

CHAPTER I

PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN SOUTH AMERICA

BEFORE THE 1990S, Venezuela's two-party system was among the most stable and well-institutionalized party systems in the developing world (Coppedge 1994: 174–77). One of the two traditional parties won every fully democratic presidential election in the country's history. From the early 1970s through 1988, these traditional parties, in effect, faced no challengers, winning a combined share of at least 85 percent of the presidential vote in 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988. Over this period, the traditional parties also dominated the legislature.

In 1993, however, these established electoral patterns began to change rapidly. Both traditional parties lost roughly half of the support they had enjoyed in the previous presidential elections, and—for the first time in Venezuelan democratic history—the winner of the election was not endorsed by either of the established parties.

What began as traditional-party decline in 1993 culminated, in the 1998 presidential elections, in a party-system collapse (Dietz and Myers 2007; Morgan 2007).¹ Neither of the two traditional parties was able to get any traction for its selected candidate. One party endorsed a candidate from outside the party system early in the campaign cycle; the other waited until days before the election

to throw its support to that same outsider candidate. Thus the election became a contest between two candidates from outside the established party system. Both traditional parties have been electorally marginalized since that election.

The same election that saw the collapse of the Venezuelan traditional parties also elevated Hugo Chávez to the presidency. Subsequently, Chávez has departed dramatically from the moderate, pro-U.S. politics that were previously traditional in Venezuela, striking out instead in the direction of a bold, confrontational populist leftism (Hawkins 2011)—an approach that regularly reaches provocative symbolic heights, memorably including the moment when Chávez used a United Nations speech (on September 20, 2006) to characterize U.S. President George W. Bush as the devil (Lapper 2007: 19–20); more substantive moments of provocation include Chávez's repeated statements that he intended to construct "21st-century Socialism" and remake his country as a "Socialist Republic of Venezuela." In a country that had once been a leading U.S. ally in Latin America and a model of moderate democracy, the degree of political change represented by these events is breathtaking.²

In Peru during the 1980s, a less established party system also collapsed (Cameron 1994; Tanaka 1998; Dietz and Myers 2007). Three political parties had dominated the Peruvian electoral landscape starting roughly with the 1980 presidential elections. These three parties provided all of the major presidential candidates for the elections of the 1980s. They also controlled most of the seats in the legislature and won most local elections.

However, between 1985 and 1990, this three-way party system largely collapsed. From a combined 1985 presidential vote share of 85 percent, the traditional parties fell to a combined 1990 presidential vote share of only 31 percent. Indeed, neither of the two candidates who advanced to the second round of the 1990 Peruvian presidential elections came from a traditional party. In the wake of this 1990 collapse, the Peruvian traditional parties received single-digit vote shares in local and national elections for the rest of the 1990s.

During that decade, outsider president Alberto Fujimori instituted a free-market economic policy, featuring extensive privatizations and a sharp reduction in trade barriers, that substantially departed from the patterns of recent Peruvian economic history. In tandem with these economic reforms, Fujimori launched a military coup that overthrew Peru's democratic regime and dissolved the sitting Congress. He then held a constitutional convention that refounded

Peruvian democracy on Fujimori's terms. At the conclusion of a turbulent decade of personalist, anti-party electoral authoritarianism, Fujimori finally lost power in the wake of a fraudulent reelection in 2000 and a series of corruption scandals involving an ally of his: intelligence operative and dirty-tricks specialist Vladimiro Montesinos.³

The rise of Hugo Chávez and of Alberto Fujimori involves many convergent series of events. The personal biography of each leader is relevant, as are the stories of their tactical, ideological, and organizational preparations for electoral victory.⁴ Yet, the crucial role of these factors notwithstanding, it is difficult to imagine that either man would have won power if the Peruvian or Venezuelan party systems had not been in the process of collapse. If Fujimori or Chávez had faced credible, competitive candidates from established, valued traditional political parties, then they would have faced perhaps insurmountable challenges from voters' strategic voting calculations, citizens' loyalty to the existing parties, and the resource and visibility asymmetries associated with major-party status. Party-system collapse significantly reduced those obstacles to outsider victory. Hence, understanding the process of party-system collapse is a vital part of thinking about the political origins of Chávez or Fujimori.

Latin America is a notoriously turbulent region for political parties. Among countries where no party-system collapse occurred, net electoral volatility scores—the percentage of the overall vote that changes between two specified elections—for the period from 1982 through 1995 range from a low of 17.7 percent in Uruguay to a high of 64.3 percent in Brazil (Coppedge 2001: 175). Change in a party's electoral strength is not at all unusual in the region. Furthermore, the experience of debt crises, economic restructuring, and neoliberal reform during the 1980s and 1990s was far from politically placid. Perhaps the Peruvian and Venezuelan party-system collapses were merely typical instances of political instability during Latin America's neoliberal era?

In fact, while party-system change of some kind has indeed been common in the region, party-system collapse has been rare. In some countries, collapse was not an issue because no identifiable party system exists; examples include Ecuador and Panama. In other countries, including Chile and Costa Rica, an established party system was relatively stable through the 1980s and 1990s. Still other countries, Argentina in particular, but also Mexico and Uruguay, have undergone extensive party-system change without experiencing party-system

collapse. Thus, even in the context of Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, the changes observed in Peru and Venezuela stand out as extraordinary.⁵

How did these party systems collapse? What motivated most Peruvian and Venezuelan voters to abandon the traditional parties and instead vote for outsider candidates and parties? Why did leaders within the established parties not make strategic choices that could preempt voter alienation or bring alienated voters back? Political parties play a central role in processes of democratic representation and often profoundly shape the political experiences of citizens; hence, answers to these questions about party-system collapse are integral to understanding South American politics over the past three decades.

More generally, close attention to the processes of party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela illuminates why countries may violate the widespread expectation of partisan stability. Stability in party systems is predicted by multiple, convergent lines of research. Downsian theory regarding party decision-making predicts a stable partisan offering, down to the level of consistent ideological appeals over time, because party leaders always face the same strategic incentives in their interactions with each other and the electorate: "If the distribution of ideologies in a society's citizenry remains constant, its political system will move toward a position of equilibrium in which the number of parties and their ideological positions are stable over time" (Downs 1957: 115). Sociological research on party systems posits linkages between parties and fundamental social groups such as classes and religions; party-system stability, then, results from slow rates of change in social structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990; see also Wittenberg 2006). Research on voter decision-making supports an expectation of stability in relationships of identification, relationships that either reflect hard-to-change core social identities (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or the heuristic use of long-term information to facilitate short-term decision-making (Fiorina 1981). All three of these separate research traditions generate an expectation that party-system change should be gradual, conservative, and rare, an expectation that is only strengthened by the typical contrast in financial and organizational resources between established parties and their upstart, outsider rivals.⁶ Party-system collapses clearly violate this expectation; understanding their occurrence presents the opportunity to discover the conditions under which much of the established theory regarding political parties breaks down.

1.1 EXPLAINING PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE

Perhaps in part because party-system collapse represents an anomaly from many perspectives in the broader comparative theory of parties and party systems, a number of scholars have offered hypotheses regarding the causes of collapse. These hypotheses invoke a wide range of central causes, including both attributes of electorates and features of party leadership and organization. While the existing explanations are incomplete, and in some instances misleading, many provide useful elements for the construction of this book's explanatory account, outlined in Figure 1.1.

Some scholars account for party-system collapse by reference to features of societies' social class systems. For example, Roberts, while noting that political divisions in Venezuela during the process of party-system collapse "did not follow strict class lines," argues that "Chávez's appeal was especially pronounced among the unorganized subaltern sectors of the population" (Roberts 2003: 55). Thus, while arguing that party-system collapse is not a product of conflict between labor and capital, Roberts nonetheless explains it by reference to the politicization of a growing social polarization between "elites" and "the popular sectors." In effect, he says, the lines of class cleavage have shifted since the classical populist age in Latin America—but the social and party-system crisis are nonetheless to be understood as caused by class conflicts.⁷ Cameron offers




FIGURE 1.1. Causes of party-system collapse: overall structure of the argument

a parallel theoretical account, focusing on party-system collapse in Peru. Here, the relevant political cleavage is between the informal sectors and participants in the formal economy: Cameron argues that “[t]he flight from the formal economy and the breakdown of the traditional party system were two sides of the same coin” (1994: 10). Economic informality weakens established party systems, in Cameron’s view, by undermining patterns of party identification, reducing ties of communication and membership between parties and society, and generating a bloc of voters uninterested in traditional ideological appeals. Cameron’s and Roberts’s accounts differ in the details: party-system collapse may be due to informality or to poor, disorganized segments of society more generally; and the mechanism linking social class with partisan developments may involve the politicization of a perhaps latent social cleavage or more direct political and organizational effects. These points notwithstanding, explanations of party-system collapse as caused by class conflict share a key implication: actors from the specified class, rather than intra-class coalitions defined by a universalist ideological position or other shared political attitudes, should provide the central electoral impetus for party-system collapse. If—as is shown in Chapter 5 using survey data—there are no strong class differences in propensity to vote against the traditional parties during the key elections, then collapse must instead be explained by multi-class factors such as ideologies or attitudes shared by citizens who vote against the established party system.

Another natural approach is to account for party-system collapse as ultimately caused by citizens who engage in retrospective economic voting against the established parties as a group. Building on the well-known generalization that citizens vote against incumbents who preside over periods of poor economic performance, one might suppose that, if the traditional parties alternated in power through a period of consistent or recurrent economic crisis, voters would eventually turn against the parties as a bloc. Levitsky, for example, offers a version of this hypothesis, in conjunction with a party-organizational account to be discussed below, as an explanation for party-system collapse in Peru (Levitsky 2003: 236–38).

A related hypothesis is developed by Corrales (2002). In the context of an argument regarding the causes and consequences of confrontation between presidents and ruling parties during neoliberal reform periods, Corrales highlights Pérez’s 1992 decision to accede to his party’s demands that reform be

abandoned. This decision undermined the credibility of the state's commitment to neoliberalism, offering "cost-bearing sectors" of Venezuelan society the freedom to oppose reform and undermine the existing political parties. This opportunity structure, Corrales suggests, accounts for "the growth of Causa-R," the electoral victory of *Convergencia* in 1993, and indirectly even the political career of Hugo Chávez (Corrales 2002: 157–58). Here, it is not the economic pain produced by the failure to complete neoliberal reform that generates party-system collapse, but rather the redistributive effects of that reform in combination with elite political turmoil. Nevertheless, this account shares an important feature with the simple retrospective voting approach sketched above. Because reform opponents are identified by the economic costs they suffer owing to new policies, it follows that those voters who have the most intense subjective experience of economic suffering should be at the center of the coalition that brings about party-system collapse. For either version of the hypothesis, the analysis of macro-level data in Chapter 3 and survey data in Chapters 4 and 5 fail to support this hypothesis: some countries passed through devastating economic crises without experiencing party-system collapse, and, in Peru and Venezuela, voters with different views about the economy during the key elections do not differ markedly in their rates of identification with or voting for the traditional parties.

However, this does not imply that Corrales's hypothesis regarding the causes of collapse is altogether unhelpful. The proposed causal connections among perceptions of the economy, redistributive preferences and ideology, and voting behavior all need to hold for the economic-voting hypothesis to be supported. If, instead, we regard redistributive beliefs as somewhat autonomous from experiences of costs due to economic crisis and change, we have the alternative hypothesis that voters who had leftist ideological commitments, and who saw the traditional parties as unresponsive to these preferences, may have served as the driving force behind party-system collapse in Venezuela. This is Morgan's (2007, 2011) argument, in an analysis focusing on party identification rather than vote choice. The process was driven, on this account, by traditional parties' "failure to provide adequate substantive and symbolic representation to growing sectors of society" (Morgan 2007: 84), specifically those ideologically situated toward the center and the left of society. The hypothesis that party-system collapse is driven by poor representation is central to my argument regarding

Venezuela; a modified version of this hypothesis, focusing on the center and center-right rather than the left, is important for Peru as well.

Nonetheless, the ideological representation hypothesis can be improved by paying attention to the role of corruption perceptions and to the causal importance of emotion, discussed later in this chapter. Various scholars, particularly those who study Venezuela, have offered explanations of party-system collapse that highlight the probable importance of corruption and scandals in alienating citizens from the traditional parties. Coppedge, for example, argues that party-system collapse was produced by a widespread sense of “moral outrage” (2005: 311–14), a suggestion I develop further later in this volume. In Coppedge’s view, outrage was produced by a conjunction of economic crisis, corruption, and the traditional parties’ role in shielding corrupt politicians and bureaucrats from prosecution. This hypothesis suggests that the central citizen actors in the process of party-system collapse should be characterized by an interaction of two attitudes: they are both particularly concerned about the state of the economy and especially troubled by problems of corruption. Once again, the analysis of national-level and survey data in Chapters 3 and 5 shows that this expectation is not fully empirically supported; perceptions of corruption alone are not strongly correlated with vote choice; and concerns about corruption in interaction with negative attitudes regarding the performance of the economy is also a weak predictor of the decision by voters to abandon the traditional parties. Thus the roles of outrage and corruption as causes of party-system collapse need some degree of respecification.

Let us turn now from voter decision-making to a discussion of partisan elites. Some scholars characterize party-system collapse as the outcome of failed elite coordination or mistaken strategy. For example, Tanaka (1998: 201–35; 2006) focuses on episodes during which congressional leaders of traditional parties adopt strategies for dealing with an outsider president that, in retrospect, are clearly ineffective. For Peru, Tanaka highlights the traditional parties’ opposition to President Alberto Fujimori’s eventually successful neoliberal economic reforms, a position that may have helped marginalize the parties through the next several electoral cycles. Regarding Venezuela, Tanaka focuses on traditional party leaders’ decision to boycott the elections leading to Chávez’s Constitutional Assembly. One may agree with Tanaka that these were counterproductive decisions from traditional party leaders’ points of view and nonetheless note

that they constitute only a partial explanation of party-system collapse. Tanaka focuses on elite interactions after an outsider had already won the presidency, but avoids dealing with interactions between elites and voters during the electoral decline that led to the election of an outsider president—surely, at the very least, a central component of the puzzle of party-system collapse.⁸ In this book I focus directly on the contribution of elite-voter interactions to party-system collapse—the elite coordination and strategy problems Tanaka analyzes as elements of the aftermath of collapse rather than causes of that outcome. In this sense, Tanaka's work and the analysis in this volume may be regarded as complementary.

Another body of theory traces traditional party leaders' strategic failures (however characterized) during the process of collapse to features of party organization. Dietz and Myers (2007), for example, attribute party-system collapse to patterns of either excessive or inadequate party-system institutionalization, an intriguing but difficult-to-operationalize hypothesis. More fine-grained organizational hypotheses may help fill in some of the detail. In his extended discussion of the Argentine Peronist party's survival through the repeated crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, Levitsky develops a theory of party adaptability as an inverse function of a party's organizational routinization, or adherence to established rules, procedures, and institutional decision-making structures: "routinization limits the capacity of organization to respond quickly to environmental challenges" (Levitsky 2003: 18). Levitsky's discussion of routinization has a family resemblance to Kitschelt's theory of organizational entrenchment as the party-institutional explanation for politicians' strategic failures during periods of partisan adaptation (Kitschelt 1994: 212–23). However, Kitschelt's concept is more inclusive, treating large formal membership organizations, extensive patronage, size of the party bureaucracy, and the narrowness of the intra-party ideological distribution as indicators of organizational entrenchment. Levitsky, by contrast, explicitly characterizes mass linkages as a distinct dimension of party organization, focusing on the practical decision-making power of rules and bureaucracies within a party rather than the broader range of organizational issues highlighted by the concept of organizational entrenchment. The analysis of party organizational features in Chapter 7 finds strong support for Levitsky's proposal to treat party organization at a more nuanced level of conceptualization and measurement, while also suggesting that some

dimensions of Kitschelt's theory which are relatively neglected in Levitsky's account may nonetheless be important in understanding party leaders' strategic successes and failures during the periods of crisis that, in Peru and Venezuela, led to collapse.

Thus several of the above hypotheses regarding party-system collapse contain ideas that are further developed below. Yet many of them are contradicted by aspects of the data regarding collapse in Peru and Venezuela, as subsequent chapters will show, and none of them explains the decisions of both voters and party leaders during the process of party-system collapse. Instead, each hypothesis proposes explanations at the level of voters' decisions during elections, at the level of party strategy during periods of crisis, or at an aggregate national level. A fuller explanation of party-system collapse must provide a consistent account at all three of these analytic levels. Specifically, a theory of party-system collapse requires an account of the decision-making process that leads voters to abandon the traditional parties *and* an account of the factors that prevent party leaders from adjusting their party's electoral appeals to forestall voter defection. If we adopt the familiar metaphor of democratic elections as a political market, a more complete explanation of party-system collapse must provide a demand-side account—showing how voters came to decide that outsider candidates were preferable to the traditional parties, and a supply-side account—suggesting why the traditional parties failed to anticipate and adjust to voter expectations. This study develops and tests such a joint explanation. That explanation integrates themes from many of the hypotheses mentioned above, as well as some key ideas from political psychology, to create a more complete, multivariate, and empirically rich theoretical narrative of the process of party-system collapse.

1.1.1 Voter Decision-Making and Party-System Collapse

Interactions between voters and political leaders are inherently reciprocal in nature. Nonetheless, some point of entry into this process is necessary in order to make sense of the decisions by elites and the masses that created party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela. Voter decision-making processes are an attractive theoretical starting point because voting is (temporally and causally) the final step that produces party-system collapse (see Figure 1.1). Such a collapse by definition cannot happen unless voters choose outsider candidates over those

from the traditional parties; voters are thus the final link in any causal chain leading to party-system collapse. This book argues that voters abandon party systems because corruption scandals erode patterns of party identification, and because poor ideological representation then provides a motive for turning to outsider candidates.

It is useful to start the discussion by asking why party-system collapse is an uncommon event. Why do voters so rarely decide to abandon a country's traditional parties and support an outsider candidate? Such a decision is at least as inherently risky as supporting a party with a reputation for unreliability (Downs 1957: 105–8; Stokes 2001: 8–9; Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001). Candidates from outside the established political system typically have little governing experience and often have a scant political reputation against which the credibility of campaign appeals may be evaluated. Because such candidates also usually have weak or nonexistent alliances with legislators and other national politicians, there is a serious risk of political crisis and deadlock if the outsider is elected. Furthermore, voting for a candidate who does not come from an established party carries a strong risk that one's vote will be wasted. The presidency is, after all, a one-seat office. Hence the risk-averse will face severe strategic-voting pressure against opting for a candidate who does not represent a traditionally winning party (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997). For the relatively small number of voters who are very risk-acceptant, these uncertainties may not be a substantial deterrent to supporting a candidate from outside of the traditional party system, and a single source of dissatisfaction with the traditional party system may suffice to persuade such voters to support candidates from new parties or movements (Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001).⁹ However, a party-system collapse cannot be produced entirely by those who are highly risk-acceptant by nature. For the more risk-averse by temperament, either a truly powerful motive or a psychological process that produces a temporary increase in risk acceptance is needed to mitigate the uncertainties associated with a vote for a candidate from a nontraditional party. In fact, as will be discussed below, risk aversion is itself endogenous to the process of party-system collapse; citizens' attitudes toward the existing parties, and the existing social and political system more generally, may affect their broad attitudes toward the uncertainties associated with change, as suggested in the right-hand links in Figure 1.2.




FIGURE 1.2. Voters and party-system collapse: refining the argument

What kinds of motives might outweigh the uncertainties and risks of voting for a candidate from outside the traditional party system? A rational-choice approach would suggest that any motive, if held with sufficient fervor, would be sufficient. A single issue about which a voter is particularly passionate, and for which none of the traditional parties' views is acceptable to the voter, can make the traditional parties costly enough to her that she willingly bears the risk of voting for a nontraditional party. This insight seems valid; even in very established and stable party systems such as that in the United States during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, socially and politically marginal third parties proliferate, and voters seem to choose those parties for a vast array of reasons (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996).

Yet accounting for party-system collapse requires more than explaining the motives of a handful of citizens, disgruntled in a variety of sincere but unusual ways with the existing party system. Collapse is a situation in which nearly all voters decide, over a short period of time, to abandon the traditional political parties. A motive that involves unusual or only narrowly supported goals and values can lead to defections from the traditional party system, but the defections will involve a relatively small minority and thus will not substantially change the strategic-voting situation for the remaining voters.

Furthermore, for many or most sources of dissatisfaction that voters may have with an administration, a set of candidates, or even the traditional parties, numerous plausible political strategies are open other than voting for an outsider candidate. For example, consider a risk-averse voter who feels ideologically distanced from all of the traditional-party candidates. Even if a nontraditional candidate appeals ideologically to a voter, uncertainty about that candidate's electability, competence, honesty, alliances, and even the credibility of her ideological appeal itself are likely to combine to make the outsider candidate less attractive than traditional-party politicians. Similarly, for a risk-averse voter who is unhappy with the incumbent's economic management, at least two alternatives, less uncertain in comparison with a politician from outside the traditional party system present themselves. She may vote for an opposition party from within the traditional system.¹⁰ Alternatively, she may choose to accept the inevitable assurances of the candidate from the incumbent party that the candidate's new governing team has learned from the mistakes of the past and will offer more competent economic governance.

As a final example, consider a risk-averse voter concerned that the incumbent administration is deeply corrupt. While a nontraditional candidate is almost certain to promise a corruption-free administration, candidates from the traditional parties will probably also make such promises. In addition, living as she does in a society that is plagued by repeated corruption scandals—a condition that applies to the South American countries where party-system collapse occurred—our voter will probably expect, based on experience, that even the average politician who claims to be honest is quite corrupt. She may therefore tend to disbelieve both traditional and outsider candidates' claims and therefore lack a motive for supporting the outsider over the traditional parties. More generally, it is important to bear in mind that, in Hirschman's (1970) terms, dissatisfied voters have a range of strategies related to voice and loyalty, as well as the option of exit.

To explain why voters choose exit, rather than voice or loyalty, the intuitive rational-choice framework in which voters select the party or candidate that provides the highest expected utility is insufficient; the central explanatory problem here involves understanding voters' utility functions themselves, a question for which rational-choice theory offers few systematic answers. This book develops and tests a complementary perspective on the reasons why voters act in ways that produce party-system collapse, drawing on ideas about how affect and cognition interrelate.

A great deal of research supports the hypothesis that emotions are intimately involved in the processes of political evaluation and judgment (e.g., Forgas 2000; Lodge and Taber 2000; Neuman et al. 2007). Affective evaluation of new political information may begin even before specifically rational evaluation takes place, and explicit rational evaluation of political information often results in emotional associations that persist long after the relevant information is forgotten. Citizens' political thought processes thus have constant access to emotion as an implicit running tally of past political information, a prompt to engage in rational deliberation when most needed, and a heuristic decision rule for determining when to set aside habitual standing political decisions and accept riskier alternatives (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). It seems only sensible to look to emotional considerations in developing a theory of which categories of concerns affect mainstream voters' decisions to abandon a traditional party system.¹¹

Emotion does not have uniform effects on citizens' decision-making processes. Negative emotions, in particular, can differ in how they influence decision-making processes (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). Because different negative emotions can affect decision-making, we will be able to specify which categories of affect—and potentially which associated categories of cognition and real-world situations—are most likely to motivate a citizen to abandon the traditional party system during a collapse.

A key and well-studied distinction among negative emotions involves the contrast between anger and anxiety/fear. Experimental research has shown that angry individuals form more optimistic assessments of risks and are more risk-acceptant in their decision-making than their anxious or sad counterparts (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; see also Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000: 46–64). Anxious individuals, by contrast, gather more political information and base their vote choice more directly on the content of the information to which they have access (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000: 80–94; Parker and Isbell 2010). Anger and fear are among the more common negative emotions, and may be developmental primitives from which many other negative emotions emerge (Panksepp 1998: 41–58). Hence, in seeking to understand the origins of citizens' preference for party-system collapse, our attention should be focused squarely on the causes and consequences of these negative emotional primary colors. Which modes of affect lead citizens to turn their backs on their country's traditional parties and accept the risks associated with voting for outsiders with no political track record or organization? Both anger and fear likely play central roles at one stage or another of the process, with anger signaling to voters that the risks of supporting an outsider candidate are more than matched by the record of pain inflicted by the traditional parties.

Feelings of anxiety among voters are important for party-system collapse, because such feelings are connected with their decision to reject habit, seek new information, and revise standing decisions and commitments. Without such reevaluation, party-system collapse would be extremely unlikely. Instead, voters would probably rely on established habits and political identities as a basis for voting, a decision-making strategy that would reinforce the traditional party system. Hence, widespread anxiety helps set the stage for party-system collapse. The cause of such near-universal anxiety is most often a broad, multi-faceted societal crisis, as suggested at the left end of Figure 1.2. When such a

crisis arises in a society, there is ample motive for a wide range of individuals to open the door to a thoroughgoing reevaluation of their political identities and habitual commitments. The analysis of cross-national survey data in Chapter 3 shows that economic crisis can play a partial role in producing the kind of anxiety that translates into doubts about the viability of the political system; presumably, a larger and more multi-faceted crisis will produce a stronger, more nearly universal sense of fear and doubt. Thus, while economic crisis cannot by itself explain party-system collapse, it can raise the stakes connected with the other issues that serve as more direct causes of collapse.

Anxiety may open the door to revisiting settled decisions, but anger plays the decisive role in movements away from the traditional party system, either at the level of voting behavior or at the causally prior level of political identity. Party identification is a particularly important obstacle to party-system collapse; if a society has a substantial number of partisan loyalists, then the traditional parties have a cushion of support that will keep them competitive even during times of difficulty, crisis, and political failure. In both Peru and Venezuela, substantial numbers of voters initially reported party identifications. So it is important to understand how voters come to revise or abandon party loyalties during periods when high anxiety and make major change a possibility.

When a society undergoes a persistent run of high-level corruption scandals, the result is a pervasive skepticism about, and hostility toward, politicians. On the one hand, corruption scandals involve by definition situations in which politicians act in favor of their own private interests at the expense of the interests of society as a whole. This aspect of scandals tends to undermine party identification when it functions as the result of stereotypes about the social groups that a given party represents (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). After all, corrupt politicians—and by inference the parties they belong to—represent only themselves. On the other hand, the positive emotional responses that serve as the engine of the “running tally” account of party identification (Fiorina 1977, 1981, Zechman 1979, Achen 1989, 1992) are also undermined by the anger that citizens quite reasonably experience in the face of serious problems of corruption. For these reasons, politicians’ repeated involvement in corruption scandals is a central contributor to the erosion of identification with traditional parties, and therefore a crucial ingredient of party-system collapse, as shown in the upper line of hypothesized causal linkages in Figure 1.2.

In deciding whether to support a nontraditional party, a voter who has either lost her party identification or never formed one is confronted with the risks of supporting an outsider. What motivates such a voter to accept the uncertainties of supporting a candidate with little or no political track record who represents a party that has little or no politically relevant existence outside of its support for that candidate? As described above, anxiety is experimentally and observationally connected with risk aversion. Thus, feelings of fear and confusion related to a perceived or real decline in a country's quality of life, in general, or economy, in particular, become an ambiguous influence on decision-makers. Such anxiety surely motivates voters to seek change in the country's government. Yet anxiety will also predispose voters to avoid high-risk varieties of change. Because outsider candidates and parties are inevitably high-risk modes of political and social change, anxiety is unlikely to serve as voters' primary motivation during party-system collapse. Anger, in contrast to anxiety, increases risk-acceptance during decision-making. Therefore, anger may be particularly likely to motivate voters' final decision to abandon the traditional parties. For collapse to take place, the fear and uncertainty connected with broad societal and economic crisis must be replaced, among a substantial number of citizens, by anger—the emotion with pride of place in accounting for the voter decisions that produce party-system collapse.

The central remaining issue regarding the decisions of voters who abandon the traditional parties involves specifying the attitudes, perceptions, and issue positions that will lead them to experience political anger. Scholars have argued that the cognitions most closely associated with lasting political anger are a sense of moral injustice at the hands of specific political actors and a belief that those actors have unjustly inflicted personal harm on the voter in question (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988: 146–54; Lazarus 1991; Marcus 2002: 120–24; Lerner and Tiedens 2006: 117). Political discourse in both Peru and Venezuela strongly suggests which attitudes are likely to produce the widespread feelings of political anger necessary to generate party-system collapse. The two most salient and widespread accusations against the traditional parties, in the media and in the rhetoric of their nontraditional competitors, are that the traditional parties were riddled with corruption and that they were failing to represent important constituencies in society. Indeed, these claims merged in Chavez's repeated assertions that the traditional parties had effectively sold out Vene-

zuela's poor in order to keep more wealth for themselves and their personal networks of corrupt friends and allies, and also in Fujimori's campaign slogan promising "Honesty, Technology, and Hard Work," in implied contrast with dishonest and ideologically extreme traditional-party candidates. Perceptions that the traditional political elite is hopelessly corrupt and/or does not represent the voter ideologically are a potent stimulus for political anger and the belief that moral injustice has been perpetrated. The voter with these attitudes believes that her views on the good society are not being heard in government and that the reason is that politicians are too dishonest to care about the unrepresented individual. Thus, personal and social harm has resulted, not by chance or through incompetence or impersonal social forces, but because of the greed and dishonesty of named traditional-party politicians. The anger resulting from these points of view serves as a primary motive for the voters to abandon their party identifications and then take the lead in supporting outsider candidates, actions that result in party-system collapse. This argument is tested somewhat indirectly using survey data in Chapters 4 and 5, and more directly through an experimental design in Chapter 6.

This book's voter-side argument is that party-system collapse is brought about by persistent problems of corruption involving traditional-party politicians and a pattern of underrepresentation of some groups by the traditional party system as a whole. Corruption scandals are usually more of a problem for one party at a time than for the entire party system; collapse of the whole system requires a string of scandals involving each major traditional party. Underrepresentation, by contrast, is an inherently systemic problem: it arises when *all of the parties* simultaneously fail to speak meaningfully for an important ideological segment of the population (see also Morgan 2011). No one party can, in isolation, bring this pattern about; any movement by one party away from an important ideological constituency could simply be countered by a shift by another traditional party toward that constituency. Collapse of the system becomes a possibility when all of the traditional parties choose to neglect a major segment of the population. Thus, voter behavior during an episode of party-system collapse is produced by a conjunction of system-level and party-level explanatory factors—although the system-level pattern of underrepresentation necessary for collapse can itself be accounted for by party-level organizational dynamics.