Introduction

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Robert Kagan began his 2003 volume *OF PARADISE and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order* with an appropriately controversial thesis. His argument centered on the thesis that

> [Europe] is turning away from power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.

This linked directly to Edward Luttwak's thesis of "post-heroic warfare,"[1] and the consequence of all this is that "on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory—the product of one American election or catastrophic event."[2]

Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Defense Secretary, echoed a similar view in a January 2003 Department of Defense press briefing. He saw Europe as more divided, making reference to an old and a new Europe, with its center of gravity moving eastwards as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) admitted former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.[3] Four

years later the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, also echoed this belief of a divided transatlantic partnership. In his "Our Nation's Future" speech on defense policy, he stated: "There are two types of nations similar to ours today. Those who do war fighting and peacekeeping and those who have, effectively, except in the most exceptional circumstances, retreated to the peacekeeping alone."[4] A few months later, President Barack Obama may well have elicited some sympathy with this view after his initial call for a troop surge by NATO to Afghanistan was largely ignored.[5] Playing on the words of his campaign catchphrase, the British newspaper *The Times* led with the headline, "Europe: No We Can't."

What all were wrestling with were changes to the definitions of security, matched to questions about the role of the armed forces and the future development of transatlantic relations. Taken together, these elements raise the question of whether we really are at a "turning point" in the transatlantic consensus that has underpinned thinking for over half a century and whether the thesis of realist thinkers, such as John Mearsheimer, is finally proving to be correct (see next chapter).

This volume seeks to address this question. To undertake this task it is first worth remembering that, despite the strains that have emerged and appear to threaten the relationship, the importance of the relationship to all countries is generally still accepted as a given. Illustrative of this is NATO.[6] NATO has been one of the most enduring and effective alliances in modern history, and it has brought together the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic in ways that go far beyond the collective defense purposes embodied in Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter.[7]

A decade ago, few would have imagined running military operations in Afghanistan with a number of countries, notably the Canadians, the Dutch and the Danes, having sustained casualty levels over a number of years that were significant in relation to the size of their populations.[8] The strains that exist within NATO are symptomatic of the tensions that exist among countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Since the end of the Cold War, they have largely worked together to help frame a new type of relationship. Many of these countries, including former adversaries in NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact), fought alongside one another in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 and worked together through the "Contact Group"[9] as negotiators and mediators to try to address ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia. These efforts gave the illusion that the relationship

was being transformed from one that was defined by the tensions of the Cold War to one more appropriate to meeting the needs of a changing international order, with the challenges that accompany it.

In that sense, the case of NATO is illustrative. In effect, since the end of the Cold War, the purposes stated in Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty have become even more important, perhaps even eclipsing the goals of Article 5. Article 2 notes that the parties "will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions" and seek "to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and . . . encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."[10] Clearly, Article 2 provides the foundation for post-Cold War collaboration among countries with democratic political institutions and a capitalist economy that the original members dreamed about but saw as far from reality in 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted. It was in recognition of the attractions of liberal democracy that the countries of the former Eastern Bloc clamored to get into NATO; it was an acknowledgment that they had thrown off their past, and were now part of "the West." However, much has changed since the alliance was founded in 1949, and especially since its post-Cold War enlargement. Whilst acknowledgment of democracy has proven an important driver for membership, the Article 5 guarantee remains important and helps explain the desire of both Georgia and Ukraine to join the organization. Moreover, Russia too has remained central to transatlantic relations, and much of the discussion has revolved around the triangular relationship of individual states to both NATO and Russia.

The terrorist attacks on mainland America of September 11, 2001, represented the first and only case in which the collective security statute (Article 5) has been invoked.[11] However, the United States chose not to work within the NATO framework for its response but rather to move forward with a "coalition of the willing"; this had worked well in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 but, as history has shown, proved not nearly so effective in the response to the attacks of 9/11. But, more importantly, in choosing to go outside the NATO framework, the Bush administration set a course that led to division and factionalism within an alliance whose fault lines were already not far below the surface. At the same time, the prospect of membership of countries such as Georgia and Ukraine has put into focus the complexities of further enlargement. The value that Tbilisi and Kiev place on the Article 5 guarantee suggests that they have adopted a far more traditional view of NATO than that currently held by some of its members.

These differences suggest that any estrangement among the NATO allies cannot be attributed purely to the United States or a single individual such as George W Bush. Rather, as the US was charting its own course, especially under the Bush administration, the European countries were similarly thinking about what policies were in their own best interest—both individually and also within the broader context of the European Union, through the processes of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).[12]

The election of Angela Merkel in Germany in 2005 introduced a new type of leader to that country, one who was born in the East and has displayed sharp political instincts, which not only led her to the chancellorship but also helped her to chart a new and more self-assured course for Germany. Similarly, the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in France promised a new direction for that country. That promise went far beyond France when Sarkozy, under the auspices of the rotating presidency of the European Union (EU), called a summit to set up a Euro-Mediterranean partnership whose membership would, by virtue of geography, exclude the United States. Even the two countries closest to the United States and to one another in both culture and geography, Canada and the United Kingdom, have been moving in different directions.[13] And these are but a few examples of the divergence in policy interests among the countries on both sides of the Atlantic.

The divisions that have emerged among these various allies have been the result of a number of factors: different understandings and definitions of the threat that emerged after 9/11, and concomitant with that, different ideas of how to respond to that threat; changing domestic politics that have led to changing priorities; altered relationships among the various countries of the Atlantic Alliance due, in part, to the strengthening of the EU; different understandings of the role of the military and of each country's commitment to a common security policy; the emergence and strengthening of new or existing alliances that compete with—or complement—NATO; and changing perceptions of the United States, to name but a few.

Clearly, long-standing and important ties exist between the United States and its allies in Europe. It was US President Bill Clinton who first talked about NATO's enlargement as a question of "not if, but when," as he envisioned a world after the Cold War. And the economic and social conservatism of President George W Bush complemented the approach advocated by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and eventually German Chancellor Angela

Merkel. Nonetheless, the unilateral approach to foreign policy that the Bush administration ultimately pursued undercut many of the features that had brought the United States and the European allies together. It should not then be unexpected that the leaders of the other countries under discussion in this volume have similarly chosen to pursue policies that often diverge from the priorities of the United States.

It is important to note here that this volume is not a condemnation of US foreign policy under the administration of George W Bush. Rather, it seeks to explain, from multiple national perspectives and points of view, *why* there has been so much divergence in the approaches the various countries have taken. And it seeks to raise questions about what those divergent paths might mean for the future of transatlantic relations. A 2007 *Adelphi Paper,* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and titled "Repairing the Damage: Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus," hints at the potential for rebuilding consensus, but also at the fact that doing so will not necessarily be an easy task. The authors identify two conditions that they feel are necessary "for the alliance to survive, much less thrive, in this new and more demanding context." First among these, "Europe and the United States will have to develop compatible strategic frameworks within which to operate and, more importantly, select the issues for which their new à la carte alliance can be of relevance." A corollary to that is that the allies "should learn how not to agree, and even strongly disagree, on those issues on which they have chosen not to act jointly." In other words, the differences that have emerged are not irreconcilable or so deeply rooted as to rip the alliance apart. In fact, the authors argue, "properly managed, the differences could be turned into a beneficial complementarity, once the main points of contention have been overcome."[14] However, the case of Afghanistan has raised the question of NATO failure and the implications it would have for the alliance and transatlantic relations.

It is our contention that transatlantic relations are at a turning point. As we suggest above, there are deep divisions among the nations in the transatlantic alliance, but we, unlike Kagan, believe that as long as these divisions are recognized and respected, there is actually great potential for the relationship to strengthen. A number of Europe's long-standing leaders have left office (Blair, Chirac, Schroeder) whilst others (Brown, Merkel, Sarkozy) have come to office apparently intent on redefining policies, relations and priorities. The United States is undergoing a major shift in policy as it moves from eight

years of the Bush administration to the Obama presidency. First appearances indicate that these changes will bode well for the transatlantic partnership, since they could mitigate the polarization of the war in Iraq and the variable support for the war in Afghanistan. Still, there remain significant differences in the ways in which the various countries, all nominally allies, perceive the issues that are most important to them and the ways that those perceptions then become translated into policy decisions. If the countries focus on what separates them, rather than recognizing the many areas that they have in common, then the possibility of "repairing the damage" remains uncertain. However, if the various leaders can face the challenges and are able to recognize their areas of common concern, then the promise of a relationship built on complementary and supporting policies remains.

The Theoretical Framework

Classical realist international relations theory suggests that countries will join together in pursuit of common goals when it is in their perceived national interest to do so, and will remain in an alliance relationship as long as their mutual interests converge.[15] The assumption is that countries will maximize their power by working together, and, by so doing, be able to deter, or if necessary defeat, a common threat. For any relationship to endure and grow, there must be a sense of reciprocity in what each country hopes to derive from the relationship, and also in what each expects to be the outcome of decisions that are made. There must be a sense of mutual benefit, and the belief that in any cost-benefit analysis, the benefits will outweigh the costs. This suggests that the countries involved must believe that they are gaining more from continuing in the relationship than they would gain if they acted alone. What remains unclear is what shape this relationship will take when an individual country's needs and priorities change, and when the relationship is reassessed and possibly reconfigured in the future.

That theory would also suggest that countries are constantly balancing a range of variables in order to make effective foreign policy. Variables include not only the perception of the threat but also domestic priorities (for example, guns vs butter); the role of public opinion; the size, effectiveness and readiness of the military; geographic realities; and traditional ties and relationships, to name but a few. Furthermore, even countries that are close allies or have a close relationship are constantly reevaluating their relationships in

light of these critical factors. Thus, understanding foreign policy relationships means understanding the domestic and international context within which various decisions were made. This process is dynamic, and involves a network of ever-changing factors. However, in the case of nations on different sides of the Atlantic, whatever other factors were present, they were superseded by the presumed priority of the transatlantic relationship. As long as those countries were facing a common enemy and perceived a common threat, they were willing to overlook not only differences but transgressions that in other settings or contexts would have driven them apart.

Hence, for example, the Suez Crisis of 1956 presented a challenge to the closest of allies—the UK, France, Israel and the United States—yet one that could be weathered in light of the larger picture that held this group of countries together. Similarly, consider the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (neutron bomb) debacle of 1978, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's famous speech in 1977 questioning the resolve of the United States and Ronald Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly referred to as "Star Wars"—all resulted in periods of estrangement across the Atlantic.[16] More recently the decision of the United States and some European countries in 2003 to go to war against Iraq led to a serious rift between nations. The difference between these earlier cases and the more recent one is the absence of a common threat. Europeans and Americans could work together and work through the issues that separated them as long as they had a good reason to want to remain allied, and that reason was the Soviet Union. Once that threat was removed, each country had to rethink its priorities, the role of the military and, most important, its defense and security posture in light of a changing world.

This is not to suggest that today there are no threats facing these countries; in fact, there are many. However, they are not as focused or directed as the single and overwhelming threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nor is there even agreement as to the magnitude of these threats, or the priority that should be given to the possible range of threats, let alone how countries should counter them. This lack of agreement, too, has served to divide the countries of the alliance rather than bring them together.

As a result of these factors and others, these countries now face new challenges that threaten their relationship. What are their common interests and concerns, and are these enough to overcome the differences that seem to separate them? As the Europeans think more about the EU and look elsewhere

for allies, such as the Mediterranean, what role do they see the United States playing in their future? And as for the United States, which for eight years took a perverse pride in charting its own course, what global role does it see itself now playing?

In order to answer these questions, we need to examine the critical actors as individual case studies and from those, draw some general conclusions about the future of transatlantic relations.

An Overview of the Transatlantic Relationship

NATO celebrated its 60th birthday in April of 2009. It is easy to overlook the history of the alliance, which has been somewhat strained at times. It is important to remember, furthermore, that NATO is only one part of a much larger relationship that transcends the countries on either side of the Atlantic and includes other countries in the English-speaking world such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as extending into parts of the former Soviet Union and Eurasia. It is virtually impossible to understand transatlantic relationships without also looking at the relationship between NATO and the EU; the latter has also been a point of contention as it works toward a common foreign and defense policy. And one cannot adequately address transatlantic relations without also looking at the often-strained relationships between the countries on both sides of the Atlantic and Russia, at a time when Russia seems to be becoming more assertive.

Looking at the transatlantic relationship another way, we need to consider the breadth of the relationship, which goes far beyond security defined in terms of defense and the military. Rather, as the economic downturn that started in 2008 shows clearly, these countries are tied economically through trade and financial policies and institutions, a point that has directly affected their interaction in a less-than-positive way. In addition, each of the countries involved has domestic political issues that it must consider which affect the relationships as well.

Given all this, however, the most important point and the one that ultimately affects the relationship the most is history and the shared values that have held this group of countries together and have allowed them to transcend some of the schisms that have threatened their cohesions-and the Alliance—in the past.

NATO: A Brief History

This brief overview will help set the stage for what had been thought of as the "norm" in transatlantic relations. US involvement with the European allies can be traced to the First and Second World Wars, when the US military became a critical part of the Allied victories. However, it really was not until the end of the World War II and the start of the Cold War that the critical role that the United States would play vis-à-vis Europe would become most apparent. The Truman Doctrine, articulated in 1947, made it clear that the United States was willing and able to play both an economic and a security role in Europe, particularly when it came to defending the allies against the forces of communism. President Harry Truman's speech to the Congress in March of 1947 affirmed U.S. policy: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[17] But this speech also denoted an important shift in relations between the United States and Europe, and, more important, in the role of the United States as a world leader.

With the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the United States superseded Great Britain as the major western military and economic power. This 1947 speech by Truman concerning the provision of aid to war-torn Greece confirmed the ascending US role in Europe vis-à-vis Britain: "No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government. The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece."[18] Once Congress authorized the funds, the role of the United States as the defender of countries fighting communism was established. The Truman Doctrine was followed shortly thereafter by the passage of the European Recovery Act, known more commonly as the Marshall Plan, which became law in April 1948. This more firmly linked the United States with the countries of Europe by providing infusions of money to help them recover from the war. In addition to further solidifying the role of the United States as a global leader, it also forced the European countries to work together, thereby helping to create the framework for what would ultimately grow into the European Union. In fact, the United States' goals in helping Europe recover from the war were not altogether altruistic, nor were they tied solely to the need to stop communist aggression.

Underlying the US's motives was also the desire to have a strong Europe as a trading partner, which would be mutually beneficial to all concerned.

Nonetheless, the precedent was set not only for US leadership, but for a solid relationship between the United States and the countries of Europe that was tied to security writ large. The underlying assumption was: only if countries were stable economically could they resist Soviet aggression and have the wherewithal to build the strong military necessary to defend themselves, should that become necessary.

These goals were ultimately embodied in the NATO treaty, which linked the then-democratic countries of Western Europe, the United States and Canada in a collective defense agreement (Article 5) as well as stressed political and economic collaboration (Article 2).[19] NATO formalized the relationship and firmly put the US nuclear arsenal at the heart of the NATO military structure to serve as a deterrent against Soviet aggression against the US or its allies.

From the time that it was created, NATO was designed to ensure that all member countries, large and small, powerful and less so, would have an equal say in decision making. The *NATO Handbook* states explicitly that "all . . . member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views around the Council table. Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by common consent [i.e., consensus]."[20] The reality differed from the theoretical ideal, however. The United States, with its nuclear arsenal and superpower status, emerged as the "first among equals," and it quickly became the de facto leader of the alliance, enhanced by its "special relationship" with Britain. In fact, the overwhelming military as well as economic power of the United States made this role the logical one for the United States to play. Even after Britain and France developed their own nuclear weapons, in 1952 and 1960 respectively, it was the nuclear arsenal of the United States that remained the major deterrent against Soviet attack.

As any number of histories of the NATO alliance have noted, relations among the NATO nations have not always been easy; a number of internal conflicts and disagreements have shaken the alliance during its history. In addition to the Suez Crisis of 1956, these conflicts included "the Thor-Jupiter decisions of 1957–1960 followed by the multilateral force discussion, De Gaulle's decision to withdraw France from the NATO unified military command structure in 1966, the Helmut Schmidt speech of 1977, followed by the dual-track decision of December 1979."[21] Alliance unity was put to the test

at various other points as well: objections over US involvement in Vietnam, Britain's decision to use force in the Falklands Conflict of 1982 despite some allies' objections and the US bombing of Libya in 1986 (supported only by Britain), are but a few examples of one country's foreign policy decisions not being supported by, or being enacted over the objections of, its allies.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought with them a sense of jubilation but also raised a number of other challenges not anticipated by the alliance. As NATO moved toward enlargement and the inclusion of new members from the former Eastern Bloc, it also had to confront the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, which proved to be a challenge to the cohesion of the European Union as well as NATO.

NATO Enlargement Issues and the Former Yugoslavia

Early in President Clinton's first term in office, his administration identified Europe as one foreign policy area in which he could have a significant impact; specifically, there was a decision to expand NATO eastward to incorporate the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as real partners.[22] Both Czech President Vaclav Havel and Poland's President Lech Walesa took advantage of a meeting in Washington in March 1993 to press for NATO expansion eastward, "to include the new democracies of Eastern Europe as an affirmation of shared values and common defense (i.e., Article 2)." According to the story, before the day was over, President Clinton "is reported to have accepted the logic of expanding the Alliance eastward into central Europe, and by the end of that year, the movement toward NATO enlargement was gaining momentum."[23]

The decision was not without controversy, however. Some in Europe felt that the initiative was being pushed by the United States without adequate consultation with its allies. France and Britain were especially wary of enlarging the alliance, in part because of their concern that an expanded membership would disturb its already-delicate decision-making balance. But even Michael Mandelbaum, one of the most outspoken critics of enlargement, noted that "the extension of NATO eastward is thus necessary to fill what the end of East-West rivalry has created: a vacuum."[24]

One of the factors complicating the discussion for NATO enlargement was the war then raging in Bosnia without any NATO involvement. In fact, by that

time, the EU had already sent in peacekeeping troops in what was to become the first test of EU security policy. The short-lived EU mission was succeeded by an equally ineffectual UN mission. But it soon became clear that what was needed was NATO intervention including the United States.

Issues related to NATO enlargement coupled with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and if and/or how NATO should respond dominated the NATO agenda for the remainder of the Clinton administration (until 2000). History has shown that NATO did move forward to enlargement. It now includes 28 member countries that go up to the borders of Russia; 50 countries comprise the broader Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including Russia. The enlargement issue remains difficult and controversial to the present, with ongoing discussions about the possibility—or wisdom—of admitting former Soviet Union (FSU) countries including Ukraine and Georgia. This possibility has enflamed Russia, which had always been skeptical of NATO enlargement, and increased the tension between Russia, those countries, and the NATO nations as a whole.

Similarly, the decisions to take action first in Bosnia and then against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999 were also divisive; they illustrate clearly the differences on the two sides of the Atlantic regarding the use of force. But, once the decisions were made, they also show clearly that the alliance would be willing to take military action beyond the traditional NATO Guidelines Area, that is, to go "out of area"; this helped set the precedent for the military action under way in Afghanistan as this volume goes to press.

For all its divisions, NATO was absolutely united in its decision to invoke Article 5 after 9/11 for the first time in its history. On September 12, according to its official web site, the North Atlantic Council "met in response to the attacks and agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."[25]

That unity was short-lived, however, as the United States under George W. Bush made the decision to move forward with—or without—the aid of its allies. Any divisions among the alliance members to that point paled in comparison to the objections raised and the schism that resulted because of the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003. It is that deep division that remains and that the United States must now confront if it is to rebuild relations with its allies on the other side of the Atlantic.

All the enmity that resulted from that decision, however, must also be weighed against the initial support given to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, that unity, too, seems to be waning in light of the ongoing war. What will be more telling from the perspective of the alliance, however, is what will happen to that unity and sense of common purpose after the war in Afghanistan ends.

The Relationship between NATO and the EU

In January 2001, NATO and the EU recognized their shared common strategic interests through an exchange of letters between the NATO secretary-general and the EU presidency that defined "the scope of cooperation and the modalities of consultation between the two organizations."[26] In December 2002, the two groups signed the NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which strengthened the relationship, and included the basis for practical work in crisis management, combating terrorism, conflict management, as well as increased consultation and cooperation.[27]

These goals were codified in the so-called "Berlin-Plus" arrangements, adopted on 17 March 2003, that provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. In effect, these arrangements allow the alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged. Subsequently, the ties between the two organizations have been strengthened through ongoing meetings between the leaders of each organization and through meetings held regularly between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee. Since the 2004 round of enlargement of both organizations, 19 countries are members of both the EU and NATO (see institutional map on page xiv).

For the purposes of this volume, however, the NATO-EU relationship not only reinforces the need to understand in broad terms the notion of "transatlantic," but also raises in stark relief the precarious role that some of the countries included here play, further underscoring our decision to include them. Paramount among these is Turkey, the only predominantly Muslim nation in NATO and a country with a critical geostrategic location. Turkey has been in accession talks with the EU since 2005, and President Bush actively supported its membership. However, talks remained stalled officially because of Turkey's relationship to Cyprus, a relatively recent EU

member, although clearly there are other issues that work against Turkey's membership.

The leaders of both Ukraine and Georgia have indicated their desire to see their respective countries included in both NATO and the EU. However, Moscow has made it clear how much it objected to these possibilities. Russia's decision to cut off the flow of oil to Ukraine most recently in January 2009 also served as a stark reminder of the power that Russia has because of oil. Both Ukraine and Georgia seek further ties with the West, seeing themselves more closely allied with the NATO/EU countries at this point than with their former parent. But the political as well as military costs of admitting one country or both could be severe, and the discussion alone could further undermine, rather than strengthen, the relationship among the countries of the Atlantic region, broadly defined.

As we consider the various countries in the transatlantic region and the relationships between and among them, it is important to look at the juxtaposition of the priorities of each country as they are balanced against those of the whole. Ultimately, that balance is what will help determine the future of the transatlantic relationship.

The Approach of the Volume

In many ways, it would be virtually impossible for any one person to address the range of critical countries involved given the unique perspective that each has, let alone do a significant job of addressing the important issues that affect each country and the overall relationship. Thus, in this volume we bring together country experts from both sides of the Atlantic to address some of these issues. Each of the contributors has produced a chapter built around a set of themes that we think are most salient in understanding that country's perspective. In order to provide a uniform basis for comparison, all of the contributors have been asked to address certain common issues, and then to note how and in what ways the country that they are studying brings other factors to bear that could affect the relationship. For example, in order to get the most comprehensive understanding of each country's perspective, all contributors were asked to provide historical background on the domestic context within which security and foreign policy decisions are, and have been, made. This would include the role of public opinion, as well as domestic politics. Each was asked to describe the security dimension within the country

studied, including the changing nature of the threat and the role of the military as a decision maker or "stakeholder" in affecting the policies developed to meet that threat. All chapters give some background on the various alliances or relationships with which that country is involved, not only NATO but beyond, and how those relationships have played a role in influencing the emerging foreign and security policy of the nation.

More specifically, among the overarching themes that each contributor has been asked to address are the following: differing and changing perceptions of "threat" and terrorism since 9/11; the role of domestic politics and policies in determining or affecting transatlantic relations; the role of the public and the media within each of these countries; the strategic culture, including the role of the military and the use of force as well as the evolution of the country's security policy and posture; evolution of the security dimension, broadly defined to include military/security, but also to include what can be broadly termed "human security," such as the environment, economic well-being and the like; responses to the threat and the changing notion of security, including the country's relations to other actors; and finally, some conclusions about the future of transatlantic relations from the perspective of that country, given the points discussed above.

Given all this, each contributor was asked to speculate on what s/he sees as the future of transatlantic relations from the perspective of that country. Our goal is to use the ideas put forward in these chapters and the country experts' analyses to draw general conclusions about the future of the transatlantic relationship.

Chapter 1 reviews how transatlantic relations have been viewed within international relations theory. The book then takes a North American perspective, with chapters viewing these relations from the point of view of Canada and the United States. This is then followed by the European view, again subdivided into various national perspectives encompassing a range of nations drawn from the principal European EU/NATO members (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) to NATO's sole predominantly Muslim state (Turkey) to nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Poland) or Soviet Union and are seeking greater integration within Europe (Ukraine and Georgia), and finally Russia. The final chapter then undertakes a comparative analysis and draws some general conclusions.