1 WHAT IS THE ANGLOSPHERE?

The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm; the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude . . . each of them seems marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

—Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835), Vol. 1, p. 434

If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security . . . If we are together, nothing is impossible.

—Winston Churchill, The "Iron Curtain" speech, 1946

Now Mr Churchill is starting his process of unleashing war (like Hitler) with a racial theory, declaring that only those people who speak English are full-bloodied nations, whose vocation it is to control the fate of the whole world . . . Mr Churchill and his friends in England and in America are presenting those nations who do not speak English with a kind of ultimatum—recognize our supremacy over you, voluntary, and all will be well— otherwise war is inevitable.

—Stalin, a *Pravda* interview concerning Churchill's "Iron Curtain' speech, 1946

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" and the "Airstrip One." ANZUS and the "deputy sheriff." NORAD and the "51st state." These are some of the many representations, official designations, and popular caricatures of the special relationships between the United States on the one hand and Australia,

Britain, Canada, and New Zealand on the other. The relationship between the United States and Britain began with a revolutionary war in the eighteenth century, in which the former violently seceded from the latter. This germinal Anglo-American enmity is now all but forgotten, having been replaced with a remarkably durable alliance and a close friendship. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand established their special relationships with the United States more gradually, as they gained more and more sovereignty from Britain. Together, these special relationships are said to constitute a "core" of a distinct international, transnational, civilizational, and imperial entity within the global society, currently known as the "Anglosphere."[1]

Winston Churchill used to describe this entity as the "English-speaking peoples." As far back as the late seventeenth century, as he observed in his hefty *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, the proverbial Anglos have been constantly winning wars, expanding trade, and promoting freedom, security, and welfare—all of this thanks to their liberal political culture and institutions.[2] As Churchill explained in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech delivered at a small college in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946:

> We must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.

For Churchill the "great man of history," this speech evoked a moment of victory for the English-speaking peoples against the Nazi-Fascist axis just as they were about to embark upon another war against Soviet communism. For Churchill the historian, however, this juncture was a mere chapter of modern history centered on the expansion of the Anglo experience. The English-speaking peoples were doubly special, to each other and to humankind, because the progress of liberal modernity depended on their unity and cooperation. The newly minted United Nations (UN), Churchill explained at Fulton, could provide collective goods only in one context:

> Would a special relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with our over-riding loyalties to the World Organization? I reply that, on the contrary, it is probably the only means by which that organisation will achieve its full stature and strength.

Churchill's theory of history continues to claim adherents, many of whom like to point out that Churchill was right. The processes of secession, dedominionization and decolonization destroyed the British empire but left behind a distinct yet loosely bounded community of peoples, who were fiercely committed to, among other items, freedom, democracy, the rule of (common) law, and the English language. This community's lack of formal institutional actorness merely disguises its exceptional longevity and power. Centered first on London and then on Washington, D.C., the Anglosphere has dominated international politics for the world for the past 200 years, perhaps longer. Its agents—companies, empires, states, nations—colonized and industrialized large swathes of the planet and moved millions of its inhabitants, often by force. They also acted as the market and lender of the last resort, the guardian of the reserve currency, and the bulwark against various revisionists and revolutionaries. As a result, the world has now gone *An*global. Though Australians, Americans, British, Canadians, and New Zealanders make up less than 7 percent of the world's population today, the standard triumphalist argument is that "their" language is the global language, "their" economies produce more than a third of the global gross domestic product (GDP), and "their" version of liberalism in society and economy defines most human aspirations.[3] If he were alive today, Churchill might well be pleased with the state of the Anglosphere. One can imagine him making a swift autocitation: "I told you so long ago: If we are together, nothing is impossible."

This book is one story of how the Anglosphere became possible. It focuses on Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—the five states that are said to constitute the "core" of the community—and considers how they came to exempt themselves from the rules that have shaped war, peace, alliances, coalitions, and other manifestations of international conflict and cooperation in world politics. The story begins with a contention that the origins of Anglosphere are racial. The turn-of-the-twentieth-century rapprochement between the expanding United States and declining Britain was caused by a discourse of identity that implied natural unity and moral superiority of the "Anglo-Saxon race." The loosely woven fabric of Anglo-Saxonism began to unravel in the middle decades of the twentieth century. In this period, the Anglosphere emerged as a broad-angled Western community made up of interdependent, institutionalized, and integrated special relationships centered on the United States. As the Cold War dragged on and then fizzled away, the Anglosphere positioned itself as the sovereign icon of liberal internationalism

and the corollary human rights revolution. Across the decades, hitherto silent voices grew louder and louder, and antiracism went mainstream around the globe. These changes were sweeping and dramatic, yet they often occurred in such lopsided and contradictory ways that some of the old racialized privileges and hierarchies were left unscathed. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was thus once again possible for the leaders of the old and new Anglo empires to jointly claim moral superiority in the international society. The main argument of this book is that cooperation among select English-speaking states became possible through a variety of racialized processes, which come together at home, abroad, and in-between. In short, the Anglosphere is a product of its racial past, a past that might not have receded.

A RENEGADE RESEARCH AGENDA

Despite having made an excellent early start on the subject, International Relations (IR) has little or nothing to say about the Anglosphere. E. H. Carr, the putative father of the discipline, long preceded Churchill in theorizing the "English-speaking peoples" as the "dominant group in the world." He was also much more critical. In his *Twenty Year's Crisis*, Carr provocatively argued that the Anglos were "consummate international hypocrites" bent on spreading their forms of politics under the guise of morality and neutrality.[4] Carr's book is still a classic, but these lines are often skipped over. IR hardly recognizes the dyadic Anglo-American "special relationship" (AASR) as an analytical category, much less the plural Anglosphere. On the surface, the absence has to do with the current hegemony of rationalist theories. These approaches have been extremely insightful about the ways alliances and economic blocs emerge out of strategic coordination among governments, businesses, logrolling coalitions, and other rational actors bent on solving collective action problems and generating joint goods such as security or trade. Yet, with respect to the seemingly more nebulous cultural groupings like the Anglosphere, rationalist accounts of world politics tend to obscure as much as they illuminate. A deeper reason lies in the traditional sway of a narrow materialist ontology focused on a system of sovereign, separate, and nominally equal states. Missing from this picture are racism, nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, and other macro-historical processes, which imply that sovereign states are also historical and cultural nations bound by all kinds of discourses, institutions, and practices.

The obvious ontological and theoretical home for the Anglosphere appears to lie in constructivism, particularly in its research agendas revolving around

the concept of identity.[5] Much of social life, constructivist argue, can be explained in terms of the relations between the Self and Other. What social actors want and how they act is indeed determined by who they are, but the point is that the Self does not exist as a disconnected, unadulterated unit; instead, it always emerges in interaction with certain significant Others. To go back to Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, the "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples" would have been meaningless without this interaction. In the speech, one first finds the temporal or historical Others, defined by a recent global war against the Nazi-Fascist enemies: "The awful ruin of Europe, with all its vanished glories, and of large parts of Asia glares us in the eyes." Then there are the territorially bounded Others: Soviet Russia, "Turkey and Persia," the "South American Republics," and, as a particularly menacing force within, "the Communist parties or fifth columns." Here, the Self–Other relations are in a transition, with Soviet Russia and Communist partisans changing their status from wartime allies to future foes. "Christian civilization" and the UN also appear in Churchill's speech, but mostly as the second-order extensions of the Anglo Self, rather than as significant Others.

Similar "us" versus "them" dynamics are present in countless international discourses, institutions, and practices across different social realms of world politics—from pop culture (for example, James Bond, Jason Bourne) to university scholarships and literary awards (such as Rhodes, Knox, Man Booker) to political economy (as in "Anglo-Saxon capitalism") to transgovernmental and intermestic relations (such as the Strategic Alliance Cyber Crime Working Group). The continuity and change in these ideas and actions has been subject to contingent and variable interactions among the "peoples" involved, but the main point is that the Anglosphere is meaningless without some other social group in time and space, whether one refers to a state/nation, international association or organization, transnational network, civilization, or some combination of these. Herein lies the usefulness of what constructivists call constitutive analysis—an analysis of intersubjective meanings that condition the social and political possibilities within a given community, site, or field. This type of analysis resembles "theories of reference" in philosophy or "theoretical identifications" in the natural sciences. On the latter, by showing how atoms constitute molecules or how average molecular kinetic energy constitutes temperature, constitutive analysis contributes to causal explanations of various chemical, biological, and physical processes. By analogy, an analysis of constitutive dimensions of the social kinds like the Anglosphere

can therefore contribute to causal explanations of international conflict/
cooperation.

It is precisely these types of explanations that motivate the constructivist
research program on "security communities" or groups of states in which a col-
lective identity is said to lead to dependable expectations of nonviolent change.[6]
The same can be said about the constructivist work on transnational diaspo-
ras and "families of nations," which tends to treat preferential treatments in
diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, or tourism as a function of ethno(racial), (anti)
national, (neo)colonial, and (post)imperial identities.[7] That the Anglosphere is
absent in these literatures is surprising considering that it is both conceptu-
ally and substantively related to the "Atlantic community," "Black Atlantic,"
the Commonwealth, the *Francophonie*, and similar entities, which are more or
less acknowledged in constructivist IR.[8]

The absence of the Anglosphere agenda in IR is neither ontological nor
theoretical in nature, but sociological. The Anglosphere is unattractive as
an analytical category because it carries the burden of political and norma-
tive reappropriation. Most IR theorists would point out that the concept—in
fact, the conceit—of the Anglosphere must first be separated from the rac-
ist associations it carries from the era of Churchill and Stalin before it can
be used in the analysis of international relations. That this reappropriation is
inherently risky is evident in the fate of the conservative and neoconservative
discourse on the Anglosphere in the 2000s. Much like Churchill, who used
Anglosphere-talk to prop up anticommunism and empire, James C. Bennett,
Robert Conquest, and Keith Windschuttle, among others, have used it to legit-
imize or mobilize certain political projects—anything from Euroskepticism
to the U.S.–Indian nuclear alliance to assorted liberal orderings at a global
scale.[9] Unlike Churchill, this generation of thinkers never failed to underscore
the pluralist, postcolonial, anti-imperial and, indeed, antiracist nature of the
imagined community spanning sixty or so sovereign and "diverse" nations
from Antigua and Barbuda to Zimbabwe. What made these claims unper-
suasive to those on the political and cultural left was a certain consistency
in conceptualizing the Anglosphere as a hierarchy made up of the core and
mostly white Self on the one hand and on the other the peripheral and over-
whelmingly nonwhite Other. Core/periphery—like the corollary metaphors of
concentric circles, nodal points, families of nations, clubs, or waiting rooms—
is a colonial-era concept that refers to the presence of historically or cultur-
ally backward Others. The new discourse on the English-speaking peoples

thus arrived with the old discourse in tow, in the sense that the talk of the linguistically bounded and hierarchically ordered "spheres" invoked the old images of empires and civilizations. Little surprise that liberals and Marxists rejected the idea of the Anglosphere, sometimes echoing Stalin's response to Churchill's Fulton speech, as not only insufferably outmoded and parochial, but also fundamentally racist.[10]

These connotations have rightly made IR wary of the Anglosphere. Recall how the discipline evolved mostly out of the English-language study of empire, colonial administration, and, in particular, race. In an effort to forget its racist past, IR turned race into a "taboo."[11] The practice is primarily sociological, not philosophical. In contrast to the so-called eliminativist constructivists in the philosophy of race, who eliminate race as the discourse of social construction, constructivists in IR tend to eliminate race because of the particular historical developments that continue to structure their discipline. This book takes a different approach. Following the philosophical teachings of antieliminativist constructivism, I will define race as *racialized identity*, a social kind that exists because people believe it exists. From this perspective, race is not real in the biological sense, but it is real in the sense that the social and political world is constituted by groups who have been, or were, treated as if they were races.[12] Originally introduced by the sociologist Robert Miles and later developed by Lawrence Blum, Linda Martín Alcoff, and others, racialization thus refers to a social and political process of inscribing group affinity and difference primarily onto the body (for example, "blood," phenotype, genes) as well as on other markers of lived experience (such as "character," eating, shopping).[13]

The concept of racialization is useful because it rejects inherent characteristics, differences, or hierarchies among groups and because it recognizes that race intersects with—without being substituted by—ethnicity, gender, class, and other identities that define groups. For example, as historically evolving and cross-culturally variable identities, "Anglo" or "white" are related, but not reducible, to ethnic, quasi-ethnic, religious, or class groups or their hybrids such as "English" or "WASPs" (White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant).[14] Racialization is also useful because it acknowledges the continuing impact of racial histories and experiences on complex systems of separation, privilege, hierarchy, and inequality within, between, and among entities that Churchill so coyly called peoples in the contemporary world.

Much like race, the Anglosphere too has evolved over time and space as it defined patterns of inclusion/exclusion of billions of people around the world.

(Writing about the Anglosphere is related, but not equivalent, to writing about groups labeled by themselves and others as Anglos.) As an analytical category, the Anglosphere roughly approximates the idea of the "English-speaking peoples" as well as what students of history, historical sociology, comparative politics, and related academic fields and subfields have subsequently named "Lockean heartland," "Anglo-America," and "Anglo-world."[15] Each one of these alternative categories represents a different school of thought on what has made the world hang together—and apart—through large-scale historical change. While I cannot do them justice, I will document these arguments in the later chapters and consider how they might relate to my account. I also recognize that the questions of philosophy, ontology, theory, and sociology of knowledge cannot be separated from their normative implications. However, instead of separating positive from normative until the concluding paragraphs, as per the current practice of writing IR, I have decided to address the normative questions elsewhere.[16] In this book, the focus remains on the historical evolution of the racialized identities in the putative Anglosphere core and their influence on patterns of war and peace. To tell this story, I build on constructivist IR and its ideas on how "peoples" make friends, rivals, and enemies with each other in the world.

THEORIZING THE ANGLOSPHERE

One of the oldest typologies of IR theory is the so-called levels of analysis. Levels are defined by a spatial scale ranging from individual decision makers' heads to the entire planet. They are not theories but are broad ontological referents for the domain of the "causal" action. Using one scale as an example, the Anglosphere emerges (1) in Churchill's head (the "individual" level); (2) within and between various societies, states, nations, transnational corporations, and/or empires (the "unit" level); (3) within and between various groupings of states, nations, and/or empires (the "subsystem" level); and (4) within the global society as a whole (the "international system" level). Note the scare quotes around the word *causal*: As a matter of constructivist ontological principle, the collective identity of a global community of the English-speaking peoples cannot be sliced up into different levels. Instead, it is continuously constructed on, and across, all levels of analysis and therefore irreducible even to the sum of heretofore separately analyzed levels and/or structural and agential variables. Put differently, agents and structures such as elites and nations, societies and empires, states and the international system are *always* mutually constituted.[17]