



# Innovation, Transformation, and War

US COIN Operations in Anbar and  
Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007

By James A. Russell


# Figure 3-1



The disposition of US forces in the Al Qaim region in September 2005 (left) and the spreading out of those forces (right) following the deployment of the 3-6 Marines in the fall of 2005.

# Figure 3-2

## Major Tribes Of Al Qaim Region




Tribal breakdown in Western Anbar in late 2005.

# Figure 3-3







## STRATEGIC to TACTICAL LOO




Logical lines of operations, or LOOs, developed by 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment in the spring of 2006.

# Figure 3-4




1-7 analyses of the towns in its area of operations according to its LOOs.

# Figure 3-5




## Investigative Database: CopLink




Summary of the major elements of "Project Metro" used by 1-7 in adapting law enforcement techniques to its mission in the Al Qaim region.

# Figure 3-6



Insurgent attack trends against 1-7 Marines in al Qaim region December 2005-July 2006.


# Figure 3-7



Counterinsurgency methodology developed by 4-14 during its deployment in Anbar in the fall of 2005.



# Figure 3-8




The 4-14 intelligence-operations target fusion cycle used in Anbar in 2005-2006.

# Figure 3-9




Details of 4-14 cache find in Anbar, February 2006.

# Figure 3-10




Summary of 4-14 non-lethal activities during its COIN operations in Anbar.

# Figure 4-1





States contributing units to the 2/28 Brigade Combat Team during its deployment to Anbar in 2005 and 2006.

# Figure 4-2




Major 2/28 bases in and around Ramadi in 2005-2006.

# Figure 4-3



The major combat elements of the 1/1 Brigade Combat Team (left) and their scheme of deployment in and around Ramadi in 2006-2007.

# Figure 4-4



The growth of tribal support during 1/1's deployment in and around Ramadi from June 2006-2007. Green areas represent tribal support; yellow partial support, and red non-supportive

# Figure 4-5

South Central Ramadi Spring 06



Operations: 4- 17 JUNE 06



Operations: 18- 25 JUNE 06



Operations: 26 JUNE to 30 JULY 06



Operations: 1 AUG 06 - 6 SEP 06



Operations: 7-16 SEP 06



Operations: 16 SEP 06 - 10 FEB 07



The progression of 1-37's operations in south central Ramadi is shown in these graphics from left to right as the battalion expanded its control over insurgent neighborhoods in the summer and fall of 2006.




# Figure 4-6



## *Seize : COP Construction*



## *Seize : COP Planning HPTs*



**Decisive Point:** when barriers and fighting positions at the COP are complete enough to defeat a complex AIF attack.

**Key Tasks:**


- Seize the buildings that will comprise the COP
- Secure the area around the COP and the route to it IOT prevent AIF from disrupting construction. Maintain that security until the OP is capable of defeating a complex AIF attack without reinforcement.
- Rapidly move construction and barrier materials to the COP using multiple secure routes.
- Quickly emplace barriers and install life support required to sustain a PLT (+)

**Endstate:** TF has established a defensible COP with a secure

- Reconnaissance & site selection
- Engineer estimate
- Transportation requirement estimate
- Prioritization of engineer effort
- Transportation & security plan
- Construction/transportation timeline
- Supervision of loading and download
- Construction
- Layered security & surveillance



The 1-37 combat outpost construction standard operating procedure used in the fall of 2006 in Ramadi.

# Figure 4-7



The 1-37 "Census Loop" that related census activities to ongoing operations.

# Figure 4-8




The disposition of the different 1-6 elements and its Iraqi partners in joint security stations in central Ramadi in 2006-2007.

# Figure 4-9



Removal of rubble around the government center in central Ramadi initiated by 1-6 Marines in 2006-2007.

# Figure 4-10




Details of Operation Okinawa in the spring of 2007 by the ISF and 1-6 Marines.

# Figure 4-11


## West Central Ramadi District Council Meeting

**Line of Operation:** Governance  
**Who:** XO 1/6 and CA Team Leader  
**What:** First meeting of the West Central Ramadi District Council  
**When:** 25MAR2007  
**Where:** Ramadi JCC  
**Significance:**

On 25 March 2007, XO 1/6 and CAG Team Leader met with the West-Central Ramadi District Council. There were 15 members in attendance for this historical first meeting. Districts represented; Al Warar, Jamiya, Qatana and Sharikah. After introductions and welcome, the group discussed the purpose of the council as well as goals, resources, and projects. The council president, Sa'ad Hamad Sharqi, led the discussion with Arif Mukhaibir Sayad. The members of the council were very enthusiastic about ideas for improvements. Security, education, and employment as well as water, electricity and basic services were identified as important issues. All agreed the first step is to clear the streets of trash and rubble. They voted that the first 2 projects to stem from this council will be rubble and trash removal. Plans were made to have this contracted before the next meeting. Bids will be collected, voted on, and passed to Team 1 for processing. The council shared lunch and all agreed that this was a great step forward. We anxiously anticipate the next gathering.




The meeting covered specific agenda items formally, then broke for lunch and tea.



Arif Mukhaibir Sayad, vice-president of the district council discusses his vision for the district.


Details of the first Ramadi district council meeting in March 2007 convened by 1-6 Marines.

# Figure 4-12



Details on the 1-6 information operations program that featured use of loudspeakers in the Ramadi neighborhoods.

# Figure 4-13



Insurgent attack trends in the 1-6 Marines area of central Ramadi from September 2006-April 2007.



# Figure 4-13




UNCLASSIFIED


## IRAQI POLICE IN RAMADI



- IP RECRUITING IN JAN06 IN THE GLASS FACTORY WAS ATTACKED BY A SUICIDE BOMBER
- PREVIOUS UNIT CONTINUED IP RECRUITING IN THE GLASS FACTORY IN APRIL AND MAY06 DESPITE PREVIOUS ATTACK, RESULTING IN LIMITED SUCCESS
- JUN06 THE RFCT MOVED RECRUITING TO BLUE DIAMOND
- JUL06 RFCT HEAVY TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT BEGAN
- SEP06 TRIBAL “DONOR FATIGUE” WAITING FOR IP TRAINEES TO RETURN FROM JORDAN
- DEC06-JAN07 RFCT RECRUITED ERU RECRUITS FOR JORDAN (OVER 500)
- JAN07-FEB07 AO TOPEKA IP FORCE FORMALLY ADDS ANOTHER 740 IP (~370/SHIFT)



Over 3000 IP/ERU Recruited Since 11 JUN 06



AS OF 3 MAR 07

Ready First! 20

Rebuilding Ramadi's police force during during 2006-2007.

# Figure 4-14




UNCLASSIFIED

## AIF ATTACK TRENDS IN AO TOPEKA



- IRAQ STUDY GROUP INDICATES SITUATION IN IRAQ IS "GRAVE AND DETERIORATING"; HOWEVER CONDITIONS IN RAMADI INDICATE OTHERWISE
- DIRECT CONTACT (COMPLEX) ATTACK CAPABILITY IS DWINDLING
- MOST COMMONLY USED WEAPON FOR AIF REMAINS IED ATTACKS. THESE, ALTHOUGH DISRUPTIVE, ARE ALSO MOSTLY INEFFECTIVE




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## RFCT CACHE FINDS




### REMOVING THE THREAT BEFORE IT CAN BE USED

- IRAQIS KNOW WHAT TO LOOK FOR WHEN SEARCHING FOR CACHES
- LOCALS WILL SHARE INFORMATION WITH IP BECAUSE IP ARE FROM THE LOCAL AREA
- THE INFORMANT WILL NOT BE MARKED AS A CF COLLABORATOR FOR TALKING TO IP.
- UNTRAINED IP INVESTIGATION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CF INVESTIGATION BY VIRTUE OF LANGUAGE/ CUSTOM BARRIER ALONE




Summary of insurgent activity and cache finds over the course of the 1/1 deployment in Ramadi during 2006 and 2007.

# Figure 5-1




172<sup>nd</sup> SBCT laydown in Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2006.

# Figure 5-2



2-1 Campaign plan overview used in operations in Mosul during 2005-2006.

# Figure 5-3




Early Assessment of insurgent control over Mosul Neighborhoods at outset of 172nd COIN operations. Note: AAS is Ansar Al Sunna; QJBR is Tanzim Qa`idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or Al Qaeda in Iraq—the organization of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.

# Figure 5-4



Findings of pattern analysis during October 2005 by 2-1 in Eastern Mosul

# Figure 5-5




2-1 Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance plan and its changing map of battle space in November 2005





# Figure 5-7



26 October 2005 directed raids on Al Sharkya IED Cells by 2-1 in Mosul.

# Figure 5-8

**FUSED INTEL RESULTS IN DETENTION OF "OPEL GANG"**

**2/A 2-1**  
DISABLES VEHICLE,  
WOUNDS MUSTAFA

**2/A CO**  
RECEIVES SAF IN DBS ON  
THE CHEVY EXTENSION -  
RETURN FIRE AND  
DISABLE 1XVEHICLE AND  
INJURE 1XLN. LN IS  
TRANSFERRED TO THE  
ALJUMARHI HOSPITAL  
AND GIVEN CLAIMS  
FORM

**THE**  
SUSPECTED  
SNIPER CELL

**IPS**  
RECEIVE SAF IN DBS  
NEAR THE BUICK/NISSAN  
INTERSECTION. THEY RETURN  
FIRE AND DISABLE 1XVEHICLE  
AND CAPTURE 3XAF FROM IN  
FOLLOW-ON FTCP. AIF  
RETURNED TO NE1 WHERE  
DETAINED BY A2-1 AND  
QUESTIONED BY TF 2-1 THT. 3 AIF  
CONFESS THEY ARE MEMBERS  
OF THE OPEL GANG. SIGNIFICANT  
INTEL GAINED ON CELL'S  
ORGANIZATION AND TTPS.

**MRTS**  
CONDUCT CTR OF  
AL HAKRAK FOLLOWING  
OCF-1 TIP. CAPTURE  
3XMEMBERS OF SNIPER  
CELL CONNECTED TO  
THE OPEL GANG. SVD  
MAG AND KABOBS  
FOUND. LATER, CELL  
IS LINKED TO OPEL  
GANG THROUGH  
HOSPITAL VISITOR

**TIR**  
SUSPECTED  
SNIPER


**RECAPTURING ABU**  
**MUSTAFA:**  
SUSPECTED OPEL GANG  
CELL LEADER

**HOSPITAL VISITORS**

**VAPOR TRACE PLUS**

Roll-up of the "Opel Gang" by 2-1 in the Fall of 2005 in Mosul.

# Figure 5-9




Example of a situational template, or SITEMP, used by 2-1 in the spring of 2006 during its operations in Mosul .

# Figure 5-10




2-1 "Wheel of Stuff" to help guide target decision-making during its deployment.

# Figure 5-11




2-1 integrated targeting set in Mosul, January 2006.

# Figure 5-12




Insurgent attack trends in eastern Mosul from November 2004-May 2006.

# Figure 5-13




Growth of Company C 1-17's area of operations in its "economy of force mission" in Mosul during the course of its deployment. Blue Stars Are Iraqi IP Stations; Green Stars Iraq Army Facilities

# Figure 5-14



## DAILY TASK ORG




AVG Boots on the Ground: 135  
 AVG Available for Combat OPS: 100

Standard organization of Strkyer company on left vs. the organization on right created by Company C, 1-17 during its deployment in Mosul in 2005-2006.




# Figure 5-15




Example of small kill team operations by Company C, 1-17 in Mosul in May 2006.

# Figure 5-16



The 4-11 Field Artillery area of operations south of Mosul.


# Figure 5-17



The 4-11 integrated assessment of its area of operations. Key: red is negative; green positive; yellow is neutral

# Figure 5-18

## COA Analysis



The 4-11 "Targeting Wheel" as it applied to the economic situation in its area of operations.