1 Introduction

One might say that the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.

Carl von Clausewitz[1]

WHY DO NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS differ in their cohesion? Why do some countries' militaries fight hard when facing defeat, while others collapse? Why are some countries better than others at creating and sustaining cohesive armed forces in war? Consider, for example, the performance of the German military in World War II. Even when defeat appeared inevitable, the Wehrmacht fought tenaciously, prolonging the war and adding to the tremendous suffering it had already inflicted.[2] In contrast, the battlefield determination of French armed forces varied widely in 1940, with some units offering stiff resistance, while others dissolved at crucial moments. As a result, France could never recover from initial German breakthroughs in early May 1940, and its military leaders, fearing an internal insurrection, pressured the civilian politicians to capitulate in late June.[3]

What accounts for the greater cohesion of the German Army? Why did French armed forces disintegrate with their country's survival at stake? Traditional definitions of military power that focus on material capabilities offer only some clues as to why national militaries differ in their performance. Although knowing how many tanks and troops a country can send into battle can occasionally serve as a good predictor of how its military might perform in war, material capabilities alone cannot tell the entire story. Military cohesion, or the capacity of national armed forces to fight with determination on the battlefield, and *to keep fighting* even when a war appears lost, also plays an important role.

The historical record suggests no countries are alike in their military cohesion. Some countries can field armies capable of overcoming deficiencies in military hardware through their determination. Similarly, other countries bring

superior military capabilities to the battlefield, but they cannot match their opponent's tenacity. Both France and the United States painfully discovered the importance of military cohesion while fighting in Vietnam.[4] The balance of capabilities suggested that the North Vietnamese stood very little chance in their struggles against the Western Powers. In the end, however, strong military cohesion helped North Vietnam to outlast its opponents and emerge victorious.[5] Battlefield determination and the staying power to endure a long, painful war trumped the balance of forces. Today, a similar dynamic appears at work in Afghanistan. The Taliban have proven a "tenacious and determined" foe hindering the nation-building efforts of the United States and its NATO allies.[6] The pervasive nature of the insurgency has led some analysts to worry that sectarian divides in the newly raised Afghan National Army will undermine its military cohesion.[7] Victory or defeat frequently depends on which side can field the more cohesive force.

In this study, I use the term "military cohesion" to describe two characteristics of a country's armed forces in war: (1) the capacity to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield; and (2) the ability to resist internal pressures to collapse as the likelihood of winning a war decreases. Military cohesion, therefore, refers to both battlefield performance as well as the staying power of a country's armed forces to endure difficult strategic circumstances without disintegrating. Traditionally, the literature uses cohesion to discuss the ability of small units, such as squads or platoons, to fight with determination and staying power. I broaden the concept of cohesion to encompass all of a country's military organizations during war.

Scholars have advanced two kinds of arguments to explain why some countries can create and sustain cohesive militaries, while other countries cannot. One view argues that military cohesion grows out of the strong bonds of loyalty that soldiers form inside small units, such as platoons or squads; soldiers fight for their buddies, not for grand political causes.[8] This claim, however, ignores instances where militaries fought hard even when they lacked small-unit bonds, as a result of faulty personnel policies, internal divisions, or high rates of casualties during war. Another view argues that ideology, and not small-unit ties, motivates a country's armed forces to fight hard. By forging strong connections between soldiers and their nations, ideologies create cohesive militaries, capable of enduring long and costly wars. In this view, militaries fight with a high degree of cohesion because of nationalism or devotion to democracy.[9] Of course, sometimes militaries respond to ideological rallying cries, but at

other times they ignore them. Nationalism and democracy galvanized France in World War I but failed to do so in World War II. Ideologies could play an important role, but the conditions under which they promote military cohesion remain unclear.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This book presents what I call *cohesion theory* to explain why national militaries differ in their staying power and battlefield determination. My argument builds on insights from both the rationalist and social constructivist literatures on group solidarity.[10] The core idea underpinning my theory is that any large group, including a country's armed forces, motivates members to sustain collective action by both promoting and enforcing norms of unconditional loyalty among its members. Norms define individual member obligations to any group. Groups remain cohesive even under challenging circumstances because these norms motivate some members to remain committed to group goals. At the same time, these hard-core group members pressure and coerce less motivated members to do the same.

According to the theory, the relationship between a government and its military organizations determines the cohesion of its armed forces during war. Specifically, the cohesion of a country's military depends on two explanatory variables: (1) the degree of regime control over a population; and (2) the degree of autonomy the armed forces possess for training. With a high degree of control, the regime can promote an ideology of unconditional loyalty and enforce it through coercion. This level of control requires both a national ideology that demands unconditional loyalty, such as communism, fascism, or nationalism, combined with a highly repressive government with no civil society to oppose it. Regimes that dominate their societies in this fashion bolster military cohesion by creating hard-core supporters in the armed forces who fight with determination and pressure others to display a similar commitment. Some personnel are true believers, with strong ties to the regime, while others feel compelled to fight.

For many regimes, however, obtaining a high degree of control over society is too difficult or simply too repugnant to consider. Consequently, many countries create cohesive armed forces by granting military organizations the freedom to train without interference. With a high degree of autonomy, the armed forces can use training to promote norms of unconditional loyalty and trust inside their ranks. Personnel develop bonds of loyalty and trust to one another

as well as their organization. These norms will motivate most units—even reserve units—to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield. Units will display a willingness to fight even after suffering the shock of local defeats, encirclement, and intense bombardment. They will also fight with flexibility, capable of performing without tight command and control, as well as avoiding panic. Strong internal ties inspire personnel in battle and sustain them in times of defeat.

To maintain the cohesion of its armed forces in war, then, governments face several choices: they can exert a high degree of control over the country, they can allow military organizations the autonomy to train, they can do both, or they can fail to do either. Taken together, these two variables, regime control and organizational autonomy, produce four ideal types of national armed forces, each capable of fighting with different degrees of cohesion.

A high degree of regime control and organizational autonomy for the armed forces creates *messianic* militaries. I describe them as messianic because the regime's ideology advances a national mission that galvanizes the armed forces in war. Because it believes the military will remain faithful, the regime allows the armed forces autonomy to forge strong internal bonds of their own. Messianic militaries fight with a high degree of cohesion. They exhibit strong staying power: the regime's hard-core supporters fight under all circumstances and pressure others to do the same, even if victory looks impossible. They also display strong battlefield performance: strong internal bonds within the armed forces enable most units of messianic militaries to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield.

When a high degree of regime control undermines the autonomy of the armed forces, states field *authoritarian* militaries. These militaries draw their cohesion from the regime's ability to demand and enforce unconditional loyalty from the population. A high degree of regime control bolsters staying power, giving the armed forces the ability to fight even when victory looks impossible. Zealous followers fight and coerce others to do the same. However, they fight with less battlefield performance. Without autonomy, a country's military organizations cannot form strong internal bonds of their own. The state does not trust the military with the autonomy to create loyalty within the ranks. Devoid of these internal military bonds, most units will fight with determination but lack the ability to fight with flexibility on the battlefield.

In contrast, a regime exercising a low degree of control and permitting a high degree of autonomy for the armed forces will create a *professional* mili-

tary. I label them as professional because with autonomy the armed forces can concentrate on training for warfighting and, thereby, create their own internal bonds of loyalty. Under these conditions they develop a corporate identity centered on their expertise and responsibility to the county. The armed forces serve as trustworthy organizations, with the singular purpose of preparing and fighting the country's wars. With a focus on training, strong organizational bonds develop, enabling the military to show strong battlefield performance: most units fight with high levels of determination and flexibility on the battlefield. Without strong regime control, however, professional militaries will slowly lose their staying power as the probability of victory decreases. A hard-core group of regime supporters will not exist to coerce the armed forces to fight when defeat looks imminent.

Finally, countries with a low degree of regime control as well as a low degree of military autonomy will produce *apathetic* armed forces. These organizations fight with a low degree of cohesion for two reasons. Without military autonomy, the armed forces cannot instill norms of unconditional loyalty and trust across most of its members. As such, they will display weak battlefield performance: only elite units will fight with determination and flexibility in combat. This means that reserve units, critical in long wars and conflicts requiring large forces, will unlikely display tenacity in battle. Similarly, without a high degree of regime control, the government will lack a hard-core group of supporters willing to fight and coerce others to fight even if defeat in war appears inevitable. After a few defeats, apathetic militaries will quickly lose their staying power, as the armed forces voice their opposition to the war and their battlefield units disintegrate.

WHY STUDY THE SOURCES OF MILITARY COHESION?

The question of what motivates a military during war is important for policy-makers and scholars alike. How governments and military organizations can create forces with maximum staying power remains an open question. For governments and military organizations, it is no easy task to convince individuals to risk injury and perhaps death in combat to defend their country. Moreover, the issue of motivation does not pose a problem only for nation states. The fighting units of nonstate actors, insurgency movements and terrorist organizations, for instance, often rely on highly motivated members to carry out very dangerous military operations, or, in some cases, to give their own lives in support of a cause. For example, members of the al Qaeda terrorist network,

by their capacity to conduct attacks in several countries in spite of widespread pressure by the international community, by their tenacious fighting ability in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by their willingness to engage in suicide attacks, have demonstrated the dangers a highly motivated adversary can pose to international security.[11]

Understanding why armed forces differ in their cohesion should help U.S. military planners assess the military promise of potential adversaries, such as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Ultimately, planners want to gauge prospects for defeating potential opponents on the battlefield, what analysts commonly describe as net assessments.[12] Analysts performing net assessments of potential adversaries commonly examine material capabilities, but they should also attempt to discern a variety of nonmaterial factors, such as the willingness of an enemy's forces to fight. Taking the cohesion of an opponent's military into account can provide a more detailed picture of an adversary's capabilities.

For example, militaries armed with modern technology operated by well-trained personnel may do well on the battlefield but lack the staying power for long, inconclusive wars. Arguably this describes the pressures democracies face when fighting counterinsurgencies abroad.[13] Alternatively, ethnic or political divisions, for example, might keep an opponent's forces from performing effectively on the battlefield, becoming the Achilles' heel of an otherwise formidable country.[14] Still further, some regimes possess a coercive apparatus strong enough to resist a powerful attacker, even when defeat looks inevitable. Such estimates might have improved the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the tenacity and coercive power of the Baathist regime's most ardent supporters, the Fedayeen Saddam, surprised coalition forces.[15]

This study on the sources of military cohesion should interest students of security studies, and international relations more generally, for three reasons. First, it offers a broad and systematic definition of military cohesion that encompasses not only battlefield performance but also the ability of military organizations to avoid the pressures of collapse when victory seems unlikely. Recall that military cohesion is the capacity of a country's military units to fight with determination and flexibility in combat while enduring difficult strategic circumstances. In this way, military cohesion represents a national-level phenomenon that applies to all of a country's military organizations. Looking at military cohesion from this vantage point follows a growing trend in the field of international security that examines the domestic and societal sources of military effectiveness. More important, this definition allows scholars to better

conceptualize and understand variations in staying power. On the one hand, national militaries rarely fight to the last soldier; even Nazi Germany's armed forces eventually surrendered. On the other hand, national militaries rarely collapse without a fight; even the French Army in 1940 took and inflicted casualties. This study helps explain the range of outcomes in cohesion between these two extremes.

Second, the book's theory helps identify which national armed forces could fight with enough cohesion to adopt the doctrine and tactics required for success on the contemporary battlefield, what Stephen Biddle calls the "modern system."[16] Although scholars have paid increasing attention to issues of military effectiveness, they have focused primarily on why armed forces differ in skill, not will. Cohesion represents a crucial determinant of who wins and loses on the battlefield. Militaries might understand what the "modern system" requires for victory, but nonetheless lack the determination and flexibility to employ it.

Finally, cohesion theory could help scholars explain the success of collective action in several types of groups, not only national militaries but also insurgent and terrorist groups. The challenge of motivating individuals to risk their lives in combat is at the center of the collective-action problem, a subject of interest to a variety of disciplines. Economists, political scientists, social psychologists, and sociologists remain deeply divided over why some groups can achieve collective goals and why others are stymied by the free-riding tendency of individuals when pursuing collective action.[17] The view of individuals as self-interested actors, largely the view in economics and the dominant perspective in political science, contends that individuals require either coercive or pecuniary incentives to persuade them to engage in collective action. When convinced they will gain more from participating than from sitting on the sidelines, individuals will participate in groups to secure collective goals.

Social constructivist scholars, borrowing from sociology and social psychology, offer a different perspective. They argue that individuals can form group identities that facilitate collective action. Instead of seeing the world from the vantage point of self-interested individuals who ask, "What is in it for me?" social constructivists believe that there are instances when people might participate in collective action by asking, "What is in it for the group?"[18] Norms create individual members that strongly identify with a group's interests.[19] Cohesion theory bridges the constructivist and rationalist approaches by explaining how norms and coercion work together to motivate militaries.[20]

THE LITERATURE ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

There is a substantial literature debating why militaries win and lose battles. Studies of military effectiveness try to move beyond explanations of battlefield success based on technology and the balance of forces. Instead, they look to nonmaterial factors to explain combat outcomes. Most of these studies address the sources of military skill, or why some armed forces fight better than their competitors. They describe military skill along the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.[21] Stephen Biddle, for example, emphasizes the dominance of firepower on the contemporary battlefield and how skilled militaries will adopt "modern system" tactics to succeed under these conditions.[22]

To explain differences in skill, scholars have pointed to several national characteristics. According to a few analysts, tensions between civilian leaders and military organizations frequently affect battlefield performance. Stephen Biddle and Robert Zierkle examined civil-military relations to describe why some militaries encountered trouble with emerging weapon technologies.[23] Risa Brooks argues that the balance of civilian and military power shapes the effectiveness of the armed forces during war.[24] Sometimes a regime's effort to coup-proof the military reduces the skill of the armed forces on the battlefield. According to James Quinlivan, these civil-military tensions account for the poor performance of many Arab militaries.[25]

Other scholars locate the sources of military skill in a society's domestic political institutions, its political culture, or the organizational culture of its military. For example, Stephen Peter Rosen uses historical evidence from India to illustrate how societal divisions can prevent countries from realizing their full military potential.[26] These same societal cleavages might undermine unity within the ranks of the military. In a similar fashion, Elizabeth Kier argues that domestic political disputes about the role of the military in society can overwhelm strategic considerations when militaries construct their doctrines. She notes that debates about the role of the military in society can also influence the organization's culture and overall combat effectiveness.[27] Some scholars, most notably Kenneth Pollack, have also tried to connect a country's national culture with its battlefield performance.[28]

This book, in contrast, focuses on questions of will. In particular, the central issue here is why militaries differ in their battlefield determination and overall staying power to endure wars where victory looks unlikely, what I define as cohesion. Although skill plays an important role in combat outcomes, will, or

cohesion, also determines who wins and loses on the battlefield. For this reason, military planners and scholars have long sought to understand why people risk their lives in combat for a cause, country, or both.[29] Military theorists ranging from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz consider the motivation of armies a crucial facet of warfare.[30] The fact that some militaries collapse and others hold together under stressful combat conditions has puzzled generations of historians, military sociologists, and political scientists.[31] To inspire their soldiers and keep their units intact under difficult circumstances, military organizations have relied on a variety of techniques.[32]

Scholars have focused on four sources of military motivation.[33] The most obvious method of motivating involves the use of positive and negative incentives, or carrots and sticks. For mercenaries, the promise of payment or the prospect of looting the vanquished proved sufficient to keep units fighting.[34] The capacity of military organizations to provide for the physical and psychological needs of their personnel has received attention as a factor in wartime motivation.[35] Coercion and fear also play a role in maintaining cohesion.[36] Some armies threaten their men with painful penalties or death if they attempt to break ranks. Fear of punishment, including execution, encourages reluctant soldiers to fight. To complement threats of punishment, militaries drill their personnel to make battlefield discipline and tactics second nature.[37] The French military theorist Ardant du Picq believed training also facilitated the tight bonds among soldiers that made them more effective in battle.[38] Of course, the problem with positive and negative incentives is identifying the conditions under which they keep militaries fighting and when they do not.

A second line of research emphasizes the importance of small-unit bonds, from the platoon to the battalion level, and the role of training in improving an army's staying power. Awash in data from World War II, American sociologists in the late 1940s began systematic investigations to understand the behavior of soldiers in battle.[39] Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues questioned American infantrymen and bomber crews to learn how they coped with the stress of battle. In a more controversial work, S. L. A. Marshall argued that fear of injury and death prevented significant numbers of American soldiers from firing their weapons. Marshall argued that men too fearful to fire their weapons posed the key obstacle to a unit's combat effectiveness.[40]

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz interviewed German prisoners of war to ascertain how the Wehrmacht remained an intact and capable fighting force in

the face of impending defeat.[41] Their path-breaking research argued that the cohesion of the Wehrmacht reflected strong primary group ties within units. Loyalty to their friends in the unit, and not ideology, kept German soldiers fighting in the face of a losing cause. Little and Janowitz made a similar argument from their studies about the determination of American soldiers in the Korean War.[42] Charles Moskos pointed to the U.S. Army's individual replacement system and poor leadership at all levels of units in the Vietnam War as an obstacle to the formation of primary group ties in American units.[43]

Theories about the formation of primary-group ties illustrate the power of strong bonds within groups, but wrongly disregard the potential for these bonds to form at higher levels, such as within the military organization as a whole and society at large. In addition, some armed forces fail to adopt the personnel and training policies small-unit cohesion requires, but can still display tenacity on the battlefield.[44] Robert Rush has argued that strong bonds between soldiers and the military organization held the U.S. Army together in World War II, while the combination of heavy casualties and an individual replacement system undermined primary group ties. Alternatively, some militaries can fight with great determination, even though high casualty rates and their corresponding high rates of replacement can prevent small-unit bonds from forming.[45] The Iranian military, for example, still fought with great ferocity even though it suffered terrible losses during its long war with Iraq in the 1980s.[46]

A third line of research argues that a country's ideology accounts for an army's determination in war. At odds with the findings of Shils and Janowitz, the historian Omer Bartov claims that Nazi ideology, and not primary group ties, explains the determination of the Wehrmacht as it fought on the Eastern Front.[47] Stephen Fritz arrives at a similar conclusion from his study of the German Army.[48] The importance of ideology as a motivating factor in war has received increasing attention from scholars.[49] Military historians suggest, for example, that ideological commitments probably played a great role for both sides of the American Civil War.[50]

Some scholars argue that the most powerful motivating ideology is nationalism. As evidence, this view points to the effects of the French Revolution not only on battlefield tactics but also on the ability of states to raise mass armies and motivate them in combat.[51] In a case study of post-Meiji Japan, Dan Reiter shows why nationalism increases the willingness of soldiers to die for their country, to employ suicide tactics, and to innovate on the battlefield.[52] Barry Posen illustrates how Germany and France inculcated their populations with

nationalism as a way to improve their military power on the eve of World War I.[53]

Nevertheless, the historical evidence provides mixed support for the nationalism argument. Sometimes nationalism rallies a country and its forces; sometimes it does not. As they stand today, arguments about nationalism fail to describe the conditions under which these appeals work. Compare, for instance, the case of France in 1914 with France in 1940. Next to its Russian ally, the French Army of World War I paid the second highest blood price of any combatant to defend its homeland, but it displayed substantially less staying power in World War II.[54] The defeat of France stands in stark contrast to the determination shown by Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union when protecting their homelands in World War II.[55] There seems little doubt that nationalism can motivate a country's armed forces. The key lies in understanding the conditions under which ideologies like nationalism create staying power, and when they do not. The nationalism of Wilhelmine Germany, for instance, differed from the nationalism of Nazi Germany, both in its message and how it motivated their respective armed forces.[56]

Consistent with claims about ideology, other analysts argue that regime type, or a country's form of government, accounts for differences in military effectiveness, including battlefield determination and staying power.[57] Allan Stam and Dan Reiter hypothesize that democracies win wars because they choose the right wars and their personnel display more skill than soldiers from nondemocracies. Democracies field armies with high morale, they assert, because soldiers are fighting for a popular form of government.[58] Reiter and Stam, however, find little empirical support for their hypothesis about democracies and morale, since militaries with strong staying power are not unique to democracies. Their findings seem reasonable given notable examples of nondemocracies capable of fielding tenacious armed forces. For example, the undemocratic government of Japan emboldened its citizens and soldiers to fight World War II with great determination.[59] The Soviet Union likewise rebounded from the invasion of Germany in World War II by relying on a combination of communist ideology and nationalism to rally its citizens.[60]

A fourth line of research claims that a country's military fights hard when it has more at stake in the conflict than its adversary. In particular, countries fight with great tenacity when they are defending their own territory.[61] Few other causes can seem greater than defending the fatherland or motherland. These explanations, nevertheless, cannot account for the occasions when even armies

defending their homeland, such as the French and Italian armies in World War II, the Russian Army in World War I, and Iraqi forces in both Persian Gulf wars, eventually lost their will to fight.

The argument I present here, cohesion theory, borrows from each of these arguments. Claims about small-unit cohesion are important because they illustrate the power of strong bonds within groups, but they are wrong to ignore the potential for these bonds to form at higher levels, such as in the larger military organization. Similarly, arguments about ideology—for example nationalism—correctly identify the power of ideas to motivate individuals, but they do not explain the conditions under which these concepts galvanize groups.

PLAN OF THE BOOK: TESTING COHESION THEORY'S PLAUSIBILITY AND CASE SELECTION

In the following eight chapters, I present the hypotheses and causal logics of cohesion theory, test the plausibility of the theory's explanatory power, and then offer some implications of my argument for scholars and policy-makers. Overall, the book pursues two goals: to present a new theory to account for military cohesion while also providing an initial empirical test of the theory's explanatory power. The study, therefore, is one part theory creation and one part theory testing.[62]

In Chapter 2, I unpack the book's theoretical argument connecting regime control and organizational autonomy to military cohesion. First, I define military cohesion, the book's dependent variable. Second, I outline the theory's hypotheses, in the form of four ideal types of national armed forces (messianic, authoritarian, professional, and apathetic), along with the associated causal logics explaining why different combinations of regime control and organizational autonomy produce varying levels of military cohesion. Next I deduce three alternative explanations to cohesion theory from the existing literature: nationalism, small-group ties, and democracy. Although popular, most of these arguments remain vague about how and why they explain military cohesion. This omission forces me to sketch some causal logics connecting each of these alternative hypotheses to military cohesion.

The bulk of the book provides an empirical test of my argument about the sources of military cohesion. To demonstrate the plausibility of cohesion theory, I present a series of comparative case studies.[63] Using the comparative method, I test to see if my theory's variables correspond with the predicted degree of military cohesion across different cases. This approach also permits a

test of my theory's causal logic through process tracing, a unique advantage of case studies.[64] Case studies give the researcher leverage on difficult-to-measure concepts, such as determination and flexibility on the battlefield.[65]

Within each case, I assess two aspects of a country's military cohesion: staying power and battlefield performance. For staying power, I assess the ability of national leaders to keep the armed forces fighting as the probability of victory begins to fall and the pressures to quit the war rise. To evaluate battlefield performance, I select key battles within the case to assess whether most units fight with determination on the battlefield. At the end of each case study, I briefly compare cohesion theory with the three aforementioned existing alternative explanations of why militaries fight hard: the strength of small-unit ties, nationalist ideologies, and democracy. I use these comparisons at the end of each chapter as another method for gauging the plausibility of cohesion theory. Again, my aim is not an exhaustive test of cohesion theory against these alternatives, since they remain largely undeveloped. Instead, I show that my argument sheds more light than these alternatives do on the selected historical cases.

The first set of case studies come from World War II in Europe. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine, respectively, the messianic German military from 1944 to 1945, the apathetic French armed forces in 1940, and the authoritarian Soviet Red Army in 1941. In each of these initial cases, a national military fights for its country's survival. The first two, and longer chapters, on the German and French militaries, assess extreme values on my theory's independent variables (regime control and military autonomy) and the study's dependent variable (the degree of military cohesion). By comparing these extreme values, I can better illustrate the causal logics of my theory connecting regime control and organizational autonomy to military cohesion.[66] These chapters also briefly compare the cohesion of national armed forces during World War II with their cohesion in World War I, when Germany and France both raised professional militaries. Through these within the case comparisons, I demonstrate my theory's ability to explain how and why military cohesion can change from one war to the next. The shorter chapter on the Soviet Union contrasts with the German and French militaries by describing the cohesion of an authoritarian military. These first three historical chapters depict each of my theory's ideal type of military organization: messianic, authoritarian, professional, and apathetic. In the next two chapters, the book's focus turns to the Vietnam War, comparing the armed forces of North Vietnam (Chapter 6) with those of the United States

(Chapter 7). These two chapters test the plausibility of cohesion theory outside of Europe during World War II.

My case selection reflects four criteria. I choose cases covering a wide range of variation in regime control and organizational autonomy, along with variation in military cohesion during war. This first criterion allows me to test the causal logic of cohesion theory across different values of its independent variables. Additionally, I select data-rich cases that provide a chance to explore the details of the causal processes my theory predicts. These cases have the virtue of also being familiar and important to students of military effectiveness.[67] To demonstrate cohesion theory's breadth, I choose cases from different regions and time periods. By selecting cases from Europe and Asia, I avoid arguments that defy generalization by relying on a particular culture to explain cohesion.[68] Furthermore, to compare cohesion theory with the democracy argument, I also choose cases from wars where democracies fight nondemocracies. This criterion allows me to compare the relative explanatory power of my argument against the democracy argument within the same conflict. Each case study compares the performance of democratic militaries versus their less democratic opponents.

Finally, I select cases to control for several confounding variables (see Table 1.1). The cases consist of national militaries fighting on the defense where the probability of victory appears at best uncertain, and at worst increasingly unlikely. This focus provides a way to keep the operational and strategic circumstances comparable across cases. I also select cases where countries are defending their own territory to control for defending one's homeland as a possible explanation of an army's determination. Most of my cases involve countries fighting to protect their native soil.

The case studies provide three types of evidence to evaluate cohesion theory. First, for each case, I try to determine if variations in the strength of regime and organizational ties are congruent with the predicted degree of military cohesion. I then compare congruence *across* these difference cases. Second, the case studies also assess national militaries over a period of time, with multiple battles, each viewed at the time as critically important to a campaign, as well as different decision points where military leaders worried whether they could continue the war. This element of my research design also allows me to test *within* case congruence between independent and dependent variables. Lastly, the case studies provide opportunities, through process tracing, to test the causal logic connecting my theory's variables to military cohesion. Through

TABLE 1.1: The Cases

The Cases: Country and Year	Major Battles within the Cases
Chapter 3: Messianic German Military, 1944–45	Retreat from France West Wall Ardennes Offensive Defense of the Rhine
Chapter 3: Professional German Military, 1917–18	Cambrai Amiens
Chapter 4: Apathetic French Military, 1940	Dinant Sedan Montcornet, Laon, and Arras Weygand Line
Chapter 4: Professional French Military, 1914–18	First Marne Second Marne
Chapter 5: Authoritarian Soviet Military, 1941	Bialystock-Minsk Smolensk Kiev Moscow
Chapter 6: Messianic North Vietnamese Military, 1965–73	Ia Drang Operation Dewey Canyon
Chapter 7: Professional U.S. Military, 1968–72	Tet and Hue Khe Sanh

process tracing I can evaluate whether or not the predicted behaviors of my theory are occurring for the reasons it anticipates.

In the last chapter, I summarize the book's findings. The conclusion then offers some suggestions for future research and the implications for national security policy.