Notice

This third volume of *Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise* could be read as autonomous: while the problematics addressed in volumes 1 and 2 are requisites for an understanding of this one, they are re-introduced, excavated, and re-examined here. In certain respects one might even say that *Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise* constitutes a good introduction to *The Fault of Epimetheus* and *Disorientation*.

Five years passed between the publication of *Disorientation* and the completion of this volume. This third part of *Technics and Time* was already in nearly finished form by 1992 and could have—should have—appeared soon after *Disorientation*. A number of things contributed not only to the delay in its publication but to profound modifications in both its contents and the order of its publication. The work that was originally to have been the third in the series (and will now be the fifth and last), *The Necessary Default* [*Le défaut qu'il faut*], has now been displaced by *Cinematic Time*, and by another volume that will appear next, *Symbols and Diabols, or The War of Minds*.

I already felt when I sent *Disorientation* to Galilée that what would have appeared next, *The Necessary Default*, did not seem to connect with the first two volumes as I wished it to: the force of the requisite connective evidence was lacking; the text did not seem to emerge from an undeniable necessity, and some work remained to be done regarding the initial and grounding idea of the work as a whole—particularly since the first version of what was to become the *last* volume of *Technics and Time* had been written twenty years ago and still constituted, at that moment,

the starting point for the entire project, including the present volume, as an introductory discourse to the *necessary* default, to what defaults *are*.

While revising *Disorientation* in the 1990s I noticed this *connective fault* [*défaut d'enchaînement*]: reading Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* more closely as the very heart of modern philosophy, but also as the focal point of the idea that, despite many previous readings, had escaped me. Re-reading it then led me to feel immediately that I had made a major step toward identifying a kind of familiarity with or understanding of this idea that I had previously seen only indistinctly. I sensed that this hypothesis, were it to be validated, was of great importance for the rest of my work.

This hypothesis, laid out in this volume, required five more years to be completed; it was interrupted by a rupture in my professional life: following work I completed as part of my activities at the University of Compiègne, I became general director at the National Audiovisual Institute (INA) in spring 1996 and remained there until 1999. These were three infernal years rich with adventures that, though they left me exhausted, contributed a great deal to this book, whose completion permits me, after the fact, to celebrate that challenging test as also having been an opportunity, especially since the kind of slow reflection I had just experienced with Kant was all the more necessary. Yet though inundated by duties that left little time for work (i.e., for thinking) and hardly even for my immediate professional obligations, *that* nonetheless continued to work within me: *that* being the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the reading I had done of it in 1995. Indeed, the idea had invaded me: without my being conscious of it, it was working away in me even while I was busy with work that seemed to me to be of a completely different order.

This third volume appears, then, as constituted *precisely* through an encounter between a Kantian question and concerns with which I was occupied at INA: the development of the new industry of temporal objects.

Maignelay-Montigny, November 14, 2000