1 INTRODUCTION

THOUSANDS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS), most of them international in scope, have descended upon post-Taliban Afghanistan. The vast majority of these organizations are interested in improving human security, working to provide important health and development services, and promoting rights for repressed populations in the country. Despite their lofty goals, the people of Afghanistan are not impressed. According to a 2008 and 2009 survey by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 54 percent of people in Afghanistan think NGOs within Afghanistan are corrupt. Organizations of all sizes and creed have been accused of taking funds from the international community and not using that money to help the people of Afghanistan. Some organizations have been found guilty of their accused crimes. Many Afghans have run on political platforms concerning the ineffectiveness of the NGO sector. As the joke goes, the NGO community in Afghanistan is so bad that "first there was Communism, then there was Talibanism, and now there is NGOism" (Mojumdar 2006; see also Cohen, Kupcu, and Khanna 2008).

Similar attitudes exist in Haiti, where, in the few years since the devastating 2010 earthquake and hurricane, the small state has quickly lived up to its designation of the "republic of NGOs." Per capita, more non-governmental organizations, most of them international in scope and focus, are in Haiti than anywhere else in the world. Many of these organizations are extremely well funded, working to provide basic sanitation, education, and health services to help rebuild Haiti. However, resentment is high: graffiti in Port-au-Prince labels organizations "thieves," "liars," and "corrupt," listing organizations by name and then saying in Haitian Creole that "all [are] complicit in the misery"

(Valbrun 2012). Locals often see the organizations as simply interested in filling their own coffers, buying expensive flats and SUVs in Haiti, and then, according to Birrell (2012), "heading off early to the beaches for the weekend."

Despite these negative reviews, some international non-governmental organizations are making a difference in basic service provision, both within Afghanistan and Haiti and elsewhere. Examples of successful outputs are widespread; for example, the organization Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) International reported that between late 2001 and 2003, one of its key projects in Afghanistan irrigated 2700 hectares of land, protected another 600 from flood erosion, and built 1600 cubic meters of water drawing points (CARE 2003).

Similarly, non-governmental organizations working with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Haiti have removed "2 million cubic meters of rubble" and are "providing safe drinking water to 1.2 million people daily" (Valbrun 2010).

In many locales, there are examples of successful project outputs by non-governmental organizations, often with overall increases in service provision within the country. For example, vaccination drives by international non-governmental organizations have been tremendously successful. Organizations have even managed to hold vaccination days for children in the midst of civil wars, with both sides calling a "cease-fire" in order to attend vaccination clinics in the countries of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone, among others (Hotez 2001). As a result of the work of these organizations, often in concert with donor agencies and private foundations, cases of polio, a debilitating and often deadly disease that targets children, have been reduced by a whopping 99 percent since 1988. India, once the "epicenter of the polio epidemic," was actually polio free in 2011 (Pruthi 2012). As another example, international non-governmental organizations in Timor in the early 2000s were tremendously successful in providing health services after conflict; organizations there also helped empower the public health sector during reconstruction starting in 2003 (Alonso and Brugha 2006). Similarly, in 2001, organizations in Bangladesh created a government partnership for tuberculosis treatment, increasing access to key medicines for infected populations (Ullah et al. 2006).

Beyond basic service provision for human security, the success of international non-governmental organizations on human rights promotion, as another key area of human security, also appears mixed, with tremendous success by some organizations in some countries on certain issues and catastrophic

failure by other organizations in other situations. Another example is the work of organizations in North Africa. Even two decades before organizations aided in orchestrating some of the peaceful protests and advocacy associated with the Arab Spring of 2011, human rights international non-governmental organizations in Morocco had worked to limit government repression, including the use of torture during interrogations. The work of human rights organizations even led to the closure of the infamous Tazmamart secret prison (Granzer 1999). Organizations pressured regime leaders directly and brought powerful international actors, including United States and French foreign policy leaders, into the advocacy network, providing background reports on Moroccan practices and empowering diaspora groups to take up the cause.

At the same time international non-governmental organizations in Morocco were stopping government abuses of physical integrity rights, however, organizations were having very limited success at stopping the practice of female genital cutting in the whole North African region. This was an issue that many organizations thought they could quickly outlaw and eradicate. Governments had very little interest in the practice, roles of women in society were quickly expanding, and many international resources were devoted to the cause. To a large degree, all of this work by international non-governmental organizations was for naught: a huge cultural war was created by the international efforts, framing advocacy related to the eradication of female genital cutting as paternalistic and "postcolonial imperialism" (Boyle 2005, 1). The efforts even led some domestic advocates to wonder why the practice of genital cutting was being pushed for eradication by international non-governmental organizations from Western countries, where the use of breast implants, seen as another form of genital mutilation, was widespread (Wilson 2002; Lake 2012). International advocacy on the issue created a backlash: more adult women in Burkina Faso and Yemen had undergone genital cutting in 2005 than in 1998 (WHO 2010). Most of the survey data on the issue finds that women in the region generally support the practice, even after the highly publicized eradication campaign of the 1990s (Wagner 2011). Among Moroccans, where female genital cutting was not historically practiced, there is now even anecdotal evidence of its use, even by those who have emigrated out of the region.

Beyond Morocco, it is even more difficult to ascertain when and where organizations are successful in improving human rights practices. International non-governmental organizations have been credited with everything from the end of apartheid in South Africa (Heinrich 2001) to the drastic human rights

improvements in Guatemala after their civil war in the late 1990s and, to a lesser extent, Mexico in the mid-1990s (Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Godoy 2002). And yet, continued human rights advocacy by international non-governmental organizations over the use of the death penalty in China has fallen on deaf ears; similar calls for the end of abusive practices in Russia and Syria have also been wholeheartedly ignored by regime leaders.

What explains when and where international non-governmental organizations will be successful at improving human security? Why were organizations focused on development and health largely successful in India, Timor, and Bangladesh but not in Haiti and Afghanistan, where far more attention and international donor funds were directed? Within Haiti and Afghanistan, why are some organizations successful and others not? For organizations involved in promoting human rights, what determines when success happens? Why were organizations successful at getting the government of Morocco to change the fundamental ways it controlled the population (torture, political imprisonment) but similar organizations were not successful at getting individuals to stop a private practice (female genital cutting) that, prior to the 1990s in the region, was arguably already on the decline? Further, why did a little prodding by INGOs work to change human rights practices in Guatemala and Mexico but continued criticism has not been successful in China? In short, under what conditions should we expect international non-governmental organizations to matter for human security?

This book offers a comprehensive framework for understanding the effects of international non-governmental organizations (international NGOs or INGOs) on human security, briefly defined as a set of outcomes ensuring that an individual enjoys freedom from "want" and "fear" (UNDP 1994; Paris 2001). Many INGOs work tirelessly on issues of human security. As the examples above show, INGOs are active in all countries in the world, doing everything from providing vaccinations and basic sanitation in rural areas to pressuring world leaders in the United Nations to end political disappearances. Within the INGO world, organizations that work on issues of human security can be typically thought of as either primarily focused on service provision, like development or health organizations, or focused on advocacy, like organizations that focus on changing a government's human rights practices. In human security language, organizations that focus on service provision would be working to ensure that individuals were free from "want." Organizations working to promote human rights would be working to promote freedom from "fear."[1]

Since the 1980s, the number of international non-governmental organizations that are active in the world has increased significantly. These organizations, such as the well-known Amnesty International or Oxfam organizations, have increased their world presence drastically since the end of the Cold War, often setting up multiple permanent offices and expanding their volunteer bases within countries. In the last 20 years, for example, over 50 countries have seen the number of INGOs that are active within their borders increase over 500 percent; some countries saw the number of INGOs increase over 20-fold (Landman 2005; UIA 2008/2009).

This tremendous growth in INGOs has been coupled with drastic increases in the amount of aid and media attention these organizations receive. In fact, "some now estimate that more aid to developing countries is funneled through the NGO sector than the United Nations or the World Bank" (Brown et al. 2008, 25). INGOs have been heralded in the popular media for their work; multiple organizations, including Amnesty International, International Committee of the Red Cross, and Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), have won Nobel Peace Prizes.

As the sector grew, many saw INGOs as an "emerging second superpower," capable of assisting in the fulfillment of human security when previous state and intergovernmental efforts had failed (Moore 2003). In her 1997 *Foreign Affairs* article, Jessica Matthews sums up the general praise directed at the whole NGO world in the midst of this tremendous growth period:

> At a time of accelerating change, NGOs are quicker than governments to respond to new demands and opportunities. Internationally, in both the poorest and richest countries, NGOs, when adequately funded, can outperform government in the delivery of many public services. Their growth, along with that of the other elements of civil society, can strengthen the fabric of the many still-fragile democracies. And they are better than governments at dealing with problems that grow slowly and affect society through their cumulative effect on individuals—the "soft" threats of environmental degradation, denial of human rights, population growth, poverty, and lack of development that may already be causing more deaths in conflict than are traditional acts of aggression. (63)

Despite all this praise and growth, surprisingly, very little is known about the actual effects of INGOs across countries. Even outside of the academic literature, INGO workers themselves wonder about the effects of their efforts:

> Counting marketable achievements such as how many leaflets were distributed, or the quantity of funds raised, prevents us from reflecting on what changes have been achieved, or the strength of our resistance to corporates or government, or, more realistically, from analysing our effectiveness long-term in a struggle against power that isn't meant to come with quarterly "successes." (Francie 2011, 60)

Now, to be sure, most organizations have ways to measure their individual organizational output. Interviews with INGO leaders of United States–based organizations have revealed that INGOs do care about "whether or not we are sort of getting the tasks achieved that we set for ourselves" but that the individual organizations "can't determine the outcomes. . . . We don't necessarily know how many people it will affect" (Mitchell 2010, 6).

Going beyond the work of one organization or one joint movement, the academic literature has not yet provided definitive answers on whether the overall INGO sector actually delivers "outcomes" for the citizenry in locations where INGOs are active. We have not cross-nationally examined what conditions make positive outcomes more likely. A cursory look at the top journals in international relations reveals that we, as academics, have spent far more time debating the effectiveness of intergovernmental organizations, like the United Nations or the European Union, than the effectiveness of INGOs.

Despite the overwhelmingly large number of INGOs, academic inquiry is especially lacking for organizations involved in service delivery, which have been almost completely omitted from both the theoretical and empirical literature on INGOs. The literature has focused primarily on advocacy INGOs, like human rights organizations, and has often attributed the issues and dynamics in the advocacy realm to service organizations. Despite this focus on advocacy INGOs, there has actually been more growth in the number of service INGOs, such as those providing economic development or health services in developing countries (Cameron 2000).

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

Much larger than just the empirical question of whether INGOs matter, there exists a huge theoretical divide in international relations over how INGOs are viewed and what, if any, impact these organizations could have in the international system. Most of this divide is between the classic theoretical schools of realism and constructivism. On one hand, realism has very little space for

INGOs and nonstate actors in general (Ahmed and Potter 2006). According to realism, the international system today is dominated by states and, as Kenneth Waltz (1979) classically puts it, "So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them" (94). The focus in realism is on state interactions in an anarchic system. As Hocking and Smith (1990) point out, consistent with realism, states are critical actors in international relations because they possess sovereignty, recognition, and control over territory and population. None of these things are benchmarks of INGOs, of course, which are actually often advocating for changes in ways states control their population through force (i.e., the protection of human rights). Like realist notions of the role of intergovernmental organizations, realism sees INGOs as instruments of states, working to carry out the policies of state actors (Geeraerts 1995). As such, INGOs could be influential, perhaps, on service provision that would be in line with what major states want, providing development assistance and basic service provision in a country that is a strategic partner of the INGO's home state. INGOs would be unable, however, to push state actors to change their behavior on issues that went against the desires of the regime in power. If a country does not want to stop torturing its citizens, no amount of INGO pressure would be enough to make it do that.

Within the international relations theory of constructivism, where the theoretical focus is on social change, however, INGOs have quite a large role (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Most of the canonical literature on INGOs, including Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's 1998 *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations*, sees INGOs as critical actors in larger advocacy movements. INGOs serve as key entrepreneurs in normative development and then spread new norms to both state and nonstate actors, using a variety of political tactics (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Unlike other actors, according to this canonical constructivist framework, INGOs, as key actors in larger advocacy movements, are assumed to be motivated by "values rather than material concerns" (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). The tremendous potential for INGOs to be advocates for policy and behavior change rests on this idea that INGOs are "principled," motivated to help a domestic population with their struggles against an obdurate regime (Keck and Sikkink 1998; DeMars 2005; Kelly 2005). Risse (2010) refers to this motivation as one of "shared values" (285). Because of their principled motivations, INGOs are able to garner the support of the domestic community where they are working and the international community writ large, including foundations, third-party states,

clergy, and parts of intergovernmental organizations. With the combination of both this support "from below" and "from above," INGOs are able to induce improvements in human security (Brysk 1993). Worth noting, this idea of motivations in the canonical literature does not imply that INGOs are "stupid" or "not strategic" but that these actors are distinctly positioned in the world polity for social change because of their principled, shared values (Risse 2010, 287).

Both of these theoretical schools—realism and constructivism—offer large-scale predictions of whether INGOs will matter for outcomes in human security. In short, realism sees little potential for INGOs, especially if we are focusing on a human security outcome that is against the interests of the state. Constructivists, conversely, see huge potential in INGOs, as part of larger advocacy movements, to influence world politics. Some of the constructivist literature, including the canonical Keck and Sikkink (1998) and the 1999 edited volume *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, even offer predictions concerning where improvement is most likely. Many of these conditional relationships, however, have not been empirically examined, especially if looking beyond the success of a single campaign (Risse 2002).

BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: DEMONS AND ANGELS

Within both realism and constructivism, however, little attention is made to differences *among* INGOs. In both of these theoretical literatures, INGOs are typically a monolithic group with similar motivations. Further, the key causal stories through which INGOs are said to influence world politics, mainly coming from the constructivist literature mentioned above, focus almost solely on advocacy organizations. When extensions are made to service INGOs, across theoretical lenses, it is typically implicitly assumed that the same dynamics apply to both service and advocacy organizations (Cooley and Ron 2002; Prakash and Gugerty 2010).

Looking beyond the ivory tower of academia, however, it is clear that not all INGOs are equal: the underlying motivations of these organizations appear to differ. Some INGOs are very obviously acting as if motivated by principles or "shared values." Others, like the unfortunate examples of particular organizations in Haiti or Afghanistan, do not appear to be motivated by any principles or values in line with their mission statements. As one INGO specializing in ending genocide so dramatically put it, "Not all NGOs are angels. Some are demons" (AEGIS 2012). Scores of organizations, particularly those in service

delivery, have been heavily critiqued for their rent-seeking, taking funds from the international community and not investing them in local service provision. For example, in reference to INGOs in Somalia in the early 2000s, Berhan (2002) said the following:

> Many people may believe that honestly concerned individuals and groups establish NGOs. But in most cases the situation clearly shows that selfish and greedy individuals use the system to create and benefit from NGOs.

Even within the United States, such accusations of rent-seeking abound. A recent article entitled "Above the Law: America's Worst Charities" highlights how the organization Kids Wish Network "spends less than 3 cents on the dollar helping kids," and many "are little more than fronts for fund-raising companies" (Hundley and Taggert 2013). In an article in the *Jakarta Post*, Puji Pujiono, a past official of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Indonesia, summed up the issue of service INGO rent-seeking as follows:

> It is common for me to see [INGOs] benefit from disaster recovery projects: another project, another new flashy car for each of them. (Sawitri 2006)

A similar, although somewhat distinct, issue emerges concerning whether advocacy organizations are behaving incongruously with the "shared values" that underlie extant theoretical understandings of INGOs and, in many cases, the very mission statements of the organizations themselves. Within many accounts of advocacy organizational behavior, some organizations are advocating for policies or practices that are in line with the desires of at least a small portion of the domestic population they are professed to be working on behalf of. Some, however, instead of working in line with their mission statement and our common academic understanding of the shared values and principles that are supposed to motivate INGOs, are only advocating for the often extreme policies that their international donors or foreign stakeholders want. It is argued that this is what occurred when some INGOs advocated for the full eradication of female genital cutting in North Africa during a time when even domestic women's rights groups in the region were advocating only for age restrictions and the medicalization of the practice (Boyle 2002).

The issue is not isolated to just that case; many critiques of advocacy INGOs in non-Western countries begin with questions about underlying motives. In a newspaper article cleverly entitled "Western Humanitarianism or Neo-Slavery," Amii Omara-Otunnu (2007) wrote, "It is doubtful that Western humanitarian

work in Africa can have enduring positive impact unless Euro-Americans discard paternalistic racist attitude towards Africans," and organizations can "simply be Trojan horses for all sorts of forces and ulterior motives." Similarly, an op-ed piece by Joseph Mudingu (2006) in the Rwandan newspaper *New Times* began:

> The term *Non-Governmental [Organizations]* is actually a misnomer. The NGOs are financed and directed by the various imperialist agencies, the imperialist governments, and the comprador regimes. They act as the liaison between the people and the governments. They are the vehicles through which the exploiters seek to influence the opinions of "civil society."

This idea of very personalistic, organizational, or funder-driven values trumping "shared values" with the domestic population on whose behalf organizations supposedly work has not been completely lacking in the academic literature. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2001), Lisa Sundstrom (2006), Susantha Goonatilake (2006), and Elizabeth Ferris (2011), for example, all have written books on the topic. Clifford Bob's (2005) award-winning book *The Marketing of Rebellion* makes the argument that INGOs, as organizations all interested in longevity and appeasing international donors, often make decisions based not on need or community desire but on what fits with their personalistic agenda. Much of this literature, however, has really "thrown out the baby with the bathwater," equating the motivational lack of congruence with local community desires of some organizations with the motivations of all INGOs. This is unfortunate, as Sam Vaknin reported in a 2005 United Press International story:

> Some NGOs . . . genuinely contribute to enhancing welfare, to the mitigation of hunger, the furtherance of human and civil rights, or the curbing of disease. Others . . . are sometimes ideologically biased, or religiously committed and, often, at the service of special interests. Conflicts of interest and unethical behavior abound. (1)

Thus, according to Vaknin, not all INGOs share the same motivations: there are heterogeneous types of INGOs that act as if they have very different underlying motivations. This basic idea applies both to service organizations, where organizations often show their lack of "shared values" by using donor funds on things other than service delivery, and advocacy organizations, where a lack of shared values really appears when organizations do not take into account the

desires of the local population they supposedly are trying to help. This simple idea, extracted from a multitude of on-the-ground, eyewitness reports from within the INGO community, has been largely avoided in the academic literature.[2] However, in trying to understand when INGOs will aid in human security, acknowledging these on-the-ground issues leads me to ask a slightly updated research question: *How does the real possibility of INGOs with different motivations condition their overall effectiveness in areas of human security?*

In answering this question, this book extends the canonical theoretical literature on INGOs by relaxing the frequent assumption that all INGOs are motivated with "shared values" or "principles." Not all INGOs have to share the same motivations to help a domestic population achieve what it isn't able to on its own. Relaxing this assumption takes the debate away from one of classic versus revisionist ideas of INGO motivations.[3] The issue isn't whether INGOs are really "altruistic" but that INGOs differ in their underlying motivations. Some INGOs likely have motivations that are in line with the traditional notions of "shared values" and principles. Others, however, have motivations that seem to reflect both on-the-ground critiques and the revisionist literature: they are motivated, quite generally, by the personalistic rents that come from their work, appearing in the form of lined pockets or working only to please some foreign stakeholders. No work has examined how this key bifurcation in organizational motivations could condition the overall success of the INGO sector on human security outcomes. In line with the mountains of anecdotal stories out of places like Haiti, North Africa, and Afghanistan, however, examining this idea in a systematic way is critical for understanding whether and how the INGO sector can help millions in human security hot spots around the world.

CENTRAL ARGUMENTS OF THIS BOOK

At its heart, the first argument this book proposes is painfully simple: INGOs will be more likely to matter on issues of human security when and where those with "shared values" or principled motivations are likely to flourish. For both service and advocacy organizations, on issues and in states where both a domestic population and the larger international community know they are likely facing an organization with motivations that are of some value to them, we should see INGOs get the necessary support of these critical actors, leading to a likely increased human security outcome on the ground as a result of the INGO sector. This argument holds even when we acknowledge the ways that motivations and interactions differ for service compared to advocacy INGOs.

This first argument, although simple, illustrates the precarious nature of improving human security. When chaos reigns after civil wars or humanitarian disasters, it is likely that many development INGOs, for example, could be just in the region to fill their own pockets and not interested in providing services. In these times, fear of supporting an organization that does not actually intend to use funds efficiently to provide services may limit overall support of all INGOs, thwarting the potential for the whole INGO sector to actually provide services that will improve human security. Many development and humanitarian organizations in Haiti and Afghanistan have definitely worried about whether the reports and stories critical to certain organizations could limit their abilities to both get funding and work with the local populations they so desperately want to help (Mojumdar 2006).

When focusing on human rights advocacy, this simple argument also provides insights into how certain issues that appear to be more "hot-button" issues internationally, like the eradication of female genital cutting, may not be successful domestically, while other issues with less international media attention, like the releasing of political prisoners or improving prison conditions, may still manage to be positively influenced by human rights INGOs. When an issue involves organizations with preferences that appear less like "shared values" with the domestic population and more like advocacy on behalf of some foreign stakeholder, all advocacy INGOs may be negatively affected. This provides an important extension to arguments about how international pressure shapes issue emergence; just because an advocacy issue makes the international agenda does not mean that the advocacy will actually translate into marked improvements in human security on the ground (Carpenter 2007). Organizations with motives contrary to what the domestic population actually wants may limit domestic support at the end of the day, severely curtailing the success of the overall movement. Organizational advocates in Nigeria, for example, have expressed such concerns. Domestic groups there are often leery of supporting any Western human rights INGO for fear they may inadvertently support an INGO with an imperialist agenda for rights that runs strongly counter to local cultural norms (Okafor 2006).

What happens, then, when an organization is not in a situation where "shared values" types of INGOs are flourishing? Could a few bad apples really cause the whole barrel of INGOs to be thrown out? When it comes to organizations that are interested in human security in Haiti or Afghanistan or in women's rights in Morocco, what can they do to improve their chances of

getting the support necessary for human security improvements? How do they ensure that they aren't lumped in with the bad apples? More than just academic conjecture, the possibility of the few without "shared values" making work difficult for the whole INGO sector is very real. The few bad apples can try to make themselves look like good apples. Many of the United States' nonprofits that were identified as the country's "worst charities" tried to "mimic" others in the sector (Hundley and Taggart 2013). As an official with CARE reported, "Unfortunately for NGOs, critics do not make this distinction" between those working for and with the domestic population and those that are just interested in some sort of personalist agenda (Mojumdar 2006). This can create "hostility" toward the whole humanitarian sector, leading many to "lump" them all together as troublesome, unsuccessful, and unwanted actors (Mojumdar 2006).

This book's second major theme examines ways in which INGOs send signals about their underlying motivations to the larger domestic and international populations, who can be uninformed but important for the work of the INGO sector. INGOs often try to make their "brand" known: they attend public conferences, sign statements about their intentions, hire locals and put them in positions of power, and release their financial statements to the broader community in attempts to appear transparent about their underlying motivations (Gourevitch and Lake 2012). These signals, when credible, can help the INGO get the support it needs, leading to a more likely human security effect on the ground. However, for advocacy organizations, where the international and domestic communities often want very different things, these signals can solidify an organization's stance on a divided issue, sometimes limiting its support either domestically or internationally. This is the second basic argument of this book: signals sent by INGOs can and do matter. It focuses on one key signal in particular: consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic, Social, and Cultural (ECOSOC) Council. This status provides organizations with an entrée to all aspects of the UN; it is the only way an organization can formally interact at the United Nations. To acquire this status, an organization must provide financial information and participate in a review process, where the organization's policy and ideological positions on certain issues are often addressed. This fascinating process has not been examined thoroughly and provides an inside glimpse into how an intergovernmental organization (the UN) can be used to differentiate INGOs for both international and domestic audiences.

In considering the actions INGOs take to communicate their underlying motivations as "signals," this book draws on a broad and vibrant literature on

signaling in international relations, which is just beginning to examine signals made by nonstate actors, including INGOs (Jervis 1970; Fearon 1997; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2003; Fang 2008; Weeks 2008; Chapman 2011). It also connects these actions to similar actions by domestic nonprofits and to research on how these programs develop in the nonprofit literature (Reinhardt 2009; Gugerty and Prakash 2010).

This signaling framework provides a rich theoretical story with many empirical implications. Importantly, the previous signaling literature in international relations has focused on how signals sent by actors condition the behavior of others and thus impact many different political outcomes, including war, foreign direct investment, and diplomacy (Jervis 1970; Mansfield et al. 2003; Sartori 2003; Chapman 2009). By examining how INGOs' signals impact other actors' behaviors, a more theoretically satisfying account of INGOs' conditional impact on eventual human security outcomes is constructed.

The third central theme of this book concerns the domestic-level characteristics that (1) make international and domestic support of INGOs likely and (2) provide the structural and institutional preconditions that help INGO operations. This theme draws heavily on the dynamics of heterogeneous types of INGOs and their signaling behavior. By itself, however, it also provides insights into how INGO influences on human security outcomes can be conditioned by factors of development, geography, and domestic political structures within the country in which the INGO is trying to work. In short, some locations are just "easier" cases for the INGO sector than others. Understanding what makes a country ripe for INGO success is important; international donors often evaluate service INGO success and make future funding decisions based on the grade the INGO received. If the organization, however, is simply in an area where success is that much more difficult, this information needs to be taken into account. For human rights advocacy, knowing which states are more vulnerable to the pressure of human rights INGOs is also important; these states may be able to start processes that could diffuse and influence their whole neighborhood (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012).

This book's approach to the study of INGOs is novel in a number of ways. First, as mentioned, unlike much of the previous literature on INGOs within international relations, I extend my theoretical focus to include both advocacy and service INGOs. The main goal of advocacy INGOs, such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, is getting a targeted actor to adopt a policy or behavior in line with the position of the INGO (Ahmed and Potter 2006). Common

advocacy INGO missions would involve human rights or environmental outcomes. Conversely, service INGOs, such as CARE or Oxfam, focus mainly on goods provision. Service INGOs include organizations that focus on health or development-related service provision, such as handing out contraceptives or digging wells in developing countries. Because I am particularly interested in improvements in human security outcomes, I restrict the focus here to human rights INGOs as a subsegment of advocacy organizations and to development INGOs as a key component of service INGOs. The theoretical argument, however, can also apply to other issue areas where INGOs often work.

In addressing both advocacy and service INGOs, this book provides an encompassing theoretical framework for understanding INGOs that also accounts for different dynamics for advocacy as opposed to service organizations; this distinction has not been explicit in many of the canonical and recent revisionist works on INGOs. For example, while both the international and domestic community may agree that they would like to avoid supporting a service organization that wants to use funds to fill its own coffers, the international community may want to support an organization *because* it has a personalistic agenda that runs counter to the values of the domestic population where the advocacy is taking place.

This book's theoretical argument is grounded in game-theoretic formal models, something that is not typically seen in INGO studies. These models help us to rigorously and logically think about how INGOs with heterogeneous underlying motivations influence their interactions with other actors critical for advocacy and service provision and, as a result, condition the organizations' impact on human security outcomes. In addition to providing a framework for understanding many extant empirical regularities, solutions to the formal models provide a variety of novel and testable implications concerning when issues related to nonprincipled organizations will likely limit overall INGO success and the usefulness of signals sent by INGOs.

Unlike most other books on INGOs, I examine the implications of my theoretical framework quantitatively on a sample of over 100 countries without perfect human security situations since the end of the Cold War. To test these implications quantitatively, I use a novel dataset on the activities, presence, and funding of over 1000 human rights and development INGOs and back up my large-scale findings with much case study and anecdotal research. These case study vignettes serve as "reality checks" to the game-theoretic logic and empirical findings of the book. I find that INGOs can have powerful effects on

human rights and development outcomes. However, very generally, I find that the effect of these organizations is not monolithic; differences in organizational characteristics that reflect underlying motivations, issue focus, and state peculiarities condition when and where this vibrant and growing force of INGOs will be effective contributors to human security outcomes. This study, therefore, provides the first comprehensive quantitative tests of the impact of large numbers of issue-specific INGOs on a variety of human security outcomes and, more importantly, the first cross-national empirical examination of the factors that condition the impact of INGOs.

OVERVIEW OF THIS BOOK

Chapter 2, after spending a little bit of time on definitional issues, outlines the existing theoretical understanding of INGOs and their effects on human security. It then discusses the mechanisms through which INGOs are supposed to improve human security, distinguishing the work of service INGOs from the work of advocacy INGOs. I present both the traditional assumptions of INGO motivations from within international relations and the revisionist work and practitioner reports that question these assumptions. I discuss the book's baseline ideas about how the underlying motivations of INGOs differ and how both the international and domestic communities that work with the organizations are often uninformed about these motivations. The signaling approach in international relations is introduced and linked to behaviors by INGOs. This discussion serves as the motivations for the book's theoretical argument.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical argument of the book, drawing on a series of game-theoretic models that are available in the appendices. I begin by outlining the basic tensions in INGO work in the human security sector and identifying the actors that often interact with INGOs. I then explicitly relax the assumption that all INGOs share the same underlying motivations and present the idea that organizations can send signals about their underlying motivations in an effort to gain support. This framework provides many scenarios for when and where INGOs are able to get the support they need for human security outcomes. The chapter addresses these scenarios and provides the testable hypotheses that flow from this framework. Due to differences in how underlying motivations appear for service as opposed to advocacy INGOs, I present the implications of the theoretical model separately for these two types of organizations. Even though the theory is based on game-theoretic models, this chapter is presented in very nontechnical terms, accessible to both an academic

and a practitioner audience. Moreover, as discussed in the chapter, many of the empirical implications from the game-theoretic models are consistent with both practitioner and scholarly understandings of INGOs, a fact that provides a basic "reality check" to formal approach.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide empirical tests of the implications of the theoretical argument. As mentioned, the approach here is novel: most research on INGOs is qualitative, but I provide quantitative, large-scale tests of the conditional effectiveness of INGOs. Chapter 4, focusing on human security service outcomes related to freedom from "want," examines development INGOs and their impact on development outcomes in lesser development countries. In line with the theoretical framework, the results indicate that development INGOs can be powerful conduits for service delivery. However, in areas where development INGOs with very personalistic rent-seeking motivations are likely to flourish, the ability of the sector to function in ways that help improve human security outcomes drastically diminishes. In these situations, the overall effect of INGOs on service delivery can even be negative. However, when we focus on only organizations that "signal" their underlying motivations to provide services efficiently, we do see that certain INGOs can still have a positive impact on service delivery related to human security. This result holds even when we account for the structural preconditions that might make organizations more likely to send these signals in the first place. Other results in this chapter illustrate how certain geographic and economic conditions within a state can impede the ability of development INGOs to carry out human security projects and how certain controversial issues of development assistance are affected by development INGOs only when the domestic population is in favor of those services. These large-scale results are supported with case study anecdotes from East Africa, South America, and East Asia.

Chapter 5, focusing on advocacy related to the freedom from "fear," turns the empirical focus to human rights INGOs and their abilities to influence a variety of human rights outcomes within a country. The first portion of the chapter discusses how issue-focus matters: the domestic population of the state where the advocacy is taking place must be on board if broad human rights improvements can be made as a result of the effort. When we focus only on those issues where there is some broad-based support from the domestic population, a variety of structural conditions within the state, including its preexisting regime type and vulnerability to the international community, make human rights improvement more likely. And, like before, organizations that

send signals of their motivations are sometimes better able to get effective human rights improvement on the ground. Sometimes, however, these signals can isolate certain communities and reinforce stakeholder arrangements, making the advocacy world somewhat different than its service-provision counterparts. These dynamics, which are supported in the large-scale tests, are reiterated with case study anecdotes on human rights improvements in Mexico, China, and North Africa.

The empirical chapters utilize advanced statistical methods and novel events-based data on the activities of INGOs on human security outcomes. Throughout, however, I try to make the empirical chapters approachable to a large and diverse audience.

The book concludes by extending the argument back to the larger debates about how INGOs function in a state-centric world. INGOs can be powerful actors on a variety of human security issues, even issues that get at the basic arrangements between a regime and its population. This book thus adds to the broader "second image reversed" literature, which has previously focused exclusively on the effects of intergovernmental organizations on domestic politics (Reiter 2001; Pevehouse 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). By focusing on international *non*-governmental organizations and their impact on domestic politics, I extend the scope of this literature to new actors at the same level of analysis.

However, unlike some utopian ideal of INGOs as an end-all for human security concerns, the effect of these organizations is not monolithic; differences in organizational characteristics that reflect underlying motivations, issue-focus, and state peculiarities condition when and where this vibrant and growing force of INGOs will be effective contributors to human security outcomes. Organizations differ in their underlying motivations, and, once this is understood, state and society actions to control unwanted behavior while supporting organizations that do signal their domestically minded "shared values" would be helpful for improving the whole INGO sector. The book concludes with some practical advice on this front.