Introduction
Intellectual and Sociopolitical Background

The period of the 1830s–1840s was crucially important for national projects in Eastern Europe. This was a time when Romantic nationalism shaped the most persistent questions about national cohesion as well as about the relations of "imagined communities" to each other, especially in the region where ethnocultural identities were so intermixed. At that time, Romantic ideas penetrated the public debates in Eastern Europe and came to play a crucial role in how Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians began to see themselves and one another.

Romantic ideas of nationality came to Eastern Europe mostly from Germany, where philosophers associated community with the language its members spoke. In other words, German intellectuals began to *imagine* their nationality through the medium of language. These communities had their limits wherever the use of their respective vernaculars ended.[1] This vision took shape towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the thesis about language as the main marker of national community was elaborated. A (national) language came to manifest (national) identity. Since Germany at the time was not a united country with one dominant center of power, it was the German vernacular that took on the function of the main expression of German political and cultural identity. Such terms as *Sprachgeist* or *Genie der Sprache* (genius of the language) became increasingly connected with *Volksgeist* or *Nationalgeist* (genius of the nation), and the fate of a *Volk* (nationality) began to be bounded with that of *Sprache* (language).[2] Language was believed to reflect "the particular mindset [*individuellen Ansicht*] of the speaking nation."[3]

For example, already in the late seventeenth century Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz identified German-speakers with the German national community, despite all the political, religious, and ideological differences that divided Germany.[4] One of the founders of linguistic philosophy, Johann Gottfried Herder, wrote during the late eighteenth century that "(only one) who was brought up in this language, who put his heart in it, who learnt how to express his soul in it, belongs to the nation of this language. [. . .] By means of this language the nation is educated and formed."[5] For Herder, a vernacular-based nationality was as natural as a plant or family,[6] which led him to the conception of "the natural state" as "one nation with one national character."[7]

German thinkers of the Romantic epoch further refined the idea of a language-based national community. Wilhelm von Humboldt sought to define the *national* character of language or *Genie der Sprache*. For him language was "the natural consequence of the permanent influence of the nation's spiritual peculiarity [*geistigen Eigenthümlichkeit der Nation*]."[8] One could think about the spirit of the German or Chinese languages as the unity of mental, linguistic, cultural, and political elements. August Wilhelm Schlegel held that language reflected the historical character of a nationality since speech developed along with the nationality and accumulated the historical experiences of the language community.[9] Johann Gottlieb Fichte created a more exclusive program of German linguistic nationalism. He argued strongly against foreign borrowings in German (in particular from French) because language defined a community of speakers who "speak the same language, think and feel alike," which differentiated them from other nationalities.[10] According to Fichte, a separate language meant a separate nationality that had rights to political self-determination.[11] The German Romantic association between the vernacular, ethnic culture, and community defined for generations the vision of an (exclusive) nationality and citizenship in Germany.[12]

By the 1830s, the German model of Romantic nationalism had spread throughout Eastern Europe, appealing both to stateless ("nonhistorical") peoples and to social conservatives who sought to protect their respective national communities against modernization. Since Romantic nationalism overtly contradicted dynastic power, imperial governments in Habsburg Austria and tsarist Russia largely abstained from embracing nationalist policies, although they sometimes tolerated nationalist rhetoric, as the Russian case showed. Influenced by Friedrich Schlegel's Romantic philoso-

phy of history, the tsarist minister of education Sergei Uvarov sought to combine Romantic nationalism with dynasticism, although in the end he predictably failed to transform the Russian Empire into a dynastic nation-state. Earlier in the century, Schlegel himself had sought to link nationalism to dynasty in Habsburg Austria but suffered an even stronger rejection in the epoch of Metternich's dynastic legitimism.

Russian and Polish radical democrats were not so much influenced by Romantic nationalism as by Hegel's rationalism and by French social theories that treated nationality not as an organic community but rather as the product of a social contract open to constant reform. For them linguistic and cultural unification was an appeal not to some kind of mystical nation's soul but rather to the principles of rational bureaucratic administration patterned on post-Napoleonic France or Prussian *Rechtsstaat*. In addition, Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian literati within the Russian Empire had to follow the norms of imperial "political correctness," according to which any form of nationalism (including Great Russian) had to be subordinate to dynastic loyalty. In this respect, Polish intellectuals who lived in Prussia or Austria or as émigrés in Western Europe had much more freedom to choose ideological influences and express their "national" views.

In the late eighteenth century the Russian Empire became a truly multinational state that came to encompass the three major Slavic nationalities—Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles. Those nationalities, however, were quite different from what they are now. One could hardly consider "Russians," "Poles," and "Ukrainians" of the turn of the nineteenth century the modern nationalities imagined "as both inherently limited and sovereign" communities. Yet even premodern identities and local nobilities posed a problem for Russia's imperial government. Catherine II set out to eliminate administrative differences all over European Russia, and her first major victim was the Hetmanate, the autonomous state of Ukrainian Cossacks on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnieper. Having abolished the office of hetman in 1764, and then the internal administrative structure based on the Cossack corps in the 1780s, by the turn of the nineteenth century the imperial authorities managed to integrate completely the lands of the Hetmanate—now reduced to two imperial provinces, Chernihiv and Poltava—into the Russian Empire.[13] Around the same time, following the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Russia acquired huge lands to the west of the Dnieper. Those lands (except for the Polish Kingdom on the banks of the Vistula River) were populated primarily by the Orthodox

and Uniate Ukrainians and Belarusians, Catholic Poles, and Jews. Within the territory of present-day Ukraine, former Polish lands, once called the "South-Eastern borderlands" (*Południowo-wschodnie kresy*) of the commonwealth, were now officially referred to as the "South-Western region" (*Iugo-Zapadnyi krai*) of Russia.

To its Polish citizens the imperial government applied different policies, which varied from the virtual cultural autonomy for Poles during the reign of Alexander I to the harsh repressive measures in the aftermath of the Polish November uprising of 1830–31.[14] In the 1830s–1840s, Russia's Poles, while retaining social dominance in parts of present-day Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus, had lost much of their cultural privileges, including Wilno (Vilnius) University and Krzemieniec (Kremenets') Lyceum. The founding of Kyiv University in 1834 became the symbol of Russian imperial reaction.[15] The Poles living in Austria (Galicia) and especially in Prussia (Poznania) after 1840 fared much better as a community, enjoying certain cultural freedoms, which anticipated the Spring of Nations. Unlike Prussia under the liberal king Frederick William IV (reign 1840–57), Russia under Nicholas I (reign 1825–55) became an increasingly despotic state in the 1840s. The persecution of the Ukrainian Slavophile Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in 1847 symbolized the growing suspicion on the part of Russian authorities of an independent thought and of any kind of nationalism altogether.

Relations between the Russian government and the nascent Great Russian nationalism were quite complex. As already emphasized, such dynastic powers as Austria and Russia largely rejected nationalism, which they saw as incompatible with the traditional imperial order. Nicholas's policies were based on social estates rather than on particular ethnicities. To a large extent, the Russian government was "color-blind" when it came to the ethnic origins of its servants.[16] The cultural policies of tsarist minister of education Sergei Uvarov (1833–49) seemed to emphasize Russian nationalism, but his primary goal was to strengthen the positions of Russian autocracy.[17] Orthodoxy was indeed a pillar of Russian imperial order, but so were other religions—Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Islam, and Buddhism—which as official institutions, had to preach obedience to the authorities. Although government sought to promote Orthodoxy whenever possible, by the 1850s it had become clear that other established religions, such as Islam in the Lower Volga region, or Lutheranism in the Baltic, could perfectly serve imperial goals by simply emphasizing autocracy and political loyalty.[18]

The imperial policies towards particular regions and ethnic groups were, however, varied, resulting partly from specific patterns of imperial expansion and partly from ethnohistorical visions of a ruling dynasty. In the region of Russian-Polish-Ukrainian encounter, the imperial government was the most active player. The government treated Orthodox Ukrainians ("Little Russians"), who originated from the medieval Kyivan Rus', differently from the Poles, who became imperial subjects only at the end of the eighteenth century. By the 1830s most of present-day Ukraine had become an integral part of the empire, and Ukraine's Orthodox population was allowed to join the ruling "Russian" community—later known as the "all-Russian nation." The very terms *Ukraine* or *Little Russia* were lacking any official meaning, referring informally to certain parts of present-day Ukraine.

The predominantly Catholic Poles resided in Prussia, Austria, and Russia where in the latter they formed a semiautonomous Polish Kingdom (or Congress Kingdom), populating also large areas of present-day Lithuania, Belarus, and Right Bank Ukraine (that is, lands west of the Dnieper). In the aftermath of the November uprising, the Russian government sought to curb social and cultural influences of Catholic Poles by actively backing the interests of "Russian citizens" in southwestern and northwestern regions of the empire. Needless to say, in Right Bank Ukraine these "Russian citizens" consisted mostly of Ukrainian peasants, Orthodox clergy, and a few non-Polonized nobles.[19]

The 1830s–1840s also saw the rise of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe. This new social stratum, which originated mostly from local nobilities and Orthodox clergy (in Russian and Ukrainian cases), had by the midnineteenth century formed a kind of intellectual class that very soon developed a strong social and national consciousness.[20] This group consisted largely of social deviants, although the nobility was the single biggest source of its formation in Russia, Poland, and Ukraine.

While the Russian intelligentsia as a whole included people of different ethnic and social backgrounds, its core consisted of Orthodox Russians (and a significant number of Ukrainians) of mostly noble and clerical origins.[21] The group is believed to have originated in the late eighteenth-century nobility but was open to talents from other social estates.[22] With the opening of new universities in the first decade of the nineteenth century, a large number of graduates of clerical background joined Russia's newest stratum. During the 1830s–1840s the intellectual and social identity of the Russian intelligentsia was shaped considerably by the influence of

Hegel and by discussions between Slavophiles and Westernizers.[23] At the same time, several voices belonging to the previous generation of Decembrists (mainly those of Mikhail Lunin and Petr Viazemskii) were still influential, even if outside printed communication. The 1830s–1840s also saw a growing discord between the intelligentsia and the government in Russia, resulting in the rejection of government-sponsored doctrines by Russian literati and the subsequent marginalization of the most conservative thinkers, such as Stepan Shevyrev and Mikhail Pogodin.[24] Effectively, conservative thought in Russia was associated increasingly with bureaucrats, while *intelligentsia* per se became synonymous with liberal and populist ideas.

The Polish intellectual class at that time was better structured and institutionalized than the Russian and many other East and Central European intelligentsias.[25] In addition to intellectual life within the boundaries of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poles enjoyed a diverse public sphere in Western Europe—primarily in France, Belgium, and Britain—where they settled following their failed uprising in 1830–31. Unlike intense but censured Polish public life in Russia, and to a lesser degree in Austria and Prussia, the intellectual and political activities of Polish émigrés flourished both ideologically and institutionally.[26] It is in the West where emerged the most radical sociopolitical ideas both on the left and on the right of the Great Emigration. Not surprisingly, the Polish literati (such as Henryk Rzewuski or Michał Grabowski) residing in the Russian Empire, particularly in Right Bank Ukraine, exposed the most conservative and progovernmental views. Even in Russia, however, Poles maintained a separate public sphere, managing to publish a Polish-language newspaper (*Tygodnik Petersburski*) in Russia's capital. In social background, the contemporary Polish intelligentsia belonged overwhelmingly to the gentry, although émigrés, even from the "aristocratic" Adam Czartoryski camp, either promoted social solidarism or dismissed nobility as a class altogether.

Noble origins characterized also the members of one of the most populist-oriented nationalist discourses—the Ukrainian. According to my own estimates, in the 1830s–1840s almost all leading members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, conscious of national and cultural issues (with the prominent exception of poet Taras Shevchenko), belonged to upper social estates—those of the gentry and, in some cases, the aristocracy. Most natives of Ukraine who were engaged in Ukrainian intellectual or political discourses were at the same time members of the Russian imperial nobility and felt at home in the all-Russian public sphere. That was especially true about

Ukrainian academics such as Mykhailo Maksymovych, Osyp Bodians'kyi, or later Mykola Kostomarov, all of whom held chairs in different imperial universities. Despite their high social standing and access to the imperial public sphere—literary journals, publishing houses, and university chairs— a proper Ukrainian public sphere remained underdeveloped in terms of institutions and ideology. First, in the 1830s–1840s there was not a single Ukrainian-language periodical (with the exception of short-lived literary almanacs which were in fact bilingual Russian-Ukrainian). Second, few natives of Ukraine could associate themselves exclusively with a local—Ukrainian—public sphere without simultaneously placing themselves within Russian cultural or scholarly life. As a result, Ukrainian discourse was badly structured; that is, it lacked clear ideological stances and differences.

During the 1830s–1840s all three sides—Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians—produced the variety of "cultural" and "political" idioms of nationality. The analysis of those idioms is the main focus of my study. A comparative approach is essential, since these groups came to define themselves as a result of their mutual interactions within the Russian Empire (Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles)—my primary focus—and the Austrian Empire (Poles and Ukrainians). Austria's Galicia, the long-contested zone of East Slavic–Polish interactions, is dealt with only to the degree that it is included within the broader "Ideal Fatherlands" of Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians.

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In this study, I explore the representation of "imagined communities" on two levels:

1. *Geography*, that is, how the shifting borders of these communities were reflected on mental maps (as reflected in literary fiction, literary criticism, political journalism, and philosophy)

2. *Idioms of nationality*, or *rhetoric of nationality*,[27] that is, an analysis of (mostly) political and ideological texts, which contain speculations about the basis of national cohesion: a common language, history, religion, political institutions and loyalty, and so on. "Size," that is, the inclusivity and exclusivity of newly imagined communities, is also considered.

The book begins by identifying the geographical space where imagined communities were mapped. Part I (Chapters 1–3) deals with the territorial extension of imagined communities. The fluctuating boundaries of Poland,

Russia, and Ukraine are shown through the prism of all three counterparts. Significantly, the terms *Ukraine*, *Russia*, and *Poland* used throughout the text belong not to the nineteenth-century geopolitical order but rather to the present-day division of political space. When used in the past, these terms (and in the Ukrainian case also *Little Russia* and *South Russia*) referred not only to established geographical realities but also to categories of mental or philosophical geography. These categories were constantly being defined and redefined in the minds of the East European intelligentsia in both spatial (quasi-geographical) and "national" terms. In the process, the very names were being contested and negotiated. Even *Russia*, which could be found on actual maps as a political entity, was an ambiguous category, as it embodied the confusion between (visible) empire and (hidden) nationality (ethnic Great Russia per se). Most important here are the dynamics of the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian encounter as reflected in mental geography.

With regard to midnineteenth-century geography, the primary focus of Polish-Ukrainian-Russian interaction was the "South-Western region" of the Russian Empire. This region, also known as Right Bank Ukraine, comprised the imperial provinces of Kyiv, Podolia, and Volhynia. At that time Poles considered those provinces to be the "South-Eastern borderlands" of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. If the Right Bank was a focal point for the Polish-Russian-Ukrainian encounter, the rest of present-day Ukraine (Left Bank Ukraine, Sloboda Ukraine, and New Russia) was of primary importance for the Ukrainian-Russian encounter. To be sure, the spatial dimension of all three communities greatly exceeded the above territories; therefore, other contested "national" regions (such as Galicia) are also taken into account.

I connect each imagined category to a particular set of issues. For Poles it was the quest to regain symbolic and political control over lost territories, in particular the "South-Eastern borderlands," in order to return them to the framework of the "historical" and "natural" borders of Poland. By the same token, Poles understood the category "Russia" as an artificial entity without a dominant nationality. Among Polish authors, I included either those who came from the "South-Eastern borderlands" (Józef Ignacy Kraszewski and Michał Grabowski) or those who ascribed a prominent role to that region in their vision of Poland and Russia (for example, Maurycy Mochnacki and Joachim Lelewel).

The selection of Russian authors for Part I was determined by their Great Russian ethnic background, their attention to Russia's western bor-

derlands (such as the space of Russo-Polish-Ukrainian encounter), and no less importantly their Great Russian ideological position within "national" debates. Their main concern was the "national-imperial complex," that is, the challenge of how to reduce the gap between nationality and empire in Russia. Among their responses to that challenge was the confusion of spatial frontiers between imperial and national identities,[28] and the construction of a dominant nationality consisting of all Orthodox East Slavs of the empire. It was often impossible to show on real or on mental maps the point where the exclusive Russian national identity ended and a more inclusive imperial identity began. The concept of "Russia" might include the entire empire, or only territories populated by Orthodox East Slavs, or only Great Russia.

The Ukrainian case is presented as a search for a "national" territory, including its very name. The "Ukrainian" vision was that of East Slavic Orthodox observers who came from the lands of present-day Ukraine, and is irrespective of their ideological stance or identity. The most patriotic among them (whether of traditional Little Russian or more modern Ukrainian convictions) claimed the same territories that Poles and Russians assumed were part of their own mental geographies. Not only did Ukrainians have to justify the territorial unity of their "ideal Fatherland"; they also had to find a name for their country, which was situated in a space where historic Poland and the "all-Russian nation" intersected.[29]

After considering in Part I the patterns of mental geographies, where imagined communities were represented as *territorial* communities, in Part II (Chapters 4–6) I address how imagined communities were represented as *national* communities; how inclusive and exclusive they were; and most importantly, which idioms were used to represent them. These chapters thus deal with the structure of idioms used to delimit the "national" content of the imagined communities. This is not to say that all imagined communities were *national* in the contemporary sense. To the contrary, the idioms of nationality were coexisting and competing with more traditional ideas about collective bonds, such as loyalty to the ruler, dynasty, or religion, which often referred to prenational societies but could also be appropriated by the "builders" of nationalities.

First, I consider the general view of selected East European writers on nationality—its definition and idioms. What was the place of language, religion, history, political loyalties and institutions, and ethnography in those idioms? The basis for national (or supranational, that is, imperial) cohesion is analyzed for all three cases. Second, I look at the specific con-

texts in which idioms of nationality were applied: Russian and Ukrainian for Polish authors, Ukrainian and Polish for Russian authors, and Russian and Polish for Ukrainian authors. The treatment of neighbors (or even the rejection or ignorance of their existence) helps us analyze the changing self-representations of national communities under the influence of "others." Finally, the inclusiveness or "size" of imagined communities is considered in each particular case. For example, on a general level, the dominant idiom of Russianness could be Orthodoxy, the respective Russian nationality encompassing all the Orthodox (and mostly East Slavic) inhabitants of the empire. Orthodoxy as an idiom of Russianness could be used to underscore the differences between (Orthodox) Russians and (Catholic) Poles. This configuration of imagined community could be called the "all-Russian nation." Proponents of this national configuration could modify both the idiom and the "size" of nationality if they "noticed" the existence of Ukrainians. In this case, Orthodoxy could not be the idiom of Russianness since Ukrainians were also Orthodox, and therefore other idioms had to be emphasized such as language and ethnography. The size of "Russians" thus fluctuated, depending on who was included in that category—the entire "all-Russian nation" or the ethnic (Great) Russians only. As another example, some Polish democrats could emphasize political culture or history as idioms of Polishness in general, but could reluctantly point to Roman Catholicism as a pillar of Polishness to show their difference from "schismatic Russians." Poles, however, largely rejected religion as an idiom in order to avoid "domestic" strife, mostly between the Catholic ethnic Poles and the Orthodox Ruthenians, who were considered to be part of a common "Polish nation." A similar pattern worked in all three "national" cases.

The "nation-centered idioms," or idioms of nationality, are analyzed in different ideological "circles," roughly split into three conventional groups: (1) conservative, loyalist, or progovernmental; (2) liberal, centrist, or democrat; and (3) radical or leftist. The structure of circles for each of three cases roughly reflects the field of political imagination where idioms of nationality were utilized.

Idioms of nation-ness are divided into several main categories shown in Table 2, while Table 3 indicates major participants of the ideological fields in each national case. For example, in their efforts to map the new virtual Poland, Polish intellectuals adopted the discourse of historical legacy and were therefore reluctant to use ethnocultural and linguistic

arguments.[30] For their part, Russians often used pseudohistorical and legitimist arguments. There is an ongoing discussion about what constituted the basis of Russian national identity in different times. Was it the Orthodox religion (as argued by the Slavophiles),[31] the Russian language (for the enlightened bureaucrats),[32] or political loyalty to autocracy (for figures like Konstantin Leontiev and Mikhail Katkov)?[33] In their efforts to exclude the "other," Russians espoused religion as an idiom of nationality when dealing with Poles, while emphasizing language and ethnography

TABLE 2   Types of nation-centered idioms

| | | | Types of Idioms | | |
ethnolinguistic	mental or spiritual	ethnic or natural	institutional or political	religious	social
ethnography (clothing, customs, mores), folklore language/ dialect, literature, (folk) history	"spirit"/ "idea" of nationality, "national character," "substance," "love for the fatherland," common goals	ethnic origins, "race," "tribe," geography (land, territory), climate	loyalty to the ruler or autocracy, state, democracy, citizenship/ place of birth (jus soli), political culture/values, (state) history	Orthodoxy, Catholicism	nobility, commoners/ peasants

TABLE 3   Major participants of the ideological "fields"

cases	conservatives, loyalists, progovernmentalists	liberals, centrists, democrats	radicals, leftists
Polish	Adam Czartoryski's émigré circle; Russian loyalists (Michał Grabowski, Henryk Rzewuski, et al.)	Polish Democratic Society; Joachim Lelewel's groups; General Dwernicki's groups; unaffiliated émigrés	Communes of the Polish People; Henryk Kamieński; Edward Dembowski
Russian	"official nationality" circle (Sergei Uvarov, Stepan Shevyrev, Mikhail Pogodin); "dynastic conservatives" (Count Benckendorff, Stepan Burachek, Fadei Bulgarin)	Slavophiles (Ivan Kireevskii, Aleksei Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov); Nikolai Polevoi; Nikolai Nadezhdin	the Decembrists (Pavel Pestel', Nikita Muraviev, Mikhail Lunin); young Petr Viazemskii; Vissarion Belinskii; Valerian Maikov; Mikhail Bakunin
Ukrainian	"Little Russian patriots" (Stepan Burachek, Nikolai Gogol, Iurii Venelin); "all-Russian patriots"	"academic" circle (Mykhailo Maksymovych, Osyp Bodians'kyi, Amvrosii Metlyns'kyi)	Sts. Cyril and Methodius circle (Panteleimon Kulish, Mykola Kostomarov, Taras Shevchenko, et al.)

when addressing the Ukrainians. When, however, Russians ignored the existence of a distinct Ukrainian community or emphasized the idea of an all-Russian identity, they again used Orthodoxy as a dominant idiom of nationality. Depending on time and space, the limits of Russian imperial and national identities were changing. The exclusivity and inclusivity of any imagined community—that is, the place of "others" in it and the simple rejection or recognition of ethnonational differences—were modified by dominant idioms of Polishness, Russianness, and Ukrainianness used in every particular case. On the other hand, the presence of the "other" could itself influence the choice of those idioms and therefore could modify the spatial-national configuration of an imagined community.

This book traces the dynamics of "idiomatic" exchange between intellectuals who claimed to represent and speak on behalf of Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians. I show the interrelationship between the idioms of nationality and the presence of the "other," whether as a minority within a given community or as a neighboring community that often influenced national self-representations. For the Poles, Ukrainians could be an internal "other," while Russians were the neighboring nationality that often defined Polish self-representation (on the basis of Catholicism or democratic civic values versus Orthodoxy and autocratic Russia). There was also a struggle for the representation and naming of an imagined community, both among different ideological circles within the community and between the representatives of different nationalities. Put another way, different visions of nation-ness competed with each other within and beyond "national" boundaries. Thus, the Polish Democratic Society, in its struggle to represent Polishness, felt obliged to reject a Russian imperial vision as well as to impose its own "democratic" version of Polishness on all other Polish groups. An imagined community therefore could be represented either as a distinct nationality or as part of a larger community (the "all-Russian nation" or the historic "Polish nation").

Sometimes representatives of one nationality claimed only a part (social or regional) of another. For example, Poles considered Orthodox "Ruthenian" peasants from Right Bank Ukraine as part of the Polish nationality, while some Ukrainian literati regarded "Polonized" Catholic nobles from the same region as potentially part of the Ukrainian nationality. To be sure, many Russians (among them the radical Pestel' and the conservative Uvarov) considered both Little Russian peasants and Polish nobles residing in the "South-Western region" to be part of the "all-Russian na-

tion" (true, the nobles had yet to undergo some cultural Russification, but their peasants were already "Russian" enough). For most Russians and Ukrainians, however, the Orthodox religion defined the boundaries of their respective nationalities, so that Catholic Poles could not easily be considered part of their communities. By contrast, Poles generally welcomed all faiths within their inclusive nationality (although in this equation, Jews posed a special problem).

While analyzing "nation-centered idioms," I also consider each "national" case in connection with certain specific issues (similar to the level of mental geography). In general, the "national" content of imagined communities was closely related to their geographical expression. The Polish challenge (dealt with in Chapter 4) consisted of an effort at reimagining Poland as a modern nationality within historical borders. The combination of historical legitimism (legal arguments) with Romantic nationalism (ethnolinguistic arguments) led to a painful disillusionment. The Poles, who were forced to exist as a "community of tradition and spirit" beyond existing political borders,[34] could not find an adequate "body" big enough to encompass an imagined community of "twenty million." In the case of Russia (Chapter 5), particular attention is given to the "national-imperial complex"[35] in order to show how Russians grappled with imperial and national loyalties. The functions of the "all-Russian nation" are also studied. It was Ukraine (with brotherly Russian help, to be sure) that effectively deprived the Polish "spirit" of half its prospective twenty-million "body." Represented as a Herderian nationality (ethnolinguistic arguments) in search of its social and symbolic space, Ukraine was instrumental in the "unmaking" of the Polish nationality (Chapter 6). Consequently, the unity of the "all-Russian nation" itself was put in danger, something that Russians noticed already by 1847.

Because of the institutional limits of political imagination, the three "national" cases are not entirely compatible. In contrast to Poles, with their émigré and Galician print shops, Ukrainians lacked a full-fledged public sphere. As a result, many important ideas could not be expressed, and their fields of political imagination were not clearly structured. The "incompleteness" of those fields corresponded to the "incompleteness" of the social structure of the Ukrainian/Little Russian community. Russians, too, could not boast of open public debates. They had only one prominent political émigré, Mikhail Bakunin, who could freely express his opinions. Others within Russia's borders could do so only in private papers, secret manifestos, or from exile in Siberia (like the Decembrist Mikhail Lunin).

The selection of personalities and texts for Part II presented the greatest difficulty, one that legitimately raised a question about the representative value of my research. The final selection was based on several principles. First, I chose authors who were the most representative of a certain intellectual trend, or whose views were strikingly original. Therefore, it was not so important which part of the "Ideal Fatherlands" the authors and texts came from, and so émigrés are widely quoted here. Second, the selected authors, in addition to being major national thinkers, had to be perceptive about the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian encounter; that is, they had to deal with the presence of the "other," whether they included it as a minority within their own national community or treated it as a neighboring nationality. In certain instances, however, people could not be easily squeezed into a particular national circle: such was the stance of Count Henryk Rzewuski, who doubted the persistence of the Polish nationality; or of some natives of Ukraine who rejected any distinctiveness of Ukrainians/Little Russians. In the latter case, a degree of arbitrariness could not be avoided, the decisive factor being a person's ethnic background. Such an approach represents the political imagination of the time as a realm of constant struggle, negotiation, and possible alternatives with regard to national and other identities.

The authors were grouped into several "fields of political imagination" that roughly corresponded to the three main ideological stances within each "national" case, that is, rightist or progovernmental, centrist or liberal, and leftist or radical. These fields or circles of thought were often intermingled within a particular national case, and were sometimes incompatible with their counterparts from other national cases (for example, the Polish Democratic Society in their mainstream documents could arguably be placed in the center of Polish ideological debates, although the society was even more radical than the far left of the Russian intelligentsia).

Despite its insufficiencies, such a classification does allow us to compare effectively all three national cases, even if only emphasizing their structural differences. At any rate, the analysis of individual worldviews was not as important as the examination of certain paradigms of thinking about nation-ness. It is these paradigms that were at work in the fields of political imagination and were also responsible for the formation of nationalities as imagined and institutional communities.