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Stopping Global Terrorism and Protecting Rights

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Facing the threats posed by dedicated suicide bombers who intend to cause maximum human suffering and casualties in the most eye-catching way, democratic governments have hard choices to make. On the one hand, they must uphold the basic values of democratic societies based on due process and human rights. On the other, they need to preempt the kind of destruction inflicted upon New York, Madrid, London, and Bali—to name the best-known recent terrorist attacks. These two requirements appear to conflict with each other, as due process requires presumption of innocence with a high standard of proofs being produced before anyone is convicted of a crime, whereas preemption implies acting to foil an attack before it happens or acting against an individual or a group of people before a heinous crime is committed. Striking a balance between these conflicting imperatives is not easy but not impossible, and it is indeed essential if the democratic way of life so highly cherished in Europe, America, and other emerging democratic societies is to be sustained.

SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

There is an important distinction between common crimes, however heinous they may be, and acts of terrorism, particularly those modeled after the al Qaeda approach (see Chapter 7 by Stearns). Common criminals are driven by a motive to benefit from their exploits and, as a result, c

can still achieve a large part of their objectives by triggering explosions before getting to their targets and are therefore substantially less susceptible to persuasion. From the perspective of the police or security services, the use of a minimum force to arrest a common criminal in the act of committing an offense is a sensible and responsible way to proceed, but it is not a viable option when faced with suicide bombers in the course of carrying out their missions.

The gruesome reality facing government agencies responsible for preventing or stopping horrendous attacks by suicide bombers accounts for the adoption of some methods that affront defenders of human rights. There is no other way to prevent a wounded suicide bomber from detonating the bomb but to disable him instantly and completely by killing him. A shoot-to-kill policy has been developed and sometimes adopted. While such a method may indeed preempt major attacks, any mistake that results in the killing of the wrong person, necessarily an innocent one in such a context, cannot but provoke a huge public outcry, as happened in the case of the Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes in London after the 7/7 bombings. What is at issue is more than the protection of human rights; it is fundamentally important as it is as a matter of principle.

There is a practical dimension that must be given due consideration as well. An accidental shooting of an innocent person in a preemptive action that went wrong costs the intelligence and security services in terms of credibility and support from the general public. Its long-term benefits may outweigh its short-term benefits. Public interest requires a balance to be maintained between the imperative of protecting the security of the general public from suicide bombers and the accidental use of lethal force on suspects who turn out to be innocent.

In devising effective countermeasures against terrorism one must bear in mind what terrorism is about. It is indiscriminate murder on a mass scale intended above all to provoke panic and other reactions that can be harnessed to serve the purposes of the perpetrators and/or the masterminds behind the attack. Whether it is panic or other forms of reaction, it is always a means to an end. In the case of al Qaeda its objectives include sustaining a "jihad" against the West led by the United States, fomenting and inflaming public opinions in the Islamic world against the West and so on. Thus, a Western democracy that overreacts to the threats of global terrorism to the extent of breaching the rights of the individuals, willfully or negligently, furthers the cause of al Qaeda (see Chapter 8 by Danchev).

In putting this book together my colleagues and I set out to examine and explain critically the problems complicating changes that democracies and their intelligence agencies must tackle in order to meet and effectively the challenges posed by global terrorism ushered in by the

democratic countries in how they respond (see Chapters 4, 5, and Morrison, Johnson, and Heyer, respectively).

The starting premise of this book is that for intelligence organizations to meet the challenges of global terrorism, they must utilize all of their resources effectively and creatively as well as “think outside the box” (see Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 13 by Maior and Huluban, Ben-Israel, Glee, and Aldrich, respectively). These two requirements may appear to conflict with each other in the eyes of professional intelligence officers, as improving efficiency in intelligence agencies first and foremost requires perfecting the tradecraft. Whatever long-term benefits reforms may bring, making changes will almost certainly mean the opposite in the immediate term, as “perfecting the tradecraft” requires fine-tuning techniques developed over a period of time and strict discipline in applying them.

It may be politically expedient for democratically elected politicians to appear to be doing something immediately after a terrorist attack. There is always a temptation for some of them to advocate reforming the intelligence and security services after a catastrophic terrorist attack as such an appearance appears to imply “intelligence failure” (see Chapters 2 and 3 by Urban and Caravelli, respectively). However, to do so without first examining the implications of any proposed change will reduce the capacity of the services to respond effectively at a time when they need the greatest latitude to respond flexibly and make the most of their tradecraft. It should be recognized that however good the intelligence community may be, it is impossible to preempt all terrorist attacks, as the security services need to be unprepared only on one occasion and the terrorists can score. A successful terrorist attack should therefore not be seen to represent intelligence failure automatically, though it should of course be studied dispassionately to ensure lessons are learned if mistakes were made.

What is really needed is for intelligence and security services to maintain the highest standards of the tradecraft but also devote sufficient resources to cultivate and sustain a capacity to think outside the box on a continuing basis. In other words, the capacity for intelligence and security services to explore and understand new threats should be provided on a routine basis rather than as additional resources to be allocated after a catastrophic terrorist attack or, worse still, as a new demand being imposed on the already overstretched agencies.

Now that the main thrust of the post-Cold War security threats has been tallied clearly intelligence and security agencies must genuinely think outside the box so that they can not only trace and confront, to borrow Donald Rumsfeld’s terms, “the known unknown,” but develop a capacity to anticipate “the unknown unknown” of terrorist threats (see Chapter 1 by Wilson). One of the problems that intelligence agencies faced pre-

security services analysts are, after all, drawn from the societies they serve. We are all limited in our capacity to analyze by our own intuition. Prior to 9/11 how many people in the West took seriously a suggestion that 19 foreign individuals had collectively gone to the United States to commit suicide by working in four teams to hijack four airliners so that they could crash them into major landmarks at roughly the same time? Intelligence agencies should find such a scenario fanciful one would probably not have any traces of intelligence pointing to such a plot sufficiently seriously to investigate the attacks effectively. What intelligence agencies should do is to expand beyond the human capacity to think the “unthinkable.” This may require a fundamental rethink of the current practices and an alternative approach to intelligence analysis (see Chapter 11 by Ben-Israel). It may also mean reaching out into the wider communities of scholars, journalists, and others who have not been trained to understand the mind-set of the terrorists and their motivations through long periods of study or contact with their cultures and traditions in order to assess the likely threats more accurately (see Chapters 12 and 13 by Glees and Aldrich, respectively).

This implies that the intelligence and security agencies must be prepared to go beyond their own community as they think outside the box. By learning from insights gained by others, they can acquire a greater capacity to anticipate not only the known unknown but the unknown unknowns. They can also test their ideas against and accept fresh input from experts and makers in other government departments, politicians, journalists, and above all, academics who have the leisure to take a longer-term perspective and immerse themselves in the study of a highly specialized subject. Preventing and catching terrorists before they strike wins a battle; but to win the war, it is essential to remove the threat of global terrorism as a whole. A victory requires more than continuously winning battles on the ground, even if that were possible. It can be achieved only when the intelligence services work in cooperation with others.

Meeting the challenges posed by global terrorism unleashed by al Qaeda requires different responses to conventional conflicts. It ought to be recognized that al Qaeda poses two different threats. One is organized and self-governed by itself and is directed against both the Western world and the United States as its main focus as well as the Middle East with Saudi Arabia as the big prize (see Chapter 7 by Stearns). Countering this is a primary task for the intelligence and security agencies, but in light of the military forces al Qaeda and its supporters like the Taliban are capable of doing, they will need to call on the military to help. But the other threat is far less serious. It is based on the reality that al Qaeda also functions as a “franchise holder” willing to offer free help, advice, and assistance to anyone resorting to terrorist means to undermine the dominance of the

To overcome the wider political and terrorist challenges posed by al Qaeda's "free franchising" it is not enough to trace down and arrest key leaders of al Qaeda and prosecute them in a court of law, however effective. The most effective way of breaking down the organization itself is in limiting its own capacity to carry out terrorist attacks. As Richard G. Stearns explains (Chapter 7), much of this "franchising" by al Qaeda is conducted for free on the Internet, and variants of al Qaeda will survive even after the demise of al Qaeda itself.

What is really needed is to secure the peace in this "war on terror" so that there will not be ready takers for the "free franchises" offered by al Qaeda. Winning the hearts and minds of the terrorist organizations' pool of potential recruits will be essential to cut off the supply of suicide bombers (Chapter 8 by Danchev). This means the United States and the democratic world must actively engage the Islamic people of the world including the fundamentalist elements, in the Middle East and Central and South Asia. In particular, listen to their grievances, and persuade them that the Islamic and Christian civilizations are not set on a collision course. Copycat attacks based on al Qaeda ideas, instigation, or methods cannot be stopped until the potential recruits of suicide bombers can be convinced that there really is no point in their sacrifice or that there are alternative channels for them to seek redress of their grievances—and more effectively.

In the world of global terrorism inspired by al Qaeda the issues of ensuring security through better intelligence and protecting human rights are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they must be made to complement each other. The strengthening of the capacity of the intelligence and security agencies to deal with immediate threats is indeed essential in the short-term. However, winning the arguments against extremists, at the moment primarily among people of the Islamic faith, can be achieved only if the potential recruits for suicide bombing missions realize that the governments of their target countries respect their rights and dignity as individuals as much as that of their own citizens. Such an approach will be exploitative in the short-term, but winning the war on terrorism in the long-term requires above all stopping a new generation from feeling it has a cause for which its members would be willing to give up their lives. In operational terms it means that responses against terrorist attacks or planned attacks must be carefully thought through beforehand, and the security services and police tasked to respond must be trained and indoctrinated to respect human rights as they carry out their duties and make hard decisions under the most stressful conditions. Otherwise, winning battles against terrorist attacks will not produce a long-lasting victory in the war against the al Qaeda brand of global terrorism.

The support and cooperation of the people in countries that fall victim to terrorist attacks must also be sustained by ensuring they have confidence

of Africa. A particularly difficult challenge presented by the London bombings of July 2005 is their potential to provoke sectarian responses from the majority population against their fellow citizens of the Islamic faith, a number of whom had become suicide bombers. Whether this was the original intention of the bombers or of their al Qaeda inspirer, such a reaction from the general public could easily start a vicious circle of escalation and mutual hatred and violence. In 2005 the British public as a whole, in their best liberal tradition and generally avoided sectarian reactions. But some individual sectarian reactions did happen, and the prospect of a more general sectarian backlash cannot be ruled out and must be prevented. To do so, the government and its intelligence services must not be too narrowly focused on preempting terrorist attacks that they infringe upon the rights of some of their citizens and encroach on the democratic norms, and they must also reassure the general public that the presence of a handful of suicide bombers does not mean Britons of the Islamic faith cannot be trusted.

This book therefore addresses not only the question of how intelligence organizations can improve their efficacy in preempting terrorist attacks, but also the wider issue of removing the forces that sustain global terrorism as a scourge of the twenty-first century. In the latter effort, intelligence organizations must work with their governments to address two broad political priorities. The first is to remove the wider social, religious, economic, and ethnic conditions that enable groups like al Qaeda, its offshoots, and imitators to entrench or regenerate themselves by recruiting new generations of leaders, agents, and suicide bombers. As the July 2005 bombings in London confirm, the problem extends beyond the various Middle Eastern countries and failed states traditionally seen as recruiting grounds for terrorists. Young people born or brought up in the democratic and developed West are also susceptible. This problem is closely linked to the second priority: namely, the need for democratic governments and their intelligence communities to ensure that, in tackling the threats from global terrorism, they do not lose credibility and confidence among their own citizens.

In the end, in order to prevail over global terrorism, police and intelligence services must enhance their capabilities to deal with the increasing security challenges. The general public in the target countries and regions must also be persuaded that—despite their rhetoric—their governments are not engaged in a holy war. Ultimately, the brand of global terrorism promoted by Osama bin Laden and his associates is meant to satisfy the vanity and aspirations toward semidivine status. The organization that was formed for this purpose is above all a global syndicate that commits the crimes of a particularly heinous nature, which seeks to cause maximum damage by giving free advice, encouragement, and guidance as if it were a franchising operation. Intelligence services of various countries need

world to work together if the evidence unearthed by national intelligence services and others is to be accepted by the general public. Unless the emotional and quasireligious appeal of the global terrorists can be removed, the simple arrest of bin Laden and his close associates—or even the designation of al Qaeda as an organization—will not be sufficient to prevent them from rising to replace them.

To eradicate the al Qaeda brand of global terrorism, Western governments must seize and hold the moral high ground. To preempt individuals from becoming recruits or potential recruits for suicide bombing missions, Western governments have to demonstrate convincingly to communities from where such bombers are drawn that they uphold and respect the human rights of the latter to the same standards as that of mainstream Americans and Europeans.

For this purpose the U.S. government must recognize that the categorization of people captured in Afghanistan and kept at Guantánamo Bay as unlawful combatants may be technically correct under international law (see Chapter 7 by Stearns), its maintenance of the Guantánamo facility weakens its moral case in the fight against terrorism as it widely opens up opinions around the world. Even though the detention and debriefing of the unlawful combatants immediately after their capture could be justified on the grounds that as unlawful combatants they were not entitled to the privileges accorded to prisoners of war, and information thus acquired would be essential to preempt further terrorist attacks, the latter fact no longer applies. In any event their human rights must still be respected. Those who had committed criminal offenses should be brought in front of the criminal justice system. Those who cannot be released because, for example, they declare their commitment to kill Americans randomly if freed should be detained with the real reasons disclosed and on the basis of proper legal provisions—if the proper legal power for meeting the exceptional situation does not exist, it should be duly enacted with built-in limitations to avoid its abuse. Those who were detained by mistake as they happened to be in the wrong place and at the wrong time should be released.

The continued detention of unlawful combatants without an explanation that the rest of the world can understand and accept is counterproductive. Those detainees who have committed crimes as unlawful combatants should be revealed as such and treated as such, but even then their rights as individuals should be respected, in the same way that the human rights of convicted criminals are upheld. Terrorists and masterminds of terrorism are but particularly callous and pernicious criminals. Treating them in any other way, such as incarceration in conditions open to question, merely provides grounds for people who feel a strong sense of grievance against or misapprehension of the United States to choose to see and portray them as POWs with

they can eliminate the basis for al Qaeda to replenish its ranks or to imitators.

POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE CHANGING FACE OF INTELLIGENCE

The intelligence communities in the democratic world entered a period of uncertainty and change when the Cold War ended, as the long-standing rationale for their existence and paradigm for their operations was removed. Different countries responded to the end of the Cold War differently, but none felt they could dispense with the service of their intelligence and security services.

As Mark Urban examines in Chapter 2, the British intelligence community went through different stages of change to seek a proper place for itself in the post-Cold War context before it found itself at the forefront tackling the new challenges posed by the al Qaeda brand of terrorism. In the transition of the Cold War confrontation in the late 1980s to the catastrophic attacks on the United States mainland in 2001, the British intelligence and security services had greatly improved on transparency, but had not been sufficiently reoriented to preempt the new threats. It is what appears like a confrontation between certain extremist segments of the Islamic world and the democratic and materialistic West derived from Christendom, the central issue for the intelligence community. It is a debate that has come to reflect the wider political debate of the time. It is one of *realpolitik* versus human rights or realism in how to confront the threats posed by transnational terrorism. Urban rightly concludes that recent controversies over alleged failures that involve the intelligence community have made it even more important for the community to continue to move forward toward greater openness than that achieved in the 1990s.

The most dramatic organizational changes in the U.S. intelligence community since the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was founded at the end of the Cold War happened in response to the implied failings of the intelligence community to preempt the 9/11 attacks. While many of these changes are still under way and are highlighted by Jack Caravelli (Chapter 3), whether they are changing the face of American intelligence in the long way remains to be tested. Using the Iranian nuclear program as the example, Caravelli has shown that the failure to stop the Iranian program in the 1990s was more a political than an intelligence one. In facing the new threats posed by certain Islamic fundamentalists, one should not focus entirely on the al Qaeda brand of terrorism and lose sight of the cl

the old Cold War concept of Mutually Assured Destruction as a paradigm for peace no longer applies, at least in so far as an extremist Islamic fundamentalist group or government that can lay its hands on nuclear weapons is concerned. The challenges facing the American intelligence community is to provide timely, reliable, and accurate intelligence on all the major potential sources of threats to policy makers and military commanders so that they have the necessary information to ensure security and people's safety.

The ever greater need for the intelligence agencies in the democratic world to improve their capabilities and efficacy means that it is even more important that the appropriate form of political supervision or oversight is in place. Indeed, one should heed John N.L. Morrison's admonition in Chapter 4 that a robust system of oversight is required not just for the intelligence community but for the political machinery that uses intelligence as well. The Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) dossier case reveals, even in the most mature of democracies, where the top political leaders believe passionately in a course of action, it is not beyond them to ensure intelligence and facts are "fixed around the policy" and can be used to provide justification for their preferred policy option, in this case, war to effect a regime change in Iraq. As Morrison reminds everyone, there is as yet no perfect system of political supervision of intelligence services and every country must develop and fine-tune its own system.

Morrison's thoughtful insights based primarily on the British experience are echoed in Loch K. Johnson's majestic survey in Chapter 5 on how Congressional oversight evolved in the United States. The old *laissez-faire* approach might have been abandoned as far back as 1975 as CIA abuses came to light, but the essentially reactive nature in the subsequent strengthening of the oversight apparatus still left scope for improvement. By the end of the twenty-first century the United States might already have one of the best systems for legislative oversight of intelligence, but it still fell short on issues of great importance. It did, for example, on the intelligence community's assessment of the Iraqi WMD issue, one that affected the decision to go to war. The limits in Congressional oversight indeed show remarkable parallels to the British experience. Ultimately the effectiveness of legislative oversight depends hugely on how strongly motivated members of Congress are in pursuing this cause. Even if this is assured, in the case of the United States truly comprehensive oversight of the intelligence community cannot be achieved until the relevant Congressional committees can cover not only the intelligence operations of the CIA but also the intelligence operations of the Department of Defense, which in fact spends the lion's share of the American intelligence budget.

This makes a contrast to the approach in Germany where the Bundestag Control Panel on Intelligence has the power and the responsibility enshrined in the Federal Constitution, for both the civilian and the military.

States. It is one that puts greater emphasis on the protection of rights on the one hand, and it requires the overseers to work closely with the intelligence services on the other. The German approach to the balance between security and the protection of rights was to give the Parliamentary Control Panel and its offshoot, known as the G10 Commission, constitutionally guaranteed access to confidential information, and a requirement to maintain confidentiality. There is no doubt that both are meant first and foremost to protect rights and to ensure the intelligence services do not abuse their power and permission to operate in secrecy. However, their commitment to maintaining secrecy in order not to compromise the efficacy of the intelligence agencies is also real. An insider, Heyne is confident that the German system has so far worked well though there is room for improvement. Whether the German system works as well as Heyne suggests, and whether the inherently conflicting demands being put on oversight bodies can genuinely be reconciled satisfactorily in practice in the long term, it is something that the British and the Americans can only study as they reflect on how best to improve their own systems.

The context in which intelligence services in democratic countries operate in is not just political but judicial as well. It also cannot be understood from the nature of the threats against which they are required to operate. To understand what would constitute an appropriate legal framework for dealing with terrorists of the al Qaeda brand one must first inquire into the nature of the threats they pose. Thus, in his judicious assessment (Chapter 2) Richard G. Stearns starts off by examining what modern global terrorism means and why the threats al Qaeda poses are different from those posed by secessionist terrorist groups like the Irish Republican Army or by groups like Bader-Meinhof, not to say delusional cults like Branch Davidians. To put matters in perspective we need to recognize that the al Qaeda approach to terrorism as directed by bin Laden is not only globally rational and calculating one, but is also practically global in its ambition and intended to cause destruction of such a magnitude that no comparison can be found in history. Indeed, while al Qaeda has not yet merely demonstrated the capacity to use conventional technology, but has succeeded in producing their WMD, it is the only nonstate actor that is actively seeking to acquire in the black market nuclear materials that can be used in a "dirty bomb." The gravity of the threats posed by al Qaeda is such that countering it would require an element of preemption but this should at least not as a rule, be at the expense of the rule of law. Admittedly, it is not strictly to the rule of law when confronting the al Qaeda threats that the United States has always been possible and has its problems, as revealed in the trial of Mohamed Atta and Moussaoui; accepting a long-term retreat of the rule of law must be considered as an option. What the United States may need to do is to con-

in Northern Ireland.

Putting matters in its widest context, there is no alternative to upholding human rights when confronting the threats from modern global terrorism. Alex Danchev (Chapter 8) finds echoes of Kafka in Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib in the dehumanizing treatment of detainees. In his poignant examination of some of the better-known cases of abuses in order to secure “actionable intelligence,” he highlights such degrading practices contrary to our own values and are completely counterproductive. Some information obtained under torture might in principle have helped to prevent an attack here or there, but most detainees had little more than out-of-date information. There is no convincing evidence that the information thus obtained actually preempted any major terrorist attacks. In any event the sorry record of Guantánamo and the grotesque abuses at Abu Ghraib caused so much damage to the reputation of the United States that its claim to moral authority and righteousness in the war on terror was gravely compromised if not utterly destroyed. It matters as the United States and its allies are supposed to lead an alliance of values, and one that is vastly superior to what al Qaeda and its offshoots represent. By succumbing to the “9/11 syndrome,” or resorting to harsh methods or outright torture in interrogation in order to get information to deal with the challenges posed by a despicable and fanatic enemy, the Bush administration has gravely undermined the capacity of the United States, and by association much of the rest of the Western world allied to it, in the campaign to win over opinion in the Islamic world. The negative worldwide reactions to Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo have had the unintended effect of helping al Qaeda expand its influence in Islamic communities worldwide and undermining the U.S. position in the global war on terror.

MEETING THE NEW DEMANDS

The advent of the era of global terrorism might not have been accurately predicted and preempted, but it does not mean the intelligence community, at least in the mature Western democracies, had not been continually changing to meet what they saw as new threats after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as Peter Wilson makes clear in Chapter 9, the contrary is true: Western intelligence agencies started to develop techniques and structures to deal with transnational terrorist and criminal threats that distinguished themselves from the highly centralized challenges posed by the Soviet bloc during the Cold War even before the 9/11 attacks. But the tempo of change accelerated dramatically after September 2001. In adapting themselves to cope with the new threats, the intelligence services must develop whatever new capabilities to defeat the al Qaeda brand of terrorism, but they must also keep a

improving accountability, and promoting innovations within the intelligence community, but also liaising with the outside world. While the work of the intelligence services must be kept secret, its analytical elements can benefit greatly from independent research conducted by academics or other experts outside of the intelligence community on a wide range of issues that may reveal where the next surprise may come. The last is particularly important: intelligence services are to deal effectively with the unknown unknown in addition to the known unknown.

The changes that the intelligence community must pursue in the face of new threats inevitably raise the issue of the allocation of resources. In addressing this issue, George Maior and Sebastian Huluban (Chapter 10) remind us that much of this is of course about the use of money, but also, and above all about planning. Maior and Huluban in fact take a slightly different view from Wilson on how much the intelligence community has changed. The West had changed between the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. However, this reflects more a difference in how they evaluate the tempo of changes both before and after 9/11 than what happened on the ground. They see the post-9/11 changes as much greater than Wilson sees, which means that it is, for them, even more important that the intelligence community should allocate their resources efficiently and sensibly. In addition in mind they stress in particular the importance of developing new resources to the full and the benefits the intelligence community can derive by borrowing methodologies and ideas developed in other disciplines, particularly but not exclusively in the social sciences. They also highlight the value of widening the context when the intelligence community addresses the issue of resource allocation in the fight against global terrorism.

Given the gravity of the threats posed by global terrorism and even more so some specific and significant failings in intelligence in recent years, the intelligence community is well advised to subject its standard tradecraft to a thorough review. A veteran intelligence officer who has moved to academia in Tel Aviv, Ben-Israel provides a thought-provoking alternative to the standard approach to intelligence analysis in Chapter 11. Instead of inducing analysts to seek collaborative evidence to support one's hypothesis in analysis, Ben-Israel advocates the search of counterevidence to test and eliminate hypotheses. This should help to minimize, if not remove, the inherent human tendency to find evidences to prove one's pet theory or preconception. This may not be foolproof, but it provides a much more reliable basis for analysis, to draw conclusions and assess the real threat. He also urges a rethinking of the classic separation between the roles of analysts and field operators. In the modern terrorists operate in a highly dynamic and rapidly changing environment, and there is usually only a very short span of opportunity for the intelligence or security services to move against a terrorist

gence at hand adroitly and swiftly. What Ben-Israel has proposed against the long-established practices in the intelligence world, but deserves careful consideration.

Enhancing the general capabilities and capacity of the intelligence community to deal with the new transnational threats involves, needless to say, more than improving or even overhauling the way analysts should work. It requires the intelligence community to explore and, where appropriate, to establish effective working relations with their counterparts overseas. In Chapter 12 Anthony Glees focuses on what the British intelligence services, and particularly the Security Service or MI5, have done and examined by way of extending cooperation with other European Union agencies since the 9/11 attacks. It has not been a straightforward matter as Britain also cooperates closely with the United States, which is skeptical of sharing intelligence with some of the agencies in other European Union countries. Glees suggests a way out of this tension, which is to strengthen cooperation and increase the sharing of intelligence assessments though not raw intelligence or sources. He also echoes an important point already raised by Peter Wilson: the potential value that the intelligence community can get by reaching out to the academic community.

The value for getting academe actively involved is examined in greater details in the thoughtful analysis of Richard J. Aldrich (Chapter 13). He reminds everyone that serious as the threats of modern global terrorism are they will cause less damage, destruction, and casualty than some of the threats that come with globalization itself, such as various forms of environmental risk." No one will benefit if the world should get too focused on modern terrorism and fail to spot and meet effectively the other more lethal challenges. A new pandemic, for example, respects no national borders and can kill more people than any terrorist attack, and it is a classical global problem that cannot be tackled by any one government alone. Such problems and threats, as well as challenges posed by the al Qaeda brand of terrorism, are created by globalization and need to be monitored and understood by what intelligence services on their own can hope to do. What Aldrich suggests is needed is the founding of something like a Global Threat Analysis Center which can be co-located or even be part of a world-class research university but should develop a network with universities and other institutions all over the world on the one hand and liaise closely with the intelligence community on the other. Such a center will rely on open sources for information and benefit from dynamic exchanges with the world's best specialists on whatever subjects that can enhance the understanding of an emerging threat, whatever its nature. It will maintain its independence in analysis and will not be susceptible to the problem of "groupthink" in the intelligence community as it will not be a part of the intelligence community. Nevert

the intelligence community. Together they can acquire a capacity unavailable to anyone and tremendously improve the world's understand and anticipate the unknown unknown challenges that globalization will bring.