Preface and Acknowledgments

When 19 suicide bombers hijacked heavily fueled airliners and flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on the clear autumn September 11, 2001, they ushered in a new era—that of global terro Much has happened since that fateful day. There is a general recog that the "global war on terror" that American President George W. declared in response to the atrocities should now be seen as a long struggle to rid the world of this new curse. In the five-year interv United States and its allies have twice employed war as an instrum destroy modern global terrorism. The Iraq War proved at best ineff or irrelevant and at worst counterproductive for this purpose, thou Afghanistan War managed to reduce significantly al Qaeda's capac function as the chief organizer of global terrorism. In light of such e ence it is reasonable to conclude that war is not the most effective or su instrument to counter global terrorism, particularly in the long-term.

To win the global war on terror the world and the United States i ticular need to look elsewhere. They have to rely on good and timely i gence and on winning hearts and minds generally. Good intelligenc indeed be essential if fresh terrorist attacks are to be preempted and th rorist organizations—not just al Qaeda but its offshoots and imitators to be destroyed on a long-term basis.

Winning the hearts and minds in this context will require conside effort committed over a long time. The capacity of al Qaeda to take a tage of extremist and fanatical interpretations of certain elements Qur'an is predicated on the existence of serious mistrust and misgiving of the Islamic community in the world has toward the West and the U States. Whatever motivation al Qaeda as an organization had in laun

of "clash of civilizations" paradigm. Should democracies respond t
called "jihad" by waging a "holy war" against al Qaeda and its l
will fall straight into the trap al Qaeda laid for them.

The only way that the Western and the democratic world can ef
meet this new challenge is to prove that the modern and democr
of life does not pit the West or the democracies against people of th
or, for that matter, any other faith. Tolerance, respect for rights and
as well as scope for development of the individual are the hallmark
ular modern democracy, even though this modern liberal democr
of life began in Christendom. If this message can reach the potentia
and supporters of al Qaeda, it may eventually persuade them to
appeal of al Qaeda and its imitators. But to do so successfully, dem
must live up to the high standards of their own liberal rhetoric—up
ideas of democracy, liberty, and human rights universally rather th
tively and at a time when tightening up on security is necessary. The
point is for democracies to respect the human rights of persons of th
faith in the same way as they do that of their own citizens.

Trying to find a balance between the need to preempt terrorist a
the type staged by al Qaeda and protecting the individual rights of e
including terrorist suspects, is a highly delicate matter. To find a
ward that will enable intelligence services to strengthen their cap
deal with the sectarian-based terrorist threats on the one hand and t
the Western world to eliminate the appeal of al Qaeda and its me
the other requires a wide range of expertise and knowledge. To ad
many intricate issues involved, one would need a real understa
how intelligence services work, how they can be changed to adapt
the new demands more effectively, how they can be kept under
supervision, and how this can be achieved without undermining th
law and human rights. The range of specialist knowledge requi
beyond what one scholar or policy maker or experienced intelligen
can provide.

It was out of this recognition that I have gathered a team of sp
who either have had first-hand experience or have long studied t
different dimensions of relevant issues to work together to proc
book. I was able to put together such a team because of the suppo
Pluscarden Program for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelli
St Antony's College, Oxford University.

The Program was inaugurated in January 2005, and it grante
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duce this book. This conference, which took place at St Antony's
Oxford, in December 2005 also received generous support from

lectual discourse that started intensively at the workshop. It is not re
collection of conference papers, excellent as they are, since about a th
the presentations at the workshop are not included in this volume. In
three chapters in this book were commissioned after the worksh
address some vitally important issues that came up in the conferen
not adequately addressed there. Nevertheless, contributors who
present at the workshop took advantage of the brainstorming to refl
their insights before they revised and, in a number of cases, rewrote
papers to produce a coherent and cohesive collaborative book.

As the editor I am most grateful to my colleagues for their good h
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am not listing their names here as you already know who they are. W
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