

## Preface

I. William Zartman, an international authority on the study of negotiations and professor of international organizations and conflict resolution at the Johns Hopkins University, suggests that the process of negotiation is divided into three phases. First is the *diagnostic* phase, the stage when a judgment is made regarding whether to enter into negotiations. Second is the *formula* phase in which specific formulas or rules that could provide a basis for agreement are defined. In the third or *detail* phase, the specific elements of an agreement are finalized.<sup>1</sup>

What happens if we apply this three-stage formula to Japanese-Russian border delimitation? President Gorbachev's visit to Japan in 1991 saw Japanese-Russian border negotiations enter their first phase. Gorbachev agreed with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to commence negotiations on the sovereignty of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai. The process of negotiation entered its second stage when President Yeltsin visited Japan in 1993. With regard to how the negotiations over these four islands should be carried out, President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa agreed upon what formula should be used.

So what is the formula that represents the second phase of Japanese-Russian negotiations? It is found in Article 2 of the Tokyo Declaration signed by the top leaders of Japan and Russia in 1993: "Both sides agree that negotiations toward an early conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of this issue on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on the documents produced with the two countries' agreement as well as on the principles of law and justice should continue."

That is to say, the formula is represented by "historical and legal facts," "documents produced with the two countries' agreement," and "law and justice." Of those, the "documents produced with the two countries' agreement" refers to the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of the Territorial Issue Between Japan and Russia, hereinafter referred to as the Joint Compendium. This compendium was compiled jointly by the Japanese and Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and is a collection of historical

documents that both sides have agreed to include. Previously, the territorial dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union featured a pointless string of interactions in which each would selectively quote historical documents to suit their own case, refuting and denying the other side's assertions. However, things have changed. Now, when Japan and Russia discuss the border delimitation issue, neither questions the credibility of the documents in the Joint Compendium, and they may be quoted and used as the basis of negotiations. In that respect, the Joint Compendium has become one aspect of the *formula* of Japanese-Russian border negotiations.

The problem is how this kind of compendium should be used. Apart from the short preface, it is a collection of forty-two documents arranged in chronological order. There is no doubt that apart from a mere handful of specialists, no one would have any idea of the documents' significance. Be that as it may, the Joint Compendium is a set of fundamental materials that I hope are read by as many people as possible. So, what needs to be done?

In this book I have attempted to give a historical description of Japanese-Russian relations with regard to the Northern Territories (in Russia these islands are referred to as the Southern Kuriles) from the seventeenth century to the present day. It is my hope that by referring to specific historical occurrences on both a domestic and international level I have produced a chronicle of Japanese-Russian history that is more easily digestible for the reader. To the maximum extent possible I have included reference to the relevant items among the forty-two documents of the Joint Compendium and have gone on to explain their significance. I have also explained the reasons why some of these documents have not been available to the general public until the publication of the Joint Compendium, and I have provided an explanation of the significance of the documents being released. In the Appendix to this volume I have included, in their entirety, all forty-two documents from the Joint Compendium. More enthusiastic readers will be able to refer to these documents, but the main text will suffice for most. A lack of agreement between the Japanese and Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs has ruled out some other documents from appearing in the Joint Compendium, and for those that I consider to be important, I suggest reasons why they were not included and explain their content.

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*Istoriia Iapono-rossiiskikh peregovorov po pograničinyim voprosam* (Kiev: Iurinkom, June 1996).

The first Japanese edition covered the period up to Yeltsin's visit to Japan in 1993, so I felt that the need to bring the work up to date by adding coverage of subsequent developments. The revised and enlarged edition in Japanese was published by Kadokawa-shoten, Tokyo, in 2005. Kenjirō Kumagai of Kadokawa-shoten has offered invaluable assistance after the draft was handed over. The English translation of second Japanese edition was carried out by Mark Ealey, a highly skilled translator specializing in works of diplomatic history. I am greatly indebted to Mark for his devotion to such a major task. Two of his research students, Stephen Albrow and Jason Allen, also contributed to the translation of Chapter 8. Special gratitude goes to Mr. Geoffrey Jukes, professor emeritus at the Australian National University, who generously edited the entire manuscript, making numerous comments and suggestions, particularly in the military-strategic field. Proofreading of the text was carried out by Dr. Peter Berton, professor emeritus at the University of Southern California (USC), a leading authority in Russo-Japanese relations, Ms. Tatiana White, a graduate student at the USC, and Dr. Brad Williams, a young and promising specialist in Russo-Japanese relations at the National Singapore University, Singapore. I am particularly indebted to Daniel Okimoto, professor at Stanford University, who was kind enough to recommend my manuscript to the Stanford University Press. I am also grateful to Professors Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, Kimie Hara, Archie Brown, and Arthur Stockwin for their recommendations for publication.

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