

## INTRODUCTION

### Global Governance and Japanese Nongovernmental Advocacy Networks

**IN MARCH 2003**, nearly forty thousand Japanese swamped Tokyo's Sakurada-dori, near the American Embassy, in a peace rally organized by World Peace Now, a coalition of fifty nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to protest the war in Iraq and, in particular, the dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq for "humanitarian" purposes. The gathering was unprecedented in that nothing like it had occurred since the anti-U.S. Japan Security Alliance movement in the 1960s and 1970s. In March of the following year, a few hundred Japanese consumers from the No! GMO (Genetically Modified Organisms) Campaign went to Canada and the United States to protest the imminent approval of genetically modified (GM) wheat by the Canadian federal government and the North Dakota state government. The petition, signed by 414 organizations representing 1.2 million Japanese people who did not want imported GM wheat, seemed to make an impact. Two months later Monsanto announced the suspension of all development of GM wheat. In November 2004, another coalition of fifty-four Japanese NGOs and labor unions, together with fifty-two South Korean counterparts, protested in front of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in their campaign against the Japanese-Korean Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The following month, an emergent alternative globalization movement organized the first Social Forum in Japan. More than four hundred Japanese alterglobalization activists converged on Kyoto under the general banner "Another World Is Possible."

This book looks at the new phenomenon of internationally linked Japanese nongovernmental advocacy networks, which since the 1990s have grown in the context of three conjunctural forces: neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism. The book connects three disparate literatures: on the global justice movement, on Japanese civil society, and on global citizenship education. On the one hand, the literature on the alterglobalization movement that has flourished since the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle in 1999 has focused mostly on the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal model and opposition to it by North American as well as European social movements.<sup>1</sup> Japan's role as an economic superpower pushing for a free trade agenda and the role of Japanese social movements in opposition to that agenda remain largely unknown. On the other hand, although Japanese civil society has increasingly attracted scholarly attention, we know little about the internationally oriented advocacy networks that have emerged since the 1990s to monitor a variety of issues in global governance, and about the impact of those networks on Japan.<sup>2</sup> This book raises five questions:

1. Who are the activists and what are the genesis and focus of their groups?
2. What are the activist groups' critiques of and alternatives to neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism?
3. How are these groups connected regionally, nationally, and internationally?
4. What relationships do these groups have with the Japanese government?
5. How do these groups contribute to global citizenship education?

This book draws on the concept of *global citizenship*, in which people have "access to a variety of political engagement on a continuum from the local to the global, with the local marked by direct and participatory processes while larger domains with significant populations are progressively mediated by representative mechanisms."<sup>3</sup> Despite emergent interest in the concept and practice of global citizenship, its educational foundation and component—that is, how global citizens are actually made—is rarely highlighted. In the case of Japan, most analyses of political change focus on the domestic bureaucracy, on party politics, or on interest-group explanations that assume a national model of citizenship.<sup>4</sup> By examining the concept of global citizenship, this book seeks to understand how new social movements in Japan construct a new identity of the Japanese as global citizens. I argue that Japanese civil society is embedded in global civil society and that it contributes to global citizenship education through participation, knowledge production, and space creation.

### Globalization of the Market: When the Washington Consensus Arrived in Tokyo

Since the early 1980s, the Washington Consensus (a pact among the U.S. Congress, senior members of the U.S. administration, economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, think tanks, and international financial institutions), which emerged in the Thatcher and Reagan era and was based on promarket policies, including financial and trade liberalization, public expenditure cuts, and deregulation, has symbolized a dominant Anglo-Saxon neoliberal economic model worldwide.<sup>5</sup> In Japan, although trade and investment liberalization had begun in the 1980s under *gaiatsu* (foreign, particularly U.S., pressure), deregulation became a key political agenda in the 1990s, after Japan's economy collapsed and entered a long recession. Because gross domestic product growth rates have remained low and even been negative (minus 2.8 percent in 1998, only the second time in the post-World War II period that the economy registered negative growth), Japan has been challenged to find a balance between competitive pressures from globalization and Japan's traditional "people-oriented" economy, that is, to search for "a market economy with a human face."<sup>6</sup> One week after Koizumi Junichiro won the National Diet's lower house elections in April 2001, he announced that he would revisit the employment system centered on lifelong employment and relax the rules for dismissal and for the use of dispatch workers for periods exceeding one year.<sup>7</sup> In 2002, Nikkeiren (the Japan Federation of Employers Association) released a position paper entitled "Promoting Structural Reform to Overcome the Crisis":

For the sake of a bright future for the economy in the 21st century, thorough restructuring is needed to rectify the high domestic cost structure, stimulate creativity in the science and technology field and achieve sustained economic growth based on these changes, which will allow us to contribute to the progress of the global economy. Where global mega-competition is concerned, it is important to clearly define the roles of the government, labor and the private sector and establish a private sector-led economy. Reducing the high cost structure through a private sector-led economy is the most important goal of structural reform. . . . The most desirable labor market for Japan should have the following 4 characteristics: mobility, flexibility, specialization and diversity. In particular, Japan's labor market is highly regulated, and regulatory reform is urgently needed. In the case of temporary worker dispatching agencies, limits on length of employment

contracts should be eliminated, a shift made from a permit to a notification basis, and the prohibition on dispatching of manufacturing workers and health care personnel lifted.<sup>8</sup>

In 2003, part-time labor, including contract and dispatch workers, constituted about one-third of the entire labor force, or 12.6 million. In the 2004 mid-term report of the interministerial Deregulation and Privatization Promotion Council, the Koizumi cabinet further laid out fourteen key points in introducing “market testing” and privatization of public services in a variety of sectors, including medical services, child care, education, and social insurance. Among the main targets of privatization are the Narita and Haneda airports, the Japan Highway Public Corporation, the Japan Oil Corporation, the Urban Development Corp, and the Housing Loan Corporation, along with state-run universities and postal services that hold the world’s largest pool of savings.

At the level of the WTO, Japan has been under pressure to enact agricultural and service liberalization. Because of the structural and political significance of rice (more than half of all Japanese farm households are engaged in rice farming, and farmers carry disproportionate voting weight and provide disproportionate support for the Liberal Democratic Party), most politicians have thought it “politically dangerous to touch upon rice.”<sup>9</sup> When agricultural trade negotiations began under the Uruguay Round in 1986, rice was forced onto the table. In 1990, Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) issued a letter to the government, urging it to “reduce or eliminate restrictions on agricultural imports, while taking measures to minimize damage to Japan’s farmers. . . . Japan should not try to protect any domestic product or service from foreign competition (to successfully conclude the Uruguay Round).”<sup>10</sup> On December 7, 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, at a midnight press conference, urged Japan to “endure sacrifices in difficult areas such as agriculture for the sake of the future of the world’s free-trade system and bringing a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round.”<sup>11</sup> By 1994, when the trade round was concluded, Japan had agreed to a 4 percent “minimum access” to rice imports, a 20 percent reduction in domestic support, tariffication of nontariff barriers, and a 36 percent reduction in export subsidies.<sup>12</sup> Since agricultural trade talks resumed in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations in 2001, Japan has been under pressure to further reduce tariffication, in particular for rice. To counter U.S. domination of the negotiations on the agriculture and service sectors, Japan has been aggressively pushing for invest-

ment liberalization, which is considered an “offensive” sector for Japan.<sup>13</sup> In addition, Japan has been concluding or negotiating FTAs with a number of countries, including Singapore, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia since 2002.

### Militarism and Nationalism: Reverting to a “Normal Country” and “International Cooperation”

Neoliberal restructuring has occurred while nationalism and militarism have intensified in Japan, since the late 1990s. Although a nationalist legacy—centered on the ideology of racial purity, restoration of the emperor, and denial of war responsibility—never faded while the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) predominated, the late 1990s saw the creation of officially sanctioned nationalistic policies. In 1999, despite opposition from local school boards and teachers, the Hinomaru (national flag) and Kimigayo (national anthem) were formally adopted by the Diet, imposing de facto a legal duty on all schools both to display the flag and to sing the hymn during school ceremonies.<sup>14</sup> In 2001 and then 2005, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) approved a set of changes in middle school history textbooks that diminished the presentation of Japan’s wartime aggression. Although the textbook, compiled by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukuru Kai) and published by Fuso, is used by less than 1 percent of junior high students, it has aroused significant controversy both within Japan and abroad. In March 2003, the Central Council of Education submitted a report to MEXT recommending the amendment of the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education to restore “the ability of the home to educate children,” “respect for tradition and culture, and a sense of love and respect of the country and home and internationalism.”<sup>15</sup> Between December 2003 and September 2004, MEXT planted people in five town meetings to present government-authored statements supporting the bill to revise the education law.<sup>16</sup> The revision became a top priority for the new prime minister, Abe Shinzo, and it was passed in November 2006 despite popular protests. The most controversial clause pertains to the nurturing of patriotism as a goal of education. Many also fear that Article 16 of the bill (“free from subjection to unfair control, the administration of education must be conducted in accordance with this law and other education-related laws, with suitable delegation of duties and mutual cooperation between *the central*

government and local government organizations” [emphasis added]) opens the door to greater control by the state, which until now has been constrained by Article 10 of the current law (“free from subjection to unfair control, the administration of education should be conducted with responsibility vested directly in all people of the nation”).<sup>17</sup>

After September 11, 2001, the Diet passed a series of amendments and special measures that allow more flexibility for the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in emergency and war situations. In October 2001, the Special Measures Against Terrorism were enacted, allowing the SDF to use arms not only to defend themselves but also to protect those “under their care” such as refugees and wounded foreign troops. In June 2003, a set of three laws was passed, strengthening the power of the SDF in the event that Japan comes under attack. The Diet also passed the Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law to allow the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq for reconstruction efforts. Six months later, the Koizumi cabinet approved the dispatch of the SDF to southeastern Iraq, the first time in postwar history that heavily armed Japanese troops were sent to a “noncombat” area.<sup>18</sup> In June 2004, another set of seven war-contingency laws (*Yūji-hōsei*) was enacted, allowing, among other things, the U.S. military to use private land at the approval of the prime minister. A movement to revise the 1947 Japanese constitution, including Article 9, on war renunciation, is currently gathering steam within the LDP. Although the current Article 9 states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” the November 2005 draft of the LDP revised constitution puts the emphasis on Japan’s self-defense army. The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability has also put Japan’s nuclear taboo front and center in its politics. After Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s cabinet was formed, Foreign Minister Aso Taro and the LDP’s research chief Nakagawa Shoichi repeatedly argued that Japan should discuss the nuclear issue.<sup>19</sup>

The demise of the Japanese left since the early 1990s means that there is little powerful opposition to the resurgence of right-wing nationalism. In the 1993 lower-house elections, the number of seats held by the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) fell from 136 to 70, due to increasing numbers of people being attracted into new parties. The real kiss of death came in the 1996 lower-house election, when the seats of the SDPJ further decreased from 70 to 15 due to the introduction of new electoral rules that squeezed smaller parties such as the SDPJ, because of the anger of traditional socialist voters toward their

leadership in the wake of the LDP-SDPJ government of Murayama Tomiichi (1994–1996), and due to the absorption of some SDPJ members into the newly created Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) just before the election. Meanwhile, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) did well at first in 1996, increasing its Diet representation from fifteen to twenty-six as it picked up discontented SDPJ voters. But this increase proved short-lived, and the new electoral rules squeezed the JCP's presence in the 2000, 2003, and 2005 elections.

Not all concerned Japanese citizens identify with the Japanese left. But many consider nationalistic and militaristic developments at odds with the country's constitution. Japan's neighbors in Asia have also watched these trends closely. The renewed nationalism and militarism, the longstanding issues of Japan's war responsibility, and the presence of American military bases in Japanese territory, particularly in Okinawa, have revived a broad-based peace movement connected to the global antiwar protest movement. Networks such as Children and Textbooks Japan Net 21, No to Constitutional Revision! Citizens' Network, Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and the World, World Peace Now, Asia Peace Alliance, and Asia Pacific Peace Forum have developed. These new networks emphasize youth participation, new movement styles and tactics, and regional and international peace building.

### **Globalization of Human Rights Norms: Japanese Citizens and Residents Strategically Using the UN System**

The globalization of the market and the development of militarism and nationalism in Japan have been accompanied by a parallel globalization of human rights standards, or what some scholars have called "globalization from below."<sup>20</sup> A deterministic reading of the globalization of the market would have missed the emergence of global resistance. Like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, women, minorities, indigenous peoples, ecologists, peace activists, farmers, and consumers in Japan, blocked by domestic political institutions, have been claiming their rights at the level of the United Nations (UN). These substate actors practice "boomerang" politics; that is, they bypass Japanese state institutions to lobby international organizations, which then exert pressure on Japan from above.<sup>21</sup> As illustrated by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the newly adopted 2006 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with

Disabilities, Japanese NGO networks have been part and parcel of a global civil society that constructs norms around peace, human rights, and ecology.

In the past decade, many scholars have noted a boom in nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in Japan within the larger context of a worldwide “associational revolution.”<sup>22</sup> It is often argued that the Kobe earthquake and the subsequent outpouring of volunteer activities in relief work increased public interest in and government attention to the development of the third sector. Since the NPO law was enacted in 1998, more than twenty thousand organizations have obtained legal NPO status. The NPO law was revised in 2001, making donations tax deductible (when certain requirements are met) and extending the number of fields of NPO activities to seventeen: medical welfare; education; city planning; environment; disaster relief; safety; human rights protection and peace; international cooperation; gender; child health; information technology; science and technology; economic promotion; occupational training and job creation; consumer protection; advice; and science, culture, art, and sports.

The literature on Japanese civil society tends to converge on three arguments. A common position locates overwhelming power in the Japanese bureaucracy. Hence, civil society, whether in the Meiji era, the Taisho Democracy, or the postwar period, is no more than part of the state in its larger project of nationalism and developmentalism.<sup>23</sup> A second argument, often based on explicit comparisons with civil society in the United States, concludes that Japanese civil society is small and local and has a close symbiotic relationship with the state.<sup>24</sup> Finally, Japanese civil society has often been characterized as “social capital without advocacy.”<sup>25</sup> The existing literature has largely failed to notice the emergence of Japanese advocacy NGOs and networks that have mobilized around a UN human rights system of conventions and norms as early as 1975 and particularly since the 1990s.

One of the earliest NGO advocacy networks that specifically target the UN human rights system was the Liaison Group of International Women’s Year, a network of fifty-two Japanese NGOs formed to follow up on the 1975 First World Conference on Women in Mexico and lobby for Japan’s signature (in 1980) and subsequent ratification (in 1985) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).<sup>26</sup> Further, in 1986, Nikkyōso (the Japanese Teachers Union) helped form Kodomo no Jinken Ren (Federation for the Protection of Children’s Human Rights Japan), a network of more than sixty NGOs today, to lobby for Japan’s signature of



the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which it did in 1994. Since 1987, groups of Ainu, an indigenous population in Hokkaido, have been attending the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in Geneva, and they continue to lobby for adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Throughout the 1990s, many Japanese advocacy NGOs and networks were formed to focus on a wide spectrum of human rights and environmental issues. In 1991, A SEED Japan was established as part of an international youth mobilization on environment and social justice issues. It aimed to include youth voices at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Rio Earth Summit). In 1992, an NGO liaison group for the World Conference on Human Rights was founded by six Japanese human rights NGOs, including Korean resident, Buraku, women, and AIDS groups, to prepare for the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Similar to the International Women's Year Liaison Group on the CEDAW and the Federation for the Protection of Children's Human Rights Japan on the CRC, the NGO Liaison Group for the World Conference on Human Rights was the major advocacy network behind Japan's ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1995. The group has since been renamed the International Human Rights NGO Network and has become a major watchdog on Japan's obligations to international human rights conventions. In 1992, End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT) Japan was also created as part of a global network to lobby against the commercial sexual exploitation of children. At the First World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, held in Stockholm in 1996, the Japanese government was heavily criticized for its inattention to child prostitution and pornography. Largely as a result of the lobbying of ECPAT Japan, Japan passed the Child Prostitution and Pornography Prohibition Law in 1999.<sup>27</sup> In 1992, the Japan Citizens' Coalition for the UN International Decade of the World's Indigenous People was formed. Then, in 1994, Japan's Network for Women and Health was founded by eleven feminist scholars, activists, and politicians. It became a national network of more than forty NGOs that attended the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and continues to lobby for women's reproductive rights in Japan. After a long debate, Japan finally legalized the birth control pill for women in 1999, largely as a result of mobilization by this feminist network.<sup>28</sup>

The rest of the decade saw the rise of advocacy NGOs and networks working on a variety of global issues: military sexual slavery (Violence Against Women in War—Network Japan); the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Japan ratified in 1996 (Center for Prisoners' Rights, Japan); the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kiko Forum) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines) in 1997; the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan, a network of eighty-seven NGOs formed in 1997); and the International Criminal Court in 1998 (Japan Network for the International Criminal Court). The trend continues in the new millennium. The Beijing-Plus-Five Alternative Report Group, a coalition of fifty-two NGOs, including several networks addressing issues of environment, minorities, disabilities, and migrants, was formed to attend the UN Beijing-Plus-Five Conference on women in 2000. Similarly, Durban 2001 Japan, an NGO coalition of minority rights groups, was established to lobby at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban.<sup>29</sup> In 2003, when CEDAW reviewed Japan's Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports, forty-three women's groups came together to form the Japan NGO Network for CEDAW (JNNC). In December of the same year, the Japan Network Against Trafficking in Persons (JNATIP) was also created to lobby for Japan's ratification of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which supplemented the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Table 1 summarizes the development of Japanese alterglobalization, antiwar, and antidiscrimination NGO networks in the past three decades.

### **Performativity and Conversability: A Postmodern Conception of Global Citizenship**

The large body of literature on globalization, as some critics charge, is "almost entirely based on statements raised occasionally almost to the status of axioms about the way in which citizens are reacting to the processes which are taking place. It seems to believe that citizens—and even states—have no alternative but to accept globalization as a fact."<sup>30</sup> Despite groundbreaking work by multiculturalists such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka as well as feminists such as Iris Marion Young and Nira Yuval-Davis that shifts the focus of citizenship theories from equality or equal rights to difference or access to minor-

ity rights, most of this research surprisingly remains national.<sup>31</sup> Studies that attempt to formulate a theory of postnational citizenship remain nonetheless confined to the predominant national juridical framework; that is, for example, how migrant workers may be granted minimal human rights by their host countries but nonetheless be treated as noncitizens,<sup>32</sup> or how transnational elites strategically and flexibly exploit multiple national citizenships.<sup>33</sup>

In the past decade, two bodies of citizenship research that emphasize cosmopolitan and postmodern approaches have emerged. The first, led by political theorists, focuses on an expanded continuum of political responsibility tied to membership in the human race and planet. Heater, for example, defines world citizenship as citizenship that “embraces the need for some effective form(s) of supra-national political authority and for political action beyond the nation-state.”<sup>34</sup> Held argues for a model of multiple cosmopolitan citizenships in which people would have access to a variety of political engagement on a continuum from the local to the global.<sup>35</sup> The second approach, a product of a cultural turn within social movement studies, emphasizes how social movement practices produce new cultural identity.<sup>36</sup> According to Melluci, “collective identity is an interactive, shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) . . . that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals (or groups) [to the movement].”<sup>37</sup> Castells argues that citizens are actors within networks and social movements with the traditional concept of national society playing a decreasing role in shaping identity.<sup>38</sup>

This book links political and social movement theories on global citizenship to the field of Japanese studies. Scholars on Japanese citizenship have noted a conceptual shift away from the cultural margins toward redefining Japanese national identity as “more accepting of heterogeneity, diversity, and hybridity.”<sup>39</sup> They point to a “citizenship gap” between the predominant state narrative of a homogenous Japan on the one hand and the historical making of modern Japan as well as the contemporary realities of migration on the other.<sup>40,41</sup> For example, despite the fact that many second- and third-generation Korean residents were born in Japan and, in many cases, speak only Japanese, they continue to be treated as permanent residents, unable to exercise basic citizenship rights. Ainu and Okinawans, while having Japanese citizenship, are denied their status as indigenous peoples of Japan. Meanwhile, the Buraku, despite their Japanese nationality, are treated as second-class citizens.<sup>42</sup> In his 2006 Mission to Japan report, Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on

**TABLE I.** Development of Japanese Nongovernmental Advocacy Networks  
1975–2005

<i>Year</i>	<i>Japanese Nongovernmental Group or Network (Number of Organizational Members)</i>	<i>Trigger (UN Conference, Convention, Decade, Year, or Report; Other Summit; or Local Event) (Year)</i>	<i>Targeted Treaty, Conference, or Organization (Year Ratified by Japan); Domestic Legislation; or Other Actions</i>
1975	Liaison Group of International Women's Year (52)	International Women's Year (1975)	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1985)
1982	Soshiren	Revision of the Eugenic Protection Law (1982)	Stopped revision of the Eugenic Protection Law
1986	Federation for the Protection of Children's Human Rights, Japan (60)	Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1990)	CRC (1994)
1987	Japanese Association of International Women's Rights	CEDAW (1979)	CEDAW (1985)
1987	Ainu Association of Hokkaido and Shimin Gaikō Centre began attending Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP)	WGIP (1982)	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
1991	A SEED Japan; People's Forum 2001	UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992)	Agenda 21; Rio+10
1992	Japanese Citizens' Coalition for the UN International Year of the World's Indigenous People (IYWIP)	IYWIP (1993)	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
1992	NGO Liaison Group for the World Conference on Human Rights (WCHR)/International Human Rights NGO Network (15)	WCHR (1993)	Extensive review of the UN human rights system, including establishment of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
1992	End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT) Japan	First World Congress on Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (1996)	Child Prostitution and Pornography Prohibition Law (1999)
1993	Japan Citizens' Coalition for International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (IDWIP) and Ainu Association of Hokkaido and Shimin Gaikō Centre began attending Working Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD) on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples	IDWIP and WGDD (1995)	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (in negotiation)
1994	Japan Network for Women and Health (40)	International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) (1994)	ICPD; legalization of the birth control pill for women (1999)
1995	Association to Call for the Ratification of the Convention Against Torture (CAT)	CAT (1984)	CAT (1999)
1995	Japan NGO Forum for Social Development	World Summit on Social Development (1995)	Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action
1995	Beijing Japan Accountability Caucus	Fourth World Conference on Women (1995)	Beijing Platform for Action

1995	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Monitor NGO Network (AM-Net)	APEC Meeting in Osaka (1995)	APEC and World Trade Organization (WTO)
1996	Japan NGO Forum for Habitat	Second UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) (1996)	Habitat Agenda
1996	Kikō Forum	Kyoto Protocol (1997)	Kyoto Protocol (2002)
1997	Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (50)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997)	Landmine Ban (1998)
1997	Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (87)	Convention on the Rights of Migrants (2003)	Convention on the Rights of Migrants
1998	Violence Against Women in War Network—Japan	Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (1994)	[UN human rights system does not deal with past military sexual slavery]
1998	Japan Network for the International Criminal Court (ICC)	ICC (1998)	Statute of the ICC
1999	No to Constitutional Revision! Citizens' Network	Movement to revise the Constitution (1999)	To stop Article 9 revision
2001	Japanese NGO Coalition on HIV/AIDS	International Conference on HIV/AIDS, Durban, South Africa (2001)	Access for all
2001	Durban 2001 Japan (12)	World Conference Against Racism	International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
2002	Ainu Association of Hokkaido, Association of Indigenous Persons in the Ryūkyūs, and Shimin Gaikō Centre began attending the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFI)	PFI (2002)	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
2003	Beijing-Plus-Five Alternative Report Group (52)	Beijing-Plus-Five Conference (2000)	Beijing Platform for Action and CEDAW
2003	Japan Network Against Trafficking in Persons (25)	Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons (2002)	Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons (not yet ratified by Japan)
2003	World Peace Now (42)	War in Iraq (2003)	Stop war in Iraq and end dispatch of Self-Defense Forces
2003	Japan NGO Network for CEDAW (43)	CEDAW Review of Japan's 4th and 5th Periodic Reports (2003)	CEDAW
2004	Refugee Council Japan (10)	Convention on Refugees (1951)	Convention on Refugees (1981)
2004	World Social Forum (WSP) Japan listserv	Fourth World Social Forum (2004)	WTO
2004	Japan Disability Forum	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2004)	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)
2005	Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Campaign Japan Network	MDG (2000)	MDG

contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, highlights three circles of discriminated groups: the national minorities—the Buraku people, the Ainu, and the people of Okinawa; the people and descendants of former Japanese colonies—Koreans and Chinese; and foreigners and migrants from other Asian countries and from the rest of the world. Diène discusses the historical, cultural, social, economic, and political nature of the discrimination and concludes that “the national minorities are invisible in state institutions.”<sup>43</sup> Women in Japan—particularly, Buraku, Korean, Ainu, and Okinawan women as well as non-Japanese women married to Japanese men—continue to struggle for their citizenship rights in health, education, employment, public office, and so on.<sup>44</sup> People living with HIV / AIDS—in particular, illegal migrants who do not have access to national medical insurance—demand their basic right to accessible AIDS treatment. In the context of agricultural liberalization, corporate restructuring, and militarism, consumers lobby for their right to food self-sufficiency and safety, and workers claim their basic right to decent work and livelihood. In the post–September 11 context, regular citizens claim their right to peace and physical security.

The research presented in this book builds on this new body of citizenship theorizing in Japan but adds two important dimensions: it focuses first on *global* citizenship and then on global citizenship *education*. I argue that the predominant sovereign conception of citizenship has been increasingly challenged not only by racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities, but also by anyone on the economic, social, political, and cultural margins who takes issue with the metanarratives of the state and the market. A postmodern conception of citizenship emphasizes deconstruction, performativity, and conversability.<sup>45</sup> Examining Japanese citizenship in a postmodern way requires first and foremost deconstructing or undoing the claim by the Japanese state to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying sovereignty and citizenship over others. A postmodern approach does not end with the deconstruction of the networks of power behind existing metanarratives. It is centered on the production of alternatives, performed in the daily acts of activism. Citizenship in this light “is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification.”<sup>46</sup> When activists participate at the World Social Forums and the local Kyoto Social Forum, they “perform” their citizenship through both a critique of the neoliberal, nationalistic, and mili-

taristic ideologies of the Japanese state and the construction of alternatives based on perspectives on people's security, community development, peace, sustainable development, ecology, and slow life.

Critics of postmodernism often point to the danger of a permanent slippery slope of cultural relativism. What is the political project of postmodernism if all we have is narratives? A postmodern conception of citizenship also emphasizes conversability, that is, a multiplicity of narrative knowledges that exist in webs of dialogue. As Benhabib argues,

In deliberative democracy, as distinguished from political liberalism, the official public sphere of representative institutions, which includes the legislature, executive and public bureaucracies, the judiciary, and political parties, is not the only site of political contestation and of opinion and will formation. Deliberative democracy focuses on social movements, and on the civil, cultural, religious, artistic, and political associations of the unofficial public sphere, as well. The public sphere is composed of the anonymous and interlocking conversation and contestation resulting from the activities of these various groups.<sup>47</sup>

The narratives in this book have emerged out of many cross-border conversations. According to Rorty, "narrative means telling a story about something . . . in which you can place your own story," to give sense to your existence and partake in ongoing dialogues.<sup>48</sup> A postmodern approach to citizenship and democracy insistently asks "whether there are new ways of describing and re-describing the world that better serve our variety of goals, with the understanding that 'hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation lasts.'"<sup>49</sup> These narratives not only become new bodies of knowledge, but also constitute new subjectivities, redefining "who we are, how we view the world, how we interact with each other."<sup>50</sup> Recognizing and providing space for the "right to narrate," to "tell stories that will bind us together," is a central task in global citizenship education.<sup>51</sup> Through the narratives of activists belonging to fifty networks, this book explores how new social movements in Japan construct a new identity of the Japanese as global citizens.

### Methodology

Social movement and international relations scholars have been, in the words of Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, "myopically domestic" and "myopically state-centric."<sup>52</sup> On the one hand, studies of global civil society continue to be constrained by "methodological nationalism" that has prevented us from

grasping the complexity and significance of the multifaceted and multi-leveled phenomenon of grassroots globalism.<sup>53</sup> On the other hand, studies of Japanese civil society continue to be framed largely in a national context and, in particular, to focus on its limited impact on the Japanese state. This book attempts to go beyond a domestic and state-centric approach to look at the connections between the global justice, antiwar, and antidiscrimination movements and civil society in Japan. Like others who have privileged the “voiceless voices” within Japanese social movements,<sup>54</sup> I employ the method of writing “marginal experience narratives.”<sup>55</sup> The narratives in this volume represent counterdiscourses to state and media metanarratives. The aim of marginal-experience narratives is to grasp how activism is lived and how in turn participation in grassroots globalism contributes to the construction of new ideas and subjectivities, and an alternative Japan.

The findings in this book are based on fifty semistructured interviews with members of Japanese nongovernmental networks, including labor unions, in the alterglobalization, antiwar, and antidiscrimination movements in Japan. Scholars from a wide range of disciplines have increasingly turned to interviews as a powerful academic tool. According to Mendieta, the fundamental inspiration of interviews is public dialogue and public debate:

The interview is invariably conducted by a servant of open discussion and its audience is a broad public. Its role is not just to translate an arcane or potentially obtuse area of research. Its role is to register the zeitgeist and to instigate public debate. The interview is a barometer of the cultural life of a discipline and a nation. By agreeing to be interviewed the interviewee agrees to step outside his other role as an expert and to speak as a citizen, outside an official role.<sup>56</sup>

I conducted these interviews, which lasted between one and a half to four hours each, in Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, and San Francisco between November 2004 and September 2005. Interview questions clustered around (1) personal background; (2) founding and activities of an NGO or network; (3) relationships with the government, other NGOs, and international organizations; and (4) issues, concerns, and challenges. The groups were carefully chosen to allow comparisons across time, issue, size, gender, race, and youth representation, and the degree of national, regional, and international networking. With the exception of five groups that can be considered local chapters of international networks, in which international linkages are expected (A SEED Japan, ATTAC Kyoto, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Disabled Peoples' Interna-



tional, and Japan Civil Liberties Union), the focus of this book is homegrown advocacy networks.<sup>57</sup> The interview data are further supplemented by primary research materials and by my participant observation at local peace parades in Tokyo and Okinawa, as well as at fourteen international conferences and summits between 2000 and 2005 where Japanese NGO networks were present: the Asia-Pacific Symposium on Trafficking in Persons, organized by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, January 2000; the UN Beijing-Plus-Five Conference, New York, June 2000; the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, Tokyo, December 2000; the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, Durban, South Africa, September 2001; the Second World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, organized by ECPAT and UNICEF, Yokohama, December 2001; the Anti-G8 Summit, Evian, France, June 2003; the Anti-World Trade Organization meeting, Cancun, Mexico, September 2003; the World Social Forum, Mumbai, India, January 2004; the Kyoto Social Forum, Kyoto, November 2004; the International Symposium on Diaspora and Art, Tokyo, November 2004; the Women's World Congress, Seoul, June 2005; the Seventh International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, Kobe, July 2005; Aichi Expo 2005, Nagoya, July 2005; and finally, the fifth WTO ministerial meeting, Hong Kong, December 2005. The interview data are organized around eight overlapping issue areas: global governance, labor, food sovereignty, peace, HIV / AIDS, gender, minority and human rights, and youth. Five recurrent themes from the interviews are identified: (1) activism, the genesis of advocacy NGO networks, and their relationships with new social movements; (2) the critiques of and alternatives to neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism; (3) global, regional, and national networking; (4) NGOs, NPOs, and government partnerships; and (5) the educational components of activism.

Before I continue, let me provide some definitions and state my caveats. The title of this book, *Another Japan Is Possible*, reflects the slogan and frame of mind of some of the alterglobalization activists in Japan, who are part of a larger global justice movement worldwide that rallies around the belief that another world *is* possible. In this book, I use *alternative globalization movement* and *global justice movement* interchangeably. I have avoided the common usage of *antiglobalization movement* because the movement is not against globalization per se. It aims at alternative models of globalization based on transparency, democracy, and participation. The "new" in the new social movements being

discussed refers not only to the age of these networks (thirty-five out of the fifty groups have been created in the decade since 1995); the networks in this book constitute new social movements as they go beyond the politics of the traditional left (represented by the Japan Communist Party and Social Democratic Party of Japan) and the “New Left,” often a negative label on splinter groups of the Japanese Communist Party after it abandoned its avowed platform of violent revolution in 1955. Besides going beyond a class focus, these social movements are also new in their ways of exploring new movement tactics. Several activists have pointed out the need to innovate, to be “colorful,” and to be “fresh, cool, and natural” in order to be effective and to attract the younger generations (see Chapters 18 and 48).

In the ensuing analysis, *advocacy* means not only the process of using information strategically to change policies, but also the strengthening of structures that foster the empowerment of the disadvantaged. Finally, this book focuses on a specific subset of groups—internationally linked advocacy NGOs—within Japanese civil society and does not argue that they are representative of the entire Japanese civil society or consequential in Japanese politics. The aim of this book is to introduce Japanese new social movements with their perspectives. It will be the scope of a separate study to examine these groups’ claims from the perspectives of other actors. The narratives presented here provide a snapshot not only of Japanese civil society as it is experienced by various activists, or of the issues these activists represent within their larger sociopolitical background, but also of the nature of democratic participation in these activists’ quest for an alternative Japan and world.

### Analytical Overview

I conclude this introductory chapter by providing an analytical overview of the fifty interviews contained in this volume according to four themes: (1) activism and advocacy; (2) critiques of and alternatives to neoliberalism, militarism, and nationalism; (3) NGO-government partnerships; and (4) global, regional, and national networking.

#### *Activism, Advocacy, and Social Movements*

The backgrounds of the activists are as diverse as the issues they represent. Some grew up in an activist family environment in which their parents or even grandparents were involved in the local Buraku, Ainu, and Okinawan movements or in peace struggles in general (Mori, Chapter 37; Sakai Mina,

Chapter 39; Taira, Chapter 40; and Hirayama, Chapter 17). Others are more products of their own times, the eras of the vibrant student, antiwar, and women's movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s (Sakai Kazuko, Chapter 9; Ohno, Chapter 13; Ōhashi, Chapter 30; and Wakabayashi, Chapter 31). Some dropped out of college or took time off to pursue activities that led to their eventual activism (Sakuma, Chapter 2; Yoshioka, Chapter 47; and Takahashi Kenkichi, Chapter 50) while others narrate a coming of age, an "epiphany" after a mainstream educational or professional background (Hara, Chapter 29; and Morihara, Chapter 36). Many of these "cosmopolitan *bricoleurs* of resistance" seem to share two characteristics: they experience internationalism and world conference participation as catalytic events.<sup>58</sup> For several activists, their living, working, or experiences traveling abroad directly led to their consciousness of a particular issue, whether related to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, to lesbianism, or to development and education in Cambodia (Sakuma, Chapter 2; Wakabayashi, Chapter 31; and Takahashi Kenkichi, Chapter 50). In four instances, graduate studies or research in human rights, development, and sexuality in Europe and North America seems to have played a key role in the person's activism (Takahashi Kiyotaka, Chapter 6; Nakamura, Chapter 23; Hara, Chapter 29; and Hyōdō, Chapter 26). In addition, several activists suggested that their participation in world conferences was catalytic for their activism (Morihara at the UN Conference on Human Settlements, Istanbul, 1996, Chapter 36; Higashizawa at the Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court, 1998, Chapter 21; and Mitsumoto at the World Conference on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002, Chapter 48).

The activists interviewed for this book occupy various positions in non-governmental groups and networks—founder, paid staff member, volunteer, secretariat, board member, coordinator, former executive director, and so on. In the brief space of these interviews, it is difficult to discern, much less generalize, how these people live their lives as activists. However, a generalized problem of lack of funding shapes the day-to-day functioning of their organizations. Almost one-third (seventeen out of fifty) of the groups have no paid staff members. Twenty-two have between one to ten staff members; six have between ten and fifty; and only four well-established labor unions and NGOs (RENGO, Nikkyōso, Japan International Volunteer Center, and Peace Boat) have more than fifty paid staff members. The problem of chronic underfunding is best summarized by Nakamura Keiko of Peace Depot. Despite her research position, 80 percent of her time is spent on administrative tasks. An advocacy

NGO activist in Japan is typically a secretariat, fundraiser, campaign manager, coalition builder, lobbyist, and researcher all in one, while in some cases also holding a full-time job. The scarcity of paid NGO positions and the low wages paid for such positions help to shape a sort of “hourglass” structure in NGO employment, that is, a concentration of the above sixties (retirees) and below thirties (students or young singles who can afford a low income), leaving a gap in the middle age range. As Nakamura Keiko points out, this funding issue has great implications for gender participation. A man in his thirties or forties with a family to support simply cannot afford to work for an NGO in Japan.

**TABLE 2.** Historical Periodization of Japanese Advocacy NGOs

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*Before 1945: Taisho Democracy and Total War*

1922

First nationwide organization of the Burakumin was founded in 1922 as Zenkoku-Suiheisha (National Levellers Association).

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*1945–1990: AMPO and Internationalism*

1969

Publication of *AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review* led to subsequent creation of the Pacific Asia Resource Center in 1982.

1980

Japan International Volunteer Center was formed after Japanese activists rushed to Thailand to help solve the Indochina refugee crisis.

1982

Shimin Gaikō Centre was created to support the Second UN Special Session for Disarmament. Soshiren was founded to halt the movement to revise the 1948 Eugenic Protection Law.

1983

Peace Boat was created by university student activists.

1986

Disabled Peoples' International Japan was formed as the Japan chapter of DPI, created in 1981 at the occasion of the International Year of Disabled Persons.

1988

International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism was established in Tokyo.

1990

Japan AIDS and Society Association was created in the midst of the blood contamination scandal.

Forum 90 was formed to network for Japan's ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at abolition of the death penalty.

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*1991–2000: Global Human Rights*

1991

Mirine was created after the coming out of the first Korean “comfort woman,” Kim Hak-sun.

A SEED Japan was formed as part of an international youth movement to mobilize at the Earth Summit in Rio.

1992

Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society was formed after the Earth Summit in Rio as a part of a national network to monitor Agenda 21.

International Human Rights NGO Network was formed to lobby at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.

Issho Kikaku was formed in the context of enlarging foreign resident communities in Japan.

1994

Africa-Japan Forum was formed after the First Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 1993.

Shinjuku Homeless Support Center was established.

Food Action 21 was created when the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas, established in 1961, was amended in response to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture.