World Integration and Centrifugal Forces

Ethnic movements appear worldwide in different guises. Ethnic mayhem by Sudanese Muslim soldiers, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, nonviolent civil rights marches in the United States, Québécois separatism in Canada, Mexican-American protests in California for bilingual education, Protestant displays of patriotism in Northern Ireland, and regional autonomy movements in the Chiapas region of Mexico all provide challenges to social scientists attempting to explain the widespread occurrence of social movements based upon ethnic identity. While some of these movements have been peaceful, comparative research indicates that ethnic movements have contributed to the majority of violent conflicts among and within nation-states since World War II. Furthermore, some scholars warn that ethnic mobilization increasingly threatens the legitimacy and stability of the world's states.[1]

What accounts for ethnic conflict, rebellions, and protest? Up until recently, most academic and policy research has tended to rely on explanations of ethnic movements that focus on the internal characteristics of states (such as economic inequality, weakness of regimes, and the absence of democracy). Such perspectives have come under scrutiny recently because they tend to reify existing states as the key actors in world politics and they miss the relational aspect of states and nonstate organizations as a system of inter-connected actors (Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2003). To begin to rectify these problems, I start by asking if global forces have contributed to ethnic political

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[1]For instance, see Gurr (1993), Barber (1996), Strange (1996), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Fox (2002), Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003). In contrast, others emphasize more benign outcomes of ethnic politics, arguing that human rights have been expanded as a consequence of anti-discrimination movements (Risse-Kappen 1995; Räikkä 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Coicaud, Doyle, and Gardner 2003).

movements organized around distinctive features of culture, heritage, and identity.

In this book I offer and test a new approach to ethnic mobilization that considers the interplay between global forces of integration and the political mobilization of ethnicity. While it has become accepted wisdom that the fates of different polities have become more intertwined (Keohane and Nye 1972; Risse-Kappen 1995; Boli and Thomas 1999), there are few systematic treatments of globalization and ethnic politics. Here I explore whether globalization and ethnic social movements are causally connected.

Recent theoretical advances by a number of sociologists and political scientists inform my strategy of focusing on the world level of analysis.[2] Although there are differences and disagreements among scholarly studies on the impact of globalization, most researchers have emphasized the consequences of a densely connected system of economic and political links among states (Keohane and Milner 1996; J. Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Borstelmann 2001). These perspectives vary widely, from concern with world system position, to focus on impact of direct foreign investment, to interest in the legacy of the Cold War on international relations. Some scholars studying globalization take a political stand against globalization, while others are more analytically inclined. However, all of these perspectives share the growing recognition that international forces have produced a striking isomorphism among organizational forms found in institutions, constitutions, treaties, human rights, identity politics, and other social movements.[3]

My work expands on these theories of globalization, international networks, and transnational social movements by suggesting that processes associated with globalization have intensified at the same time that ethnic conflict appears increasingly divisive (Barber 1996; Gurr 2000; Yashar 1999, 2001; Sambanis 2001). These theories have considered the impact of global forces on the internal politics of nation-states, organizations, social

[2] The concepts of globalization, transnational politics, and internationalism are sometimes used interchangeably. For arguments documenting the importance of making distinctions between global market forces and transnational social movement outcomes, see Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (1992), O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams (2000), della Porta and Tarrow (2005), and Tarrow (2005).

[3] For examples, see Roeder (1991), J. Meyer et al. (1997), Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan (1997), Gurowitz (1999), Barber (1996), Huntington (1996), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse et al. (1999), Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer (2000), O'Brien et al. (2000) Berkowitz (1999), and Borstelmann (2001).

movements, and other political actors (Tarrow 2005). Globalization processes include networks of diplomatic ties and treaties, formal and informal trade and economic links, international economic aid and agreements, and non-governmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks that coordinate activities in multiple regions simultaneously.[4]

By applying a global perspective here I theorize about the dynamics of forces that have repercussions across global, state, and local levels. Such forces exert pressure on political actors through economic trade networks, diplomatic ties, military interventions, and/or ideological/cultural institutions. World system theorists once proposed quite similar notions (see Wallerstein 1976; Boswell and Dixon 1990).[5] For instance, world system perspectives focus on the role of stratification of different territorial regions as a single force. Although the world system approach is useful to some kinds of analyses of economic cycles (Arrighi and Silver 1999), one of its shortcomings is its tendency to slight important country or cultural variations and contexts that also constrain and empower nation-states and actors (Tarrow 2001). Because of this limitation, the theory cannot explain differences in form and variation in goals, magnitude of violence, success, and other outcomes within world system categories. To counter this tendency, I build on recent work on transnational social movements, politics, and activism (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1995; J. Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Gurowitz 1999; O'Brien et al. 2000; della Porta and Tarrow 2005), by including empirical analyses of organizational, state, and global processes, in an effort to identify the mechanisms that shape different paths of ethnic mobilization. Globalization also includes transnational diffusion processes, which result in the ability of events occurring in one country to affect their distant as well as proximate neighbors (e.g., see J. Smith 2004).

Globalization has taken on a number of different meanings, including (1) actions by non-state actors (especially non-governmental organizations

[4]For reviews and research, see Keohane and Milner (1996), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Tarrow (2001, 2005), della Porta and Tarrow (2005), Hegre et al. (2003).

[5]Whether the plural label, "world systems theory," or the singular label, "world system theory" (indicating a single system), is more appropriate depends on whether the analytic frame assumes the existence of a more or less unified set of processes at the global level. Because my argument regarding its effects on ethnic mobilization rests on a unified conception, I use "world system theory" throughout this book. See www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/theories01.html for further discussion.

and social movement actors) who organize across borders (Boli and Thomas 1999); (2) the diffusion of specific social movement organizations (e.g., the peace movement, the anti-globalization movement, the environmental movement, the human rights movement) that have organized across country borders (O'Brien et al. 2000; Zafarullah and Habibur Rahman 2002; J. Smith 2004); (3) transnational networks of organizations that aggregate and coordinate country-level organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998); (4) diplomatic or trade associations between two or more countries, as in protected trade treaties or economic regional associations (Keohane and Milner 1996); (5) international ties or associations, which activists mobilize support for or against (e.g., social movement activism against dams or underground mines); and (6) trends that include the global reach and spread of economic capitalism, transnational corporations, and ideological forces that support world capitalism that justify economic policies in a number of countries (e.g., outsourcing) (McMichael 2004), which various anti-globalization movements strongly oppose. Some scholars combine analysis of these forces into a single phenomenon (e.g., Barber 1996). Yet others argue persuasively that it is more useful to consider these as quite different dimensions. For empirical purposes, it seems crucial to distinguish the economic and political forces from social movement outcomes.[6]

This research monograph offers and tests the argument that processes of globalization and internal features of states both incite ethnic mobilization (Figure 1.1, p. 27, displays the key processes). Ethnic mobilization is collective action based upon ethnic claims, protest, or intergroup hostility that makes reference to a group's demands based upon one or more cultural markers. Ethnic markers (such as skin pigmentation, language, religious

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[6]For example, Tarrow and della Porta (2005: 235) and Tarrow (2005) make a distinction between international economic and diplomatic ties among nations ("globalization") and the expansion of international institutions, actors, and organizations that act on a distinctly global stage ("complex internationalism"). Others use the term "globalization" to refer to institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) that promote reduced trade barriers among nations (J. Smith and Johnston 2002). For my purposes, it is important to distinguish links among countries and international organizations from social movement outcomes. However, the majority of ethnic and nationalist movements that operate within national borders are not generally transnational in scope (but consider the counterexample of pan-Arab nationalism) (Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000; O'Brien et al. 2000).

distinctions, dialect, cultural practices, or regional or homeland identification) delineate a potential membership pool, which may or may not become activated.[7]

Several research questions guide the analysis of the temporal and geographic diffusion of ethnic movements across a large set of countries. Can global-level factors help explain mobilization based upon ethnic identity, and can global processes help us understand which forms ethnic mobilization will take? Also, when and under what conditions will ethnic movements be relatively peaceful protests, and when will they turn violent? To answer these questions, I use information on the magnitude and occurrence of ethnic protest and conflict events in more than one hundred countries, followed over time since 1965. I use data from the *Minorities at Risk* and PANDA data sets on ethnic mobilization events to evaluate ideas about how international forces that integrate regions might influence ethnic movements. In doing so, I address some of the contemporary debates in the literature about the links among ethnicity, nationalism, and civil war.

Conventional Perspectives

Conventional treatments of ethnic mobilization find that inequality or the absence of democracy has systematically produced more ethnic conflict and protest.[8] So Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that "greedy entrepreneurs" cause civil war (see also Brown 1996), while Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that poverty and rough terrain matter more to most forms of civil unrest,

[7]While there is no shortage of definitions of ethnicity, there is growing consensus that focusing on ethnic boundaries provides useful insights for operationalizing ethnic identity (Barth 1969; Olzak 1992; Hechter 2000). Nevertheless, the process by which ethnic boundaries become transformed into active social movements has not been identified with precision. I pursue these concepts more thoroughly in Chapter 2. For examples of ethnic mobilization, see Gurr and Scarritt (1989); Gurr (1993, 2000), Olzak and Nagel (1986), Horowitz (1985, 2001), Lake and Rothchild (1998), Connor (1973, 1978), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Hegre et al. (2003). For reviews, see Brass (1991), Nielsen (1985), Olzak (1983), Brubaker and Laitin (1998), Yashar (2001).

[8]The tendency to rely on the nation-state as a core unit of analysis for studying social processes within states has been labeled "methodological nationalism." This approach can be contrasted with methodological transnationalism, which seeks to uncover the interactions and links between state, local, and international levels and flows of information, exchange, personnel, and resources (Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2003). For a review, see Tarrow (2001).

including ethnic ones. Petersen (2002) finds that resentment plays a role, whereas Horowitz (2001) finds that the presence of revenge motivations and strong emotions helps to predict when local feuds will end in deadly ethnic riots.

My analysis adds another layer of complexity to these arguments by examining the impact of key globalization processes. I do not claim that these intrasocietal forces are inconsequential; indeed, they undoubtedly shape the nature and timing of specific events and outbreaks of violence and protest. Rather, I am arguing that theories that emphasize internal factors capture only part of the story. Thus, my approach stresses both direct and indirect effects of measures that have impacts at the global level, in addition to the effects of poverty and inequality at the country level. Refuting my argument would imply that the globalization indicators are not systematically related to outbreaks of ethnic mobilization. Alternatively, supporting evidence must show that globalization forces have significant effects on ethnic movements, once internal features of ethnic inequality, poverty, and cultural diversity have been taken into account.

Prior empirical research has understated the possibility that ideological mechanisms underlie both nonviolent and violent ethnic mobilization. In applying a global perspective, I seek to redirect attention to transnational organizations that have encouraged widespread acceptance of ideologies of human rights and equality. My framework emphasizes the importance of diffusion of a worldwide human rights ideology, as it has been carried to remote regions by organizations that have established local connections in many countries.

In exploring these theoretical and methodological issues, my aim is to move the discussion about ethnic mobilization beyond discussions of intranational characteristics that spawn ethnic movements, by systematically analyzing the causes of movements that have roots in processes associated with world integration. This global perspective has proven extremely useful in the analysis of economics and international trade (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1972; Keohane and Milner 1996), international relations (Krasner 2001; Tarrow 2001), human rights (Risse-Kappen 1995; Gurowitz 1999), social movements and voluntary associations (Frank and McEneaney 1999; O'Brien et al. 2000; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; J. Smith 2004; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Khagram 2004; Sikkink 2005), and international conflict (Hegre et al. 2003). My purpose here is to understand

how a global perspective provides new insights on why different forms of ethnic mobilization might appear in different settings and historical periods.

World Integration and Ethnic Mobilization

The inclusion of arguments about the interplay between global and state-level forces in our analysis gives us more leverage over an increasingly interconnected world in which global forces affect internal politics. Economic and political crises that once affected only local areas now have repercussions in vastly different and formerly unconnected regions and states. Since the advent of the modern media, civil wars, terrorist acts, and acts by ethnic social movements have produced reactions across national borders. It seems reasonable to carry the implications of this fact one step further, to consider whether integrative processes have specific, centrifugal consequences for ethnic politics. Put differently, I first explore whether the magnitude of ethnic and nationalist movements varies systematically with integration into the world system.

Taking an international perspective helps clarify how economic interdependence among states may also foster rising ethnic subnational movements. Regional associations such as the EU, OPEC, NATO, and other supranational organizations promote interstate migration and decrease reliance of regions within states on the military and economic power of the nation-state. Multistate organizations also provide an audience for insurgent groups demanding new sovereignty rights (Olzak and Nagel 1986; Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2000). In this view, the growing network of international economic relations, exemplified by multinational corporations, growing trade and foreign investment, and supranational economic associations, will continue to produce more large-scale ethnic movements.

My strategy here offers arguments about forces of globalization that produce inequality, competition, and mobilization. My argument holds that *integration of a world economic and political system has encouraged ethnic fragmentation within states*. It does so by (1) increasing access of formerly disadvantaged groups to political resources, thus creating new political opportunities for mobilization, and (2) increasing levels of economic inequality in peripheral countries, which increases the potential for competition and conflict among groups within these states. This in turn encourages groups to make demands for redress of injustices or inequalities within states based

on ethnic identity. My argument further specifies that the process of integration of the world's states has varying effects on different sectors of the world system. Thus, my argument builds on prior work showing the impact of changing levels of economic and political access, but also considers various interaction effects between a country's position in the world system and its economic and political characteristics. The goal of this project is to uncover some of the global causes of ethnic mobilization, while trying to sort out those factors that shape ethnic and nationalist movements in different settings and in different time periods.

I present three arguments linking interdependence among states in the world economic and political system to internal sources of variation in rates of ethnic mobilization. First, I use world-systems inequality theory to suggest that *patterns of ethnic violence ought to differ in peripheral and non-peripheral countries.* In particular, I expect more ethnic violence (and more state repression) in countries that are most dependent on the world economic and diplomatic system.[9] Peripheral countries are those that are dependent, economically, politically, and militarily, on more central and dominant countries. Dominance in the world system, though associated with wealth and democratic regimes, is not conceptually equivalent with these other characteristics. It refers specifically to the number and coherence of ties to the center of world economic and political activity.

A second line of argument relates globalization to the emergence of a worldwide ideology supporting the expansion of broad civil rights to various deserving groups, including ethnic minorities (Appadurai 1996). The legitimation of this ideology across states has produced reactive local rebellions based on these claims.[10] Research findings by scholars studying transnational movements have added insights about the organizational mechanisms of international non-governmental networks and associations that transmit this ideology.[11] Following these scholars, I argue that one (unintended) consequence of the global diffusion of an ideology supporting

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[9] For empirical support regarding collective violence see Boswell and Dixon 1990.

[10] At first glance, there seems to be some similarity between this literature and other popular arguments linking processes of economic globalization to various forms of insurgency, as in *Jihad vs. McWorld* (Barber 1996), or to a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996). While these arguments have wide appeal, they have not received much support when investigated systematically (Oneal and Russett 1997).

[11] For instance, see Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse et al. (1999), and Tarrow (2005).

minority rights and rights of sovereignty is the mobilization of ethnic movements at the local level. My point is that a distinctly global ideology validating human rights mobilizes groups to make claims to acquire resources, attain parity with other groups or expanded civil liberties, or gain rights of governance over homeland territories. To the extent that local reactions to a world culture of guaranteeing human rights also intensifies competition for power among interacting ethnic groups, ethnic mobilization will arise (Barth 1969; Hannan 1979; Olzak 1992). These ideological frames legitimate powerful claims against injustice and provide strong motivation for activating local ethnic group identities. Conflict may escalate as other local groups mobilize in reaction to these forces, in order to resist coming under the power and control of oppressor groups. According to this argument, the spread of a world culture legitimating human rights for minorities and oppressed groups *increases political opportunities for minorities, raises the likelihood of ethnic protest, and exacerbates ethnic tensions within states.*

A third argument relates these international ideological forces to the internal characteristics of countries. It states that, although an international culture supporting human rights has diffused broadly, this culture is likely to have divergent effects on local regions, depending on varying levels of inequality, resources, and political opportunities (Keck and Sikkink 1998; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 2005). The literature on transnational social movements suggests that while a global human rights ideology has delivered a crucial message about the sovereign rights of groups, this message is refracted and reshaped by a number of cultural factors and opposition movements at the country level (Tarrow 2001). These country-level characteristics provide the cultural and historical context for defining ethnic claims for expanded rights within particular ethnic movements.

I argue that the diffusion of an international culture favoring human rights will produce systematically different forms of ethnic mobilization in different settings. Violent ethnic movements ought to be strongest in regions where ethnic rights are denied by the political system, and nonviolent ethnic protest will arise where ethnic group rights have institutional standing. Thus, I argue that while there has been widespread diffusion of an ideology championing the rights and protection of minorities, this ideology will produce different types of ethnic mobilization within different countries. In particular, *core countries and countries granting more inclusionary rights to*

minorities will exhibit ethnic mobilization that is less violent, while more exclusionary states will experience significantly more violent outbreaks.

Status in the World System and Inequality

Although it is seldom applied to ethnic movements, the notion that world-level forces affect internal economies and polities is not new. For many decades, world system theory has offered a coherent analytic framework that provides a theoretical context for understanding global integration processes and their consequences.[12] According to a world system theory of stratification, the economic integration of the world system has linked together various regions, polities, and markets into a dense and interdependent system. Wallerstein (1976) emphasized that over the past 300 years, the integration of a world economy created a hierarchy of more and less powerful countries.

World system theory rests on the historical argument that the world's states were gradually transformed into economically and politically dominant "core" nations, a less-developed "semi-periphery," and increasingly dependent "peripheral" nations. Core states can be defined as having (1) centrality in trade and military interventions; (2) maintained dominance through the use (or threat) of a superior armed force; and (3) centrality in a network of diplomatic information and exchange, specifically in their role of sending diplomats and authoring treaties (see Snyder and Kick 1979). Peripheral states are those that score lowest on centrality and dominance. Other researchers have argued that the middle, in-between category of "semi-periphery" is perhaps more relevant to understanding outbreaks of conflict, because this category includes many countries moving from the periphery to the core. Such countries are also likely to be in flux, experiencing various economic and political transitions. This makes them especially interesting and relevant to arguments regarding the role of increasing and decreasing political freedom and economic inequality. Thus, it makes sense to explore the impact of semi-peripheral status on ethnic mobilization in the empirical analysis chapters that follow. Wallerstein and his colleagues have suggested that the addition of this intermediate category advances the theory because

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[12]See Wallerstein (1976), Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Strang (1990), McMichael (2004), and Arrighi and Silver (1999).

it carries the implication that dependency can be viewed on a continuum, rather than as a dichotomous variable (Wallerstein 1976).

POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY

According to the world system perspective, the diffusion of a world capitalist system has increasingly reinforced the dependence of the peripheral nations on core nations. The consequence is that the persistence of inequality among nations retards political and economic development in the peripheral countries, including the diffusion of minority rights (see Strang 1990; Alderson and Nielsen 2002). From a world-system/dependency theory perspective, peripheral nations ought to have a different political dynamic with respect to existing group inequalities than do core nations. This is due to the fact that peripheral nations by definition hold a relatively dependent position in the world stratification system. In this view, dependency intensifies the effects of all types of internal conflict. The analogy here is with a local environment of shrinking or limited resources, in which groups find themselves increasingly in competition over fewer political and economic resources. The processes of change within peripheral nations will have more immediate and more intensified consequences in more dependent settings, where there are fewer degrees of freedom. According to this view, the triumph of an integrated world economic and political system widened even small gaps that existed between richer and poorer regions within and between countries.

In contrast, several leading social movement perspectives have claimed that declining gaps in resources mobilize challengers against authorities. Thus, resource mobilization perspectives suggest that increasing access to resources among disadvantaged groups offers new opportunities for mobilizing at the grassroots level (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). To the extent that embeddedness in a world system encourages economic development, *increasing equality among regions (or groups) within a country releases forces of competitive exclusion and conflict*. This is because advantaged groups perceiving a growing threat from upwardly mobile groups will react by suppressing opportunities and closing off means for advancement. Ethnic aggression can occur as dominant groups attempt to reassert their dominance over newly competing groups. At the same time, protest rates rise as formerly disadvantaged ethnic groups gain access to resources and challenge the existing power structure. The changing economic leverage among ethnic groups provides the impetus for mobilization

by newly empowered subordinate groups and by dominant groups whose position becomes threatened. This argument suggests the hypothesis that countries with higher levels of income inequality will experience more disruptive ethnic violence.[13]

Furthermore, these economic effects are likely to depend upon the degree of embeddedness of a country in an international organizational network. Highly dependent peripheral countries without external links to international organizations are likely to be the most vulnerable to ethnic aggression. Conversely, peripheral countries that are embedded in the world system of organizations may be shielded from disruptive internal ethnic aggression. In countries more embedded in the global community, internal strife is more likely to invite external intervention (diplomatic, military, and otherwise) (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999). This argument implies an interaction effect between peripheral status and the number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations. Following this logic, peripheral countries that also have a large number of links to the international network of organizations would have lower levels of ethnic aggression, when compared to peripheral countries without such links.

The threshold for mobilizing nonviolent ethnic protest is likely to be higher in the periphery than in core countries. In peripheral countries where there are authoritarian regimes, mild forms of collective protest will be suppressed and human rights activists less able to form local networks (Olivier 1990; Francisco 1995; Rasler 1996; Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003). This suggests that, on average, peripheral countries would experience less ethnic protest. At the same time, because the cost of protest is high, protest levels remain relatively low. However, when protest does erupt in less

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[13]Recent empirical evidence suggests that income inequality among nations is declining (Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; Goesling 2001). Does this evidence run counter to my hypothesis regarding the impact of inequality? Not necessarily. This is because my argument states that the spread of human rights ideologies implies that the persistence of any gap in human rights, income, well-being, minority treatment, etc., among ethnic groups has rendered ethnic identity more salient. Existing evidence shows that the rhetoric, demands, and claims of ethnic movements are more likely to be based on claims of economic inequality and civil rights, when compared to earlier periods when these comparisons were less global in scope. Furthermore, resource mobilization theories of social movements find that ethnic groups mobilize when formerly disadvantaged groups experience economic gains. Taken together, these findings suggest that recent declines in income inequality among all nations will not necessarily eradicate ethnic movements.

democratic states, it is likely to have achieved some momentum and support. In this view, protest is more likely to be violent, secessionist, and confrontational in more repressive countries compared to more democratic and open ones (Koopmans 1995; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Guigni 1995; Olzak and Tsutsui 1998; but see Fearon and Laitin 2003).

VARIATION IN MEMBERSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

At the global level of analysis, I expect that international links have a galvanizing effect on ethnic alliances and hostilities within states. As the evidence from the Cold War period suggests, even the threat of an outbreak of international conflict provided a structure for building new alliances, coalitions, and interdependent relations between countries that can generate new opportunities for local mobilization efforts (Borstelmann 2001). With each new realignment of nation-states comes a new set of regulations for political asylum, immigration laws regarding citizenship, welfare rights, and deportation. As scholars in the international relations field argue, the recent demise of the Cold War demonstrates that new and different sets of network alliances can emerge among former enemy camps. My argument is that international organizations have produced additional forces of realignment within countries.[14]

To examine this argument empirically, it is crucial to distinguish nongovernmental organizations from ethnic social movements. Tarrow (2001) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) have defined international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as organizations that include members from more than one nation-state, operate independently from authorities in any given nation-state, and engage in routine activities that include interacting with local residents to influence the organization's goals (e.g., human rights, world health, AIDS research, etc.). Although social movements generally include goals of broad social change as part of their mission, *ethnic social movements* are contentious social actors, because they incite conflict against other ethnic groups, make claims to authorities demanding the end of discrimination, or make demands for expanded rights of geographical autonomy, separatism, or statehood that are not being met. Thus, as Tarrow (2001: 12) indicates,

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[14]Refugee flows can be analyzed as both causes and consequences of these same historical processes. International wars as well as internal conflicts provide a steady stream of political refugees seeking safety (Jenkins and Schmeidl 1995). In Chapter 8, I investigate the impact of ethnic conflict on civil war and international wars.

although both INGOs and ethnic social movements may seem to share common goals, their behaviors are (usually) quite distinct.[15]

The extent to which a country is tied to the international network will determine its response to the forces of globalization (Keck and Sikkink 1998; O'Brien et al. 2000; Tsutsui 2004). I pursue the argument that a country's number of connections to INGOs will amplify forces of political and economic stratification in the world system. Conversely, the absence of ties to INGOs implies that global culture and ideology will have weaker effects in more isolated states. Thus, I expect that ethnic movements in peripheral states will be most affected by membership in international organizations that have been established, dominated, and run by core countries. Because core countries are more deeply embedded in the transnational organization network, I expect that the global integration of human rights ideology will facilitate more nonviolent protest in these countries, and that these same forces of integration will constrain outbreaks of violent ethnic demands.

I am not arguing that international organizations produce more protest because groups in subordinate countries attempt to imitate social movements in the core. Instead, I am proposing that international networks are themselves a major vehicle for transporting ideology, behavior, and institutions supporting human rights. Consequently, countries with a greater number of links to these agencies should be most influenced by pressures that are both ideological (e.g., J. Meyer et al. 1997) and material (Tarrow 2001). Conversely, those countries that are most isolated from the international system of government organization should experience the lowest amount of protest.

The Diffusion of Human Rights Ideology

Recent analysis of the diffusion of world culture and ideology has shifted the emphasis of world system theory to consider the ideological implications of the integration of the world system (J. Smith 1995; Keohane and Milner 1996; J. Meyer et al. 1997; Ramirez et al. 1997). According to the world polity perspective, the diffusion of human rights has become a key motivation

[15]For some scholars, the key distinction between INGOs and social movements is that the latter engage in contentious politics, with state authorities, power holders, or other groups competing for power, whereas INGOs engage in fewer confrontational tactics and strategies (D. Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Since the Seattle anti–World Trade Organization protests and participation of INGOs and IGOs (international governmental organizations) in the annual meetings of the World Social Forum, these distinctions have become less useful (Caniglia 2002).

underlying modern social movements, including ethnic ones (Soysal 1994; O'Brien et al. 2000; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Growth in number of memberships in human rights organizations and associations has led to the expansion of group rights in states that declared independence since 1945 (Ramirez et al. 1997). Countries that are richer, participate more in world trade, have more educated populations, and are larger participate more in this world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999: 68). Research from this tradition also finds that since 1960, all newly independent states have formally guaranteed human rights in their constitutions. This evidence has led some scholars to claim that there is an emerging international culture (Soysal 1994; Boli and Thomas 1999).

The world polity perspective suggests several ways to link the outbreak of ethnic movements in the contemporary period with processes associated with the diffusion of nationalism in earlier periods. In this perspective, modern citizenship has been conceptualized in terms of two concepts: rights and identity. Because human rights are formulated in terms of rights to self-determination that are increasingly guaranteed (and regulated) at the global level, identity politics make demands for recognition of groups in terms of national identity, separatist rights, or administrative self-rule (Soysal 1994: 159). Accordingly, nationalist and ethnic movements share common ideological roots that legitimate demands that "a people" deserve specific rights, and that some of these rights include claims of "sovereignty." Seen in this way, nationalist and ethnic social movements can be analyzed as consequences of a (more or less) cohesive world culture of democratic principles linked together by an interdependent world system of economic and diplomatic exchanges. Thus, nationalism increasingly spawns new claims-making activity, based upon a gradual escalation and diffusion of human rights to any deserving group. Identity social movements (those based on gender, sexual orientation, ethnic, and religious identities) proliferate as a result of this diffusion (Frank and McEneaney 1999).

In this view, legitimate identities in liberal state polities accrue first to individuals or groups, who become viewed as actors in their own right, entitled to (or excluded from) guarantees of religious and ethnic rights and of freedom of expression.[16] Programs and policies guaranteeing civil rights now reach a variety of local communities, but there is considerable variation

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[16]For examples, see J. Meyer et al. (1997), Boli and Thomas (1999), Frank and McEneaney (1999), and Frank et al. (2000).

in the extent to which immigrants, refugees, and diasporas are deemed eligible to receive these rights.[17] Expanding on these global perspectives of social movements, it seems likely that increasing forces of world integration also influence the content of internal policies of ethnic rights of inclusion and exclusion within states. I suggest that as nation-states have become linked together by membership in transnational organizations, attempts by renegade states to limit minority rights are increasingly viewed as illegitimate. As a result, violations of minority rights have become an issue for international debate (Risse et al. 1999). In this way, a combination of forces related to globalization have reframed minority rights (once considered purely local issues) as key international concerns.

Global diffusion processes that spread nationalism as a legitimating ideology and stimulated independence movements have parallels with anticolonialism movements, human rights movements, and ethnic mobilization (Strang 1990). With respect to human rights, this process has been labeled a type of "boomerang" effect, in which demands for expanded human rights in one country create the demand for parallel movements in other countries (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 13, fig. 1). This boomerang process is activated when a domestic organization exerts pressure on states to conform to existing laws and guaranteed rights, but a state ignores (or denies) these rights (for example, against child labor, domestic abuse, etc.). According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), these organizations turn to support from transnational networks of advocacy organizations, whose members can pressure their own states and/or other third-party organizations to exert pressure in turn upon the recalcitrant states. Furthermore, international institutions look more favorably upon human rights campaigns than they did previously. According to Sikkink, international associations became more open than transnational economic organizations were to international social movements related to human rights by the 1990s, in contrast to the 1960s (Sikkink 2005).

Analyzed from this perspective, international organizations might also promote mobilization for ethnic rights, as a result of this same boomerang process.[18] In this way, ethnic resurgence can be analyzed as a by-product of

[17]For examples of this research, see Soysal (1994) Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse et al. (1999), della Porta and Tarrow (2005), Tarrow (2005).

[18]Sikkink (2005: 157) argues that the opening of international opportunity structures for groups located within closed domestic opportunity structures produces this boomerang effect, in which international organizations become the critical support network for local social movements. See also Risse et al. (1999).

the global interplay between these domestic and international social movement networks, demands, and information flows. Here my argument suggests that global movements will have an independent effect on local insurgencies, net of the effects of local grievances and mobilization capacities.

Processes of ethnic resurgence are not new, but they might be intensifying as economic and political organizations gain influence in multiple countries. In particular, as political associations (such as the EU, NATO, the UN) expand their authority over activities once controlled *only* by state authorities, international organizations become the target of new claims and demands, providing career paths and experience for human rights activists. International associations, anti-globalization conferences, and regional associations provide a forum for debate over ethnic rights (Nagel and Olzak 1982; J. Smith 2004). Such expansion of authority over larger territorial units has implications for the scale of subnational movements and their aims. For example, ethnic populations that span borders are now more likely to express nationalist demands for statehood, rather than demands for expanded rights within the states where they reside (Brass 1991; Horowitz 1985). As military, economic, trade, and other international associations grow in number, the actions of individual nation-states will become less salient relative to those of regions, politicians, or other powerful actors within states. As states become more enmeshed in a world system of diplomats, economics, and financial and military obligations, state actions become more constrained by the density of ties. At the same time that states are more constrained by world integrative processes, ethnic groups within states become less constrained by their own state authorities (Strange 1996). This is because highly integrated nation-states cannot simply repress, jail, or torture the ethnic challengers without risking international condemnation. World-level sanctions are regularly employed to induce recalcitrant states to conform to international norms, as are military forces, advisers, and other external pressures.[19] As state authority becomes challenged by external control, internal cleavages gain at least some new opportunities to challenge the state. My point is that the rise in the political authority of transnational

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[19] This argument does not imply that international sanctions will be successful in achieving their aims. Rather, I am arguing that, in the contemporary period, the imposition of sanctions is increasingly likely to be debated at the international level, as reducing human rights violations has become part of the goals of human rights organizations (Räikkä 1996).

associations ought to coincide with an increasing number of movements based on ethnicity.

This second globalization argument suggests that as principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights have become increasingly accepted and legitimate in institutions that span national borders, ethnic movements will become more numerous. In other words, demands and protests concerning standards of living, amenities, public services, discrimination, and violation of human rights that were once limited to local comparisons now take on wider scope (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As others have commented, residents of regions lagging behind in development or family income can become mobilized in response to the dissemination of information about economic disparities (Gurr and Moore 1997). While it is difficult to identify precisely when this process became more intense, the years between 1960 and 1965 show a sharp increase in United Nations attention to ethnic and racial rights.[20]

In the core, support for the expansion of human rights provides a clearly articulated and legitimate ideology to frame new demands for economic and political rights among ethnic groups (Boli 2001). Furthermore, institutionalization of ethnic demands for inclusion is likely to be underdeveloped and less openly sanctioned in peripheral countries. Following this logic, levels of ethnic protest will be significantly lower in peripheral countries compared to levels of protest in core countries.

THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC INCORPORATION AND IDENTITY MOBILIZATION

Arguments about the political consequences of incorporation rules for immigrants and ethnic minorities suggest several important implications for theories of ethnic social movements.[21] For instance, Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003) argue that national rules of political incorporation (such as the formal rights of groups, immigration policies, or racial discrimination policies)

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[20]See Räikkä (1996) for a record of UN member histories of ratification of a set of declarations regarding minority ethnic and racial rights. For a history of participation and ratification of the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (from its introduction in 1965 to the present), see www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/constitutions/un/e_un_conv_racial_discrimination.htm (accessed November 19, 2004).

[21]See Soysal (1994), Jepperson (1992), J. Meyer and Jepperson (2000), and Levitt (2001).

TABLE 1.1
Location of Authority and Basis of Social Interests in Polities

Basis of Social Interests	LOCATION OF SOCIAL AUTHORITY	
	Civil Society	*State*
Functional/Class	Social Corporateness (Sweden)	State Corporateness (Japan)
Ethnic Group	Consociationalism (Canada)	Apartheid (South Africa)
Individualistic	Liberal-State (United States)	State-Nationalist (France)

and the degree of centralization of authority within states inform us about which types of political identities will be more and less effective in different systems. This theoretical tradition rests on the notion that polities empower and legitimate either groups or individuals with certain rights and duties.[22] As Soysal (1994) describes, immigrants in Western Europe have confronted vastly different state policies regarding membership, access, and rights. The degree to which immigration policies absorb newcomers into the polity has implications for ethnic mobilization within states.

In Table 1.1 I build on the world polity perspective's four-fold typology regarding the centralization and corporateness of polities (Jepperson 1992; Soysal 1994; Nagel 1995).[23] One implication is that ethnic politics will predominate if group (rather than individual) and ethnicity (rather than class) are the dominant modes of political incorporation. Table 1.1 suggests that states that incorporate citizenship rights and obligations based on formal class or occupational position (as in Sweden), or in terms of

[22] Jepperson (1992, 2000) refers to a set of legitimate "scripts" that are activated during the process of making political claims. These cultural scripts shape the political identities of individuals and groups that are recognized (by both the state and its challengers) as efficacious.

[23] Jepperson (1992, 2000) proposes two contrasting dimensions of organizational authority and the basis of social interests in a political system. The first dimension, labeled "statism," refers to the degree of centralization of the state apparatus. In Table 1.1, countries that locate social authority in the state are high on this "statism" dimension. The second dimension refers to variation in levels of "corporateness," of which "high" refers to the degree to which states grant rights of incorporation and citizenship to groups, and "low" refers to a more individualist, market orientation. In this table, I add an ethnic component to the world polity argument about how states authorize citizenship based upon a specific type of group identity. Jepperson applies this typology to explain underlying institutional changes among states in post–World War II Europe.

production work teams (as in Japan) will have relatively less ethnic conflict than will states that strongly reinforce the significance of ethnic identity in the political sphere.[24]

It seems likely that political opportunities for ethnic groups are more and less open in states depending on the degree to which the states may be classified along the dimensions of statism and corporateness. Incorporation may be fundamentally along ethnic, class, or some other cleavage. It may be organized at the group level (as in occupational or class categories) or by a highly individualist identity (as independent citizens). According to this view, if states implement more corporatist (or group-oriented) as compared to individualist strategies, we might expect mobilization along group identity lines to rise in response (Soysal 1994; Risse et al. 1999; Jepperson 2000; J. Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

This incorporation argument has additional implications for the impact of immigration on ethnic conflict. Using Table 1.1 as a rough guideline, if a country's mode of incorporation facilitates mobilization around particular identities, we might expect that states that incorporate newcomers on the basis of ethnic group status will experience more ethnic tensions over citizenship, identity, and human rights. Alternatively, states that incorporate newcomers into the polity in terms of class or labor union status ought to have higher rates of labor unrest but lower rates of ethnic mobilization. Race and ethnic categories play a pivotal role in most countries in defining eligibility for citizenship (Soysal 1994). For example, in countries where national citizenship rests upon assumptions of a single ethnic or racial identity (as in Germany), the divergent definitions of national and ethnic identity can easily become problematic. In countries where ethnic and religious divisions crosscut one another, ethnic mobilization is likely to be subdued (Mazrui 2000). Using this same "group incorporation" argument, we might also expect hostilities to peak when ethnic and religious boundaries directly coincide (Fox 2002).

Political party structures can be arrayed along a continuum indicating the extent to which ethnic identity is directly incorporated into the party

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[24]It is important to distinguish "corporateness" from "corporatism." The former refers to group incorporation of routines, laws, and policies, while the latter refers to government coordination of large-scale collective bodies, such as business or labor (Jepperson personal communication; see also Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).

structure (in terms of the degree to which the constituent support, representation, or leaders overlap with ethnic interests).[25] The political incorporation argument suggests that by formalizing ethnic group identity in party structures or other institutions (e.g., cabinet posts), states reinforce ethnic solidarity and increase the potential for ethnic conflict.[26] Recent empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. For instance, Wilkinson's (2004) analysis of ethnic conflict in India finds that the participation of ethnic parties in highly competitive elections evidently intensifies the process of ethnic competition and incites violence. In particular, Wilkinson finds that when political party contests are most evenly divided in local settings across India, ethnic violence erupts in a systematically patterned way. Because ethnic incorporation is part of the structure of the political system in India, local politics invariably generate ethnic confrontations. Wilkinson reports that even innocuous "national day" marches in India can be transformed into violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims. Not surprisingly, as in Northern Ireland, symbols of ethnic loyalty that begin in celebration can mobilize movements and countermovements that can erupt into violence.

Processes of transition and change also affect the likelihood of mobilization along one or more of these levels of identity. For example, in countries undergoing state building, efforts of unification can become the basis of ethnic insurgency especially when state builders attempt to impose a *single* national ethnic identity where many existed previously. Similarly, efforts of state building imposed from external authorities (e.g., colonialism, empires, or occupation forces) may only temporarily decrease the likelihood of ethnic mobilization, but increase its resurgence in the long run. Furthermore, shifts among different levels of identity arranged in concentric circles can take place, as coalition politics render some identities more salient than others.

[25] This general argument is suggested by Jepperson (2000). In his view, high corporateness and low statist structures maximize the degree of empowerment of group identity in state systems which allow easy access and regularized participation. See also Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) for an examination of this thesis with respect to corporateness and participation in voluntary associations.

[26] If a country's dominant mode of incorporation along ethnic lines facilitates ethnic mobilization, then Table 1.1 suggests that the failure of consociationalism to provide a peaceful solution to ethnic strife is structurally induced (see also Varshney 2002). Consociationalism legitimates ethnic political parties by creating systems of ethnic regional representation or by instituting formulas of proportional representation in the polity. Chapter 2 reviews some relevant research on consociationalism and ethnic mobilization.

Examples such as Bosnia or Chechnya, which were once parts of the former (nonwarring) regions of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, illustrate these points dramatically (Toft 2003).

POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

State policies that exclude ethnic groups have equally strong implications for what types of identities become mobilized against the state or against other groups. Whether or not ethnic protest continues to challenge state authorities depends on a number of other factors, including the centralization dimension ("statism") of state authority. Prior to 1994, South Africa offered an extreme example of a state that ranked extremely high on ethnic corporateness, exclusion, and statist dimensions. In the case of apartheid in South Africa, race and ethnic identity governed economic, social, and political options. Political opportunities were accordingly open (or closed) to any individual in this state dominated by a powerful administrative center. The implication is that political conflicts are more likely to occur along race and ethnic lines in countries where these divisions have been institutionalized as official categories, compared to countries that do not incorporate group rights on the basis of racial or ethnic identity.[27]

In states that exclude ethnic groups it is likely that forms of ethnic mobilization will adopt more violent tactics than in states where ethnic groups have regularized access to the polity. Whether or not ethnic movements will turn violent also depends upon the level of state centralization, the state's use of repression, and the dynamics between movement violence and state-sponsored violence (Olivier 1990). Weaker and decentralized states (which are low on the statist dimension) encourage collective violence, and this effect is likely to be stronger in states where access to political institutions has been eroded (Hironaka 2005).

The application of repressive force in centralized states as compared to in less centralized states also plays a role in shaping ethnic movements. Such differences are likely to emerge as important when states confront challenges from internal insurgent movements and from external ideological pressures to expand human rights. We might expect violent ethnic movements to characterize states weakened by internal insurgency and civil unrest. Conversely,

[27] For an analysis of the consequences of official categories of race on different levels of anti-apartheid protest in South Africa, see Olzak et al. (2003).

states with institutionalized ethnic group rights are more likely to experience nonviolent protest based upon ethnic and national identities.

The Global Diffusion of Social Movements

Temporal and spatial diffusion properties of social movements increase the rate of social mobilization (Strang and Soule 1998). To the extent that diffusion has intensified in recent decades, diffusion processes might also assist us in understanding the spread of ethnic movements. Studies analyzing the diffusion of movements, tactics, and ideologies have directed attention toward the ability of similar social movements to be imitated and adopted successfully in many countries.[28] Diffusion theories have found empirical support from case studies reporting that democracy movements, independence movements, anti-globalization protests, Islamic fundamentalist movements, student movements, and other goal-oriented social movements seem to cluster in time.[29]

Many researchers have noticed that collective action seems to occur in periodic surges of activity, growth, and decline (e.g., Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; Koopmans 1995). These "cycles of protest" perspectives direct attention to specific historical periods that elevate the risk of contentious and public protest. For example, the cycles of protest model suggests that peaks and troughs in collective events produce distinctive regularities in protest activity. Other scholars have focused on the fact that it seems that regions that have experienced civil unrest are somehow more vulnerable to subsequent eruptions. For instance, in research on race riots in the United States, Spilerman (1976) found that cities that have experienced at least one race riot have a higher risk of experiencing a second or third one. There is also evidence of an independent effect of the recentness of an event. For instance, the probability of another race riot occurring is highest in the twenty-four hours after a riot has occurred (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996). A wide variety of studies found that occurrence of and participation in racial unrest affected the spread of race riots across (mostly urban) America (Spilerman

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[28]For reviews of the literature on transnational social movements, see Tarrow (2001), J. Smith and Johnston (2002), and J. Smith (2004).

[29]For empirical research and reviews, see Strang (1990), Strang and Meyer (1993), Strang and Tuma (1993), Strang and Soule (1998), Soule (2004), and Tarrow and McAdam (2005).

1970a, 1970b, 1971, 1976; Boskin 1976; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983; Olzak 1983; Olzak et al. 1996; Myers 1997; but see Myers and Caniglia 2004).

Following Tarrow's (1998) pioneering theoretical ideas, research also suggests that during the height of a protest cycle, the *salience* of a particular type of event spreads to other groups, countries, or settings. Examples have included the diffusion of airplane hijackings, bombings, terrorist attacks, race riots, and other dramatic events (Strang and Soule 1998). In this view, an event produces initially potent ripple effects that eventually dissipate over time (Strang 1990).

But what are the mechanisms of contagion? Most researchers have reasoned that strategies, claims, and grievances are more easily imitated soon after an event has occurred. For example, studies of race riots in the United States suggest that looting provokes similar behavior in nearby counties soon after the initial race riot.[30] In practical terms, this implies that the rate of protest rises up to some optimal point, at which point activity, mobilization, and imitation become much harder to sustain. Thus, the very existence of a growing upsurge in protest activity acts as an inducement to others to engage in collective action. The downward cycle is analogous to dissipation of contagion, as motivation, energy, and resources become exhausted.[31]

There is also empirical evidence in support of worldwide diffusion mechanisms that have spread ideas and tactics related to various civil rights movements. While the legitimacy of protest has diffused broadly, state reactions to specific tactics vary widely, depending on the repressive nature of given regimes. For example, the classification of protest as contentious behavior depends heavily on the institutional context of political freedom and civil liberties within countries, as the civil rights "sit-in" tactical history suggests (McAdam 1983). Internal political structures of access and inclusion may

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[30]For evidence on diffusion and race riots, see McPhail and Wohlstein (1983), Baldassare (1994), Myers (1997), Myers and Caniglia (2004).

[31]Fearon (1998) provides another explanation for exhaustion, related to game-theoretic notions that over time the payoffs to continuing cycles of violence are self-limiting, and both sides (in a two-person game) eventually realize this fact. However, as Sambanis (2001) notes, most ethnic conflicts involve more than two parties, and escalate when third parties enter the conflict. On the other hand, Wilkinson (2004) has found that, in India, when the political payoffs attached to nonviolence are greater than those attached to violence, local police have successfully undermined the escalation of ethnic riots.

also depend on world-level differences among countries, in which the diffusion of human rights ideology spreads from more democratic settings to less democratic ones.

There is some evidence in favor of this argument, especially in the literature on Western European protest. Indeed, one characteristic of the so-called "New Social Movements" is that nonviolent tactics have become more common. In this tradition, identity movements, which would include ethnic protest movements and movements for expanded civil rights, are characteristically less violent and more likely to engage in institutionally sanctioned claims-making (Koopmans 1995). Kriesi et al. have added that protest movements in the nations granting many civil liberties will commonly involve conventional party politics or conventional nonviolent protest, such as marches, vigils, and petitioning (Kriesi et al. 1995: 176–78).

These endeavors have benefited from the emergence of new theories and methods for tracking the process of diffusion (Strang and Tuma 1993; Bremer, Regan, and Clark 2003). Such methods appear relevant for testing claims that ethnic movements diffuse rapidly in the current world system and that spatial and temporal proximity affects diffusion. These theories have been applied successfully to the study of the breakdown of colonial regimes (Strang 1990) and to the study of race riots (Myers 1997). Analysis of the connections between cycles of protest in different countries begins to make more transparent some of the consequences of the globalization of ethnicity.

Diffusion encourages instability both directly and indirectly by providing networks of social movement actors organizing and financing campaigns of instability. For example, such movements move across country borders to recruit political refugees or exiles as mercenary soldiers, informants, or spies. Obstacles to analyzing this type of activity include the lack of reliable data and the difficulty of untangling the causal sequence of events. For instance, there is a classic endogeneity problem in trying to sort out whether it is weak state authorities or the infiltration of insurgents (or increasing supply of weapons) from neighboring countries that incites civil war (Sambanis 2001). Indeed, a number of scholars have found that a decline in the political authority of a state coincides with an increasing number of movements based on ethnic regionalism (e.g., Brown 1996; Hechter 2000). Another international process suggests that social movements such as ethnic cleansing or Islamic nationalism that occur in neighboring countries are highly likely

to diffuse into contiguous countries. The presence of contentious neighbors also destabilizes nearby regimes (Sambanis 2001). Brown (1996), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Levine (1996) all argue that elite factions (or warlords) offering military and financial support from neighboring countries have played crucial roles in prolonging ethnic wars in Africa and Central Asia in recent years. Although this is very difficult to study (because many of the transactions are clandestine), it also seems increasingly important to scrutinize flows of arms, mercenaries, supporting organizations, and finances that have fueled ethnic wars (without state or international sanctions) in neighboring countries (See, e.g., Brown 1996).

Heuristic Model

Figure 1.1 highlights the main causal arguments explored in this book. It emphasizes how position within the world system, embeddedness in the world system of international organizations, inequality, poverty, and restrictions on minority civil rights all play roles in the generation of ethnic mobilization. For simplicity, I have omitted many feedback loops and other relationships, in order to highlight the key relationships between global and state-level forces. In later chapters I will argue that most of these processes interact in complicated ways (as shown, for example, by research examining the impact of ethnic conflict on inequality). The purpose of Figure 1.1 is to suggest a type of channeling effect of internal features of states, their relationship to three key global forces, and types of ethnic mobilization outcomes. The argument outlined above suggests ways that human rights movements facilitate ethnic nonviolence while global forces of dependence and inequality exacerbate violence.

While I have argued that global forces have generally increased the overall potential for ethnic mobilization, the mechanisms that propel social movements toward violence are likely to depend on internal characteristics of states. In particular, for nonviolent ethnic protest, the key intervening mechanism is an increase in opportunities for mobilization, which are in turn escalated by the widespread acceptance of a broad human rights ideology (Risse-Kappen 1995). As countries become more embedded in the world system, and as neighboring countries experience more cross-border ethnic mobilization, all forms of ethnic mobilization might be expected to increase.

World-Level Processes

Dependency in the world system

Diffusion of human rights ideology

Diffusion of social movements

Country-Level Factors

Poverty
Inequality
Exclusionary policies and state restrictions

Membership in INGOs
Formal incorporation policies for ethnic groups
Formal civil rights

Group-Level Factors

Cultural distinctions
Competition for land
Internal resettlement
Discrimination

Ethnic violence

Ethnic nonviolent protest

Ethnic political mobilization

FIGURE 1.1 *Heuristic Model of the Interplay among World-, Country-, and Group-level Forces and Ethnic Mobilization.*

Factors that enhance the relative position of given ethnic groups so that they gain new leverage against competing groups, or in negotiations with state or international authorities, also expand opportunities for ethnic mobilization. Countries that both are dominant in the world system and grant civil liberties will therefore experience more protest that is nonviolent in character. In contrast, higher levels of inequality in peripheral countries encourage ethnic violence based upon claims of discrimination and victimization.

Figure 1.1 also suggests that ethnic mobilization shares many underlying causal features with other types of social movement activity. Diffusion of ethnic protest ought to be most potent across proximate regions; thus, nonviolent and violent ethnic mobilization ought to have strong spillover effects into neighboring countries.

There are also a number of countervailing forces at work. While authoritarian states and states with many restrictions on civil rights will have low rates of nonviolent protest, core states with restrictions on ethnic rights will have more nonviolence and less violence, all else being equal. Peripheral states that are more embedded in the world system will be less likely to experience violence than will peripheral countries that are relatively isolated from the diffusion of a world culture extending human rights.

As economic and political comparisons across ethnic groups become more common, ethnic grievances and claims are likely to become more violent. My argument is that dependence in the world system magnifies discontent with regional poverty and ethnic inequality, and that this discontent has been shaped by human rights ideologies that activate ethnic social movements aimed at reducing inequality. For this reason, we would expect poor and dependent countries to be significantly more prone to outbreaks of ethnic violence.[32] If a global human rights ideology has diffused as I have argued, existing inequalities within countries have become increasingly indefensible and are more likely to incite protest than in earlier periods. Thus, income inequality may have an independent effect on ethnic mobilization, net of the effect of total average income in a country.

According to this global argument, restrictions on civil liberties ought to increase grievances and comparisons with countries that grant more

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[32] Poorer countries are also more likely to experience internal civil war—see Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Chapter 8 of this book.

liberties, thus facilitating ethnic violence. I also expect participation in world organizations and diffusion to produce more ethnic violence, as ethnic social movements become legitimate forms of nationalist claims-making. Finally, I expect that, in contrast to core countries, the more dependent peripheral countries will experience more ethnic violence, net of the effects of poverty and organizational involvement in the world system.

The Global Perspective

This book seeks to explain how different forms of ethnic mobilization share common causes that operate and interact with varying historical, economic, and political features within states. While worldwide trends have set in motion forces activating ethnic identities, not all movements turn violent, not all are successful, and many have different goals and purposes. Thus, I will explore the conditions under which global trends mobilize direct ethnic challenges to any given state's authority, rather than examining ethnic social movements that are relatively more peaceful celebrations of ethnic identity and culture (Horowitz 2001; Gurr 2000).

A global perspective has many advantages. First, an explicitly international perspective provides a context for understanding some of the key paradoxes in the empirical literature. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that states that rely on a high level of primary commodity exports (such as oil) experience more insurgency and civil war. As a result, these authors conclude that economic viability (as measured by primary commodity exports) increases risks of rebellion and civil war, whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) find no effect of primary commodity exports. Instead the latter scholars report that poor states and states weakened by political instability and ineffective bureaucracies matter most. While the debate over "greed" versus "grievance" versus "weak states" has not been resolved empirically, it is likely that the development of increasingly dense networks of trade and diplomacy affects all three measures. In particular, while world trade networks and exchange partners shape demand for primary exports, it seems equally reasonable that diplomatic ties and links to international organizations constrain and weaken the ability of states to counter insurgency within their borders (Hironaka 2005). Thus, it seems important to try to tease out the impact of global ties from the influence of internal forces (and their interaction) on ethnic mobilization.

A second advantage of using a global perspective is that we gain insights on the different layers of cultural difference expressed as ethnicity, in order to see patterns that might not be visible otherwise. For instance, there is little consensus about the labels used to describe the phenomena of ethnic movements. They can refer to specific religious, ethnic or racial, or regional differences, or they can involve various combinations of these identities—as in the various polymorph labels "ethnoreligious," "politically active communal groups," and "peripheral nationalism" (e.g., Hechter 1975; Gurr 1993; Fox 2002; Varshney 2002). By stepping back from each specific case history (which often carries its own historical label), we might uncover the core analytic causal mechanisms shared across cases.

Third, a global vantage point allows some distance from assumptions that ethnic movements are inevitably malevolent. By viewing all forms of ethnic mobilization as rooted in similar global processes but shaped by internal factors, we can begin to make sense out of the claim that ethnic identity appears to be a divisive force in nearly every region of the world. However, scholars who have argued that ethnic nationalist movements threaten the nation-state system have not provided a cohesive argument about why this should be the case. Furthermore, Gurr (2000) finds that ethnic violence has actually decreased over time. By examining two large data sets, and by controlling for a number of other factors, I will be able to evaluate these claims.

Fourth, a global view can help give a unifying perspective of most existing accounts of ethnic mobilization, which are driven by empirical analyses of state-level factors that have produced long and sometimes contradictory lists of factors. So studies variously emphasize the importance of issues such as increasing (or decreasing) economic inequality, intergroup competition, the absence of democratic institutions, transitions to democracy, gaps in cultural or linguistic differences, increasing acts of discrimination, weak states, political transitions, the collapse of state regimes, absence of civil liberties, changing demographic patterns, rapid modernization, and poverty (either separately or in combination).[33] Without theoretical guidelines, it becomes difficult to judge what sets of factors have priority. And if global factors also affect internal politics (as many suggest they do), then models restricted to internal characteristics of states are misspecified.

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[33]For examples, see Bollen (1989), Brown (1996), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Wimmer (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Wilkes and Okamoto (2002).

Fifth, a global approach provides strategies for confronting the criticism that ethnic mobilization lacks a cumulative theoretical and empirical tradition. One explanation for this shortcoming is that scholars often use different indicators and statistical techniques, often analyzed over different time periods. Furthermore, the units of analysis used (country versus region versus event- or group-level analysis) differ so substantially that the creation of cumulative knowledge about these movements has been difficult.[34] Simply put, a distinctly global perspective opens up the potential for unifying a number of disciplinary findings.

This research seeks to contribute to theoretical efforts conducted at the macropolitical level. I believe that by examining the process of ethnic mobilization with a wide-angle lens we can begin to theorize about how ethnicity is affected by network connections of information, labor migration, political treaties, and refugee flows, as well as by distribution of international corporations and companies that span country borders. If these explanations make sense at the world level, then we will have gained more understanding of the rising importance of ethnicity as a political identity in the modern world.

Conclusion

This chapter began with the argument that world integration of state economies and politics has led to ethnic fragmentation and conflict. In particular, the chapter has introduced the notion that processes of economic and political integration in the world system have caused a rise in ethnic protest movements. In core nations ethnic protest may be relatively more frequent than in other countries, but in these core countries ethnic politics are more likely to be routinized by institutional politics and open systems of ethnic inclusion. In contrast, in peripheral nations ethnic protest is likely to be more sporadic, but potentially more violent. Whether scattered nonviolent protests develop into armed rebellions also depends on internal processes related to political and economic opportunities for ethnic inclusion and economic mobility.

Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, scholars have suggested that these forces have intensified, creating a cascading

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[34] For examples, see Connor (1973, 1978), Nagel and Olzak (1982), Gurr (1993, 2000), Horowitz (1985, 2001), Lake and Rothchild (1998), and Wimmer (2002). For reviews, see Nielsen (1985), Olzak (1983), Brass (1991), Brubaker and Laitin (1998), and Koopmans and Olzak (2004).

process of discontent, separatism, and, all too often, violence in their wake (Gurr 1993, 2000). However, these claims have rarely been tested empirically. Moreover, few theories have been offered that would link the end of the Cold War to multiple episodes of ethnic violence in African, Middle Eastern, and Asian states. On a smaller scale, competitive forces may arise in states weakened by external wars and/or regime crises, independent of Cold War processes. These conditions make it favorable for small-scale ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize. I argue that the integration of the world system facilitates these local-level processes because the ideologies, strategies, tactics, and leaders rapidly diffuse across geographical and administrative units. If the arguments presented here show evidence at this world level of analysis, then we will have gained more understanding of the rising importance of ethnicity as a political identity in the modern world.