious physical, social, and cultural proximity to Arab Muslims, did she reject any association with "Arabs"?

Margot's refusal to demonstrate against anti-Semitism was a third surprise. In the first place, she was hardly indifferent to the problem of anti-Semitism. She told me early in our relationship about an anti-Semitic encounter witnessed on a Parisian bus: a Jewish boy who had accidentally shoved an "Arab" passenger had been threatened and even hit by the passenger's friends, despite repeated attempts to apologize. She also readily recounted the anti-Semitic experiences of friends and friends of friends. Like many of her classmates and their parents, she worried about what the state's slow response to the post-2000 growth of anti-Semitism meant for a Jewish future in France. Over the past 30 years, similar concerns about post-Holocaust anti-Semitism in France have driven both Jews (and non-Jews) into the streets in large numbers. In the early to mid-1980s, when French Jews feared a resurgence of deadly anti-Semitic attacks tied both to neo-Nazis and events in the Middle East,[5] a series of demonstrations against anti-Semitism mobilized large swaths of the French Jewish community interested in defending Jews' "rightful" place in the Republic. In 1980, after the bombing of a Parisian reform synagogue on rue Copérnic and then French Prime Minister Raymond Barre's famous gaffe about Jewishness and Frenchness,[6] more than 200,000 people marched in Paris against anti-Semitism and for Republican values, the French flag in hand. After the 1985 bombing of a movie theater showing a film about Adolph Eichmann, the Jewish press reported a demonstration in which Jewish and non-Jewish protesters chanted, "Arabs in Meton, Jews in Paris, it's my buddy who's being assassinated," thus confounding distinctions among ethno-religious minorities (Haymann 1985:11; Lewer 1985:17). And in 1990, after the desecration of a Jewish grave in Carpentras, 200,000 people again responded to Jewish institutions' calls for a massive protest in favor of French Republicanism.[7]

Margot's refusal to demonstrate can thus be read as a rejection of the post-Holocaust French Jewish tradition of publicly arguing for the inclusion of Jews (and others) in French national imaginaries. Indeed, many of her classmates claimed that such demonstrations were pointless or that Jews should not be responsible for demanding Jewish

rights in France. Some even went so far as to insist on the fundamental incompatibility between Frenchness and Jewishness, or to insist that Jews had no future in France (see chapters 3 and 5). Given this history of Jewish public engagement and the pride many teachers and parents felt in their dual identity as Jewish *and* French, Margot's seeming disinterest in a Jewish future in France was new.

And finally, there was Margot's outfit. I called it part of a Jewish day school "uniform" because I found similar forms of dress in all the Jewish schools in which I worked, regardless of geographical location and religious orientation. Whether in the relatively wealthy, leafy suburbs to the east of Paris or the gritty, heavily minority neighborhoods to the north, I easily identified Jews by looking at sneakers, jean brands, necklaces, and earrings. This in and of itself was hardly surprising. Like many of her teenage counterparts all over the developed world, Margot consciously constructed identities through the tools of the global market (Dolby 2001; Gopinath 2005; Hall 2002). Her clothing brands, colors, and cuts; hairstyle; jewelry preferences; and hangout locations proclaimed a particularly ethnicized and classed form of Jewishness, one known by her peers as *chalalah* (see chapter 6). In other words, Margot's red Converse sneakers, matching hooded sweatshirt, tight jeans, and hoop earrings were as much a part of her Jewishness as the day school she attended and her family's abbreviated Sabbath rituals.

But Margot was enrolled in Brith Abraham, an orthodox Jewish day school dedicated to relatively strict observance of Jewish law and to encouraging students to dress "Jewish," meaning in accordance with the precepts of *tzniout*, or modesty. Although girls were allowed to wear pants, they were not supposed to cultivate sex appeal and were forbidden to show their shoulders, collarbones, or knees. For those who respected tzniout, a Jewish star was hardly a necessary or sufficient mark of Jewishness; simplicity, modesty, and gender distinction were. Margot, however, was heavily invested in a sartorial style—those form-fitting clothes and large earrings—that violated the spirit (if not the letter) of tzniout. In the eyes of observant Jews, her skin-tight jeans blurred gender lines, the low-cut T-shirt revealed far too much skin, and the flashy colors and jewelry called inappropriate attention to her body and material means. So why was Margot dressed this way? More importantly, why did Margot—like many of her classmates—think of

this combination of jeans, sneakers, earrings, sweatshirt, and T-shirt as a "Jewish" style when she learned something very different in school?

Racializing Religion

These paradoxes do not apply uniquely to Margot. Many of her classmates from similar socioeconomic and historical backgrounds both articulated and embodied these ruptures and discontinuities. Why? What motivated Margot and many other day schoolers to refuse to recognize "Arab" and "Jewish" structural similarities in France *and* to openly embrace "racist" forms of discourse? What produced the seeming rupture between Frenchness and Jewishness that led to Margot's disinterest in protesting anti-Semitism? Why did Margot work to visibly mark her Jewishness in ways that were not religious, if not irreligious? What, if anything, might these questions have to do with the ways in which young Jews were rethinking national, religious, and ethnic identities? And how might answers help us understand the relationship between and among religion, race, and identity in the post-modern, post-colonial context of contemporary France?

This book explores the puzzles and paradoxes raised by Margot and her Jewish day school classmates. It does so by outlining the construction, reconstruction, and contestation of Jewishness, Arabness, and Frenchness as primordialized categories of belonging in Metropolitan France. I will suggest that for historical reasons tied to the particularities of French colonialism in North Africa and decolonization in the Metropole (chapters 1 and 2), Sephardi Jews like Margot blurred the boundaries between and among these three categories. In other words, Margot and her friends were liminal in France's postcolonial triptych of identity categories, threatened with exile from Frenchness both as Arabs and as Jews. Despite a powerful theoretical tradition that links this kind of experience of liminality—and particularly the liminality associated with youth—to antiessentialism and antiracism (Bauman 1991; Bhabha 1993, 1994; Bucholtz 2002; Dolby 2001; Gilroy 1990; Gopinath 1995; Hall 1990; Hebdige 1979; Park 1928; Wulff 1995; also see chapter 6), I argue that the categorical uncertainties around Margot's identity underwrote both her racist and racializing tendencies. In other words, the lived ex-

perience of Sephardi liminality in France produced the opposite of what social science theory has so often predicted. Within the structural and material constraints of postcolonial France, imagining identity in the naturalized terms of race became one of the few ways to negotiate both anti-Arab racism and bourgeois (sometimes Ashkenazi Jewish) hostility toward ethno-religiously marked practice. Racializing Jewishness helped distinguish Arab Jews from Arab Muslims, who were imagined as a heteronomous population, too fully saturated by embodied religious obligations to embrace French secularism and liberal democracy (Davidson 2012). It also shored up strained Sephardi ties to Ashkenazim and therefore to "European" values, whiteness, and (at least in theory) Frenchness (see chapter 3).

As a result, Margot and her friends were far more likely than their parents or teachers to attempt to construct and understand Jewishness as inevitably visible and legible (see chapter 6). They were also more likely than their elders to reject hybrid identities, refusing the possibility of being Jewish and French, or of being Jewish and Arab. Instead, they insisted on the absolute ontological as well as expressive differences between and among all these categories. The more liminal their structural position—if they were Moroccan rather than Algerian, struggling to remain middle class rather than well established, living in immigrant neighborhoods rather than the heart of Paris—the less tolerable any form of identitarian ambiguity seemed to be. The less inherently natural and exclusive their Jewishness appeared, the more likely it was to be primordialized through appeals to race. Race, in other words, became the grounds on which some young Sephardim tried to reconstruct lost or endangered organic communities within the context of multiethnic, multiclassed peripheral Parisian neighborhoods. In the process, as we will see, they ironically fashioned and biologized themselves out of the French nation.

Writing Jewish Racism

Margot's racializing tendencies may have been relatively new, but they were certainly not news to the institutionalized French Jewish community. Eight months into my fieldwork, I agreed to write an abstract

of my early results for a graduate student conference at the Ecole Normale Superièure, a prestigious French university. My abstract, which highlighted adolescent racism and racialization, ended up circulating well beyond the world of conference participants. It landed in the inbox of a bureaucrat in the central administration of a Jewish school network in which I worked. From there it was ultimately circulated to the principals of every day school in Paris.

Within a week after the circulation of the abstract, I was removed from all three of the schools in which I had been working: a coeducational school that I will call "Brith Abraham," an all-girls school that I will call "Beit Sarah," and an all-boys school that I will call "Beit Ya'acov."[8] All three schools were located in the semiurban zones that ring Paris to the north, east, and south, and accessing them from Paris often required a combination of metro, regional train, and bus rides. They were all part of larger educational networks that historically educated Jews in North Africa. And all three first started educating French Jews in the years following decolonization and massive North African Jewish migration. From March 2004 until December 2004, with a two-month break in July and August during summer recess, I spent two days of every week at Brith Abraham, two days at Beit Sarah, and one day at Beit Ya'acov.[9]

By the time I was removed from both Brith Abraham and Beit Sarah, I had become part of the landscape. My strange accent and syntax, non–North African roots, and ambiguous position within school hierarchies had faded from view. Students had stopped treating me like a cross between an alien and a rock star. Most teachers seemed comfortable with my constant presence, even in their classrooms. And administrators were happy to use me as a substitute teacher, a hall monitor, or an exam proctor when they found themselves shorthanded. In both schools I taught English (very badly) to upper-level middle- and high-school students. In exchange, I was given the opportunity to explore official national and school-based narratives of self and belonging by sitting in on what school officials called *khol* (secular) classes taught by state-paid and educated teachers as well as *kodesh* (religious) classes provided by privately trained and financed instructors. I talked extensively with secular and religious teachers, administrators, and parents about the identitarian goals of Jewish edu-

cation, the effects they hoped it would have on students, their aspirations for students and French Jewry more generally, and their fears for the future. We also talked about their Jewishness and Frenchness, how Jewishness should be institutionally defined, why it had become so important to separate Jewish kids from other French children, and what this meant for thinking about national moral and political community.

I compared these formal and informal narratives with the kinds of stories adolescents told about themselves, about "Jews" more generally, and about a whole range of "others"—"the French," "the Arabs," "the blacks," and so on. To do so, I followed students through average days, attended assemblies, watched students interact with school officials and each other, and participated in school-based community activities. I informally interviewed students at lunch and recess; accompanied them into public spaces that forced interaction with non-Jews; and participated in lively group discussions about racism, national politics, identity, and school. I also recorded a number of formal interviews with students outside of school, mostly individually, but sometimes in groups.

Within days, all of this came to an end. And for a few months, even my physical removal hardly satisfied school officials, one of whom hoped to prevent me from ever doing fieldwork with Jews in France again. I had gone from being a relatively trusted insider—one administrator had even asked for my help with the American consulate over a visa problem—to an enemy.

In many ways, my removal was part of a larger struggle over the politics of representation, which is in turn tied to the paradoxes that produced Jewish racism in France. French Jews—and most particularly Sephardim—are both relatively powerful and impotent. Historically, Jews have been highly upwardly mobile and are, on average, more educated than the French population as a whole (Cohen 2002:17–18).[10] Over 40 percent of Jews work in jobs with considerable cultural or economic capital in France; they are upper-level state employees, liberal professionals, writers, and academics (ibid.:20). As part of the dominant class, French Jews have the resources to produce their own representations of Jews. There are Jewish listservs, websites, and documentaries devoted to re-presenting French anti-Semitism, Israel, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Conseil Représentatif des Institu-

tions Juives de France (hereafter known as the CRIF), one of the most powerful Jewish organizations in France, sends out a daily electronic newsletter with a press review and commentary. Its president regularly writes editorials for national newspapers, agrees to written and oral interviews, and meets with government officials. Community centers, synagogues, day schools, Jewish student unions, and youth groups host their own public debates about a whole range of issues—religion in the Republic, anti-Semitism, foreign policy, and, of course, Israel. Paris boasts at least a score of Jewish magazines, newspapers, analytical reviews, and scholarly series, many of which are advertised and sold at regular newspaper kiosks. There is a full-time Jewish radio station as well as a number of television programs. And demonstrations led by Jewish organizations are regular occurrences on Parisian streets. In other words, Jews have constructed a (partially visible) parallel public sphere with Jewish accounts of what are perceived to be Jewish issues (Werbner 2002). A good part of my fieldwork, particularly after my "excommunication" from Jewish schools, involved exploring these representations and the way they have changed over the last two decades.

But this highly developed representational apparatus does not mean that Jews have the power to shape public perception. "Jewish" interests are hardly hegemonic. At least since the Six Day War in 1967—which followed hard on the heels of the French decolonization of North Africa—French foreign policy and public discourse has long favored what many call "Arab" interests. As many Jews note with anger, both print and televised media tend to be sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians and quick to denounce Israeli actions. When "Jewish" opinions are solicited for the national press, the writers and scholars asked usually confirm mainstream representations. As a result, they are seldom viewed favorably within the parallel Jewish public sphere. For example, *Le Monde* and *Libération*, two major national dailies, regularly publish Esther Benbassa's commentaries on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and French Jewish identity (see, e.g., Benbassa 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006, 2010; Benbassa and Attias 2001). However, Benbassa, a left-wing Sephardi historian based at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales,[11] is reviled by many with a voice in the Jewish press. She has been accused of everything from self-hatred and being a useful idiot for rabid and racist

pro-Palestinians to shoddy scholarship and ignorance (Kurtz 2007; Lévy 2001; Trigano 2007).[12]

This inability to decisively impact public opinion, particularly on issues related to Israel, is evidence of Jews' dominated status within the dominant class. Whatever the intent of state policy and media depictions, they seem to align mainstream French politics with socio-economically and culturally dominated Muslim groups who have been called by French government practice, national discourse, and increasingly their own social and religious networks to identify with "Arab" causes. If these representations (fleetingly) turn Muslims into part of the French political mainstream, they also presuppose and entail Jewish alienation from some normative social values. This, in turn, symbolically reverses relations of domination between Arab Muslims and Jews. This dynamic has been particularly noticeable since the beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, when the French press blamed Israel for precipitating the violent upheaval and France's then-socialist government was slow to respond to the resulting wave of anti-Semitism in France.

If Jewish exclusion from the mainstream consensus on Israel and Palestine is proof of relative Jewish marginality, Jews often understood it as a sign of their absolute domination. During my fieldwork, a number of French Jews did not (perhaps could not) understand or experience themselves as part of the dominant class. Some, particularly Sephardim, imagined themselves as the only truly dominated population in France. Faced with a rise in anti-Semitism often attributed to "Arabs," many Jews argued that a complacent (post-)Catholic French majority was in league with a bloodthirsty Arab minority to persecute Jews. At a Jewish community center conference on the French media, anti-Semitism, and Israel, one evidently panicked Sephardi audience member screamed: "They are all out to get us!"[13] This sense of powerlessness and victimization made the question of Jewish representation crucial.

The "charge" of Jewish racism fueled this sense of panic because it seemingly placed Jews on the wrong side of history. On a variety of discursive levels, an accusation of "racism" entails exile from post-Holocaust European modernity and even civilization. As a result, human rights groups, French newspapers, the occasional government official, and a

whole range of pro-Palestinian groups condemn Israel by accusing the Jewish state of systemic racism.[14] At the same time, some French Jews and non-Jews accuse "Arabs" of anti-Semitism as a way of arguing for their exclusion from both European and French citizenship (Brenner et al. 2002; Brenner 2004; Finkielkraut 2003; Taguieff 2005). For some teachers and administrators, this context meant that it was just as important to combat student racism as to conceal its existence. The principal at Beit Sarah told me that he tried to correct every "wrong" word his students uttered. A handful of teachers at Brith Abraham devoted entire lessons to dismantling student stereotypes (see chapters 4 and 6). But in some cases the desire to conceal any potential parallels between Jewish and "Arab" children trumped any pedagogical mission. One important administrator at Brith Abraham instructed teachers not to challenge racist student remarks, noting that teachers just needed to "understand" where students were coming from. From this kind of perspective, highlighting the racializing tendencies of Jewish youth was clearly perceived as arming the enemy—as comforting those in the white Catholic majority and the Arab Muslim minority who traded consciously or unconsciously in anti-Semitism. As one school director noted: "Why would I bring someone into my school who can then be used as a weapon against me?"

The high school principal who saw me as a loose cannon certainly had a point. My story about shifting conceptions of Parisian Jewishness is not always flattering, and it could be misread. There is growing propensity in France and Europe more generally to reduce social behaviors to a kind of cultural biology; through this lens, my work could be read as "proof" of anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jewish materialism, clannishness, and imagined superiority. Is this a reason not to write about the racialization of identity going on among some French Jews, or at least to write about it very differently? For some of my informants, the answer is clearly yes. But that anxiety echoes the same reductionist and essentializing tendencies that this book rejects. This book is not about the essence of any group, Jewish or otherwise. Quite the contrary. It is an attempt to illustrate the ways in which a particular set of actors navigated social conditions that were of neither their own choice nor their own making. As we will see, the tensions and structural binds with which the Jews in this story—parents

and children, teachers and administrators, self-identified Sephardim and Ashkenazim, struggling middle-class salespeople and relatively privileged academics—were regularly confronted led to attitudes, arguments, and actions that challenge the platitudes of liberal multiculturalism. In many ways, this was overdetermined, called into being by the conceptions of identity, nation, and religion that structure belonging and exclusion in postcolonial Europe. Ignoring the practices of some young Jews would hardly do justice to the very difficult social tightrope many Jews (and Muslims) are forced to walk in France. It also would reproduce the very logic that underwrites both anti-Semitism and racism, reducing structurally conditioned behaviors to culturally determined, if not racial, traits.

There is a second reason why I have not shied away from a story that might raise eyebrows in France. My tale is deeply historical and thus specific to a particularly classed and ethnicized group of French Sephardim. But it nonetheless has implications for some of the larger questions animating contemporary political debate and scholarship about national identity, minority identity politics, and secularism, particularly in Europe. My story historicizes and deconstructs the supposedly primordial conflict that pits "Jews" against "Arabs" all over Europe and the Middle East (Taguieff 2002; Weinstock 2004; Ye'or 1980, 1985, 1999), insisting instead that the two categories are dialectically tied and therefore mutually constitutive (see chapter 1). I also challenge the facile conflation of European Muslims with practices of self-exclusion, including racism (Brenner et al. 2002; Taguieff 2002; Trigano 2003; also see Fernando 2009, 2010). Rather than presume that Islam itself is atavistic and incompatible with Western values (Bensoussan 2004; Brenner et al. 2002; Hirsi Ali 2007; Taguieff 2002, 2005; Trigano 2003; Ye'or 2005),[15] or that economic exclusion has led to the alienation of Muslim youth (Cesari et al. 2001; Kepel 1987; Wihtol de Wenden 1999), I call attention to contradictions within national logics that place a variety of ethno-religious minorities, including Jews and Muslims, in impossible structural binds (see chapters 2 and 6). And finally, I question whether illiberal religious traditions themselves pose the most intractable problems in contemporary Europe (Bowen 2007; Fourest 2005; Huntington 1996; Roy 2004). It may in fact be nonreligious expressions and enactments of

ethno-religious identities that fuel some of the major ruptures between minority and majority populations (see chapter 4). In other words, as France and Europe continue to wrestle with 21st-century versions of the "Jewish question," my work offers new ways of thinking about the production of national community, intolerance, race, and racism within the postcolonial nation-state.