CHAPTER ONE

The Ethnic Question

Premodern Identity for a Postmodern Europe?

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In periods of European Union expansion and economic contraction, European leaders have been pressed to define the basis for membership and for accommodating the free movement of citizens. With the lowering of Europe's internal borders,[1] the member nations have raised the question of whether a European passport is sufficient to integrate mobile populations into local communities. Addressing the European Parliament on the eve of the 1994 vote on the Czech Republic accession to the European Union, Vaclav Havel, then president of the Czech Republic, selected particular civic values to define the new Europe to which all citizens would subscribe:

> The European Union is based on a large set of values, with roots in antiquity and in Christianity, which over 2,000 years evolved into what we recognize today as the foundations of modern democracy, the rule of law and civil society. This set of values has its own clear moral foundation and its obvious metaphysical roots, whether modern man admits it or not.[2]

Havel's claim that Greco-Roman and Christian values define what it means to be European can be read as a prescription for policy, and even sociability. In the increasingly multicultural Europe his definition has been repeated, but it has also been challenged: scholars, policy makers, and ethnic community representatives debate the most effective response to increasing heterogeneity and social conflict. For those who endorse, and also for those who reject Havel's idea of binding moral roots, this new collection on ethnicity in globalized Europe reveals surprising positions.

The scale and quality of change since Havel's 1994 speech challenges confidence that we know the principles to socialize new Europe. During 1995–2005, immigration into the European Union grew at more than double the annual rate of the previous decade.[3] Within the overall population growth, employment statistics, specifically for residents of very recent immigrant origin, are difficult to aggregate, but in terms of accessing professional positions, the numbers show a steep downward trend.[4] As immigration continues to grow, the lagging employment statistics offer one kind of evidence that recent immigrants face disproportionate difficulty accessing economic benefits beyond state welfare and unemployment provisions.[5] In this constituency, the rising entry rate and falling number of fully employed raise questions about how newer ethnic communities integrate into local community, and also about how they participate in the Union's system of expanding regional mobility. Once within the European Union, does the failure of particular groups to gain professional employment constrain access to economic and educational mobility? What impact does the lack of mobility have on ethnic and civic identity?

This collection offers new ways to see how thinking ethnically, even in sympathy with minority rights, may be creating a condition that constrains the European Union's grand promise of a European community. While Europe's open internal borders offer the promise of professional and social mobility, the region is following two tracks, in one direction for mobile citizens and in another for immigrants who arrive from increasingly distant origins and who do not integrate in the flow of students and advanced professionals able to relocate around Europe. In one tightly integrated volume, this collection gives the reader the unique and exciting combination of social science and humanist answers to these questions of globalized Europe. The essays, written by some of our most influential authors and analysts, take us

into Europe's fast-growing communities, sweeping us from the global to the local. The collection moves along as if descending from the high vantage point of generalized views of mass-scale diasporas, down into the details of neighborhoods, borderlands, and the arts and literature spawned by the creative mixing of ethnic cultures. We begin by forming a theoretical basis for discussion.

Using Ethnicity

Beyond lack of integration, increasingly intense and at times violent conflict raises questions about ethnic theory and policy. When we use ethnic categories, do we protect or rather divide and marginalize an identity? In the East, such questions spring from states founded on ethnic ties: will European Union and international community safeguards of ethnic Balkan enclaves produce normalized relations after massacres and ethnic cleansing? Does European and U.S. recognition of Albanian Kosovo validate claims for Flanders, Scottish, and Corsican independence and Basque ethnic heritage? Does litigation in the name of Roma—as opposed to human—rights impose on Italy and Croatia a mandate for effective policies of integration, or segregation?[6] In the West, concern stems from the contrary tradition of suppressing the politics of ethnic difference: the widespread riots in France in 2005 and 2007 by urban youths of mainly North and West African descent against police forces raise questions about the relevance and enforcement of the French non-ethnic, secular, republican model. In the United Kingdom, the tradition of multiculturalism, while distinct from French republicanism, is aimed for a similar goal of creating a common community beyond ethnic difference.[7] Yet the recent trials of suspects in the 2005 London transit bombings, ending in several court dismissals, have done little to resolve confusion about government policies to recognize local Imams as representatives of British Islamic communities.[8] With eroding confidence in national or local religious leaders to explain the violence, analysts assert contradictory explanations linking or distinguishing violence, ethnic communities, and policies of multiculturalism. Government prosecutors, media outlets, and self-proclaimed Islamic community leaders each speak for increasingly suspected UK Muslim communities, alternately claiming that the London

public was targeted by those protesting UK troops sent to Iraq, or rather by domestic Islamic fundamentalist terrorist cells waging a campaign for community Shari'a law within larger UK society.[9]

In the French case, the violence of 2005 and 2007 has ruptured confidence in the balance traditionally struck between public security and ethnic tolerance.[10] France's official response was aimed more to excise rather than reintegrate the protesters. If there are identity-based messages from the protestors, their shared grievance has been effectively characterized as little more than the urge to vandalize. In 2005, against a backdrop of successive nights of media images of attacks on security police and private property, then interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy announced the imposition of "zero tolerance" for those he termed "*racaille*" [scum].[11] The descriptor was deployed to shape public opinion, and by and large had its intended effect. The Interior Ministry was given responsibility to marshal the response, when the prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, initiated a meeting of the government (Conseil des Ministres) to declare a national state of emergency. The declaration of emergency invoked a law dating from the 1954–62 War of Algerian Independence, and applied only previously against ethnic uprisings in French Algeria and New Caledonia for searches, detainments, house arrests, and press censorship without court warrant. Today we can note the irony of invoking a law originally written to suppress ethnic independence in order to put down what the government insisted was mainly vandalism; but at the time, fear of violence overwhelmed such insight into the government's awareness of the importance of the protestors' ethnic identity.

Based on the ministry's own records, the violence likely did not catch the government by complete surprise. As was reported in early July 2004, before the first episodes of riots, the French Interior Ministry had been presented with a report as early as June 2004 which documented nearly two million citizens living in districts of social alienation, racial discrimination, and poor community policing.[12] The document raised an alert that youth unemployment in what journalists have long referred to as *quartiers chauds* [troubled neighborhoods] surpassed 50 percent. Although a 1978 law has to a large extent impeded ethnic-based surveys, the report nevertheless acknowledges what most already understood: that the majority of the unemployed and disenfranchised youth were French-born whose parents or grandparents were of African descent.[13]

French researchers continue to struggle with constraints limiting ethnic data gathering. Social scientists characterize the problem of ethnic identity in France as a challenge to make visible the social phenomenon that is lived but officially kept invisible.[14] A recent book from the School for Advanced Study of the Social Sciences (EHESS) documents what seems to be renewed self-identification among French of Caribbean and African descent of a newly reconsidered common "black" identity.[15] The shared identity is not easily created. Post-war labor migrations from the French Caribbean and Francophone African diasporas formed mainly separate communities in France, but their children may be forming bonds.[16] While state-sponsored surveys still cannot collect data on ethnic family heritage, the youngest generation of French families from the Caribbean and the sub-Saharan Africa are creating an ethnic identity one step beyond even family heritage. The most recent generation of children of immigrants from the French Caribbean and from French sub-Saharan Africa are identifying as a community of "black" French.

Ethnicity—Postwar and Today

Postwar era immigration, from the 1950s European reconstruction through the 1960s and 1970s decolonization, is best defined as postcolonial migration.[17] As part of the extensive rebuilding of postwar Europe, European governments targeted particular nationalities in and around the greater Mediterranean region to attract an immigrant labor force. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, continued immigrant labor programs brought workers and their families, as well as the development of communities—planned and unplanned—that became neighborhoods for immigrants who essentially moved from countries that had been colonial periphery regions to the outskirts of cities in what had been the imperial metropole.[18] The new residents' education, language, and collective memory had been significantly shaped by colonial administrations, and that background gave them some familiarity with the host societies. Since 1990, however, and based on projections in this collection, we have entered a period, for lack of a better name, of post-postcolonial diaspora.

The peoples emigrating to Europe are increasingly coming from lands without characteristic European colonial heritage.[19] While few countries of

origin have no instance of European intervention, the new arrivals are adding rapidly growing numbers of émigrés of global diasporas from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Israel, as well as the Indonesian archipelago, the Philippines, and sub-Saharan and East Africa. This most recent demographic trend takes Europe, and the larger transatlantic West, into an era not well served by existing models of how individuals integrate and communities differentiate.[20]

In this collection, nine prominent authors substantiate this shift. The essays offer extended arguments on microhistories and long-term trends. In combination they create an unusual and productive dialogue between humanist cultural studies and social scientist modeling to confront assumptions and clarify recent trends of immigrant origin, European identity, and policies of tolerance.[21] It is clearest to begin the collection with the most basic question: How and why are some included and others excluded as members of new Europe? In Part One, three essays by Saskia Sassen (sociology/global thought, Columbia University), Rogers Brubaker (sociology, UCLA), and Salvador Cardús (sociology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) refine the value of ethnicity as a category for understanding European social membership. Sassen highlights the way expanding Europe is also globalizing Europe, and reveals the implications of the overlapping local, national, supranational, and global domains for establishing who determines citizenship—or more broadly, membership—and in which constituency. As new immigrants enter the European Union, they relate simultaneously with traditional communities, voluntary organizations, and national governments but also with the increasingly robust European Union institutions, and now with global corporations. For example, a Hindu immigrant from Bangalore, India, to London, England, may join greater London in an established neighborhood of postcolonial émigrés but also may seek access to British cultural clubs (such as social, sports, and leisure membership organizations), attempt to run for electoral office, appeal to European Union labor protections, and find employment in a private multinational corporation that limits its responsibility to European labor laws. While in one domain the ethnic immigrant may be alien, new Europe in Sassen's model offers concentric spheres of membership that demand fresh study.

Brubaker offers an elegant model of ethnicity as an identity socially organized and politically expressed. In his model, if we are to understand ethnic

identity in its European context, we must treat separately the two realms—the social and the political—to clarify the special interplay between today's flows of immigration, separatist movements in the East and West, and the dynamic state formation in Europe's eastern reaches. In today's Europe, immigrants affirm an ethnic affinity and heritage by joining social groups, and this ethnicity may or may not coincide with the territorial ethnicity defended by the nation. European ethnicities, in this model, are the result of the relationship between populations that are mobile, or that can mobilize, and state ambitions. A most intriguing implication of Brubaker's insight is that in Western Europe the weakening of the state may offer a means of satisfying demands for ethno-national self-determination. In several cases, including Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom, membership in the European Union may enable states to devolve power to ethno-regions, to satisfy demands and also maintain institutions that can mediate disputes. In addition, Brubaker's sociopolitical model of ethnic identity enables him to argue that for Eastern Europe the concern over the instability caused by the breakup of the ethno-Hungarian empire is to some extent answered by the accession of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania to the European Union. Now under a bureaucratic apparatus legislated by a parliament in Strasbourg and an executive commission in Brussels, these communities with historical ethnic ties are once again under a single administrative structure.

Facing the global and regional models of Sassen and Brubaker, Cardús warns of the risk we run when we assume that ethnicity describes an organic condition. Although he acknowledges that ethnographers have replaced the biological category of race with the idea of cultural ethnicity, he nevertheless detects an area of concern, where theories of European society contain the assumption that mobile groups carry their ethnic qualities from one community to the next, as if cultural attributes are static, genetically coded, and unaffected by social relations. Cardús's essay is best compared with those of Sassen and Brubaker by interchanging the variables in the three models. Sassen makes the communities and domains (neighborhood, nation, employer) relative, and Brubaker makes the relationship between individuals and institutions (national versus supranational ethnic politics) variable: Cardús argues that even if domains and national relations hardly change, Europe's increasingly mobile individuals alter the surface of their cultural attributes—their manners, folk customs, and religious observance—to negotiate their

group membership. All three theorists, in this way, see today's Europe as a kind of laboratory of belonging, in which the institutions that include, the individuals who join, and the relating of the two are all transforming along with the expanding and globalizing society.

In Part Two, essays by Alec Hargreaves (French, Florida State University) and Pavle Levi (art and art history, Stanford University) with Želimir Žilnik (filmmaker, Serbia) reveal the way ethnicity nevertheless continues to be used to divide society, and to marginalize and alienate minorities. Hargreaves brings to light the consequences of the French government's history of obscuring ethnically coded survey data. By statutorily blocking the collecting in surveys of identifying ethnic detail, the French state continues its traditional commitment to its model of civic republican citizenship. However, Hargreaves also reveals how state media, housing, and employment agencies consistently perpetuate and accentuate ethnic profiling and stereotypes, often in clumsy projects to overcome discrimination and grievances that are not officially recognized. The result in France has been a tightening spiral of ethnic grievance, official denial, state-sponsored positive action policy, and the muting of research that could address minority grievance. Blocking social scientists from studying ethnic data cripples their efforts to document conditions, give voice to minority groups, and offer systematic analysis that could serve as the basis for improved state policy. As noted earlier in this essay, the republican model of citizenship, and the policy dictated to defend it from modern research detail, appears increasingly at odds with the rise of newly forming ethnic identities especially among younger generations of Francophone Caribbean and West African descent.

Levi focuses on the Balkan lands and what they reveal of Europe's tense internal relations. In sharp contrast to the European Union promise of the free flow of citizens between member states, this essay shines light on the shadow regions of border lands, and on a major artist's career spent documenting the experience of Europe's internal undocumented immigrants. Levi interviews and annotates the comments by one of Europe's leading filmmakers, Želimir Žilnik, whose films date from and depict the years of the most robust European Union expansion and internal immigration, from the 1960s to the present. Žilnik's recent films document the conditions and testimonies of those who attempt to cross without papers or sufficient economic resources from Moldova, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, and Ser-

bia into Italy, Austria, and the Czech Republic. Immigrants, local police, and border town residents each caricature one another as ethnic aliens: they agree, however, that the European Union Schengen agreement, promoted as a safeguard for citizen mobility, seems to them principally a means of facilitating the free flow of organized crime. Levi uses the interview with Žilnik to articulate in words what the filmmaker attempts in visual style: a manifesto on the ability of art and film to influence the creation of European transnational, multiethnic border cultures.

In Part Three, four essays by Bassam Tibi (international relations/ professor at large, University of Göttingen/Cornell University), Kader Konuk (Germanic/comparative literature, Michigan State University), Leslie Adelson (German studies, Cornell University), and Carole Fink (history, Ohio State University), build on this collection's theory and critique to propose four bold models of ethnicity as a promising tie for socializing Europe. Tibi begins with criticism of European multiculturalism, which, he argues, inadvertently enables European Islamist fundamentalism. He levels this critique in an attempt to challenge his fellow Muslim immigrants to embrace traditional European civic values (which he dates neither from antiquity nor the Christian era but rather from the French Revolution) as the foundation, not for multiculturalism but for a cultural pluralism that fosters social integration. In terms reminiscent of Havel's 1994 speech, but marked at an updated milestone of 1789, the result would replace Islamist fundamentalism with a Euro-Islam capable of Euro-integration.

Konuk sets Tibi's insight on European-Muslim ethnicity into the history of European-Turkish relations. Those readers questioning Turkey's European Union candidacy will find that the two essays shift the common critique of Turkish policy towards a more pressing question of Europe's social capacity to integrate prospective Turkish–European Union citizens. Konuk reveals the fate of European Jews who immigrated to Turkey during the 1930s, hired by Turkish universities as part of the Turkish modernization-Europeanization campaign, but never fully accepted as Turkish citizens. Just as this history reveals the fate of German Jews in Turkey, the essay reminds us to review Turkish experience in Germany. In the context of contemporary anxiety over Turkey's potential candidacy into the European Union, we are reminded of the history of difficulty both in Turkey and in Germany of integrating Turkish Germans and German Turks.