Preface

Recife, October 1930. The sergeant came to attention and saluted the commanding colonel, saying that he was under arrest. The colonel unsnapped his holster, stating, "[Y]ou should take my pistol because a prisoner should not be armed." The sergeant replied, "Colonel, keep your pistol." Officers within earshot applauded. The sergeant then asked the arrested colonel for permission to order the changing of the guard. The colonel refused, saying that he was no longer in charge, that he was nobody. Hearing that, the sergeant snapped to attention and said, "To me you are a colonel in the army. . . . [O]nly momentarily are we in opposing camps." The colonel then told him to order the guard changed.[1]

That this scene actually happened during the Revolution of 1930 challenges common ideas about military rebellions. Brazilian military lore included unwritten norms that guided behavior in extralegal situations. Although discipline as conventionally understood in other armies was disrupted in Brazilian rebellions, certain attitudes were maintained. Disruption of discipline was transitory; as the sergeant told his colonel, "[O]nly momentarily are we in opposing camps." The history of the Brazilian army is best understood as a reflection of the complex, complicated, and sometimes contradictory national culture.

The military, particularly the army, has had a significant part in Brazilian social and political history; indeed, the armed forces oversaw the government from 1964 to 1985. When I set out to understand the how and why of military behavior, my path continually returned to the 1889–1937 period, which I came to see as the seedbed of later developments. I am particularly confident in asserting this because I carried my research on the history of the army down to the early 1990s. Moreover, my earlier work had given me a familiarity with the army during the *Estado Novo* of 1937 to 1945. In a series of articles and conference papers, some of which were published in Brazil as a book entitled *A Nação Armada* (1982), whose topics took me back and forth across the twentieth century, I examined various aspects of the army's role in Brazilian society and politics. That project convinced me that a history of

the army itself was necessary. My original goal was to take the story up to the 1990s, but the Old Republic and the 1930s proved too rich in documentation and literature to be dealt with briefly, so I decided to end with what I see as the crucial event in Brazil's twentieth-century army history, namely the establishment of the Estado Novo in November 1937. The experiences of the Old Republic and the 1930s explain the preoccupation of the officer corps in later decades with institutional unity during political crises.

Many of the fine studies of post-1930 Brazil miss fundamental aspects of the military's role in society. Even when portions of the army rose up, as in the *tenente* rebellions of the 1920s and in the Revolution of 1930, the tendency of the literature has been to explain behavior in relation to civilian politics and society, making the military rebels instruments of, spokesmen for, or symbols of urban middle-class desires. Yet to do so ignored powerful influences within the army itself that molded the conduct of both individuals and the institution of which they were a part. In 1916 the army's new procedures for recruiting its rank-and-file soldiers changed the relationship between the army and society, altered civilian penal practices, and injected the army and the *Pátria* [motherland] it espoused and the State that it defended, into the private realm of the family and into the far corners of Brazil.

In the period with which this book is concerned the army was the *only national institution,* the core of the developing Brazilian State. It was a position that the army assumed fitfully, almost haphazardly, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of the monarchy and gradually acquiring doctrine and vision to support its de facto role. Although it had more units and men in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul than elsewhere, its presence was felt throughout the country, and its personnel, its interests, its ideology, its vision, and its commitments were national. The *Pátria Brasileira* stood above Constitution, cabinet, emperor, or president.

Exceptional or extralegal behavior would ultimately be justified as acts of loyalty to the Pátria. Alone among the various Brazilian elites, the officer corps of the armed forces were nationalists by definition and constitutionally mandated at that. The political parties of the 1889–1930 period were not national but regional and/or personalist. The Catholic Church, although present throughout the country, was international in its personnel, ideology, liturgy, and purposes. Although Catholicism certainly was, as Gilberto Freyre noted, the cement of Brazilian *culture,* neither the church nor political parties held Brazil's territory together; the army did that.

It is startling that Brazil, alone among the continental countries of Latin America, not only still embraces the area claimed in colonial times but extends beyond it in the west and north. The only significant piece of colonial terrain that Brazil lost was the *Banda Oriental,* now Uruguay. In con-

trast, all of the Spanish-American viceroyalties were torn apart by regionalist forces. The Brazilian army stood, and still stands, as a bulwark against regionalist, centrifugal forces.

Interpretations of post-1930 Brazil often lack an understanding of what the army and its role was prior to that watershed year that opened the important Getúlio Vargas era (1930–54). This book is a history of the core institution of the expanding Brazilian state that examines how the army developed, how it was co-opted by the civilian elites, how the processes of professionalization and Europeanization disrupted the bonds of co-optation, and how the stress of rebellion and social change in the 1920s led to its unraveling in 1930, as well as how it reinvented itself in the 1930s, eventually becoming the backbone of the Estado Novo dictatorship after 1937. At the same time army recruitment; expansion of its postings; suppression of internal rebellions; road, railroad, and telegraph line construction; and mapping of the interior injected the army and Pátria that it represented into the vastness of its claimed, but poorly controlled, territory. In the 1930s the rebuilding of the state and the army went on apace of one another, and by 1940 both were different from what they had been a decade earlier. The events and struggles of the turbulent 1930s, and the subsequent trends that culminated three decades later in the military regime of 1964 to 1985, are more clearly understood against the backdrop of the army's experience in the Old Republic. That experience explains why civil war broke out in 1932 and why the army became the core of the dictatorial Estado Novo—the country's first rational and nationalist government that laid the foundations for post–World War II Brazil.

The attitudes of officers who directed the destinies of Brazil from 1964 to 1985 were shaped to a good extent by their experiences as junior officers, or as the sons of major actors, in the Old Republic. Presidents (Generals) Humberto Castelo Branco, Arthur Costa e Silva, Emilio Garrastazú Medice, and Ernesto Geisel were only the most prominent; there were literally hundreds of others. João Batista Figueiredo, the last general president, was heavily influenced by his father, Euclydes, whom the reader will meet in these pages.

It is easy to forget that every army's mission is to be ready to wage war, to exercise controlled violence in the name of a state. An army's structure, doctrine, equipment, and training exist for the paramount test of the battlefield. A history of an army that does not deal with its ultimate mission would be partial at best. The book takes the reader into battle because I believe that we should not separate the army's barracks life, internal politics, and relations with society from its exercise of violence, from its war making. Without examining what it did at Canudos in 1897, in the Contestado from 1912 to 1915, in the tenente revolts of the 1920s, in the Revolution of 1930,

and in the paulista revolt of 1932, we would be left with an incomplete understanding of the army and the men who constituted it.

I emphasize the officer corps because, especially after obligatory service was instituted in 1916, the officers were the only permanent element in the army. The Brazilian army did not develop a strong tradition of leadership by sergeants, as did the American, British, German, and French armies; from top to bottom it was an organization controlled by officers.

Although the officers are the main actors in this story, however, I have called the reader's attention at several points to the common soldiers who marched in the army's columns. Throughout its history the army has been plagued with recruitment policies that were shaped by the protective mechanisms of a class society bent on keeping the mass of the population relatively ignorant and subservient. The officer corps' modernizing ideology collided with the tenacity of the land-based regional oligarchies determined to maintain their supply of cheap labor. That determination explains why recruitment prior to 1916 was frequently forced and why after that date its results often fell short of projected goals; it also explains why the army was small, relative to the rapidly expanding Brazilian population.

Although it has not been possible here to do more than give passing reference to military family life, I have provided career sketches of officers to highlight their friendships and family ties and to show how such social linkages affected behavior. I have stressed bonds of friendship, of loyalty to classmates and to certain commanders, and the importance of trusting colleagues, having what the Brazilians call *gente de confiança* (someone you trust). On an individual level such personal loyalties, which are so much a part of the Brazilian culture, could be linked to idealized loyalty to the Pátria. After the closure of the Rio de Janeiro military school in 1904, the officer corps lacked a single, shared common educational tradition. As a result officers felt affinity with those who had common backgrounds and shades of alienation from those who did not, and as the various schools were opened and closed, the results of alienation turned explosive. Put another way, the men who passed through the military school at Realengo had a different introduction to their careers from the men who studied in the schools at Porto Alegre or Praia Vermelha. Efforts to shape a standard educational program in the 1920s gave the army permanent schools, but in the short run intensified intracorps and intergeneration alienation. Only after 1944 with the creation of the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras would the army get the curricular and experiential commonalty that provided later generations of officers a bonding tradition.

Why does the navy only appear at the margins of this story? Because that was its role and stature during the era. Especially after the naval rebellions of 1893 and 1910, the generals and politicians did not trust the admirals or the

sailors and deliberately kept their service weak and marginal. The air force came into being as a separate service in 1941, but I give some attention to the early development of military aviation under army aegis.

Because revolutions, popular and military rebellions, and armed state interventions play such an important part in the era, it may be useful to the reader to have some explanation as to how I view such phenomena. I agree with Alain Rouquié that regimes that begin in a coup d'état are marked with an "original sin" that "affects everything that they do, for conspiracy and surprise are at the opposite end of the spectrum from social progress. Plotters, far from mobilizing politically the social forces interested in change, exclude or ignore them. From the outset radical praetorianism appears like enlightened despotism: everything for the people, nothing by the people."[2]

Military intervention in politics and society is a sign of weakness of both the state and society. But to apply that statement to Brazil is to say the obvious. During the nineteenth century the monarchy and the army were the sole national institutions in a remarkably weak state and society. The coup of 1889 left the army as the republic's core institution but without the ideology, structure, experience, personnel, political mandate, or will to embrace fully such a role. During the Old Republic the prime mission of the officer corps evolved into building the infrastructure of the state and the human "fiber" of the society. In the early 1960s the pathbreaking studies of Edwin Lieuwen and John J. Johnson depicted military intervention as flowing from social class and interest group demands. One result of their books was the scholarly norm, at least in the United States, that equated the study of the "military" with analysis of civil-military relations. It was widely accepted among American intellectuals and government officials that increased "professionalization" of the Latin American military would reduce intervention. However, the reality of the 1964 to 1985 military regime's being supported by the most professional military in Brazilian history called that idea into question.

Much of the social science literature on the military in Brazil, and elsewhere in Latin America, rests on a precarious foundation that consists more of conjecture and assumption than historical research. In his influential book, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (1971), Alfred Stepan assumed that the moderator model of military political behavior that he observed in the 1960s could be extrapolated backward into the Old Republic. He supposed that after overthrowing the empire, the military had taken over the moderating power from the emperor. He later added that the military regime born in 1964 displayed an internal nationally focused "new professionalism" that contrasted with the external, foreign-defense focus of the previous decades.[3] But my research does not bear out such assumptions.

The army did not become the moderator in the 1890s; its power was too shaky and too co-opted. Prior to the 1930s it did not have the institutional

will, doctrine, or capability for such a role. This is not to say that some officers, such as the 1890s Jacobins, did not want to play moderator; rather, the institution could not do so. Nor was the officer corps the nonpolitical, externally oriented force that Stepan pictured; rather, officers were politically involved in securing their promotions, assignments, and benefits. Some used their military status to propel them into political position. Throughout the 1889–1930 period many officers held congressional, state, and municipal posts. The kind of involvements that I once assumed had grown out of the Estado Novo dictatorship of 1937 to 1945 had in fact been the norm throughout the Old Republic.[4] Officers ran the frontier strategic towns, mapped the country, demarcated the borders, constructed roads and telegraph and railroad lines, built barracks, commanded police forces and firemen in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere, intervened in local politics on federal order, and otherwise enforced court orders. They also ran arsenals, a steel mill, prisons, and apprentice orphanage programs, and they supervised the Indian Protective Service and taught in and administered the army's educational system. In short, the old professionals were much like Stepan's new professionals. Understanding that historical perspectives shape thinking about the present, I came to believe that studies of Brazilian civil-military relations would continue to be marred by inaccuracies until the military's institutional history became clearer.

Happily, I was not the only one to reach such a conclusion. José Murilo de Carvalho argued that it was necessary to understand the army institution in order to understand its relations with state and society. The army, he noted, was not merely an instrument of political and social forces; rather, its internal structure, mission, and ideology shaped its relationships with the political and social spheres. He held that the behavior of military institutions could not be reduced to mere reactions to external influences. But that is not to say that the army would refuse to enforce the political and social norms set by the political elite; it was, after all, the strong arm of the state. He also emphasized the interpretative importance of some of the army's structural characteristics: recruitment; size, function, and distribution of personnel; formation and makeup of the officer corps; military training and education; and development of ideologies.

Recruitment policies reflected the institution's relative openness or closedness, its social roles, its missions, its self-image, and its most basic interaction with the society. Size and distribution tell much about the institution's real power and ability to act, whereas analysis of training and education sheds light on internal cohesion and professionalism. The army's increased capacity in the 1930s for political intervention on the national level rested on the transformations it experienced, not on the demands of social classes or interest groups.[5]

In a similar vein Edmundo Campos Coelho rejected analyses of the army's role in society and politics that were based on the idea that it was the instrument of the oligarchy, the "dominant" or middle classes, or even that it was the moderator that arbitrated disputes among classes and groups, because if the army were merely an instrument, then researchers could "concentrate on the play of the antagonistic interests of the social classes" and could ignore the study of the military organization itself. He argued in favor of research on the organization, noting that three related processes had marked the historical evolution of the army: that the institution's own needs and interests were factors in its political behavior, that it increasingly became more autonomous in relation to the social system, and that it was progressively more closed to the influences of civil society.[6] Yet in this book we see the army suppressing social movements on the orders of a national government controlled by the "dominant classes," thereby suggesting that the army's evolution followed a path from instrumentality to autonomy. Hopefully, this book will sharpen our understanding of the army's roles and of its place in Brazilian history.

By its very nature an army is different from other social institutions. As the principal agency of state violence it is set apart and has its own special characteristics as a social organization. An army is a *total institution,* in the sense that Erving Goffman used the term, whose members distinguish themselves from others who follow different, less embracing lifestyles. A "central feature of total institutions" is that they breakdown the barriers separating the three spheres of life—sleep, play, and work—by controlling where, when, and how they take place. Total institutions tend to separate their members from the surrounding society and to press them into a closely managed routine in "a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution." Such institutions are composed of people divided into a large managed group and a small supervisory group, with little social mobility between them and with specified ways of dealing with each other. Total institutions socialize their members in particular ways that shape their thinking, self-image, and behavior.[7] Of course, we should expect that a total institution in Brazil will reflect aspects of Brazilian culture that will distinguish it from similar institutions in other countries.

Regarding revolution, social movements, and state violence, I have found helpful ethnohistorian Anthony F. C. Wallace's suggestions toward a theory of revolution for Latin America. He specified two types of revolutions: those based on the "politics of the appetites" and those related to the "politics of identity." It might be objected that he is not a Latin Americanist and that he did not deal specifically with Brazil, but I think that applying his appetites/identity model provides a useful way to look at seemingly familiar

events. In the 1889 overthrow of the empire the officers and their civilian republican allies wanted to seize power in an essentially intact social and economic system to exercise influence within it; they wanted to change the political trappings but not the underlying structures. They avoided expanding and extending the two requisites of effective political participation by the citizenry, namely public education and the vote. Theirs was the politics of the appetites. Their successors often experienced conflict between the legacy of those politics and the goal of a professionally efficient army.

The politics of identity applies neatly to the popular rebellions of Canudos (1897) and the Contestado (1912–15). In the pursuit of new and better identities the people of those places were swept up in revitalization movements. Wallace defined such movements as deliberate, organized efforts "by some members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture." The persons involved were likely to have had "an intense religious experience, a moment of revelation, after some prolonged period of personal dissatisfaction and disillusionment, and see as their combined task the salvation of their own souls and the salvation of the world around them." Collectively the people of Canudos and the Contestado were seeking salvation in an earthly, as well as a heavenly, sense. In the process they designed what Wallace called a "transfer culture" that was to reshape the flawed society into an ideal one. The demands of "transfer culture" adherents for change were not "fundamentally hostile to the personnel of the Establishment." Rather they wanted to convert the rest of the world by words, not by force. However, when the Establishment itself responded with force, the movement's participants defended themselves accordingly.[8]

In Brazil the establishment historically responded violently to demands for change because to acknowledge the validity of the politics of identity would threaten the foundations of the politics of the appetites. In crushing the Canudos and Contestado movements, and the 1904 Vaccination Revolt in Rio de Janeiro, the army was the instrument of the politics of the appetites, and in the 1911–1913 salvationist *(salvações)* interventions a number of senior officers were active practitioners of those politics. The appetites/identity framework can*not* be applied so neatly to the tenentes of the 1920s or to the Liberal Alliance of 1930; however, in their desire to reshape Brazil the tenentes shared some identity attributes. But their goal, and that of the Liberal Alliance, was to take over an intact political, social, and economic system. The revolutionaries of 1930 were, to continue with Wallace's terms, an appetites/identity mix, which is one reason why the decade of the 1930s was so violent as the contending political and social forces struggled for dominance. It also helps explain the many contradictions of the dictatorial Estado Novo that ended that decade's conflicts.

Violence was the common response to demands for change because Brazil, the nation-state, was still being formed. The break with Portugal in 1822 had not provided a crucible to blend the many regional Pátrias or homelands into a Brazilian nation, much less a nation-state. During the empire the government had relied on political alliances in the provinces (Pátrias) to deliver victories in highly restricted elections. That electoral system obligated the ruling party so deeply to provincial interests that it severely curtailed, as Roderick Barman has written, "the capacity of the national government to undertake bold, independent action in internal affairs," and it precluded the formation of a strong national party system. The Pátrias, dominated by *parentelas* (kinship networks), resisted external influences and control, and throughout the nineteenth century monarchs had difficulty extending their authority into them.[9] The monarchy repeatedly used the army to hold the country together by suppressing regional revolts between 1817 and 1848. The formation of Brazil, as a political entity, required that the central government weaken the independence of the Pátrias. The process of state formation had not been completed under the empire and continued on into the republic. Indeed, the republic expanded the power of the Pátrias, the former provinces now called states, and at the same time searched for a formula that would hold the country together. The often contrary trends of decentralization and centralization placed physical, psychological, and emotional pressures on the army, whose sole reason for existence was to serve the national Pátria. The crushing of the naval rebellion and suppressing the civil war in the south in the 1890s and the salvationist interventions (1911–13) can be seen as part of the state formation or nation-building process.

Those actions were aimed at the political elites; however, as mentioned above, the army was also used to keep the common people or masses in line. The political history of republican Brazil is the story of the growth of the Brazilian nation-state. The army, as the one national institution, was a central actor in that story. By extending the power of the central government into the Pátrias, the army contributed to political change, to the formation of the nation-state, and to the aggrandizement of the national Pátria. As the strong arm of the state, the army's role was, to borrow Alain Rouquié's phrase, the "intervention of the state within itself."[10]

One of my goals in writing this book was to tell the army's story in terms of the interaction between the institution and the men who shaped it and who were shaped by it. I introduce the reader to a large number of officers whose beliefs, emotions, strengths, and weaknesses molded the institution and through it affected the history of Brazil. This subtheme of mutual influence of institution, membership, and society runs throughout the book.

In these pages the reader will follow the Brazilian army through civil war, rebellions, and conspiracies, moving back and forth from ministerial offices to the firing lines. Armies are instruments of organized violence, and their histories should reflect that fact. I have sketched the careers of key officers; sought to show the institutional, national, and international pressures involved in decision making; and tried to keep the reader abreast of the army's relationships to society and politics. I have also called attention to the networks of friendships, *turmas,* families, *parentelas,* and patronage that interlaced the army and linked it here and there to civilian society.

The narrative runs from the fall of the empire through the end of the Old or First Republic in 1930 to the onset of the dictatorial Estado Novo in 1937. It is the period in which the army established itself as the one national institution, the strong arm of the state. Indeed, during those decades the army extended the reach of the central state throughout the vastness of Brazil.

There is a wide range of labels applied to the various regime changes in Brazil. *Revolution* particularly is thrown about with abandon in Brazilian historiography. Were the events leading to the overthrow of the empire in 1889 or the "Old" republic in 1930 revolutions or coups d'etat? The question may well have relevance only for those who regard revolution positively and coup negatively. Historians have the choice of using the terminology employed by the actors of the time or an established definition rooted in accepted social science usage. In the period of this book there were three regime changes: in 1889, in 1930, and in 1937. In my view *revolution* should only be used to label popular upheavals that change the nature of government and society; I do not believe that such an event or set of events has yet occurred in Brazil. The changes resulting from each of the three were important and, after the latter two, far-reaching, but they were not revolutionary in the sense of being deliberately sought by policies of the newly imposed popular regime. Of the three, 1930 came closest to a popular revolution, but the resulting government lost that quality; oddly, the dictatorship established in 1937 gradually took on some qualities of a populist, if not a popular, regime.

What has interested me here is not the descriptive label but the process behind the events. For example, I do not see 1930 as an army seizure of power but rather as a prolonged crisis during which the army's chain of command disintegrated. The central command in Rio de Janeiro struggled to maintain control over units in the capital. In effect, if not in the historiography, the army fell apart in the rebellion, and the events in Rio de Janeiro, such as taking President Washington Luís into custody, were a cosmetic attempt by a small group of senior officers to maintain some influence in the new order that was being born. They had no choice about passing authority to Getúlio

Vargas because they had lost effective control of everything save the tiny federal district.

The years 1889, 1930, and 1937 were years of "regime change." In each case the initial violence was limited but followed by extended periods of violent adjustment. The relatively pacific nature of the coups themselves gave the appearance of compromise, but invariably turmoil burst forth afterward. The periods of adjustment in the three cases were protracted and involved some authoritarian rule. This book is a study of the army during the first two periods of adjustment to regime change. That which followed 1889, the Old Republic, ultimately failed and resulted in the "Revolution" of 1930 and the opening of the more profound adjustment process of the Vargas era.

In doing the research I followed a well-marked trail. Edwin Lieuwen's landmark study *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (1960) was the first book I read about the military in Latin America, so it was an honor to have his comments on earlier versions of some of these chapters before his untimely death. Another historian who encouraged me was John J. Johnson, whose *The Military and Society in Latin America* (1964) suggested that the Brazilian military was different from its Spanish-American counterparts, that militarism in Brazil derived "from the uncertainties arising from the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the overthrow of the empire in 1889" (244). Although I agree on both counts, these pages tell a considerably more violent story than he thought was the case back in the early 1960s. I have benefited from the work of Robert A. Potash on Argentina, Frederick M. Nunn, Karen Remmer, and Brian Loveman on Chile and Latin America generally, Roderic A. Camp on Mexico, and Ronald M. Schneider and Alfred Stepan on Brazil. The tack that I have taken is somewhat different from theirs. They focus primarily on the interaction between military institutions and politics, whereas I have concentrated more on the military institution itself. Clearly, the army is not totally separate from society, but it has developed a special status that has influenced its interactions with society and politics. I concur with the above authors that social science theory should seek to explain how the various segments of society contribute to the functioning of the whole. However, I think that history is more than the testing ground for theory and models; it is a process of research and writing that gives people the stories that shape their self-images and identities. The stories that they know about the past influence the way they think and act in the present and thereby shape the future.

Armies are closed institutions, anxious about security, and suspicious of outsiders. As a foreigner studying the Brazilian army I have been a double outsider, both to the society and to the institution, so to do this study I had to become intellectually an insider. As a U.S. Army reserve officer during the Vietnam War I was ordered to active duty and sent to teach at the United

States Military Academy. During those years, in attempting to explain West Point and the United States Army to my civilian friends and academic colleagues, I was impressed with how different the view from inside the army was from that outside it. This awareness led me to consider more carefully the problems related to studying closed institutions and to look more critically at the literature on the Latin American militaries, particularly the Brazilian. The difficulties that scholars in the United States face in interpreting other societies and their institutions are magnified when dealing with military organizations. Moreover, from 1964 to 1985 the military dominated the Brazilian government, so in that period to be doing research on the army invited suspicion from all sides. Many Brazilian intellectuals were so alienated that they could not understand why anyone would or how anyone could study the military.

Establishing credibility was a major problem. The key army research facilities are run directly by active-duty officers. The army's historical archives and library are located in the regional headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, and its documentation center is in the General Staff building, known in the army as "Fort Apache," in Brasília. Armed guards abound, leaving no doubt that these are serious places. Obtaining access to collections and individual officers is time consuming and frustrating, especially in the absence of clear rules and procedures. On several occasions officials ran security checks to assure themselves that I was not working for United States intelligence agencies. My patience, willingness to listen, and frequent returns convinced officers that I was an independent scholar. I made clear that although I did not favor military regimes, my purpose was to understand the history that had given the military such a significant role in contemporary Brazil.

At times my research was obstructed. Documents that I read one day disappeared mysteriously the next. Once some officers tried to have me ejected, and on one memorable occasion a general threatened arrest if I used a 1930s intelligence report "injudiciously." In retrospect, however, such incidents provided an atmosphere of creative tension that helped me to understand the social pressures within the army officer corps that molded thinking and behavior. I should say that eventually toleration turned into acceptance, and I was invited to give talks on my research to groups of officers; and my writings have been used in classes at the command and general staff school and at the military academy.

Whatever measure of success I have had in capturing the tone and substance of Brazilian army history is a result in no small part of the interest, advice, assistance, hospitality, and patience of a large number of army officers who welcomed me into their offices, barracks, schools, and homes. They took me inside the institution and reduced my handicap of being an outsider. There is not enough space to list them all, but I would be remiss if I

did not mention several who have been continuously helpful even to the extent of reading and commenting on various pieces of writing. Colonel Newton C. de Andrade Mello was the first Brazilian officer I met when he was a military attaché in Washington in the early 1960s, and years later he sponsored my membership in the Instituto de Geografia e História Militar do Brasil. Colonel Luiz Paulo Macedo Carvalho has been my counselor, teacher, critic, commentator, translator, sponsor, publisher, host, and friend. General Carlos de Meira Mattos has opened many doors, has been a genial host, has explained things that are written nowhere, and has read and critiqued my writing. Brigadier General Newton Bonumá dos Santos helped me understand the nuances and functioning of the military educational system and ran interference for me. And Colonel Sérgio Paulo Muniz Costa has shown me how today's younger officers view their army's history. These men have been my mentors, sponsors, and friends. However, although they may see some of their ideas in these pages, I alone am responsible for errors of fact and interpretation.

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Frank D. McCann
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