

Introduction: The Political Progress of John Bunyan

VERA J. CAMDEN

DAVID HUME WRITES in his *History of England* that the “confusion which overspread England after the execution of Charles I” was defined by the “dissolution of all authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, by which the nation had ever been accustomed to be governed.” He proceeds to lament the individualism incipient in the spirit of the English Revolution. “Every man had framed the model of the republic; and however new it was, or fantastical, he was eager in recommending it to his fellow-citizens, or even imposing it by force upon them. Every man had adjusted a system of religion, which, being derived from no traditional authority, was peculiar to himself” (386).¹ Hume’s description of the dissenting religious sects that cast off the authority of the Church of England, along with the sovereignty of the Crown, bitterly elaborates on the peculiar intolerance that in his estimation made the Parliament during the Commonwealth more tyrannical than any king.

To illustrate Parliament’s inconsistent treatment of even the various religious factions that flourished during the Commonwealth, Hume with masterful irony tells the by-then notorious story of the Quaker James Nayler whose messianic delusions threatened Oliver Cromwell’s supporters enough to land him in Bridewell Prison:

James Nayler was a Quaker, noted for blasphemy, or rather madness. He fancied, that he himself was transformed into Christ, and was become the real savior of the world; . . . As he bore a resemblance to the common pictures of Christ, he allowed his beard to grow in a like form: he raised a person from the dead: he was ministered unto by women: he entered Bristol mounted on a horse (I suppose, from the difficulty in that place of finding an ass;) . . . When

carried before the magistrate, he would give no other answers to all questions than "Thou hast said it." What is remarkable, the parliament thought that the matter deserved their attention. Near ten days they spent in inquiries and debates about him. They condemned him to be pilloried, whipped, burned in the face, and to have his tongue bore through with a red-hot iron. All these severities he bore with the usual patience. So far his delusions supported him. But the sequel spoiled all. He was sent to Bridewell, confined to hard labor, fed on bread and water, and debarred from all his disciples, male and female. His illusions dissipated; and after some time, he was contented to come out an ordinary man, and return to his usual occupations (523–24).

Infused with the "inferences and conclusions" that he deems it the proper "duty of an historian" (518) to disclose, Hume's perspective flies in the face of the "Whig" version of the history of the English Revolution more familiar to students of dissent. The latter, of course, looks back on the turbulent events of the mid-seventeenth century as having played a crucial role in the emergence of individual rights and freedom that we now regard as indispensable for citizens of a democratic society. The majority of recent studies of John Bunyan likewise rest on historical assumptions that celebrate his grounding in dissenting traditions and cast him as a lonely pilgrim who foreshadowed the possessive individualism that is the hallmark of the modern subject.

It is not necessary to dispute the validity of such interpretations to note that they were not familiar—and indeed would not even have been fathomable—to the vast majority of people who lived through the events in question. Hume, who writes at the remove of only one century from the struggles we now recognize as having yielded the triumph of individual rights and representative governments, does not respond to the debates of a fledgling parliament over Nayler's threat to political and religious order with the enthusiasm of the "Whig historian." Despite his tone of satirical mockery, however, Hume's account of Nayler's torture and eventual degradation from mounted prophet to "ordinary man" registers the price that had to be paid by the individual whose radical nonconformity brought him or her up against the religious authorities of the most turbulent decades in seventeenth-century England.

Against the backdrop of an age in which, as Hume wrote, the "violence of the English parties exceeded anything which we can now imagine" (518), John Bunyan (1628–88) reached maturity. His father was probably a Royalist sympathizer, yet Bunyan himself served in the parliamentary army at the Newport Pagnell Garrison. His dissenting

beliefs were crystallized during the Interregnum, during which he began to preach and write. A comparison of his career to the foiled mission of James Nayler is by no means far-fetched considering that Bunyan's own blasphemies, profligacy, mental instability, and unlicensed preaching led him to be accused of practicing witchcraft and other crimes and nearly brought him to a violent end on many occasions. Following the restoration of Charles II, he indeed suffered persecution and was imprisoned for some twelve years. This lengthy ordeal fostered his greatest literary creativity. While in prison he wrote his classic spiritual autobiography, *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, as well as his allegorical masterpiece, *The Pilgrim's Progress*.

Despite his dissenting beliefs, Bunyan in his later years seems increasingly to have valued stability and peace, and he by no means unequivocally supported the Glorious Revolution that brought an end to the Stuart dynasty in 1688, the year of his own sudden death. His dramatic life thus followed the contours of his tumultuous times: his spiritual pilgrimage was also a political "progress" both in its traversing of a perilous landscape and, ironically, in its ultimate quiescent resignation to the monarchy against which he had once rebelled. Like Nayler, he may be said first to have undergone a trauma in his conversion years by seeking to imitate Christ and then a transformation into an "ordinary man" as he embraced his role as father to his flock. Bunyan's early writing is awash in metaphors of torture and violence, yet his conversion from profligate soldier to Puritan preacher prepares the way for a final period of conservatism in which he enjoyed considerable influence—and even ease. In his youth, he was drawn to radical sects such as the Ranters, but he later took it upon himself to contend with the Quakers. Indeed, one could argue that much of his career was spent resisting the pull of radical rhetoric that led to the kind of free-wheeling individualism identified in Hume's critique of the assault on the monarchy. Throughout his career, his relationship to authority—both internal and external—was ambivalent, mirroring the upheaval and uncertainty engendered by the crisis of authority within his society. The civil liberties won by political revolution opened up religious challenges, personal anxieties, and often libertine occasions for a young man whose "nature," as he puts it, was "in its prime."

The essays here collected thus take up the question of Bunyan's "political progress" from the many different perspectives engaged by such public and private interaction; they each recognize that the political culture of seventeenth-century England is reflected in and reflective of

the religious, social, cultural, and psychological lives of its subjects. All but my own contribution on Bunyan's young adulthood were delivered in the shadow of the traumatic events of 9/11 at the Third Triennial Conference of the International John Bunyan Society on October 11, 2001, in Cleveland, Ohio. Certainly, the challenge of gathering together in the United States scholars from around the world so shortly after this national trauma influenced the atmosphere of the conference and has in turn shaped this volume. In retrospect, it seems uncanny how our ongoing crisis appears to have been adumbrated in the cultural cataclysms of Bunyan's England. Because of this conjunction between his time and ours, our scholarly discourse about religious pluralism and intolerance, rebellion against authority and the temptation to tyranny, the psychological impact of military and domestic service, the gendering of dissent and the dissent from gendered imperatives, and the impact of cultural change on the experience of national subjects—to name just a few of the topics treated in this volume—took on an immediacy that could not have been premeditated but that now appears to have been—to follow Bunyan—"foreordained."

The essays in this volume pretend to no resolution of the problems of political and personal trauma and their transformation in Bunyan's life and times or in our own. What they do offer, however, is a palette of fresh perspectives on the contexts of Bunyan's world and work that collectively yield a deeper understanding of his political progress. For John Bunyan's life and writings follow the contours of the Civil War, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution that shaped seventeenth-century England. Yet when compared to such contemporaries as John Milton, Samuel Pepys, or Andrew Marvell, Bunyan is strikingly silent about the events of those tumultuous years. In his single-minded spirituality, Bunyan endures as an intriguing figure, but his political legacy is more conflicted and remains subject to dispute. He augurs the dilemmas of modernity in his anguished yet self-conscious pursuit of salvation. At the same time, he vigorously espouses dissent and liberty. This volume reassesses the tensions that have surrounded Bunyan since he first began to preach and write. The crises of authority, agency, and identity that pervade his writings reflect the societal and psychological fault lines of the modern culture he himself epitomizes. Most notably, the essays in one way or another all recognize that in 1649 the English people suffered a tremendous wound, a psychic lesion, as they both instigated and endured the killing of a king. This rupture in the social,

political, and religious order of the nation severed the old from the new: it was a beginning in an end, a birth from a death. Indeed, in Hume's estimation, "no people could undergo a change more sudden and entire in their manners, than did the English nation during this period" (518). This change, both radical and irreversible, is what *Trauma and Transformation* charts in the life, works, and times of John Bunyan.

In his anchoring essay, "Dissociation and Decapitation," Peter L. Rudnytsky throws down the revisionist gauntlet by reviving T. S. Eliot's theory of the seventeenth-century "dissociation of sensibility" as a watershed of the modern experience, but also links that experience of dissociation to the oedipal victory enacted by Parliament in its violation of the primal taboo against regicide. Rudnytsky's claim that Eliot's theory can be "deemed to have been the single most seminal contribution to English literary history of the twentieth century" is grounded in his sophisticated psychoanalytic understanding of the decapitation of Charles I as a cultural, social, and literary trauma.

In addition to its oedipal dimension, the regicide was widely assimilated to the biblical paradigm of the Fall, observes Rudnytsky, "thereby fusing religious and political discourses" only to become "enmeshed with private psychological issues of sexuality and self-consciousness" in such major writers of the period as Marvell and Milton. Applying Freud's theory of "deferred action" to interpret the "epistemological rupture that did occur with the decapitation of Charles I," Rudnytsky further argues that the cataclysmic events of 1649 collapse history into fantasy and myth in a way that imbues a historical event with ancient meanings. Such events, however historically constrained, create in those who live through them specific and recognizable symptoms of trauma, yielding to a transformed awareness of the self.

David Norbrook, in "A Response to Peter Rudnytsky," resists the notion that there was a collective trauma suffered by England as a whole. Norbrook finds the model of a dissociation of sensibility to entail an unnecessary collapsing of the "process of dialectic in which contending interests" are in constant conflict and their concomitant ideologies are likewise always in dispute. Norbrook thus regards the revival of Eliot's notion to be politically backward looking and intellectually suspect as it propels Rudnytsky into ferreting out guilt for primal sin in historically and politically complex circumstances that might more persuasively be explained, for instance, by the classical idiom of tyrannicide. Such an idiom might be only "as central a part of

the national psyche as divine right kingship," while a longing for a return to a conception of monarchy when the king "was a feudal *primus inter pares*, not a presumptuous absolutist," might be no less culturally resonant than Royalist fantasies of a golden age. Despite his reservations concerning Rudnytsky's rehabilitation of Eliot, however, Norbrook acknowledges the far-reaching impact and implications of Charles's execution, conceding that it must indeed have been traumatic, a "huge disruption" in what Eliot ventured to call the "mind of England," the unconscious as well as the conscious dimensions of which still need to be charted.

Although he does not take up Bunyan directly, Rudnytsky's psychoanalytic reading of English literary history applies to his case extremely well, as the succeeding essays in this volume demonstrate. Indeed, insofar as the English Revolution may be said to herald the birth of the divided modern self, which mirrors the sundered royal and natural bodies of the King, it is Bunyan who can be seen as its exemplary embodiment. Fueled perhaps by his own oedipal conflicts—like Hamlet, Bunyan might have claimed that the meats from his mother's funeral meal were best served "coldly-furnished" as leftovers at his father's hasty remarriage—Bunyan as a young man enlisted in Cromwell's army to take up arms against the reigning patriarch. Upon his discharge from military service, however, Bunyan, as it were, moved the war inward and made it into an immensely productive and devotedly chronicled psychomachia from which he never fully emerged.

His first sustained narrative, *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, delineates the internalization that followed his conversion, an experience that can be described as self-conscious, traumatic, and ultimately transformative. Having been a soldier in Cromwell's New Model Army, Bunyan returned to English village life as a sportsman, bell-ringer, dancer, braggart, and hooligan-in-chief, only to "split" before the reader's eyes into page upon page of spiritual torment. In his autobiography, Bunyan records his personal sense of rupture and restoration. As an ur-text of the Puritan hero, *Grace Abounding* chronicles Bunyan's emergence as a prototype of the "divided" modern subject.

Here is where the unconscious dimensions of Bunyan's response to a national trauma become enmeshed with his psychological history. The essays here collected challenge the received wisdom that Bunyan was, throughout his life, unconflicted in his identity as a radical Dissenter. Such an ideologically constructed portrayal of Bunyan has held

sway at least since Christopher Hill's influential biography of Bunyan published some twenty years ago and often carries with it a vision of a Bunyan who is a hale and hearty defender of the republic throughout his career. Such a picture must give ground to Richard L. Greaves's more recent Bunyan biography, *Glimpses of Glory: John Bunyan and English Dissent*, which offers instead an intensely drawn picture of a man suffering from, but ultimately sublimating, a mental illness. Bunyan was as conflicted politically as he was psychologically. His career is compulsive, creative, and at times quite conservative in relation to the pressing causes of his day. Never losing sight of the Bunyan who dominates the pages of English dissenting hagiography, this volume shows that ambivalence and anxiety, as much as faith, mobilized his history. The political affiliations that motivated his enlistment in Cromwell's parliamentary army lead to his persecution during the Restoration, during which time his most creative and psychologically complex writing occurs. His release from prison affords him freedom, as pastor to his flock, to build upon the stunning productivity of his prison years. From hooligan to husband, father to pastor, soldier to prisoner, preacher to prophetic writer, Bunyan progresses within an ever-changing political culture that is inextricably woven into the fabric of his literary productions.

My own essay, "Young Man Bunyan," maps Bunyan's participation in the national cataclysm of civil war. Drawing upon Erik Erikson's groundbreaking psychobiography of Martin Luther, whose evolution from a troubled rebel into a defender of the status quo strikingly anticipates Bunyan's, my analysis of Bunyan's early years highlights how the regicide, the impact of which touched the lives of all English subjects, resonates with young Bunyan's "masterless" state. Bunyan's military service served ironically as a moratorium—in the Eriksonian sense of the term—from the deviancy of his youth. The regimentation of army life provided him with the external discipline he needed to maintain his psychic structure. Hence, upon his discharge he succumbed to an intense period of "acting-out"—playing the madman like the Tom O'Bedlam he describes himself to have been in *Grace Abounding*.

Bunyan's profligacy upon leaving the army is notorious and may very well have been a panicked response to having deposed the patriarchy as represented by both King and father. Indeed, he settled down only when he embraced a heavenly Father—and the Bedford pastor, John Gifford—to whom he was introduced through the gentle discourse

of the Bedford women. The mediation of these feminine figures permitted his perception of his calling. Yet, this connection—between his embrace of the feminine and his embrace of the Dissenter's cause—has not yet been adequately specified. Bunyan scholars have instead insisted upon seeing Bunyan's affiliation with the Dissenters as fully integrated in his life as a soldier and thus have missed the crucial role played by the Bedford women and their congregation in solidifying his identity as a Dissenter.

Indeed, as Margaret J. M. Ezell's essay on "Bunyan's Women, Women's Bunyan" insists, Bunyan's relations to women, and theirs to him, are far more historically, artistically, and psychologically complex than most previous critics have allowed. Bringing to Bunyan studies her grasp of seventeenth-century women's literary history, Ezell decisively reorients our perspective on Bunyan's place in the gender politics of the early modern landscape. Through archival investigation of a neglected historical episode in Bunyan's life, Ezell demonstrates that critics have curiously colluded with Bunyan himself in averting their gaze from the powerful feminine figures who inform and emerge from his writings. She takes as departure point the controversies surrounding one Margaret Pryor, who was accused of witchcraft after having been turned into a bay mare! This reported incident, Bunyan's pamphlet about it which is now lost, along with the more renowned scandal of church member Agnes Beaumont riding behind him on horseback, highlight the historical reality of the women who populate Bunyan's writings but who are usually treated as mere footnotes in critical discussions.

Ezell's argument is that Margaret Pryor transformed as "horseflesh" and Agnes Beaumont reviled on "horseback" cannot be reduced to mere abstractions in Bunyan's life. Bunyan's involvement with these women was real and intense. Yet Bunyan's admirers have rushed to close ranks around their hero, perhaps rightly repudiating all accusations of adultery, witchcraft, and lewd living; but in so doing they have robbed his writings of much of their fervor and flair. Bunyan's disavowal of vulnerability to the flesh has seemed to undermine the capacity of critics to recognize that the pervasively erotic—and gendered—quality of Bunyan's writings derive from the flesh and blood women who populated his world, yielding complex characterizations of femininity, throughout his "nearly thirty years worth of writing." Bunyan's critics have by and large joined Bunyan in a disavowal of the flesh, being as "shie" of looking at Bunyan's depictions of women as he himself claims to have been "shie" of looking at their bodies.

But Bunyan cannot paint the threats of the flesh in the blood-red colors he does without splattering some on himself and the reader. No amount of rational determination can undo the incipient realism, individualism, and sensibility that make Bunyan's impassioned discourse a precursor of the modern testimonial. Bunyan's passive submission to the will of God dictates dissociation from his body and enforces a "cutting-off" which might well distance him from traumatic memory—both personal and political. But its traces inevitably emerge in the body of his works.

Whereas Ezell invites us to tour that region—the body in and of Bunyan's writing and world—Thomas H. Luxon, in "One Soul Versus One Flesh: Friendship, Marriage, and the Puritan Self," shows us a different province altogether by aggressively analyzing Bunyan's repudiation of the female body in terms of its resonance with classical idealization of homoerotic friendship between males and the concomitant relegation of the feminine to a lesser spiritual capacity. Through a comprehensive interpretation of Bunyan's treatises on marriage and "Christian behavior" as well as his imaginative works, Luxon exposes the disparagement of marriage and heterosexual union as a kernel of Bunyan's antihumanistic ideology. Bunyan's depiction of human sociality, however inflected by historical incident, turns on a denied but deeply cherished view of "homosocial and homoerotic relation . . . as the foundation of self-recognition." The relation of oneness with the risen Christ celebrated in Bunyan's vision is fundamentally narcissistic; the believer's identification with Christ becomes the only reality of which all human bonds are mere shadows.

For Luxon, Bunyan's allegorical dreamscape turns upside down the actual terrain of the English village mapped by Ezell. Luxon takes Bunyan at his word when the Puritan preacher protests he is invulnerable to feminine charm, identifying in Bunyan's disavowal of sexual difference a refusal of the "real" in favor of an imaginary, dyadic surrender to the divine. For Luxon, Bunyan is a "pure Puritan," one whose politics of exclusion finds no place for feminine flesh, insofar as it represents worldly affiliation and must be transcended. Indeed, he ties Bunyan's repudiation of the feminine to a larger rejection of the "Other"—"the Jew, the black person, the Muslim . . . the not-self or the pre-self." Thus armored, Bunyan can never "touch" the second self "embraced across difference." For Luxon, Bunyan is forever complicit in a perverse politics of patriarchy.

Agreeing, as it were, with both Ezell and Luxon, Michael Davies's "Bunyan's Bawdy: Sex and Sexual Wordplay in the Writings of John

Bunyan" acknowledges at the outset Bunyan's "almost pathological revulsion towards sex," while emphasizing his "equally powerful fascination with it." In an interpretive tour de force, Davies inspects the puns that erupt from Bunyan's texts as if from burst seams. Bunyan's antipathy to the flesh, extending from his early dissent against the decadence of the tastes of both Ranters and religious "professors" to his condemnation of the debauched England of the 1680s, is belied by his own agitated and explicitly erotic language: "For it is precisely when Bunyan is being most unequivocal about sexual matters that the very language he uses begins to betray him: his words suddenly start to buckle and slip from his otherwise firmly pastoral grip." But Davies is no Freudian: he rejects the notion that Bunyan is either oblivious or maladroit. In a mediation of seemingly contradictory positions, Davies demonstrates that Bunyan's banter reveals an acute vulnerability to the flesh while at the same time it vents his outrage at its—and his own—sinfulness. Bunyan's bawdy language is amusing but it is no laughing matter; it is rather a means of turning his reader away from sexual transgression and back to God. Davies's Bunyan clothes the Lamb in wolf's clothing, in order to bring the reader to repentance. In this sense, he neither puts Bunyan on the defensive, as one might suggest Luxon does, nor does he put critics on the defensive as one might suggest of Ezell, but rather he puts the reader on the defensive by following Bunyan's invitation, to "come hither, . . . And lay my Book, Thy Head and Heart together."² For Davies, Bunyan's seductive glance is not, so to speak, directed at (even if his designs derive from) the bodies of women. His "come hither" gaze is fixed on the souls of his readers.

In "Bunyan and the Antinomians," Roger Pooley bridges the sexual politics of the previous three essays by showing how the political unconscious resonates with the psychological, and indeed, how gender politics generates theological dispute: the antinomian doctrines of the seventeenth-century world turned upside down are dangerous because they appeal to the licentiousness in the individual English subject. Pooley's essay examines Bunyan's "moral panic" and "anxiety" when confronted with the religious, political, and sexual radicals of his day: the Quakers and the Ranters. Bunyan's contempt for these sects arguably fueled much of his involvement in the theological disputes of his entire career but ultimately emerged from his conflict around his own impulses. While for some conservatives the Ranters' espousal of egalitarianism and communal sharing of property might have been of

greater concern than their sexual libertinism, for Bunyan—whose fleshly nature was “in its prime” when he found himself pulled into Ranter rhetoric—the promise of spiritual freedom from biblical Law outweighed the threat posed by worldly lust or glory. It was his conflicted conscience that led him to Martin Luther and to embrace Christ’s “imputed” righteousness; the dangers of antinomianism were subordinated to his affirmation of the rights of the individual to obey his own conscience against all external authorities. This dissenting stance protected him from the extremes of antinomianism on the one hand and conformity on the other, since both were seen as representing a capitulation to worldly pressures and a turning away from the calling to follow Christ and conscience. Even in his final years, Bunyan makes it clear that while he does not resist the “divine right” of kings, he nonetheless retains “that Right which is Divine, to all / That is enjoyned, be they great or small.” In such an utterance, Pooley recognizes that Bunyan exposes the provisional nature of all outward authority when weighed against obedience to Christ and conscience. Whether he obeyed or bravely disobeyed, Bunyan continued to steer by this north star of his spiritual compass even as the political winds blew mightily first from one quarter and then from another.

Although the primary emphasis of this volume places Bunyan’s life and work in the context of the English Civil War and the Restoration, the young soldier who struggled with the traumas of revolution and regicide, and the maturing writer who expressed the agon of his salvation against the lament of his imprisonment, are perhaps no less conflicted than the middle-aged preacher who was torn between his allegiance to James II and the call of a new order. For under James’s rule, Bunyan and his congregation enjoyed freedom of worship and expression, while facing pressures by his fellow Dissenters to resist the blandishments of this Catholic king. In “John Bunyan and the Politics of Remembrance,” Sharon Achinstein brilliantly ties his late political ambivalence to the difficulty experienced by Bunyan and other Dissenters in redeploying under James II the tropes of persecution by which they had been sustained during Charles II’s reign. For James not only tolerated but also shrewdly wooed the Dissenters in his Declaration of Indulgence in 1687. As Pooley disputes the tendency of critics and historians to lump Bunyan in with the most extreme factions of the Interregnum, so Achinstein concludes with an interrogation of Bunyan’s ambiguous relation to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

As I have noted, 1688 was also the year of Bunyan's swift and sudden death. Already sixty years of age, he was caught in a rainstorm, fell ill, and died of a fever while returning, on horseback, from a pastoral errand in which he had effected the reconciliation of an estranged father and son. He died in London at the home of his friend, the grocer John Strudwick. It being impossible to move his remains to Bedford, he was buried in Bunhill Fields in London. All his biographers make note of these circumstances of Bunyan's end, though it was commemorated first by Charles Doe in a moving tribute to Bunyan as a minister. But Achinstein points out that there was very little contemporaneous commemoration or even acknowledgment of his death. There is no entry of his burial in the Bunhill Fields registry, no record of his funeral, and no marker of his grave until 1717. She ties this silence to the ambivalence of the Dissenters towards how his life and death would be represented. As Achinstein writes, "The Glorious Revolution seems inevitable only in hindsight and by fiat of a good deal of whitewashing of history," and Bunyan may not have found himself on the winning side of the Revolution to come. Though he was indeed a persecuted Puritan under Charles II, the latter-day Bunyan may well have longed to be among those "old-fashion Professors, that covet to fear God, and honour the King," if that King were prepared to give him freedom to labor in his religious vocation.

Thus, Bunyan's silence in the face of regicide in his youth is revisited in his advanced middle age when, once again, he is silent about his political loyalties. And when his death was met not with lamentation by the crowds of Londoners who had thronged to hear his sermons, but rather with yet more silence, we may well wonder if, as Achinstein suggests, Bunyan's apparent cooperation with James II's overtures of toleration necessitated a muted response on the part of those Whig dissenters who supported the Glorious Revolution: their silence about Bunyan's death was the calm before the storm of William III's landing.

Such silences can be interpreted by historians and critics but never fully understood; they suggest both a remembering and a forgetting. Indeed, all efforts to appropriate Bunyan, whether in his life or death, seem to be thwarted by silence, his own or that of others. Trauma, whether personal or political, is not easily integrated into memory; its effects are not often clearly spoken but rather signified by mute repetition in an effort at mastery. For some, the Glorious Revolution surely signified that mastery and the inevitable culmination of the "Whig"

revolution started in the 1640s and then snatched away in the 1660s. But it is not clear that Bunyan would have seen things this way: he was, as Achinstein insists, "no Whig resistor." "Bunyan tended to place his political hopes in kings rather than in other members of the legal and social establishment."

If, in his youth, Bunyan joined Cromwell's army reeling from an oedipal rage at his Royalist father, thus making the personal political, it is reasonable to suggest that his death made the political personal. For as he insisted throughout his writings, God's kingdom is not of this earth; Bunyan's mission was primarily pastoral. His final act of mediation between an estranged father and son may thus be read in hindsight as a gesture of immense meaning for one who had lived through the "bloody" English Civil War and a prolonged period of persecution under Charles II, only to meet his own death in an act of ministerial service, on the eve of the "bloodless" Revolution.