PREFACE

THIS BOOK EMERGED from a series of discussions that the editors initiated in 2003 about the limitations of hegemony resulting from challenges by secondary states. We recognized that the majority of the literature on great powers and hegemons focused on their motives and strategies for fending off other great power challengers and rivals. In adding a new dimension to the discussion, this book focuses on the responses to global and regional hegemons by secondary and tertiary powers, and particularly their motives, objectives, and interests. Unlike other authors, not only do we discuss the limitations of hegemony, but this volume also examines the domestic and international factors that motivate the rest of the powers. Secondary and tertiary states rarely challenge global and regional hegemons directly and must find other ways to respond. Our overarching question is: Why do states follow, or not, the hegemon? To explain the motivations and strategies of these states, we develop three explanatory frameworks and examine them in the case studies: realist arguments and the role of material power distributions (both global and regional), the role of domestic politics, and liberal institutionalist theories and the role of international organizations and global norms. We examine the strategies and motivations of the followers, which range from opposing the hegemon to accommodating it, and the specific strategies including hard balancing, soft balancing, blackmail, leash slipping, binding, bonding, and bandwagoning. In examining these responses to the hegemon, the chapters also highlight the process of negotiation and renegotiation of the relationship between hegemons and followers.

We focus on the Cold War and post–Cold War periods and on responses to global and regional hegemons. The cases in the volume examine the three explanatory variables that are developed in Chapter 1. The cases are: Romania's response to Soviet hegemony, Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union, Ireland's response to American and British hegemony, domestic divisions in Jordan's and America's response, the role of trade relations between the United States and Latin America, NATO allies' interaction with the United States after the end of the Cold War, Pakistan's cooperation with the United States, the response of Brazil's neighbors to its regional hegemonic aspirations, the balancing relationship between Russia and its new neighbors, the effect of India's emergence as a hegemonic power on South Asia, the relationship between China and its Asia-Pacific neighbors, and South Africa's interaction with other states in the region. The conclusion discusses American decline and the greater space it gives other powers in their region and on the global-international level.

The concepts, explanatory frameworks, and strategies of the rest of the powers in this volume were developed and refined during many conference calls and e-mails between Worcester, Salt Lake City, and Bowling Green, and during three conference presentations at the International Studies Association annual meetings (2004, 2007, and 2011). We were fortunate to have all the contributing authors participate on at least one of these panels.