# 1 INTRODUCTION

In the growth of a general war, the entry of additional nations was often like the fisherman who intervened while the waterbirds fought or waterbirds who pounced while the fisherman slept.

MAJOR WARS IN THE HISTORY OF NATIONS have been characterized by the involvement of foreign powers. In the nineteenth century, the two deadliest conflicts involved external states as interveners. Great Britain, France, and Italy entered the Crimean War (1854–1856) on the side of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Russian claims as a protectorate over the Ottoman Greeks and its insistence on the neutrality of Istanbul to great powers strengthened the Concert of Four Powers, leading to a consensus on the possible responses to Russian aggression. British government claimed that "nothing is more calculated to precipitate [a Turkish catastrophe] than the constant prediction of its being close at hand." Napoleon was prepared to declare war against the Russian offensive in the Near East: "France, as well as England, will be compelled to leave to the fate of arms the fortune of war that which might now be decided by reason and justice."

A decade later, Uruguay and Argentina built the Triple Alliance with Brazil (1866) against an expansionist Paraguay and defeated the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano Lopez in the deadliest war in Latin America. The unmatched military and economic power of the Brazil–Argentina alliance inflicted tremendous economic costs and human casualties on Paraguay, wiping out half of its population.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, in the twentieth century, much ink was spilled on wars such as the Balkan wars, two world wars, the Korean War, and the Gulf War, which had an undeniable but mostly overlooked international dimension. While the shadow of Turks united Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War (1912), they were soon to be divided on territorial issues, giving the Ottomans a chance to double the territory that they had retained with the Treaty of London (1913). In the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire intervened against Bulgaria and accrued the highest casualties of the war to secure the return of Kirk Kilisse, Lule Burgas, and Adrianople, which Bulgarians had previously captured with the help of the Balkan alliance.<sup>5</sup>

The wars that characterized American foreign policy in the twentieth century mostly involved the United States as an external intervener. The United States entered the Korean War on June 27, 1950, to support South Korea, two days after the North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and poured southward. Similarly, in the world wars, Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene on behalf of the Allied Powers against the Central Powers on April 6, 1917, and Congress declared war against the Axis Powers on December 11, 1941, only four days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Foreign powers have systematic impact on the evolution and termination of armed conflicts and play crucial roles in shaping belligerents' capabilities and resolve.8 By understanding external intervention, we can shed light on several riddles of conflicts and gain purchase on questions related to important conflict processes with implications for international peace and security. How long states and nonstate actors fight and whether they terminate fighting with negotiated outcomes or battlefield victories mostly depend on the role that foreign powers play. American military strategists had little doubt in 1991 that Iraq would wipe Kuwait off the map if the United States did not enter the conflict to change the situation. American aerial bombing reversed the fate of a conflict by tipping the balance of power and securing a victory for Kuwait in an astonishingly short period of time.9 External intervention was also a crucial element in grasping the course and outcome of the world wars. In World War I, U.S. involvement on the side of the Allied Powers, driven by a combination of economic and security interests, determined the winners and losers of a long and expansive war in the power core of the international system. In World War II, U.S. intervention dwarfed the military ingenuity of German and Japan strategists with technological superiority and facilitated the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

The concept of intervention remains a central one in world politics:

Intervention lies at the boundary of peace and war. It also defines the outer limits of sovereign control. It is this liminal character of the concept that makes it a useful vantage point from which to inquire about the role and purpose of force in international society.<sup>10</sup>

Strategies	Opportunities	
	Civil wars (1944–1999)	International conflicts (1946–2001)
Diplomacy	513	1283
Economic intervention	130	113
Military intervention	942	413

Table 1.1. In strangers' conflicts.

source: Data on international conflicts come from Renato Corbetta and William J. Dixon, "Danger beyond Dyads: Third-Party Participants in Militarized Interstate Disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 1 (2005): 39-61. Civil war interventions are adopted from Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5 (2006): 736-756.

NOTE: The number of interventions is reported in the table. Data cover all intervener types such as states and organizations. International conflicts include wars as well as militarized interstate disputes.

Intervention is an integral part of armed violence in the international system. It is also full of riddles that await attention from scholars and policymakers. Defining opportunities to intervene is the foremost task (Table 1.1). The realist research program traditionally focused on states' reaction to conflicts between nations and put international conflicts at the forefront of intervention research.11 The competing logic and predictions of offensive and defensive realism mostly emanated from the disagreement among scholars on how states respond to powerful and threatening states in the international system.

Yet there are other important intervention opportunities that have rarely been explored in the same framework with international conflicts. Civil war intervention is a new form of interventionism. Civil wars and irregular warfare where modern armies, trained for conventional warfare, confront elusive enemies in forests, mountains, and urban areas are a post-World War II phenomenon, whereas conflict between states is as old as the modern state system.12 Violent nonstate actors are unequivocally emerging among the key players in the international system and are becoming a systemic factor in many ways. Insurgents and terrorist groups are obvious candidates, though there are more obscure examples, such as the increasing piracy in Nigeria's waters, along Somalia's long coastline, and in Indonesia, a crime thought to be an archaic one until recently.13 Although most of these actors operate in the periphery of the international system, their influence is disproportionate to their location. Changing dynamics of violence in the international system require that violent nonstate actors become the foci of conflict management and the study of external intervention. While U.N. peacekeeping operations were

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mainly directed at wars between nations in the 1980s, one can see that intrastate violence stole the scene from its interstate counterpart. Mayall quotes from the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1995):

Of the five peace-keeping operations existed in early 1988, four related to interstate wars . . . Of the 21 operations established since then, only 8 have related to interstate wars . . . Of the 11 operations established since January 1992, all but 2 . . . related to intra-state conflicts. <sup>14</sup>

Strategy is another key dimension of intervention. Instruments of state-craft that interveners adopt to influence the course of a conflict take several forms. An intervener can respond to armed conflicts in several ways, including coercive strategies, economic pressure or incentives, and international diplomacy (Table 1.1). States would differ in their responses to violence in the international system and react only after a careful examination of all available options in relation with their interests in the belligerents. As Baldwin suggests, "Policymaking involves making decisions, and decision making involves choosing among alternative courses of action." External interveners commit themselves to a particular course of action that is commensurate with their interests and consider a variety of factors when assessing the resources they are willing to allocate for intervention. These factors include a nation's material capabilities, previous political or economic relations with the belligerents, perception of security threats, and the location of the conflict.

The stakes of intervention are strategically chosen: Just as interveners carefully select their level of commitment, they also select themselves into certain conflicts and avoid others. External states to conflicts commonly choose to stay on the sidelines and watch when others fight. When Russian forces poured into Georgia in August 2008 to support the separatist movement in South Ossetia or when Israel responded to Hezbollah's barrage of rockets in August 2006, the international community, including the United States, preferred waiting to intervention. Among those states that do intervene in strangers' conflicts, motivations are mixed. Some external interveners are pulled into conflicts to please international audiences or their major power allies, such as smaller powers joining U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other interveners may pursue their national interests in the War environment. As the United States became increasingly concerned with Al-Qaeda influence

in poor Africa, it tacitly supported an Ethiopian attack on the Islamic Courts Union rebels in Somalia in July 2006.

Surprisingly, why and how interveners enter militarized conflicts between or within countries have attracted little systematic inquiry. Despite the centrality of external actors in armed conflicts, the academic fields of international relations (IR) and security studies have invested heavily in examining why states and nonstate actors start fighting in the first place. States' decisions to become involved in armed conflicts have largely remained a peripheral and finally outdated area of security studies until interest in the management of civil wars was revived in the late 1990s. The effectiveness of external states in shaping the fate of these conflicts as latecomers as well as the specific objectives that informed their decisions did not lead to broader research questions about the causes and implications of external involvement. Yet, "who intervenes?" is equally central with "who fights?" in international security and requires addressing the specific objectives that motivate interveners to step into strangers' conflicts.

This book makes a theoretical and empirical effort to bring external interveners back into the study of armed conflict. Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts constructs a coherent research program of intervention based on the economic liberalism variant of the liberal paradigm. Using statistical analyses and case studies, the book tests hypotheses about why and how external states become involved in international conflicts and civil wars. Informed by the liberal IR theory, it crosses the traditional boundaries between economics and security studies by developing a theoretical framework that places economic interests and domestic political institutions of external states at the center of intervention decisions.

# THE DEBATE

Structural realism claimed to explain historical trends in states' behavior by heavily referring to systemic elements. In the realist debate, states' policies aim to maintain the distribution of power through alliances. When balancing fails and alliances fail to deter armed conflict, external states are expected to wind up on the weaker side. Contemporary realist scholarship went beyond the capabilities of belligerents and emphasized perceived threats, shared interests, and risk calculations in explaining intervention (Table 1.2).16 Work on alliance reliability, extended deterrence, and war expansion has dealt directly

Debates	Key variable	Selected works
Realism	Borders	Siverson & Starr, The Diffusion of War
	Alliances	Leeds, Alliance Reliability
	Power	Schweller, Unanswered Threats
	Threats	Walt, Origins of Alliances
	Interests	Altfeld & Bueno de Mesquita, Choosing Sides
Liberalism	Economic interests	Fordham, Revisionism Reconsidered
	Democratic	Reiter & Stam, Democracies at War
	institutions	Werner & Lemke, Opposites Do Not Attract
Constructivism	International norms	Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention
Institutionalism	Organizational	Doyle & Sambanis, Making War
	decision making	Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?

or indirectly with the behavior of external actors in violent international settings. <sup>17</sup> Extension of realist claims in bargaining models of conflict suggested that interdependent decision making between adversaries and external states plays a central role in initiation and intervention decisions. <sup>18</sup> Institutionalist and constructivist approaches to intervention have similarly argued that pressures on states mostly originate from systemic processes. Institutionalism debated the role of organizational decision making and design in structuring belligerents' preferences in armed conflicts, whereas constructivism emphasized changing norms and behavioral patterns in the international system to explain the evolution of intervention.

While potential or actual use of force in response to conflicts plays a central role in major theoretical debates of international relations, "a liberal view of international affairs suffers from a complete misunderstanding of the role of force in world history." A utopian belief in the harmony of nations and obsoleteness of war in liberal thought can be traced back to early scholars. In this approach, force is less predictable from the lenses of the liberal scholarship, whereas the realist paradigm remains as the sole systematic study of force in international relations. Yet the liberal approach, like its realist competitor, is a positive theory that explains a wide variety of state behavior in the international arena. It does not make any normative or moral claim about the superiority of peaceful state strategies over coercive ones, nor does it expect to see coercion become obsolete in world politics. Moravcsik powerfully argues that liberal IR theory is not less empirically valid than realism in explaining international outcomes.<sup>20</sup> With its emphasis on state preferences (interests)

and the domestic context from which such preferences originate (institutions), a reformulation of the liberal theory overcomes an artificial duality between this scholarship and the study of force.

It was particularly difficult for the economic liberalism variant of liberal IR theory to establish a link between economics and coercion. Scholars commonly associated protection of economic interests abroad through forceful strategies with imperialism and argued that this practice has died with the change in the economic environment and international norms. Coup d'état attempts to punish the nationalization policies of a hostile government or overt uses of force against ideologically incompatible trading partners appeared in the foreign policy repertoire of powerful states in a few instances during the Cold War.<sup>21</sup> Increasing economic competence of the Third World in protecting property rights and regulating foreign investments, the changing nature of overseas economic activity from primary to industrial production, and financial transactions and evolving norms of the international system reduced the effectiveness of military force or the threat of it to achieve economic ends.22

These changes, however, opened up other avenues of influence between states. The role of force has been transformed in the new global order, though this observation should not lead to the overarching assumption that force has become obsolete. What is obsolete in the post-1945 global economy and world politics is the context in which force is applied but not the goals that states seek to achieve with forceful policies. Following this logic, transition from European imperialism to good neighborliness is about strategy and not about the motivations behind states' attempts to influence others' policies.23 In an era where international legal sovereignty and border fixity have been triumphed by the United States and are widely accepted and monitored by nations, use of force to control other governments and impose alien policies in a colonialist fashion may no longer be on the menu of state policies.24 Yet the motivation to defend economic interests abroad by adopting security measures continues, and it takes other contemporary forms that mostly escaped scholarly attention.

Important among these contemporary forms is that states intervene in a conflict environment to protect their economic interests against the negative externalities of intra- and inter-state violence without exercising direct political or military control of the target. International norms in the post-World War II period do not allow states to forcefully meddle with other states' affairs to collect sovereign debts or protect foreign capital as in earlier days but allow intervention in armed conflicts, mostly in a collective fashion, to protect "international peace and stability."

International rules are loose and open to reinterpretation, especially by powerful states that can endure the costs of naming and shaming by international institutions and audiences. When states act to protect their significant economic partners in the context of conflicts, it is not clear whether international law is breached. Yet, in a system where borders are closely observed, violating international sovereignty to achieve similar goals would invariably lead to coalitions of states aimed at restoring the rights of international ownership. The Gulf War is a typical example of this case. Both Iraq's attack on Kuwait and U.S. intervention on behalf of Kuwait could have been driven with a combination of motives that includes economic ones in the mix. Yet Iraq's strategy to annex Kuwait triggered coalitions of states on the defense side, whereas the international community approved U.S. strategy as an act to preserve peace and stability in the volatile Middle East.

The United States established the post-1945 order and vehemently pursued its rules. Therefore, its behavior is further illustrative of what is acceptable and what is not in the new international order. Despite the low international and military costs of imperial intervention to a hegemonic power, it is highly infrequent in American foreign policymaking. The United States, on the other hand, played an active role in exerting its influence as an external intervener in conflicts in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In an overwhelming majority of these conflicts, the United States stood up against the attacker on behalf of the target state and attempted to preserve the status quo to the favor of its significant economic and political partners.<sup>25</sup>

Considered from this perspective, contemporary liberal scholarship offers valuable insights to understand intervention from a political economic perspective. This book argues that intervener states' security considerations and economic interests in the belligerents drive their decisions. It begins its analysis with important insights from the realist scholarship that dominated the study of wartime coalitions and alignment patterns. The book then provides an account of intervention that combines the realist paradigm with contemporary liberalism. Most and Starr write that involvement of outside actors in conflicts have generally been "explained by some . . . extra-societal phenomena." Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts points to this "liberal" deficit in the study of intervention that overemphasizes forces external to the intervening state and devalues interveners' internal dynamics.

Emphasis on external stimuli as agents of intervention downplays state preferences and domestic imperatives in decision making. Yet conflicts redistribute the risks and costs for domestic constituencies exposed to their adverse effects. Changes in its international environment may, therefore, affect a state's behavior indirectly through their impact on domestic preferences. We do not yet know much about these dynamics. Several important trends in foreign powers' behavior are still unexplored and present empirical puzzles that wait to be solved with systematic theorizing and empirical testing. In doing so, intervention literature needs to catch up with the progress achieved in contemporary liberalism and its reflection in security studies.

#### INTERVENERS MAKE A COMEBACK

The political economic model of intervention brings together separate literatures on civil wars, international conflicts, and conflict management with major theoretical debates in IR scholarship. The two components of this model are closely intertwined. First, international trade motivates a wide range of security policies. States create a security umbrella for trade through regional integration arrangements, defensive alliances, economic sanctions, and coercive diplomacy. At the intersection of economics and security, states also adopt intervention strategies to defend economic interests abroad against externalities of conflicts and to signal their commitment to the stability and territorial integrity of a significant economic partner. Policymaking in these cases involves private economic actors that carry cross-border economic transactions. These groups will attempt to influence policies that protect trade, financial links, and investments. This book develops this bottom-up view of political decision making as the second component of the intervention model. It identifies the circumstances under which national leaders are likely to protect interests of economic actors in belligerent economies and argues that political institutions play an important role in the conversion of economic interests into actual policy.

### Motivation

Empirical views in economic liberalism research have demonstrated a strong link between economic stakes and security policies. Scholars and practitioners alike have acknowledged that economic integration and shared democratic institutions reduce incentives to fight and help states maintain peace with each other. Economic integration through international trade has broader impacts on national security that go beyond the "do interdependent states fight?" question.27 Interdependent states form a network that shields trade not only

against conflicts within the community but also against external threats that might come from outsiders.<sup>28</sup> International trade energizes several security policies that aim at managing armed conflict because political stability and peace provide the essential infrastructure to maintain the efficient level of trade and to fulfill economic expectations.

Economic ties that bind states in a pacific manner may at times require foreign policy choices that involve coercive tools to protect them against possible disruptions. Conflicts between and within nations not only destabilize belligerents' economies but also affect external states that have economic stakes in these economies. There are several processes through which violence in the international system should affect important economic indicators for external states. <sup>29</sup> Most conflicts remain dormant for a long period of time or terminate before militarized hostilities escalate to destroy infrastructure and drain productive factors in belligerent economies. Yet economic externalities are usually not related to the intensity of fighting and resulting damage. Speculative behavior, loss of confidence in the foreign market, and increasing transportation and insurance costs or expectation of these externalities make it difficult for traders and investors to realize economic goals without incurring unusual risks and costs.

A cursory look at recent history reveals the magnitude of economic losses that conflicts cause, independent of the intensity with which belligerents confronted each other. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, oil prices almost doubled and led to a tight production market as a result of the Iraqi aggression against the oil fields in Kuwait. A few months later, after successful American air campaigns, prices fell back to their prewar levels. Fluctuation in markets and price instability affected not only the belligerents but also the economies of energy-dependent foreign powers, such as the U.S. and Western economies, which decided in favor of military intervention.

In addition, location of the conflict in an economically strategic region for an external state can lead to intervention independent of its direct interests in belligerent economies and/or the severity of fighting. U.S. interventions in a series of international and civil conflicts in which Yugoslavia was the aggressor were aimed at the protection of its political and economic interests in Europe. The U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Yemeni rebels (1962) and military intervention in the border skirmishes between Oman and Yemen (1982) also aimed to preserve the stability of the Persian Gulf and the interests of its key allies, including Saudi Arabia and European countries.

Conflicts, therefore, have broad economic consequences and affect external states with economic interests in belligerent nations or the conflict region. It follows from this argument that states can be expected to defend their economic interests abroad against the externalities of violence. This, however, is not the complete story. An important part of the puzzle is the traders and investors who carry cross-border exchange and directly benefit from economic transactions. These private economic actors are exposed to the costs and risks of changing circumstances in foreign markets. Accounting for their possible influence in foreign policymaking suggests that economic integration between states is indeed a source of constraint on state behavior in foreign policymaking.

#### Constraint

Political leaders answer to domestic constituencies and satisfy groups that support their incumbency with public and private goods. The link between domestic politics and foreign policy has strong theoretical tenets. Second-image-reversed arguments have modeled international factors in states' decisions through their impact on domestic politics.31 Similarly, democratic peace arguments voiced by both scholars and top decision makers in the United States illustrate that people from a variety of backgrounds see domestic politics as a central issue in foreign policy.32 The state-society dimension of policymaking is particularly relevant for economic liberalism research. International trade is, most of the time, a private activity and involves certain segments of the society, which requires the study of trade's political consequences through domestic processes.

The constraint perspective points to the domestic dimension of international trade. Opening up the black box of state challenges the implicit assumption in economic peace research that states are the primary actors in economic exchange. States do not directly benefit from trade; similarly, they are not directly exposed to the risks and costs of political instability in foreign markets. When gains from trade are high, trade creates societal groups with a vested interest in the continued growth of trade relationships.

Changes in the international economic environment redistribute the costs and benefits to economic actors. 33 Trade externalities of armed conflicts have a direct effect on the welfare of these groups, while external states are indirectly affected through domestic political pressures. With the outbreak of conflicts in profitable markets, individuals, firms, and privately organized groups that carry the exchange would register their grievances with policymakers for policies that protect the efficient level of trade and ameliorate the consequences of armed conflicts. Investors' political risk insurance claims to the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC) illustrate the obstacles that they face in foreign markets as a result of domestic and international conflicts. <sup>34</sup> OPIC, established by the U.S. government in 1971 to manage risks in new and developing markets, has paid forty-six political violence claims and \$32 million in compensation of these claims since its inception. The majority of these claims relate to insurgent violence such as the Philippine Geothermal, Inc., versus the Philippine government in 1987 and the Haitian Tropical Management, S.A., versus Haiti in 1991. There are also claims related to international violence such as F. C. Shaffer & Associates versus Eritrea in 1998. <sup>35</sup>

Security policies that aim at defending economic interests abroad inevitably involve domestic constituencies that are agents and beneficiaries of significant trade relationships. Economic interest groups may ask for security policies that defend their position in foreign markets in which armed conflicts break out. Such incentives can be read in the foreign policy announcement by business representatives:

What is most important is that the United States employ its influence to sustain responsible, orderly governments and to oppose the expansion of revolutionary regimes. Southern Africa is the mineral treasure house of the Continent. It is very much in the national interest of the United States to maintain access to the gold, uranium, coal, chrome, copper, platinum and other strategic materials in the subcontinent. Access will be denied if Marxist regimes extend their sway . . . the United States has a special interest in the Cape of Good Hope. . . . It is essential that the [tanker] traffic not be interrupted or threatened by the growing Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean . . . A common sense solution for the United States [to protect its security interests in the Indian Ocean] would be to seek permission from South Africa to establish a missile-handling facility at the Simonstown naval base near the Cape. <sup>36</sup>

The distribution of trade benefits within a society and beneficiary groups are central elements of a liberal approach to state behavior. A bottom-up view of foreign policymaking, where political leaders respond to economic imperatives, requires more than simply acknowledging the role of domestic constituencies in economic interdependence. It is perhaps more important to understand the factors that transmit domestic demands to policymakers and shape the latter's responsiveness.

The political power of domestic constituencies with trade interests in foreign markets hinges on the institutional features of the political environment in which they operate and put demands on the political system. Disruption of trade conducted by private actors should have a small effect on the political survival of elected officials unless traders and investors convert their economic power into political power. Though policymakers have domestically oriented concerns, they do not simply respond or succumb to external pressures. They have little interest in what happens in foreign markets unless changes in the international economic environment are likely to have domestic percussions such as losing the support of a key constituency.

If political institutions occupy a central place in states' relation to their societies, then how do they transmit domestic demands to policymakers? What is their role in redistributing power in a society? In which institutional environments would states be more responsive to the protection demands of economic agents? Milner writes, "Certain institutions privilege particular actors, and hence policy choices reflect their preferences more."38 Interactive effects of international trade and political institutions are rarely accounted for in security studies. This book provides a theoretical and empirical assessment of political systems in terms of their responsiveness to economic agents' demands for protection in foreign markets. It particularly investigates which political systems may have a representational bias toward economic actors and are susceptible to producing security policies for their protection through usurpation of public funds. In doing so, the theoretical framework disaggregates political systems on the democracy-autocracy distinction and relies on the most recent developments in comparative politics to develop this framework.39 Power between key decision makers is distributed quite differently in democratic and autocratic regimes. I particularly highlight that democratic states face a crowded bargaining table with intersectional and competing interests. The gridlock engendered by political institutions undercuts the power of political actors in catering to private economic actors and other specialized interests with private goods. Because democracies would be reluctant to produce security policies that benefit the few, democratic institutions put a break on intervention aimed at protecting economic agents abroad.

## OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts illustrates the sophistication and rigor of economic liberalism in explaining real-life outcomes. The book advances a causal framework that explicitly addresses the domestic dimension of economic interests and the institutional environment in which privately organized groups, individuals, and firms that carry out trade interact with their government. It applies this framework to understand the causes behind intervention in international and civil conflicts and formulates and tests hypotheses around these predictions. In proposing a theory of intervention, it provides scholars, students, and other interested readers of IR the tools to compare and combine various approaches to intervention.

Chapter 2, "Bringing Foreign Powers Back In," presents a conceptual assessment of intervention. Conceptual ambiguities have inhibited a straightforward application of existing theories to understand intervention. The term intervention has been adopted to refer to a diverse set of cases, including interventions in civil wars, military coups, and other overt or covert operations that target another country's government by force. This chapter engages in a classification effort that discusses intervention in a wide variety of international settings and across forms of political violence in the international system. It clarifies the concept of intervention as states' military and nonmilitary response to conflicts between and within other nations. Reactive interventions, undertaken as a response to ongoing conflicts, represent the conventional approach in the literature. Chapter 2 goes beyond this framework. In the second section, it discusses interventions in the preconflict and postconflict stages and combines literatures on preventive interventions and postconflict reconstruction. In the following sections, the chapter examines a critical element of intervention: interveners. International law heavily emphasizes collective action in reacting to conflicts and considers unilateral actions as illegitimate. Yet intervener types, even when external actors react collectively, show a substantial variation. States, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) undertake unilateral efforts in conflicts. They can also act in concert and form coalitions outside an organizational framework. The "Coalitional Intervention" section examines various forms of coalitions and attempts to identify the possibilities for coordination in ad hoc coalitions formed among external states.

Chapter 3, "Defending Economic Interests Abroad," develops a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the liberal dynamics of intervention and brings a theoretically coherent and empirically testable approach to the link between economics and security policies. The chapter theoretically assesses the role of force in liberal IR theory in general and its economic liberalism variant in particular. Scholarly work limits the theoretical power of economic liberalism to the "does trade inhibit war?" question.

Instead, liberalism is a positive theory that can explain a wide range of security policies, including forceful and peaceful ones. Drawing on Andrew Moravscik's reformulation of the liberal IR theory, this chapter's framework approaches liberalism as a paradigmatic alternative to the realist scholarship. Instead of compartmentalizing types of state behavior that can be explained with specific paradigms, it identifies the causal mechanisms that differentiate liberalism from its competitors.

Liberalism's explanatory power lies specifically in providing insights into the domestic sources of state preferences and the derivation of domestic constituents' demands from the exigencies of the international context. Crossborder economic exchange is undertaken by private economic groups, and states have little direct interest in the security of international trade. This approach requires emphasizing private preferences in the formation of state preferences and their translation into policy through representative institutions. Chapter 3 builds on this liberal framework to explain intervention behavior around the core relationship of economic interests and their reflection in foreign policy through domestic political processes.

Based on the theoretical assessment in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 6 evaluate hypotheses about external states' choice of sides and strategy in international conflicts and civil wars. Adopting quantitative data, these chapters expand on the empirical work in economic liberalism by changing the outcome of interest from conflict onset to intervention. The chapters redefine the explanatory variables in this body of work to account for the interests and expectations of traders and investors. The form and magnitude of international trade is central to measure domestically oriented economic interests in foreign markets. Chapters 4 and 6 examine trade and foreign direct investment to account for the current stream of benefits and preferential trade agreements to account for the future expectations of economic agents in intervention decisions. Empirical findings show that, even after controlling for plausible alternative political factors, external states intervene to protect economic stakes of their nationals against the repercussions of armed conflicts. To do so, they prefer military forms of statecraft in international conflicts and diplomacy in civil wars.

To explain how economic agents' demands are filtered and translated into foreign policy, I examine economic interests in belligerent economies in conjunction with the representative institutions of intervening states in Chapter 4. The empirical framework elaborates on the responsiveness of policymakers to private economic groups in democracy and autocracy subtypes, including presidential and parliamentary democracies and autocracies with personal rule. Macrolevel results show that the most significant variation in policy-makers' incentives to protect international trade with intervention can be observed on the basis of the democracy-autocracy distinction. Highly complicated relations among political, economic, and military actors in autocratic regimes may not allow for a clean causal mechanism that links intervention and pressures from economic agents in these cases. On the other hand, the diversity and volume of societal demands in democracies increase the burden on the system to the point at which a public goods provision is the only attractive option for rulers and therefore reduce their responsiveness to the protection demands of private economic groups. While political institutions seem to play into states' decisions to pursue economic interests of their nationals in international conflicts, trade has the same effect on the probability of intervention in civil wars for democracies and nondemocracies.

Qualitative evidence in Chapters 5 and 6 evaluates the relative importance of security considerations and economic interests in intervention decisions. It draws attention to the similarities in U.S. interventions observed by prominent scholars such as Kurth, Lowenthal, Gilpin, and Krasner in other international contexts. It also suggests previously unnoticed patterns and unveils the linkages between U.S. interventions in different historical epochs. Most importantly, it shows that neither the liberal nor the realist framework alone can explain intervention decisions: Instead, a subtle combination of economic and security imperatives has driven U.S. decision making. Chapter 6 examines a contemporary case, that of Ethiopia and Somalia, to illustrate the dual role that the United States has played in international conflicts and civil wars that are linked through transnational rebellion. On the other hand, Chapter 5 presents the first systematic account of U.S. interventions in the international conflicts that took place in less-developed areas such as Latin America, North Africa, and the Middle East.

A historical account of U.S. intervention in international and civil conflicts delineates that, throughout the twentieth century, the United States acted to resist foreign interference and strengthen regional allies against outside subversion even when allies had no political or economic significance other than being a buffer zone against dissident regimes. In these intervention decisions, long-term interests in belligerents and their region rather than short-term hegemonic calculations and economic determinism guided American policymakers. Few scholars would deny that there was a strong economic

undercurrent to the U.S. security policies in less-developed areas, which this chapter also emphasizes. However, historical evidence suggests that there is no compelling portrait of policymakers being driven by the protection demands of investors and traders. Washington frequently allowed economic actors to register their grievances and concerns about the political situation in a foreign market, but, in the end, U.S. policy was based on a careful calculation of long-term strategic interests that accounted for regional and international dynamics. Broad economic objectives mostly related to the stability and security of a region, and safe access to land and sea routes for economic activity played into these decisions. In doing so, U.S. actions indirectly benefited economic agents and created a public good for the security and continuity of international trade.

Chapter 7, "Conclusion," draws the analysis together by presenting the hypotheses and findings in previous chapters. It discusses the conditions under which states intervene, militarily or nonmilitarily, in foreign conflicts within or between nations. In doing so, this chapter particularly suggests that applying the liberal paradigm to a complex phenomenon like intervention, which has been exclusively approached through the lenses of realist, normative, and legal thought, can contribute to a deeper understanding of armed violence and its management in the international system.