

## INTRODUCTION

### Masculinity in a National Imaginary

*Social workers estimate that thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of Muslim women live as invisibles in Germany, their lives physically defined by the four walls of their home and ordered by four staples: the Quran, male superiority, the importance of family, violence and honor. In the middle of Germany, these women live as slaves, unseen or ignored by their German neighbors, hidden behind walls and forgotten.*

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*The percent of schoolgirls wearing headscarves in the Berlin district where Hatin [sic] was killed has gone from virtually none to about 40 percent in the past three years. Which one of today's smiling schoolgirls . . . will be next year's victim of honor?*

**Blehl 2005**

THE COVERED MUSLIM WOMAN has become a spectacle in the Western media. Repeatedly visible on magazine covers and the front page of newspapers, she is a symbol of the challenge facing European governments that are struggling to integrate large and growing Muslim populations. For many, her headscarf is emblematic of the failure of immigrants who came to countries such as France and Germany as guestworkers to assimilate to the culture of their European hosts, even after generations of residence. Debates rage in both France and Germany over whether Muslim women and girls should be allowed to wear headscarves in public schools, with many who support a headscarf ban, arguing that the headscarf symbolizes the oppression of the Muslim woman, which a modern democracy should not condone. Many narratives by and about Muslim women portray them as victims of male brutality who must be rescued from traditional, oppressive male morality, which is imagined as a total control

## 2 INTRODUCTION

over female bodies and actions. Memoirs by women who have escaped forced marriages, attempted honor killings (murder of a family member to preserve the family's reputation), and other violence are taken up by publishers and reviewers and become international best sellers, at least in part because they fulfill expectations that stir the moral outrage of their intended audience.<sup>1</sup>

With all of this attention directed at the Muslim woman as victim, no one has stopped to investigate how the Muslim man has been depicted in such accounts. Even when men are not mentioned directly, such narratives implicitly embed negative representations. These representations are particularly prominent in Europe and play a major role in the political process in many European countries, shaping public policy, citizenship legislation, and the course of elections. Though these stigmatizing images bear little relationship to the everyday practices and experiences of most men and women of Muslim background now living in Europe, the naturalization of negative stereotypes of the Muslim man has been so profound that even people who see themselves as politically and socially liberal, tolerant of difference, and cosmopolitan may not recognize the extent of this stigmatization. Why is this so? How have these negative stereotypes become so naturalized that they go unrecognized, even among many who are concerned about social equality and the rights of minorities? What is the significance of such failures of recognition?

In this book I show that the stigmatization of the masculinity of a minority such as Muslim men often goes unnoticed because of the blind spots and silences that surround this stigmatization. This sometimes invisible or implicit process of stigmatization is linked to intertwined national and transnational imaginaries that rest on a foundation of fantasy. I argue that the fantasies associated with stigmatization are enacted through national dramas of moral panic that play out in the arenas of politics and the media. A *national imaginary* is a system of cultural representations that makes the contours of the nation-state emotionally plausible,<sup>2</sup> in part by differentiating the nation-state from others on the basis of distinctive national cultural forms and “a strong sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’—a sense of exclusive belonging” (Borneman 2004: 14). A national imaginary is thus generated and sustained through an ongoing process of myth-making (Barthes 1972). The state makes claims on the loyalty of its inhabitants through identification with the nation and its specific forms of culture, a process of imagining a shared experience that simultaneously marks various forms of social difference. Thus, a “Muslim man,” while recognizable on the street of any German city as an individual, likely an immigrant or the

son of an immigrant, most probably from Turkey, is also seen through the lens of a socially shared fantasy that forms the context through which his visible attributes are noticed and interpreted. This social fantasy positions the Muslim man as a stigmatized “other,” a positioning that affects the possibilities for the Muslim man’s cultural citizenship or sense of full belonging.<sup>3</sup> Even more significantly, this fantasy also plays an important role in constituting a German national identity as this identity is taken up and inhabited by those who consider themselves to be German. Why would German identity be linked to a fantasy about Muslim women and their violent men?

The identity of the national subject, that is, of one who fully belongs to the nation as one of “us,” rests on a discursive process in which others are defined as “not-us.” In this national imaginary of belonging, the other occupies what Judith Butler has called a “zone of uninhabitability,” in which the thought of inhabiting the position of the other is a threat to one’s own sense of identity and is abjected with a feeling along the lines of, “I would rather die than do or be that” (Butler 1993: 243 n. 2). *Abjection* is thus the process of maintaining a sense of wholeness and identity by casting out that which is felt to be improper or dangerous to the integrity of the self.<sup>4</sup> I argue that stigmatization of Muslim masculinity is a form of abjection, in which the Muslim man’s sense of self and honor are represented in European national discourses as an uninhabitable way of being, for instance, a German or a Frenchman or a Norwegian. This process of abjection structures fantasy. But the Muslim man is not simply other to specific German or French or Norwegian national imaginaries. His abjection is reinforced by his positioning in a transnational imaginary in which the “modern” is constituted in opposition to the “traditional” as abjected other. As Edward Said recognized in his analysis of Orientalist discourse (1978), the Muslim stands as other in a discourse that casts the Orient as the antithesis of the West and its Enlightenment values.<sup>5</sup>

The national subject of a modern democracy based on equality and a respect for human rights stands as the antithesis of an abjected subject whose sense of belonging must rest on violence and the abuse of women. I show that this stigmatization is intense yet unnoticed because local cultural practices in Western countries—especially culturally specific aspects of gender and the organization of public spaces such as the nuclear family and the boundary between public and private—are confounded in public discourse with what are generally agreed to be universally applicable ideas of human rights and democracy in a kind of logical or rhetorical slippage.

#### 4 INTRODUCTION

When the two levels—presumably universalizable (though still historically contingent and contestable) principles such as basic human rights, freedom and autonomy, and locally specific cultural practices that vary from one European country or region to another—are confounded, minorities that do not conform to local cultural expectations are also presumed to fall outside what is expected of a citizen in a Western democracy. Through this process, other organizations of gender and family relations are identified as oppressive of women, the Muslim man is associated with this oppressive organization of gender, and he is located as other. He is stigmatized in the name of freedom, democracy, and human rights and is abjected as the antithesis of these principles. He is recognized as seeking honor and respect primarily through violence and the oppression of women, means that are incompatible with the ethical subject of a democracy. His location as other stimulates moral outrage at the violation of culturally local but assumed-to-be universal ethical assumptions about the proper organization of gender and social space, and his stigmatization goes unrecognized. Even his situation as an exploited guestworker or a minority subject to social discrimination and racism is obscured by this association with terrorism and domestic violence. The confounding of culturally particular practices and ideologies with universal principles exacerbates and justifies the stigmatization of Muslim masculinity, making it invisible even to those who are morally outraged by social inequality and discrimination.

Though negative perceptions of the Muslim man have been reinforced by the post-September 11 climate in which the Muslim man is often viewed transnationally as a potential terrorist, and though the situation of Muslims has been framed in many European countries in similar terms as a “crisis” in the media and public discourse, the specific manifestations of this crisis are somewhat different from one country to the next, even when the media and governments of the various European countries are attuned to issues facing their neighbors and closely watch steps taken to deal with various manifestations of the crisis. Each nation-state experiences the Muslim challenge in somewhat different terms because of the place that specific Muslim populations occupy within the national imaginary of the country they inhabit.

This book analyzes the structure of stigmatized masculinity as fantasy and its place in a national imaginary by focusing on an important subpopulation of Muslims in Europe, namely, Turkish immigrants and their descendants now living in Germany. In Germany, the sense of crisis has been framed as the evolution of a “parallel society” that threatens the coherence of Germany as

a recently reunified state.<sup>6</sup> The emergence of this threatening parallel society has been attributed to a refusal of men of Turkish background to assimilate to German culture because of what is perceived as their unwillingness to give up traditional Turkish and Muslim cultural practices such as the maintenance of honor through the control of women. Some German scholars, for example, have argued that the women are eager for education and integration, but that their men hold them back and lock them up (e.g., Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder 1997). Furthermore, the specific manifestations of stigmatization in Germany have been shaped in part by the prominence and conflation of two sets of stereotypes: those associated with Muslims and Islam, and those associated with the Turk. Images of the Turk have a distinct and vivid history due to the often threatening presence of the Ottoman Empire at the edge of Europe over many centuries. Furthermore, Germany's long and complex history of ties to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has also shaped representations of the Turk.

Interrogating both the sense of crisis over the integration into Germany of Turks as a Muslim minority and popular as well as scholarly explanations and proposed solutions for the crisis, I argue that the stigmatization of the Muslim man and the Turk occupies an important place in the constitution of German nationhood and subjectivity at this historical juncture. Given Germany's troubled history associated with its Nazi past, the country has been particularly preoccupied with establishing and maintaining itself as a state that exemplifies democratic values in the post-World War II period. In Germany's post-war Constitution, or Basic Law, gender equality is a key ideological site for the articulation of these democratic values. Much of the German stereotyping of Muslim men reflects a preoccupation with a Muslim organization of gender as a threat to a social order founded on these universal values as they are embedded in the Constitution. But German gender organization is itself linked to culturally and historically specific forms of personal honor, bodily discipline, and social space that mark the most intimate aspects of the relationship between the citizen and the state.

Both rural Turkish and various Islamic modes of gender organization, bodily discipline, and the maintenance of honor are in many respects at odds with these German cultural practices. However, they are not necessarily incompatible with the principles of democracy that underlie the German nation-state and its constitutional foundation. But the possibility that other gender practices might be consistent with life in a liberal democracy such as Germany is rarely

considered. The alternatives are, instead, stigmatized and abjected. The confounding of the universal and the local enables and renders invisible forms of stigmatization that would be difficult to justify if they were visible and explicit.

It has been argued that “there is no single narrative of the nation” because “different groups (genders, classes, ethnicities, generations, and so on) do not experience the myriad national formations in the same way” (McClintock 1997: 93). But can we nevertheless see traces of a hegemonic national imaginary even among those who are marginalized by it, including immigrants and others marked as outsiders? I argue that not only do these stigmatizations and the social fantasies associated with them constrain the possibilities for full cultural citizenship for a stigmatized minority, but also that traces of these stigmatizations are manifest by individuals as an array of strategies for the maintenance of a positive subjectivity and identity in the face of abjection. I therefore juxtapose German social fantasies of the Muslim man with the voices of diasporic men and women of Turkish background, examining traces of stigmatization in their negotiations of public identities. My goal is to make the stigmatization of a minority masculinity visible. I demonstrate how this stigmatization is naturalized through a hegemonic discourse emotionally structured by social fantasies and how a national and transnational imaginary based on such fantasies is produced through government institutions and public culture.

### **NATIONAL IMAGINARIES, NATIONAL SUBJECTS, AND THE PROCESS OF ABJECTION**

Where does a hegemonic national imaginary come from? A national imaginary is based, at least in part, on ideas of the state<sup>7</sup> that are reproduced through what Foucault called *governmentality* (Foucault 1991)—an array of practices through which the population of a modern nation-state is governed, including institutions such as schools and the police, agencies for the provision of social services, discourses, norms, and even individual self-regulation through techniques for disciplining and caring for the self. These forms of governmentality encompass more than what might formally be called “the state.” They simultaneously reproduce the state and its place in a global order and locate individuals as subjects within that order,<sup>8</sup> regulating the most intimate details of their lives such as marriage, birth control, and kinship relations as an aspect of the state’s mission to optimize the welfare and productivity of its population.<sup>9</sup> Forms of governmentality include institutions that minorities must negotiate every day, institutions that have the potential to shape their practices and identities. As

Alhwa Ong has demonstrated, the provision of social services to immigrants converges with other techniques of administration to constitute “particular categories of citizen-subject” (Ong 2003: 6). Often, the provision of such services is accompanied by demands for conformity to local norms and by practices of recognition and misrecognition that marginalize those who fail to conform to dominant norms.<sup>10</sup> These practices thus constitute a minority subject in relation to the state as it is imagined by this subject through everyday experiences of governmentality.

In Germany, social service provision and the rights of minorities to governmental services have had a significant impact on the discourse about integration. The emphasis on irreconcilable cultural difference that pervades popular discourse and that is manifest in vociferous concerns about the establishment of a parallel society stems in part from specific forms of governmentality by which minority populations are categorized and managed. Frank-Olaf Radtke (1997) has argued that migrants to Germany were turned into “ethnic minorities” by policies of the German state. These policies foregrounded language and religion in providing immigrant social services and dealt with people in terms of their ethnic identity and group membership rather than in terms of their individual circumstances. The growing number of migrants was distributed among competing welfare organizations, which provided social services, split according to differences of language and religion associated with the migrants’ countries of origin. Thus, migrants from Catholic countries were handled by Catholic welfare agencies, Protestants by Protestant agencies, and Muslims (primarily from Turkey but also from the Maghreb) by nondenominational organizations with links to trade unions.

This reified perspective on cultural difference in turn shaped the research questions pursued by social advisors and scholars, who, as experts, are in a position to generate authoritative “truths” that are the basis of social projects,<sup>11</sup> typically framed in terms of the “difficulties and conflicts of a life between cultures” (Radtke 1997: 252). For example, detailed reports of village life in Turkey were used to demonstrate how difficult integration would inevitably be for Turkish migrants. This focus on “culture” and the difficulties of integration penetrated into popular and political discourse, contributing to xenophobic political propaganda and negative stereotypes and creating increasing pressure to restrict immigration. Family structure and gender organization have been targeted directly by institutions such as shelters for women and girls and in policies that include removing children from the care of their parents if their

rights as defined in the German Constitution have been violated. In this context, the categorization of Muslims as culturally different has directly affected social policy.

Popular culture and the media—literature, newspapers, cinema, and television—also play a central role in this discursive process of shaping national and transnational imaginaries and producing identity in the contemporary world (Abu-Lughod 1993, Appadurai 1996) by generating naturalized images that delineate the realm of the possible and even the possibilities for resistance (Appadurai 1996; Foucault 1978, 1995; Butler 1989).<sup>12</sup> These images are often crystallized in the form of stories that embed beliefs about the origins and evolution of the nation (Shohat and Stam 1994: 118), narratives that provide variously positioned citizens with possibilities or “scripts” for individual lives, and stereotypes that characterize identities associated with many of these various social positions. In Germany there has been a growing corpus of films about and by Turkish immigrants and their offspring. This cinema is one site where the stigmatization of Turkish Muslim masculinity by German directors and even by directors of Turkish background can be traced.

Cinematic images are particularly powerful when they are consistent with other forms of knowledge that are tied to governmentality—state policies, bureaucratic expertise, and social services—as well as to the scholarly apparatus that often guides policy formation.<sup>13</sup> When all of these forms of knowledge production are consistent in their articulations of the plight of the Turkish or Muslim woman caught in webs of traditional patriarchy, they converge to constitute a convincing truth about the problematic integration of the Turkish other into German society, a truth often focused on representations of Turkish and Muslim gender relations and the place of masculinity in this discourse. (In Chapter 2, I examine this discursive convergence of governmental practices, scholarly apparatus, cinema, and other media that maintains a national imaginary.)

Though governmentality, the knowledge of experts, and the media are formative of subjectivities and the idea of the state, they are not in themselves sufficient to account for the emergence of a national imaginary that produces the emotional intensities associated with the threat of an immigrant Muslim population and makes the stigmatization of Muslim men unnoticeable.<sup>14</sup> It is not simply a coincidence that the rather diverse forces of governmentality, scholarly knowledge, and the media converge. Furthermore, as Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Sherry Ortner (2006), and other “practice theorists” stress, individuals



as discursively constituted subjects nevertheless have agency to draw on diverse discourses—alternative cultural logics—as they carry out projects that both reproduce and transform existing structures. These diverse projects are clearly evident in processes of political contestation, intergenerational struggles, ethnic strife, sexual politics, and class struggles, all of which reveal profound ruptures and divisions in the social fabric. Yet there is in most nation-states most of the time a tendency for a rather remarkable coherence amidst all of this diversity and contestation, a hegemonic discourse across a range of social fields. It involves, at the very least, implicit agreements about the terms of the debate, the objects of controversy. This discourse constitutes subjects with relatively fixed identities and a delimited range of perspectives on the nation, its past and future. How is this coherence produced and reproduced out of the flux of the myriad acts, desires, and forces that make up social life?

The coherence and “truth” of a hegemonic discourse that is grounded in a national imaginary relies on the intertwining of the imagined with conditions that prevail at any particular moment (Iser 1993: 1). This intertwining generates realities with a mythological structure<sup>15</sup> that people emotionally invest in through the process of fantasy. Cinema and other media are often structured through a mythological process in which the identities and attributes of people, events, and objects are deprived of their specificity and turned into gestures or attributes. These abstracted individuals are dichotomized and polarized, with some being idealized and others abjected.

Abjection occurs within a discursive order that is structured by making certain things unthinkable and certain subject positions uninhabitable. Within the discursive space of a national imaginary, desires and attributes that have been abjected as not-self in the formation of a national subject may be projected onto categories of people who are viewed as other. Rhetorical associations are made among objects and concepts that may be quite dissimilar, and the attention is drawn away from inconsistencies and logical slippages. As a result of this channeling, certain objects and signifiers acquire an otherwise unaccountably powerful emotional charge,<sup>16</sup> often of horror, and others become nearly invisible. Hence, stigmatization through the process of abjection often goes unnoticed. Those who inhabit unthinkable subject positions are not thought about in a straightforward way.

Fantasy operates by giving the fantasizer some sort of pleasure through the imagined fulfillment of a desire. An explicit desire that is often a focus of modern identity politics is positive recognition by another, a recognition that

occurs within the context of “having” a certain identity. But to take up an identity as a particular type of subject, such as a heterosexual German male, means performing that identity—in this case, masculinity—in a socially acceptable way and renouncing or disavowing other desires that may be inconsistent with that identity. Other desires and other subject positions are foreclosed, abjected, made “not-self” as part of the process of identity formation, though these abjected desires are also an important, if ambivalent, component of fantasy.

A national imaginary reflects processes by which internal differences are suppressed through the deployment of elusive objects of desire as signifiers in political discourse, often made more powerful by the mobilization of a threat to the nation (see Žižek 1989; Santner 1990; Ivy 1995; Navaro-Yashin 2002).<sup>17</sup> It is a commonplace that talking politics can be a potentially disruptive business in any social setting because of the emotions that such talk arouses in many of us. From the rhetoric surrounding familiar themes such as the threat of the Muslim man (especially as manifest in media focus on honor killings and the headscarf), it is clear that these signs carry powerful affect that can be seen in political speech-making, the writings of journalists, and the everyday conversations of Germans. The affect associated with such signs is linked to the ways that they evoke elusive desires.

Among the most visible public expressions of affect are moments of crisis linked with what Stanley Cohen has dubbed *moral panics*: “A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests. . . . The moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions” (Cohen 1980: 9). The media play an important role in a politics of anxiety associated with moral panics. I argue that such moral panics acquire their emotional force by drawing rhetorical links between a current issue and latent, historically configured social fantasies associated with a national imaginary. Moral panics are an important means by which the public renews its emotional investments in a national imaginary.

The German national imaginary in the post-1989 period of reunification has involved a reimagining of Germanness (see Borneman 1991), a remapping of homeland (Verdery 1991), and new ways of imagining nationhood. In post-World War II Germany, this process has been particularly ambivalent, especially with respect to the provision of a historical memory that prioritizes the nation, its origins, and its cultural traditions as elements of a national imaginary. Thus, there has been recurring political controversy in Germany surrounding

the idea of a German *Leitkultur* (leading culture) to which immigrants might be made to conform. Yet the word is basically devoid of content since any effort to attach a specific meaning is contaminated with associations to symbols prominent during the Nazi era. As I argue in Chapter 7, *Leitkultur* thus operates as a signifier that evokes desired yet ambivalent aspects of Germanness that are threatened and produced by the presence of the immigrant. Much of the emotional force of such fantasies comes from the ways in which they trigger *jouissance*.<sup>18</sup> that is, pleasure associated with that which has been abjected, an unsatisfiable desire that becomes attached to politically powerful signifiers.

Both gender and the place of self within hierarchies are essential components of the process of imagining nationhood. The modern nation-state provides models for the ordering of individuals and the organization of gender as part of its educational and regulatory apparatus. The fears and desires of individuals can be powerfully evoked through perceived threats to these fundamental aspects of social order, and thus they constitute an important part of the underpinning of a national imaginary. Gender, as the fundamental social difference rooted in every individual's earliest experiences, rests on a foundation of renunciation of early desires and abjection of infantile attachments that forms the subject as a social being. Sexuality and gender organization are not merely practices to be dispassionately regulated and organized by the state. Gender and social hierarchies are fundamental aspects of our experience and identity and often serve as material for social fantasies. Even when a minority is granted full legal rights, these collective fantasies can be a source of basic challenges to the possibilities for full cultural citizenship, especially if the minority has been stigmatized and abjected.

### **MASCULINITY AND THE GENDERING OF THE NATION**

As Simone de Beauvoir observed many years ago, "One is not born a woman, but rather becomes one" (de Beauvoir 1953: 267). Men, too, are fashioned by the cultural and political forces that converge on the particular situation of their existence. But, as de Beauvoir argued, it is woman who has been marked as other and inferior in Western thought and institutions. Following the inspiration of scholars like de Beauvoir, feminist scholars in the second half of the twentieth century set out to transform the position of women by making woman and her subordinate position an object of study. Studies of men and masculinity in the United States eventually followed, with considerable emphasis on the tensions that many men feel as they experience the pressures of

conforming to the normative masculinity that has played so powerful a role in the subordination of women.<sup>19</sup> This normative masculinity has been characterized by heterosexuality, emotional control, aggressive social dominance, and success in the workplace.

Along with the social pressure that has accompanied the struggle for women's equality have emerged new models of masculinity that stress a move away from the "macho" toward interactional styles characterized by traits typically associated with "feminine" behavior.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, there has been great interest in exploring the limits of masculinity and the stigmatizations associated with homosexuality and "gender bending," within the context of the gay rights movement and the effort to normalize and celebrate alternative sexualities and gender orientations in the face of a powerful normative heterosexual masculinity.

Virtually unrecognized in this evolving discourse on masculinities, however, has been another site of stigmatization, one that is implicit in the preceding paragraph. Many of us consider ourselves "politically correct" when we criticize the dominant white male for his macho behavior and demeanor. The term *macho*, a Spanish word that has entered English as well as German and many other northern European languages, is often used as an insult in English, especially in educated and professional circles. In the United States, the form of masculinity associated with machismo is highly stigmatized and stereotyped: "As defined by U.S. society, the concept of 'machismo' has distinct negative overtones. Being macho is often associated with being a wife-beater, a philanderer, a drunk, a 'bien gallo'—a fighter, like a rooster" (Rodríguez and Gonzales 1997). What often goes unnoticed by Americans who identify themselves as politically correct is that in the United States this label was applied first to Latin American men and has contributed to their marginalization. Here is the perspective of a Hispanic journalist:

What is macho? That depends on which side of the border you come from. Although it's not unusual for words and expressions to lose their subtlety in translation, the negative connotations of "macho" in the U.S. are troublesome to Hispanics. . . . The Hispanic "macho" is manly, responsible, hard-working, a man in charge, a patriarch. A man who expresses strength through silence. What the Yiddish language would call a "mensch." The American "macho" is a chauvinist, a brute, uncouth, selfish, loud, abrasive, capable of inflicting pain, and sexually promiscuous. (del Castillo Guilbault 1996)

"Othering" through racism and through discrimination against minorities is commonly manifested as a denigration of the masculinity of the other. Thanks to the strength and success of the civil rights movement and the accompanying rise of African American studies, many people in the United States have been sensitized to the racial stigmatization of African Americans, and the legacy of racist clichés about the hypersexed, animal-like black man has been deconstructed (see, for example, Collins 2004). Nevertheless, such stigmatizations persist, as in feminist writings that problematize African American masculinity. Though writers such as bell hooks usually locate the source of problematic expressions of masculinity such as "coolness" in the "patriarchal imperialism" of the U.S. society in which these men live (hooks 2003), they nevertheless reproduce stereotypical generalizations about the black male.

Latino studies have more recently begun to question hegemonic stereotypes of Latino men (for example, Gutmann 1996) as the discipline becomes academically established, though questioning this perspective has not yet penetrated very far into U.S. public discourse. It has been recognized that the "mistranslation" of the word *macho* has had consequences for the identity of the Latino male: "Drunkness, abusing women, raising hell . . . are some mistaken conceptions of what macho means" (Anaya 1996: 59). Journalists seeking to disrupt this naturalized stigmatization of machismo have observed: "the uninformed often point to such behavior and call it machismo. In fact, much of this negative behavior is aped by a new generation, because as young men they are not aware that they are being conditioned. Young men acting contrary to the good of their community have not yet learned the essence of maleness" (Rodriguez and Gonzales 1997). Not only has it become an accepted stereotype that is often applied indiscriminately to all Hispanic men; it may also affect the self-esteem, identities, and behavior of Hispanic youth in the United States. As one of the founders of a group of professional Latino men whose goal is to instill positive values in young Latino men observed: "This confuses young males. . . . And some young Latinos fulfill this distorted definition of manhood by acting out a false manliness in response to living in a foreign culture where they feel emasculated by racism and a lack of educational and job opportunities" (Rodriguez and Gonzales 1997).<sup>21</sup> A similar unreflective stigmatization of a culturally labeled masculinity is a significant force that shapes discussions of Muslim minorities in Europe that in turn affects the possibilities for identification among Muslim men in Germany.

The stigmatization of Muslim men in terms of women's rights is a longstanding element of Western discourse. The Bush administration used the argument

for women's rights as part of the justification of the war in Afghanistan, as in Laura Bush's radio address to the nation in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: "The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women" (Bush 2001). Statements such as this echo the arguments of earlier colonial administrators in South Asia and the Middle East, who used them to justify similar invasions and paternalistic policies (see Abu-Lughod 2002).<sup>22</sup> Such justifications often rhetorically equate "radical Islam," the oppression of women, and the cultural practices of Muslim men more generally.

The colonies were the site of other stigmatizations of the manhood of colonized subjects, not all of which focused on disrupting local gender roles. In some cases, representations of gendered subjectivity signified the power relationship between colonized and colonizer (Scott 1989; Stoler 1995), as in the case of the male Indian subject, who was depicted as feminine in relation to the manly Englishman. This was particularly true, for example, of the "effeminate Bengali babu," as the British characterized Bengali intellectuals in the late nineteenth century (Sinha 1995). Stigmatization is a symbolic process that creates a hierarchical relationship between self and other. But in colonial representations, there was often a profound ambivalence toward this other, a tension between the hypersexed, patriarchal savage and the effeminate, subordinate other, sometimes alternating in representations of the same other, generating an uncanny tension. This "other" masculinity is stigmatized and forms the abjected ground on which the European's dominant masculinity rests (see Bhabha 1995; Fanon 1967; Stoler 1989).

The theme of masculinity is thus deployed to stigmatize a minority as part of the process of forming a national subject. In Germany, especially during the extreme nationalism of the National Socialist period, the masculinity of the pure-blooded German was a focus of symbolic elaboration and physical discipline. The masculinity of the Jew as stigmatized other was, in contrast, denigrated, usually by representing the Jewish male as effeminate in sometimes fantastic ways. In the postwar period, the national project of shaping a democratic subject has involved a shift in the ideals of German masculinity away from a militaristic, hierarchical subjectivity toward an egalitarian orientation grounded in constitutional patriotism. Despite this reformation, there are continuities in the process of subject formation itself, founded as it is on an ever-present act of negation of forms of nationalism associated with Nazism.<sup>23</sup> This reformed masculine subject is also grounded on a stigmatized other—an other

that has similarly been transformed so that the qualities of masculinity embodied by this other stand in contrast to those of the ideal masculine subject. At this historical juncture, the Turkish Muslim man, as a member of the currently largest minority in Germany, is a signifier that is readily at hand to embody this stigmatized masculinity.

### THE TURKISH MINORITY IN GERMANY AND THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION

Turkish guestworkers (*Gastarbeiter*) began to flow into Germany in the 1960s to meet the demand for low-cost labor during Germany's post-World War II economic boom years. The need for a large number of foreign laborers developed suddenly with the construction of the Berlin Wall and the sealing of the border between East and West Germany in 1961. These laborers were explicitly called "guests," in contrast to the term used for foreign workers (*Fremdarbeiter*) who had been enslaved during the Nazi era (Herbert and Hunn 2001: 191). Most came directly from rural Anatolia rather than from cosmopolitan urban areas, exacerbating the cultural distance between these immigrants and an urban German population. They were meant to be a rotating, primarily male workforce and were given short-term contracts, were housed in hostels apart from established neighborhoods, and received minimal social services. But this arrangement was inefficient for employers, who preferred to renew contracts, thereby creating a more long-term labor force (O'Brien 1996). When the economy faltered in the early 1970s, the German government banned further labor recruitment, but workers already in the country were allowed to remain and to bring their families into Germany. These pragmatic responses to changing conditions led to a gradual modification of policy, without any publicly conscious decision to open the country to migration.

In the early years, these workers remained on the fringes of German society as temporary residents. At first, both Germans and the migrants themselves imagined that they would one day return to Turkey, an imaginary that has been called the *myth of return*. But by the 1980s it became clear to many of these families and to the German public that most of these migrants were in Germany to stay, and German public discourse began to frame the "problem" of their apparent lack of integration into German society. The adolescent girl who is expected to wear a headscarf, pulled out of school at a young age, kept close to home, and forced to marry a relative from Turkey became a powerful symbol of cultural and religious difference and the failure of Turks to embrace assimilation.

Though Turkey is a country with a Muslim majority and most of the Turkish migrants to Germany are of Muslim background, many Turks are quite secular in orientation.<sup>24</sup> Turkey became a secular state in 1924, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Turkish Republic. Old religious institutions such as the Sufi orders and schools for the training of imams were shut down.<sup>25</sup> Mosques came under the control of the state-run Directorate of Religious Affairs, and clothing associated with Islam and the Ottomans was banned.<sup>26</sup> Various institutions such as state-run schools and the military have played a central role in inculcating secularism as a core element of the state's project to modernize the population and create a Turkish national subject. In the early 1980s, a new wave of migration to Europe was triggered by the 1980 military coup in Turkey. Thousands of activists, many of them intellectuals, were imprisoned and tortured, and a significant number fled as refugees to Germany and other European countries. These refugees, many of whom were secularist leftists or actively involved in Islamic groups,<sup>27</sup> played a major role in establishing newspapers and other organizations for Turks in Germany. Given their institutional positioning, many of those who came as refugees have been highly visible and have disproportionately influenced public representations of the Turkish population in Germany.

The exuberant fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the ensuing reunification of East and West Germany were followed by intense public debate around articulations of national identity and citizenship, including the place in the future of a united Germany of Turkish and other Muslims as Germany's largest minority. These debates about citizenship were also accompanied by expressions of xenophobia and ethnic violence that targeted the Turkish population. Anti-immigrant sentiment was especially strong in the former Eastern states, which underwent profound social and economic transformations during the reunification process. Turkish communities experienced considerable fear for their safety throughout Germany. The political rhetoric calling for foreigner-free zones (*ausländerfreie Zonen*) and a number of brutal attacks on Turkish families by neo-Nazis sharpened public awareness of integration issues and generated intensified support among liberal Germans for the competing idea of Germany as a "multicultural" society. Though the liberalization of citizenship laws, away from the principle of descent or "blood" (*jus sanguinis*) to the principle of place of birth (*jus soli*), was slow in coming—becoming law in a limited form in 2000—and restrictions on dual citizenship are still onerous, increasing numbers of second- and third-generation Turks have opted for Ger-



man citizenship and are becoming more involved in the political process. But many continue to be troubled by media and political representations of Turks and Muslims as well as the “failure” of integration, a rhetoric that has been exacerbated by the increased fear of Muslims after September 11, 2001, and the rising strength of nationalist, socially conservative politicians across Europe.

Even before September 11, escalating nationalism and xenophobia in both Europe and the United States were associated with burgeoning immigrant populations. Aside from the powerful rhetorical links that are now made between Muslim immigrants and terrorism, many people fear increasing social unrest and the chaos of disintegration that a growing minority population threatens to bring. One conservative German politician, Hans-Peter Uhl of the Christian Social Union, expressed these concerns in the following terms: “Nine percent of the current German population consists of immigrants. While this percentage is relatively small, the immigrant population can be a social problem when there are too many foreigners in your workplace, in the streets, in your apartment building, and in your child’s classroom. . . . There are 7 million foreigners living in Germany, and the main political question is how to integrate them into society.”<sup>28</sup> The murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004 and the rioting of Muslim youth in France in the fall of 2005 brought discussion of the problems of integration even more fully into public discourse in many European countries. Best-selling Dutch author Leon de Winter, for example, spoke about minority problems in the Netherlands: “The problems began when the first guest workers arrived in Holland—as soon as we let people from the third world come here to work in our rich country, we had a guilt complex and somehow saw them as sacred victims. We then let them bring their wives and children over without having any clue that we were importing integration problems with which we had no experience” (Spiegel Online 2006).

Concern with the problem of immigrants is not limited to a vocal conservative wing. On the contrary, Uhl spoke as he did to an American scholarly audience (a Fulbright seminar) precisely because attention to the “question of immigration” and its problems is of concern to people across the political spectrum. Though liberals and conservatives in countries such as Germany differ sharply on how to solve the nagging problems associated with the integration of immigrants and especially Muslims into their society, and though they approach these problems in divergent ways, few question the fact that integration has thus far been fraught with problems that have escalated since the 1990s. The mainstream media, policy makers, and many scholars take as a given that

integrating minorities into European society is one of Europe's primary and worsening social challenges.

Debates over how integration should be accomplished are intense. These debates are grounded, not as much in disagreements about tactics, as in fundamental principles involving competing visions of the nation, the meaning of citizenship, the nature of identity, and the desirability of difference. And there are always concerns, expressed both in the media and among scholars, about the "problems" of integration and, especially during periods of high levels of immigration, an agonized search for an understanding of why integration has thus far "failed," why the social segregation of Turks into ethnic enclaves is growing (see, for example, Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder 1997; Leggewie 2000) and ethnic self-identification is increasing (Münz, Siefert, and Ulrich 1997: 103), and how social policy can be legislated and adjusted to fix the perceived problems. These concerns are often manifested in firestorms of controversy around events and symbols that seem to crystallize the evidence for failure and make it visible to the public eye. Most of these points of conflict have revolved around the organization of gender, as represented by the headscarf and honor killing.

Despite all of this hand-wringing, public and political angst over the "failure" of integration cannot necessarily be taken at face value. In the case of Turks in Germany, recriminations about the failures of integration (both blame assigned to immigrants and self-blame for failed policies and inaction), so starkly expressed during controversies such as these, are out of joint with evidence from studies which have shown that Turkish immigrants in Germany have by some measures actually done quite well. For example, 55 percent of immigrants from Turkey and 93 percent of the second generation speak German well (Heckmann 1997: 3). Most members of the second generation are by a number of social, cultural, and economic measures closer to "native-born" Germans than they are to their immigrant parents (Fertig 2004; Kogan 2003).<sup>29</sup> Economic and sociological literature on continuing disparities in educational attainment and job mobility tends to focus explanations for these disparities on problems of measurement<sup>30</sup> and the obstacles to integration, usually locating the sources of these obstacles in the German educational system, legal system (especially restrictions on access to citizenship), occupational structure, and social discrimination. For first-generation guestworkers these obstacles have also included limited knowledge of German, lack of education (exacerbated by the near-total discounting of Turkish educational credentials), and the percep-

tion for many years that the stay of guestworkers was temporary, a perception that made employers unwilling to invest in on-the-job training for unskilled workers (Kogan 2003: 2). Immigrants' children who were raised in Germany continue to face some structural constraints, including a lack of social capital, geographical segregation, and discrimination due to social origin (Kogan 2003: 2). Furthermore, ambivalence about the process of integration has been pervasive at the level of policy goals, with some policies aimed at furthering acculturation and assimilation and other policies—often associated with an ideology of multiculturalism—aimed at fostering a process of minority formation, reinforcing the ethnic identity of the family and the development of minority institutions (Heckmann 1997). Thus, most quantitative empirical research locates the reasons for continuing disparities in the educational and occupational attainments of minorities in structural obstacles but also indicates that integration is nevertheless proceeding at a good pace.

In contrast to the focus among quantitative social scientists on structural barriers, public and political discourse tends to focus on “culture” as the cause of failure. The integration process is said to fail because of the cultural backwardness and religious orientation of Turkish immigrants and an associated lack of motivation, all of which contribute to these immigrants resisting assimilation when given the opportunity.<sup>31</sup> From this perspective, any visible tendencies of immigrants to “cling” to cultural traditions become evidence confirming this resistance. In addition to the headscarf and other practices associated with Islam or village tradition such as honor killing, Germans often point to phenomena such as the large number of satellite dishes, which receive broadcasts directly from Turkey, in Turkish neighborhoods as evidence of the unwillingness of the people in those neighborhoods to integrate. Recent rhetoric in the German media has called for legislation that would force Turks to give up certain cultural practices and become more like Germans. In this rhetoric, the concept of culture is a key term used to define the Turkish minority as outsiders.

#### **AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF FANTASY: TRACING MASCULINITY THROUGH THE GERMAN NATIONAL IMAGINARY**

Instead of asking what the “problems” of integration are or why it has “failed,” as the German public is often inclined to do, or becoming mired in the ambivalence that characterizes policy debates about assimilation versus minority formation and multiculturalism, I consider who talks about integration and

its failures, how they talk about it, in what contexts, and to what ends in order to examine the stigmatization of masculinity and of Muslim gender practices more generally. By asking what work such perceptions and statements are doing for those who utter them, I find that a key silence surrounds the situation of the Turkish Muslim man in Europe. This silence masks how the stigmatization of Muslim and Turkish masculinities has been used as a strategy to manage immigrants and consolidate German national identity. I delineate the intensities and silences that are produced through the practices of governmentality, public debates, and the media as manifestations of a structure of social fantasy that underlies a German national imaginary. I argue that this fantasy rests on a foundation of abjection of a social other. This German national imaginary is, therefore, a force in the constitution of cultural citizenship, distinguishing those who fully belong from those who do not. By examining how diasporic, stigmatized Turkish Muslim men deploy and resist prevailing stereotypes, I also identify how this national imaginary, with its stigmatization of Muslim masculinity, leaves its traces on those who have been abjected. I then focus on moments of national controversy and moral panic when the processes of abjection in the constitution of a German national imaginary become explicit.

This book is an ethnographic study of public culture and the discursive construction of the nation. Anthropology has ventured into novel realms of inquiry that transcend the confines of “the field” as a geographically delimited space. Questions such as the discursive constitution of a stigmatized masculinity and its relationship to a national imaginary cannot be studied solely through face-to-face interactions by simply “being there.”<sup>32</sup> The limits of ethnography have expanded to encompass new forms of data collection and the methodological blurring of disciplinary boundaries, resulting in a productive juxtaposition of sources. Such sometimes surprising juxtapositions, along with a willingness to suspend judgment on what should be selected as data and an openness to looking at a phenomenon in many different ways, have always been the hallmark of ethnography. I thus make a number of what might be construed as startling juxtapositions—anthropological ethnographies of rural Turkey with nineteenth-century German travel diaries; newspaper articles, films, and the writings of social workers. In a quest to identify the recurrent, self-evident truths and fantasies that underlie the coherence of a national imaginary, I interweave interpretations of media and scholarly sources with analyses of conversations and interviews with men and women of Turkish background living in Germany; with knowledge of families of Turkish background gained from living

with such families for short periods of time and from knowing individuals over several years; and with conversations with German students, social workers, and educators.

Part 1 focuses on the historical sources of the discursive strands that come together to naturalize representations of the Turkish man as stigmatized other and manifestations of the resulting stigmatizations in identity negotiations among men of Turkish background. I begin in Chapter 1 by tracing the roots of this positioning of the Turk and the Muslim man as other in Germany. I identify several strands, ranging across academic scholarship on the Ottoman Empire, the anthropological construct of the “honor-shame complex,” nineteenth-century European travel accounts, twentieth-century Turkish efforts to construct a nation of modern cosmopolitan citizens, a transnational discourse of gender equality, and ethnographies of the Turkish village. I suggest a convergence in their representations of Turkish masculinity that naturalizes understandings of cultural difference within German discourse.

Chapter 2 draws a contrast between the cultural stereotypes that structure social fantasy and the micropolitics of everyday life by exploring the powerful theme of rescuing the Muslim woman as it has appeared in German social work literature and in cinema. I argue that these distinct genres, the former playing a significant role in the shaping of practices of governmentality that affect the lives of minorities and the latter projecting widely disseminated images into public spaces, materialize cultural difference and stigmatization.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider manifestations of stigmatization and abjection among men who themselves occupy the subject position of stigmatized masculinity by examining the micropolitics of the research situation itself. Chapter 3 focuses on how assumptions of cultural otherness shape the research even of scholars who seek to present the experiences of men. Drawing on interpretive perspectives gained from my own research over the course of several years in Germany between 1999 and 2005,<sup>33</sup> I analyze the performance and negotiation of discursively constituted identities in the interview process. I examine how men manifest tensions and ambivalences about how to inhabit conflictual identities in the face of stigmatization and the extent to which such tensions play out around issues associated with this stigmatized masculinity. In Chapter 4, I focus on honor. I consider how filmmakers and other men of Turkish background negotiate issues of reputation and self-respect in a world where the concept of honor is associated with traditional masculinity and is a primary target of stigmatization.

In Part 2 I move to a series of controversies that manifest social panic surrounding the Turkish Muslim immigrant population and expose the abjection of the Turkish and Muslim man in the German national imaginary. The rhetoric surrounding these controversies indicates that these signs carry a powerful emotional charge focused on the threat of the Muslim man that can be seen, not only in the writings of journalists, but also in the everyday conversations of Germans. These controversies emerge from a discourse that locates the Muslim man and the Turk in specific ways as other.

Chapter 5 focuses on the extensive media coverage following an honor killing in Berlin in 2005, in which a young woman was murdered by her brother or brothers because they objected to her nontraditional lifestyle. For many Germans this controversy threw into relief the extent to which Muslims were moving in the direction of a parallel society, an enclave in which the honor of the Muslim man, the foundation of his masculinity, rests on a principle of violence fundamentally incompatible with the principles of modern German citizenship.

Some of the proposed solutions to problems of integration have also generated controversy. These controversies, many of which have developed over citizenship legislation and efforts to further the integration of Muslims into German society, have become symbols that reveal the fault lines within German national identity as well as the problematic position of immigrants within German society. I foreground these controversies, which define Muslim gender practices in the German media and mark the Muslim man as other. By delineating this otherness, they also reveal the contours of cultural citizenship in Germany today.

In 2006, a controversial “Muslim Test” was developed to serve as a guideline for determining the suitability of applicants for German citizenship. The questions on this test reveal the specific points at which the essence of Germanness is seen to collide with Muslimness or Turkishness. In Chapter 6, I examine the controversy surrounding this test within the context of debates over specific Islamic practices that many in the German public find troublesome: the wearing of headscarves by female teachers and the exemption of Muslim girls from school gym classes. These controversies expose the intimate linkages among gender, bodily practices, and the state, as well their foundation in social fantasies. A German discourse of the body and notions of bodily purity are directly challenged by Muslim practices.

One particularly intense debate erupted in 2000 after a conservative German politician proposed that the idea of *Leitkultur* be a standard for assimilation.

Controversy erupted because the term evoked memories of Nazism. Chapter 7 examines this controversy and some of the social fantasies of nationhood associated with it. Notions of Germanness and the need to protect the essence of German national identity in the face of large numbers of Turkish Muslim immigrants came into sharp relief during the *Leitkultur* controversy. In this discourse, the Muslim man is often posed as a threat to the German Constitution, revealing the culturally peculiar significance of the postwar Constitution as it is used to articulate the rights of the citizen as an autonomous liberal subject. Ironically, constitutional patriotism, an ideological principle developed to guard against discriminatory forms of nationalism in the name of democracy, has become the basis for abjecting a minority by characterizing this minority as an embodiment of the nondemocratic traditional other.