

## *Introduction: Territorial Conflict*

### *Definition of Globalization*

We are now said to be in the age of globalization. However, the word “globalization” does not necessarily mean the same to everyone.<sup>1</sup> Here it will be used to mean the flow of people, goods and services, capital, information, ideas, values, and technology around the globe on a level transcending state boundaries.<sup>2</sup> Globalization has been facilitated by rapid strides in development of communications, freight and transport systems, and the huge cost reductions that have resulted, particularly with the “revolution in information technology (IT).”

The word “internationalization” is often used as a synonym for “globalization,” but the nuance is slightly different.<sup>3</sup> Internationalization does not negate national borders, and indeed, it is premised on the existence of countries divided from each other by clearly marked state boundaries and territories. Its focus is on the increase in frequency and scale of exchange between those states and their peoples. In contrast, “globalization” places emphasis on issues that transcend the preexisting doorstep to states, namely, national borders.<sup>4</sup> One might even say that the authority and function of nation-states and state-centric agencies is reduced.<sup>5</sup> In their place, nonstate entities such as individual citizens, groups, corporations, and international organizations create the procedures and global standards for making reasonable choices. As a consequence of such processes, “social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place.”<sup>6</sup> All this suggests “the shrinking of distance,”<sup>7</sup> “the world as a single place,” and in the most extreme of terms, the advent of the “global village,”<sup>8</sup> as envisaged by the likes of Marshall McLuhan.

So when did globalization start? This is a difficult question to answer. Some like to suggest that in the broadest sense of the word it started more or less at the same time as the history of mankind.<sup>9</sup> Others consider that the establishment of the Silk Road as a route for economic and cultural exchange between Asia and Europe marks the advent of globalization.<sup>10</sup> However, this represents what could be termed “thin globalization.”<sup>11</sup> “Thick

globalization” or “contemporary globalization,”<sup>12</sup> which is more intensive as well as extensive, affecting the lives of many more people, began in the latter half of the twentieth century.<sup>13</sup> To be even more specific, it should probably be seen as a phenomenon that began in the early 1990s when the walls separating the East and West camps crumbled.

Globalization does not occur at the same speed and scale in every sphere of human activity.<sup>14</sup> This is one reason why it is difficult to determine when globalization actually began. Some areas (for example, technology and the economy) have been globalized more smoothly and rapidly than others (for example, politics), where the influence of globalization has been slow and less remarkable. Some areas, such as social and cultural activities (for example, customs and fashion), would fall somewhere between these two extremes.<sup>15</sup>

Also, globalization does not have a uniform influence.<sup>16</sup> Generally speaking, its impact is greater in the “North” than the “South”; in the younger generation rather than the older; in the professional class than among manual laborers. For example, at this point in time, when we have just entered the twenty-first century, as many as one-quarter of the population of the United States is availing itself of the benefits of the World Wide Web (www.); the corresponding figure in South Asia is no more than 0.01 percent. Even by 2010, it is thought that as much as 70 percent of the world’s population will still not have access to the Internet through computers and cellular phones, and approximately 50 percent still will never have made a telephone call.<sup>17</sup>

It is therefore important for us to make it clear which fields or dimensions of globalization we are talking about. Failing to do so merely confuses the issue and leads to unproductive discussions.

As a political scientist, I feel obligated to ask the following questions: Does globalization reduce the role of “nation-states,” thereby eroding their meaning?<sup>18</sup> Will the advent of the borderless age that is expected to result from globalization render those key components of “nation-states,” such as “territory,” “national borders,” and “sovereignty” meaningless? These two questions are mutually related, as nation-states control set areas of territory, and within the national borders that define such territory, in principle, they claim to exercise exclusive authority, for example, “sovereignty” over the residents. The concept of the nation-state is based on this thinking.

### *Globalization and the Nation-State*

Does globalization, by rendering the concepts of “territory,” “national borders,” and “sovereignty” obsolete, therefore lead to the dissolution of nation-states?<sup>19</sup> In particular, does the trend toward borderlessness, or to use a slightly

more difficult term, “supraterritoriality,” erode the *raison d’être* of one of the key elements of the nation-state, namely, “territory”?<sup>20</sup>

Broadly speaking, there are three ways of responding to these questions.<sup>21</sup> “Globalists” would answer in the affirmative. In other words, they suggest that advances in globalization, in particular in the IT field, have overcome geographical limitations and that, as a result, the significance of political borders as the artificial barriers that previously divided nation-states, has diminished, and therefore territorial sovereignty is becoming obsolete.<sup>22</sup> In contrast, “traditionalists” would say “no.”<sup>23</sup> They consider that the process of globalization is occurring within the parameters of the nation-state system; therefore, the notion of national sovereignty will not be eroded in the foreseeable future. The third group is that of “transformationalists,” those who occupy the middle ground between the other two.<sup>24</sup> They argue that while as a result of globalization the notion of territorial sovereignty will not necessarily disappear, in terms of power and function it will undergo significant transformation. Personally, I tend to take the third “transformationalist” view. Let me explain why.

First of all, territorial instincts are rooted in human nature. Any theory that shrinks from this fact immediately distances itself from reality. We all desire to secure for ourselves a certain territory where we feel free and unfettered by others. This is merely a reflection of our animal instincts.<sup>25</sup> The expression “elbow room” best illustrates this inherent desire in man. In his work, *Hōjōki* (My ten-foot-square hut), the thirteenth-century Japanese literary recluse Kamo no Chōmei philosophized that a human being does not require a large amount of space to lead his life. He did qualify this, however, by stating that to survive, a human being must have at least a ten-foot-square space. That securing a certain amount of space is essential for human survival is also illustrated by the appearance of deep vein thrombosis syndrome among airline passengers. Being confined to a small space in an aircraft for long periods of time not only results in psychological discomfort but also manifests itself as a physical problem.

Apart from shelter from the elements, human beings need to secure and control a certain amount of space in which to hunt or farm, and a “love space” for breeding activities to preserve the species.<sup>26</sup> Normally, the larger that physical space is—whether as “territory” or “sphere of influence”—the more free and comfortable we feel.

Secondly, we must remember that territory is not just a living space that provides us with the food, clothing, and shelter to facilitate basic survival. To put it another way, it does more than merely allow us to achieve physical and material security. It plays another important function. It is endowed with nonmaterial value. “Territory” supports a certain distinctive “lifestyle”

that reflects the language, culture, and customs of those who belong to its component groups. This also means that it is an area that confirms one's own identity or sense of belonging.<sup>27</sup>

For example, terms such as "home," "fatherland," and "motherland" are deeply stored in the collective memories of families, ethnic groups, and nations.<sup>28</sup> While the feelings attached to a particular area may, in some cases, be somewhat irrational, their psychological or symbolic significance cannot be easily dismissed. This land gives birth to and fosters feelings of affection and comradeship toward other members of the same group. It is the basis of love for one's hometown, patriotism, and nationalism. Should such a "sacred land" be lost, the displaced souls will often suffer from a "loss of home," a feeling of being *déraciné*, and even an identity crisis.

To recapitulate, territory is inherently linked to man's basic desires in terms of existence on a physical and cultural level.<sup>29</sup> When these basic desires are denied, or prevented from being realized, humans possess an innate desire to defend the territory or sphere of influence under their control. In his book *On Aggression*, Konrad Lorenz, winner of the Nobel Prize for physiology and medicine, wrote that "in every individual the readiness to fight is greatest in the most familiar place, that is, in the middle of its territory."<sup>30</sup> In other words, the threshold value of fight-eliciting stimuli is at its lowest where the animal feels safest, that is, "where its readiness to fight is least diminished by its readiness to escape."<sup>31</sup> Thus, "In nearing the center of the territory the aggressive urge increases in geometrical ratio to the decrease in distance from the center."<sup>32</sup>

It therefore becomes understandable, and even justifiable, to have police and military to defend one's territory by ejecting the invader. In return for protection of these territories, we agree to grant sufficient control (sovereignty) to the organ possessing the power to force such issues. With these background factors and reasons, a state with territorial sovereignty is born and legitimized, and it continues to exist until now.

### *Will Territorial Sovereignty Become Obsolete?*

A nation-state is defined as an entity, which possesses its own fixed, demarcated territory, within which it exercises exclusive authority (sovereignty) over its nation. What, then, is the impact of globalization on the sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states? Here again, there is a diversity of judgment.

Globalists argue that global change will make both territorial sovereign states and the systems comprised of sovereign states increasingly vulnerable, even obsolete.<sup>33</sup> They suggest that instead of the nation-state system, nonstate or nongovernmental entities, especially multinational and supranational organizations, are emerging and increasing their significance. These newly

emerging organizations are a “challenger” to the nation-state in the sense that they are trying to deprive nation-states of their roles and even replace them.<sup>34</sup>

Globalists often support their claims by citing (1) the development of multinational organizations; (2) trends toward unification of states; and (3) proposals for “joint-sovereignty” or “joint-administration.” But I would like to suggest that these do not necessarily provide a sufficient basis to justify globalist arguments. Let me explain.

### *Multinational Corporations*

In today’s world, nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations, are assuming increasing prominence. Multinational corporations are huge international enterprises that carry out the majority of their business activities across national borders. All over the world they have subsidiary companies, through which they carry out international investment, production, management, and sales activities. This phenomenon started in the 1960s, as a result of huge, mainly American, corporations setting up overseas in order to sidestep trade barriers. Similarly, Japanese corporations have, almost en masse, transferred their production bases to China and South-East Asia in search of cheap labor, leading to the hollowing out of Japanese industry. These days there is little point in asking about the nationality of certain products. Being able to label a product as completely “Made in Japan” or “Made in the USA” is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. At least in the economic sphere, globalization undeniably diminishes the controlling power of nation-states. Yet it is premature to jump to the conclusion that such active and prosperous development of multinational corporations will, before too long, lead to the demise of nation-states or the nation-state system. Let me explain three related reasons why one should doubt the validity of such a conclusion.<sup>35</sup>

The first lies in the fact that nation-states have been displaying considerable ability to stand up to multinational corporations. It is true that when multinational corporations began their activities in the 1950s and 1960s, nation-states were completely defenseless to deal with the inroads these organizations made into state affairs. But as awareness of the economic impact of the situation has grown, a reaction has set in that demonstrates the survival capacity of nation-states. Nation-states began to counter by implementing a range of criteria to which multinationals must adhere in order to gain access to national territory. In other words, “political imperatives” have initiated defensive countermeasures against “economic infringement.”

Secondly, the development of multinational corporations does not necessarily lead to reduction or denial of the power of nation-states. These two organizations are not in a zero-sum relationship. Let me quote the excellent explanation given by Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University.

Predictions of the death of the nation-state are premature. They overlook the ability of human beings and human institutions to respond to challenges and adapt themselves to changed environments. They seemed to be based on a zero-sum assumption about power and sovereignty: that a growth in the power of transnational organizations must be accompanied by a decrease in the power of nation-states. This, however, need not be the case . . . an increase in the number, functions, and scope of transnational organizations will increase the demand for access to national territories and hence also increase the value of the one resource almost exclusively under the control of national governments.<sup>36</sup>

The third reason is that multinational corporations tend to move into geographical areas where peace and security are sufficiently assured thanks to the authority of nation-states. Nation-states protect their domestic order and guarantee property rights from both internal and external threats, through the use of police, armed forces, and other institutions. Multinational corporations assume this of nation-states and organize their activities on this premise. (In that sense, the power of modern-day multinationals pales compared to that of the East India Company of years gone by, which boasted its own army and territory.)

If we were to divide sovereignty into two, internal and external components, we see that they are closely linked.<sup>37</sup> For example, Stephen Krasner had the following to say: "If a state cannot regulate what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within them."<sup>38</sup> The opposite is also true. Even looking at it in these terms, as Huntington suggests, not only should we avoid seeing multinationals and nation-states as mutually exclusive, we could even say that they can only coexist, but actually rely on each other's support.

On close inspection, we see that while multinational corporations are multinational and transnational in terms of their activities and personnel, their administrative authority and headquarters, which effectively monitor, regulate, and police their activities, particularly final decision-making power, are located in the United States or other major nations.<sup>39</sup> This has nothing to do with where the corporations want to pay taxes.<sup>40</sup> They differentiate between the location of the base for decision making and the geographical scope of operations, and in this sense, there is no great difference between, say, the World Bank and the U.S. Air Force.<sup>41</sup> The latter maintains a clear national base in terms of control and personnel, yet qualifies as a transnational organization in terms of its scope of operation. This is more or less applicable to the former as well.

### *Intergovernmental Organizations*

In recent times, there has been an undeniable trend for nation-states to integrate into larger units, as intergovernmental organizations. Of course we have

not yet succeeded in creating (and are never likely to create) a world government. While the United Nations may appear to have that potential, at present it is merely a collection of individual states that possess sovereignty within their territories.<sup>42</sup> Be that as it may, we have the following supranational, global, or regional bodies, which deal with matters that cut across national borders: NATO, EU, ASEAN, African Unity (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and so on. These governmental organizations, or even institutions, have taken over some of the aspects of sovereignty previously held by sovereign states.

However, this does not mean that these organizations will look to deny states their sovereignty. In fact, the opposite is the case, in that the activities of intergovernmental organizations are actually based on the premise that nation-states exist. In this respect, the relationship between these organizations and nation-states differs little from that between multinational corporations and nation-states.

Let us take the European Union (EU) for example. The EU has had its own money (Euro) as a standard currency since July 1, 2001. This means that it has removed currency sovereignty from its participating member-states. It does not mean, however, that the EU intends to strip those states of their sovereignty in its entirety and bring about the collapse of the nation-state system. Britain, for example, is still using the pound.

The EU is a collective entity, comprising states that have similar historical and cultural backgrounds. In this respect, the EU can be seen as an exceptional case, one that could probably only come about in Europe. The formation of the EU thus represents neither “the retreat of the state” nor “the twilight of the nation-state system.”<sup>43</sup>

Furthermore, the establishment of an international organization such as the EU only becomes possible with the consent of the member-states. It was formulated after the countries that sought to create it agreed of their own volition to do so. Denmark, for example, joined the EU after its inception. Also, member-states transfer only some parts of their sovereignty to the EU. Speaking of the extremes, the EU’s activities are based on the wishes of its member-states and are an extension of their own national agendas.<sup>44</sup> By the same token, if a member-state is unhappy with the EU’s operations, it can freely withdraw from membership.

Which is larger then, the degree of sovereignty that member-states have transferred to the EU, or the part that they have retained? It goes without saying that the latter is far more significant. In the soccer World Cup, held in Korea and Japan in June 2002, about the time that the Euro was introduced, the participant teams were from states such as Germany, France, Italy,

Spain, or even smaller units than that, for example, England. Players who normally played in foreign club teams appeared for the country of their nationality. Fans followed their national teams, supporting them with bold displays of patriotic fervor.

The EU neither ignores nor denies the existence of national borders dividing its member-states. On the contrary, it takes for granted the notion that borders serve as the geographical boundaries between nation-states. We might even say that the EU could not exist without its acceptance of the concept of territorial borders.

Let me give an example. The future position of Kaliningrad provides a good illustration. In November 2002, it was decided that Lithuania and Poland would join the EU in 2004. In a departure from the past, the EU will surely require these two countries to make their customs controls at their borders with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad tighter than now. Without this stipulation, the EU would be unable to prevent illegal goods and immigrants being smuggled into its domain via these new member-states from Kaliningrad and even from Russia and Belarus. Kaliningrad has twenty-three border-crossing points with its neighbors and is notorious as a center for the smuggling of cigarettes, drugs, and used cars, as a hub of human traffic and prostitution, and as a breeding ground for HIV and AIDS. President Putin agreed that Russians traveling to and from Kaliningrad will require a “transit permit.” While these transit permits allow multiple entry during a set period, they are, nevertheless, a kind of visa. So while the EU might be looking to liberalize the flow of people and goods among its member-states by lowering the height of the “doorstep”—borders—between members of the EU, it is at the same time trying to increase its height between EU member-states and nonmembers.<sup>45</sup>

Even if we see Kaliningrad as a special case and put it aside for the moment, there is little need to explain that the EU is hardly opening its doors to all the people and goods that are ready to flow in from nonmember states. For a range of reasons, including humanitarian grounds and liberal multiculturalism, the EU and its members do not reject out of hand people or goods from nonmember states. But they are opposed to the unlimited flow of refugees and illegal immigrants. If this were allowed to happen, the EU would run the risk of provoking unnecessary friction and conflict with the residents of the region. The flow of illegal immigrants has become such a serious problem in countries such as Holland, Germany, and France that it has helped extremist right-wing political parties rapidly increase their influence.

It thus becomes necessary for us to distinguish clearly between the following two things.<sup>46</sup> First, in recent years, there has been a trend for nation-states to transfer to international organizations some *parts* of the powers and functions they used to possess. This is one thing. But, second, this does not



mean that a state relinquishes *all* its powers and functions to such supranational institutions. Indeed, a state can even withdraw from an international organization it once decided to join (for example, the EU), and by so doing recover the powers it had previously ceded. That is to say, the transfer of sovereign power does not amount to its relinquishment.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, even when grouping together, at least now nation-states retain far more sovereignty than they cede.

It has also to be pointed out at this conjunction that so many new nation-states have come into existence since the end of the Cold War. For instance, fifteen independent states were created from the former Soviet Union; the Yugoslav federation was divided; Czechoslovakia has broken up into separate Czech and Slovak republics. Also, but for the Russian Federal Government's use of military force, the Chechen Republic would undoubtedly break away to become an independent nation. In the thirteen years since the end of the Cold War, at least twenty new states have been created. The number of countries that join the United Nations continues to increase (as of mid-2006 the total was 192).

### *Joint Sovereignty*

Recently some have advocated such schemes as "joint sovereignty," "shared sovereignty," and "joint administration." In other words, apportioning sovereignty to a number of states, rather than just one. This too presses for revision of the traditional concept of a nation-state, for example, "one sovereignty-state presiding over one territory." For instance, in November 2002 the British government held a referendum in Gibraltar on the question of putting it under joint sovereignty of UK and Spain. Since about 90 percent of Gibraltar's 30,000 population are of British descent, an overwhelming 99 percent of voters rejected the proposal.<sup>48</sup>

The notion of "joint sovereignty" or other forms of joint control over a particular territory may sound quite acceptable to the uninitiated, but it soon becomes clear how unrealistic an ideal it is when we try to put it into practice. Suppose, for instance, that some conflict or trouble were to occur in an area governed in this way. Which state would have the right to exercise judicial control over those concerned? Some might say that those involved should come under the jurisdiction of the participating state to which they belonged, but if so clear discrepancies would be likely to occur in handling people of different nationalities who have committed the same act. Also, if individuals of one nationality received different legal treatment in the area under joint administration from what was the norm in their home country, this would invite criticism as violating the principle of equal treatment under the law.<sup>49</sup> Another question to raise here is to which state would

a resident of such an area pay taxes? In short, “shared sovereignty” cannot provide acceptable solutions to basic issues with regard to jurisdiction and taxation, matters closely connected to state-sovereignty.

This may not pose a serious problem over joint use of rivers and pasture land in border areas where nobody resides, but in a place with even just one resident, complications would be unavoidable. Karafuto (now Sakhalin) prior to 1875 provides an excellent illustration of this. At that time the island was a sort of condominium under Russo-Japanese joint sovereignty, where Russians, Japanese, and Ainu lived side by side. Because of such a legal limbo, there were constant conflicts between these groups, and it was not uncommon for them to explode into violence, murder, and arson.<sup>50</sup> This was one of the main reasons why in 1875 Japan and Russia concluded the Treaty of St. Petersburg, giving Russia sovereignty over Sakhalin in exchange for ceding the entire Kurile Islands chain to Japan.

In short, joint administration, at best, is nothing more than an interim measure put in place until a definitive solution can be reached. At worst, it is an attempt to avoid facing the problem that is at the core of territorial disputes. Though it may be conceived as a wise means of settlement, in reality it frequently creates potential bases for new and probably even more complicated sources of conflict.<sup>51</sup>

Despite all these defects, Moscow governments under Yeltsin and Putin repeatedly made proposals to Tokyo to conduct “joint economic development [*sovmestnoe khoziaistvennoe osvoenie*]” on and around the disputed Northern Territories. If this would contribute to finding a final solution to the territorial dispute, the Japanese government would have seriously considered it. However, if it only helped consolidate the current *de facto* Russian ownership of the disputed islands, then Tokyo would not accept the idea at all.<sup>52</sup>

### *Summary*

Let me summarize the argument thus far.

1. It is safe to say that the traditional notion of territorial sovereignty is, to a certain extent, changing because of globalization. The trend that sees sovereign states cede part of their powers and function to nonstate entities (multinational organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and so on) is likely to continue.
2. However, this trend cannot be cited as evidence that the process of globalization leads to the demise of nation-states, as strategically they transfer only certain aspects of their powers and functions to transnational or nongovernmental organizations.<sup>53</sup>
3. The usual understanding of the relationship between nation-states and globalization as a dichotomy is an illusion in the first place.<sup>54</sup>

Such thinking does not reflect the realities of contemporary international society. Indeed, not only do nation-states and globalization coexist at the same time, but also they can be said to complement each other.<sup>55</sup>

4. It is far too early to suggest that the recent expansion of “supra-territoriality” is consigning the concept of the sovereign state to the past. Nation-states, founded on territory, are as important now as they have ever been. That a number of new states have been born one after another is surely testimony to this. It is likely that both territorial and state consciousness, as well as the nationalism based on them, will continue to exist for some time into the future.
5. This means that we need to pay close attention to both the outbreak and continuation of territorial conflict. Those who suggest that such interest has been rendered inappropriate in what has become a borderless and globalized world run the risk of being criticized as Utopians ignoring reality.
6. In post-Cold War international society, two forces are progressing simultaneously. One is a centripetal or unifying force, which looks to bring things together at a level involving units larger than the state. It could also be described as movements toward globalism. The EU is a prime example of this force. The other force is of a centrifugal nature, conversely acting to divide the state into even smaller pieces. This is a trend rooted in nationalism. The dissolutions of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia are typical examples.

Centrifugal and centripetal forces are coming to bear at the same time. Alvin and Heidi Toffler explain it as “‘glocalism’—the decentralist shift of political control downward from nation-states to local communities and, simultaneously, upward to the European Union, the United Nations and other supranational agencies.”<sup>56</sup> These two forces could just as easily be described as “integration” and “fragmentation,”<sup>57</sup> or “fusion” and “fission.” However we describe them, the important issue is that these two mutually contradictory trends are occurring simultaneously and in parallel.<sup>58</sup>

If we accept this, we can safely draw the following conclusions about the relationship between globalization and nation-states. Both “globalization” (the demise of the state) and “sovereign nation-state” arguments are extreme forms of their respective logic. A view somewhere between these two extremes, one that reflects the current “transformationalist approach,” is an appropriate form of analysis both for current circumstances and for the foreseeable future.<sup>59</sup> This may seem yet another example of an academic fence sitting, but today’s complex international environment requires us to view

matters in terms of a more multifaceted and multidimensional paradigm than simplified or overgeneralized concepts.<sup>60</sup>

### *Territorial Conflict as a Cause of War*

Territorial conflict can easily lead to war. That is to say, conflict over territory, be it land, air, or sea, involves a contest for sovereignty over something that there is only one of. It therefore tends to assume the nature of a zero-sum game (a conflict in which one party gains only through the other's loss). In extreme cases, zero-sum game situations lead to war.

The relationship between territory and war is close and complex. Territorial conflict, first of all, can lead to war. Next, it cannot be solved by resorting to war. Yet, it also sometimes occurs as a result of war. Be that as it may, it can be described as the most widespread and significant cause of wars in the past two or three centuries. Why is this? Between what kinds of nations are wars most common? Many wars occur because of conflict over the national border dividing adjacent countries.<sup>61</sup> Paul Diehl has discovered a close correlation between wars and territorial "proximity or contiguity." Of the thirteen significant wars fought between the world's major powers from 1816 to 1980, twelve (92 percent) were between nations that shared a national boundary. In that same period, of fifty-four disputes between nations that did not share a border, only one (2 percent) escalated to open warfare.<sup>62</sup> That of course was Japan's war against the United States, the British Empire, and the Netherlands from 1941 to 1945. Also, according to research by Lewis F Richardson (1960), a close correlation exists between shared frontiers and external wars.<sup>63</sup> Richardson's research focuses on wars involving the world's thirty-three major nations during the period 1825–1946. He found a clear correlation between the number of wars a country was involved in and the number of national borders it had.<sup>64</sup>

There is no doubt that since World War Two there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of wars fought with the objective of occupying or acquiring *all* of another country's territory, but unfortunately the world has not seen the end of wars aimed at *partial* expansion of one country's territory.<sup>65</sup> In recent times there have been armed conflicts between Israel and neighboring Arab nations, China and Russia over Damansky (Chenpao) Island, the Iran–Iraq War, the Falklands (Malvinas) War, to name just a few examples of fighting sparked by conflict over territory. Military clashes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir were frequent.

Countries that share national boundaries or are geographically close to each other have more opportunities to become involved in armed clashes or wars than more distant countries. Let us take China as an example. It is more likely to fight a war against Russia, Vietnam, or India than Tunisia or

Paraguay.<sup>66</sup> Richardson used the analogy of domestic violence to explain this. Murders and other violent acts are frequently committed by the victim's friends, relatives, neighbors, or acquaintances, but violence by strangers with whom one has little chance of contact is rare.<sup>67</sup> With this, we can conclude that conflict over national borders "has been probably the most significant cause of wars between nations in the past two or three hundred years."<sup>68</sup>

Of course this does not mean that countries sharing national borders are constantly in conflict with each other, causing armed clashes and wars. The 7,600-kilometer border between China and the Soviet Union at that time, the world's second longest, did tend to heighten tension between these two nations. This was one cause of antagonism between them and did in fact lead to bloodshed near Damansky (Chenpao) Island. But, by the same token, the United States and Canada share the longest border (8,900 kilometers), but maintain a very friendly relationship.<sup>69</sup> In other words, shared borders or geographical proximity do not by themselves automatically lead to conflict or international cooperation. That is to say, the former factors are not a direct cause of either of the latter outcomes. However, the former does at least function as a catalyst to amplify relationships that involve conflict or cooperation based on other reasons. As Professor Bruce M. Russett of Yale University commented, "Except in some sense for border disputes, countries do not fight each other *because* they are physically close; they merely happen to have the *opportunity* to fight because they are close. Proximity becomes the catalyst."<sup>70</sup>

### *The Need for Research on Territorial Disputes*

The above analysis helps confirm that territorial disputes are an important source of conflict that, in extreme cases, even results in armed clashes and wars. Despite the significant role territorial disputes play in international politics, they have to date received little more than perfunctory attention as an area of research in study of international affairs. It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality as a basic cause of conflict has been so neglected and so little studied by students of international politics.<sup>71</sup> The reason for this is that, up to now, mainstream research has emphasized ideological factors in the conflict between East and West, in particular the nuclear weapons debate and the shift to remote warfare, with the result that territorial or border disputes have tended to be seen as geographical or localized clashes, of minor importance for research.

However, the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War have forced us to amend our approach. That is to say, it has greatly alleviated the conflict centered on the ideological gap between the United States and former Soviet Union, the world's two nuclear superpowers, or their respective

caches of nuclear weapons. It has, instead, seen the reemergence of territorial disputes, which for a time at least seemed to have disappeared from history's center stage. During the Cold War, certain types of territorial disputes between the blocs were bottled up and frozen by the fear of nuclear war, the solidarity of the Western camp, and the firm establishment of Soviet hegemony.<sup>72</sup> But from 1989 to 1991 the collapse of communist ideology, the breakup of the Eastern European bloc, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a military superpower, rekindled the flames of pent-up disputes over territory, seeing them burst forth and rage rampant, for example, the civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia in former Yugoslavia. Conflict within or strife between the republics that made up the former Soviet Union such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Georgia, Moldova and the Republic of Transdnistria, as well as the civil war in Tajikistan, are but a few examples of such border or territorial disputes.

Territorial conflict can be traced back to a broad range of causes related to racial, ethnic, political, economic, and national security issues. Psychological or symbolic factors concerning the dignity or honor of the nation or its people also have an important role to play.

Methods for solving territorial conflict are also many and varied. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into two means: use of force to expand the territory of one country and therefore change national borders; and those involving peaceful talks to reach agreement.

Military solutions involve bloodshed, and on top of being expensive exercises, they give birth to feelings of hatred that lead to acts of revenge. Thus in the long term, they provide no true solution to the dispute. In particular, use of military force does not produce a normal and stable situation acceptable to both parties. One of the main reasons why the Germans—normally known for their wisdom—could be incited by Hitler to cause World War Two is that after defeat in World War One they not only had harsh reparations forced on them, but they also had to cede territory to neighboring countries, most notably to Poland. In other words, the seizure of territory by military force tends to lead to a vicious cycle.

Realizing this to be the case, in the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the Cairo Declaration (1943), the Allied Powers in World War Two declared their stance on seeking “no aggrandizement, territorial or other.” That is to say, they attempted to bring a stop to this cycle by stating the principle of “territorial nonexpansion,” namely that the victorious nations shall not, neither as revenge nor punishment, seize territory from the defeated nations. Unfortunately, however, Stalin chose to ignore this new code of ethics, and under his guidance the victorious Soviet Union expanded its territories before and after the end of World War Two. Those nations, which became victims

of the same “aggression and greed” cited by the Allies as a reason for stripping Japan of territory, amounted to eleven countries. In 1939–45 the USSR annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and took territory from Finland, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Outer Mongolia, and Japan. It obtained in total some 670,000 square kilometers of land in the postwar turmoil, equivalent to the combined area of Great Britain, Italy, and Greece. What I want to emphasize particularly here is that means of solving territorial disputes without resorting to war were already starting to be explored by mankind in the mid-twentieth century.

Modern international political theory sees the solution to territorial issues and conflict in the above-mentioned two ways. Even though times change, for the most part, human thought and ideas remain the same. Our ancestors in both Japan and Russia will have been absorbed—although they did not necessarily clearly appreciate the fact—by the sort of problems and solutions summarized above. Now, sufficiently armed with an awareness of the issues involved, it is time for us to shift our attention to an examination of the actual history of negotiations between Japan and Russia.