

## The Problem of Proliferation

In the hard-fought and often divisive United States presidential campaign of 2004, rivals George W. Bush and John F. Kerry found precious little common ground, particularly in the arena of foreign policy. However, in the midst of a televised debate, the two candidates nonetheless discovered a point upon which they agreed; both men argued forcefully that the global proliferation of nuclear weapons currently poses the gravest of all threats to U.S. security.<sup>1</sup> Bush and Kerry were not alone in their views regarding proliferation's dangers. They echoed a chorus of other leading voices in the world community, which have characterized the spread of nuclear weapons as one of the foremost global security challenges of our time. As International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei put it, "If the world does not change course" to prevent continued nuclear weapons proliferation, "we risk self-destruction."<sup>2</sup>

Despite such widespread concern, our understanding of nuclear proliferation's impact on the international security environment is limited. Predictions regarding nuclear proliferation's effects are based largely upon analyses of American and Soviet behavior during the Cold War, which may not apply to future nuclear rivalries elsewhere in the world. The spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia, where India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, therefore offers us an important opportunity for study. The Indo-Pakistani security competition has been bitter and enduring, with the two sides fighting four wars since independence in 1947 and waging a low-intensity conflict in the disputed territory of Kashmir since the late 1980s. The introduction of

nuclear weapons into this antagonistic relationship enables us to investigate a number of important questions in a political and historical context different from that of the Cold War: Does nuclear proliferation cause ongoing security competitions to diminish or to intensify? Why does proliferation have these effects? And do these findings support or contradict the theories of nuclear deterrence that we derived from the U.S.-Soviet rivalry?

This book addresses these issues. Its findings are sobering, both as we assess the South Asian security environment and as we contemplate the possibility of future cases of nuclear proliferation. The study finds that nuclear weapons have significantly destabilized the subcontinent, due primarily to India's and Pakistan's territorial preferences and relative military capabilities. Specifically, proliferation has created strong incentives for conventional aggression by Pakistan because Pakistan is conventionally weak relative to India and is dissatisfied with the territorial status quo in Kashmir, the key issue of Indo-Pakistani contention. Aggressive Pakistani behavior has in turn triggered forceful Indian responses, which have further destabilized the subcontinent. Thus, this study finds that nuclear weapons have not only failed to prevent subnuclear conflict in South Asia, but they have actually made such conflict more likely.

### Nuclear Proliferation: Background

Although nuclear weapons proliferation is a major subject of current international concern, the problem is by no means novel. Almost as soon as the United States acquired a nuclear capability, the U.S. government began to fear that its primary rival in the emerging Cold War would develop the weapons as well. The U.S. nuclear monopoly was the key to its military and diplomatic policy in the late 1940s. Militarily, atomic weapons enabled the United States to deter the Soviet Union from launching a conventional military attack on Western Europe. Diplomatically, the weapons gave the United States the confidence to pursue an assertive foreign policy without fear of a diplomatic crisis escalating to an armed confrontation with the Soviets.<sup>3</sup> Although U.S. officials knew for some time before its 1949 atomic test that the Soviet Union would soon possess the bomb, the Soviets' eventual acquisition of a nuclear capability was jarring and called into question the fundamental assumptions underpinning American foreign policy. Dean Rusk believed that, "U.S. strategic plans now had to be reexamined. Indeed, the nation's entire foreign policy posture required a reappraisal."<sup>4</sup>

The Soviets' acquisition of nuclear weapons did reduce American military and diplomatic leverage over the Soviet Union, but it did not ultimately result in a Soviet invasion of Western Europe or in the escalation of U.S.-Soviet

diplomatic crises to the level of military confrontation. Nor did the subsequent nuclearization of Great Britain, France, and China during the 1950s and 1960s end in military or diplomatic disaster. Nonetheless, the United States and the other nuclear states were deeply concerned regarding the dangers of proliferation beyond their small group. They therefore sought to create an international nonproliferation regime to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons. The bedrock of this regime was the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Predicated on the belief that "the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war," the treaty required nonnuclear states not to receive, manufacture, or seek assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.<sup>5</sup>

Over the coming decades, some countries that had seriously considered pursuing a nuclear capability ultimately decided not to do so.<sup>6</sup> Other states that had actually succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons capacities subsequently decided to dismantle them and accede to the nonproliferation regime.<sup>7</sup> By 2000, a total of 187 states had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A handful of other states, however, had steadfastly refused to foreclose the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan were among this group reserving the right to develop a nuclear capacity, and by the 1980s, they had become the subject of intense international concern.<sup>8</sup> The international community found the possibility of Indo-Pakistani proliferation particularly worrisome because of the two countries' violent history. Independent India and Pakistan had been born out of a bloody partition of British India in 1947, which saw the deaths of between 500,000 and 1 million people and the resettlement of 10 to 12 million.<sup>9</sup> Since then, the countries had fought three wars, two of them over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Although the Kashmir issue had appeared to subside during the 1970s and the early 1980s, by 1989 it was once again a major source of tension, with a Pakistan-backed insurgency wracking Indian Kashmir, and India flooding the territory with hundreds of thousands of security forces in an attempt to crush the uprising. Thus, many feared that if India and Pakistan in fact acquired a nuclear weapons capability, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict in South Asia would be considerable. CIA Director James Woolsey, for example, argued in 1993 that "mutual Indian and Pakistani suspicions have fueled a nuclear arms race, increased the risk of conflict, and gravely increased the cost of war, if it should occur . . . The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons."<sup>10</sup>

India's and Pakistan's nuclear programs dated back to their first decade of independence. Although the Indian government had established a Department

of Atomic Research in 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had publicly opposed the development of nuclear weapons. However, in the wake of their devastating loss in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and of China's 1964 nuclear test, the Indians began to reconsider their position. After Chinese threats to open a second front during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, unsuccessful attempts to secure a nuclear guarantee from the existing nuclear powers, and much internal debate, India abandoned its earlier antinuclear position. Choosing explicitly to keep its options open, it refused to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, anxious to augment India's enhanced regional position in the wake of the Bangladesh War and to improve her domestic political fortunes, subsequently authorized India's first nuclear test, which took the form of a fifteen-kiloton "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) on May 18, 1974.<sup>11</sup>

Pakistan's nuclear research program began in 1957 with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistan's nuclear efforts remained peacefully oriented through the mid-1960s with the country's leaders convinced that its conventional capabilities were sufficient to handle the Indian threat. This attitude began to change with Pakistan's failure to prevail in its 1965 war with India, the American decision to cut off the flow of U.S. arms to Pakistan in retaliation for that conflict, and growing evidence of India's conventional superiority. Pakistan refused to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. Then in 1972, after its crushing loss to India in the Bangladesh War, Pakistan began a full-fledged quest to develop a nuclear weapons capacity.<sup>12</sup>

India and Pakistan rejected the nuclear nonproliferation regime on both philosophical and strategic grounds. First, they believed that the regime created a world of inequality in which the existing nuclear powers enjoyed the political and military benefits that came with possession of the ultimate weapon, while other states had to reconcile themselves to second-class status. This double standard was particularly repugnant given India's and Pakistan's colonial history. Second, the nonproliferation regime failed to recognize the legitimate security concerns of nonnuclear states. Many nonnuclear countries were located in extremely dangerous regions and sorely needed nuclear weapons' deterrent effects to ensure their survival. Thus, in the Indian and Pakistani view, the nuclear nonproliferation regime was morally bankrupt and strategically unsound. As Indian Senior Advisor on Defense and Foreign Affairs Jaswant Singh argued,

The first 50 years of Indian independence reveal that the country's moralistic nuclear policy and restraint paid no measurable dividends, except resentment that India was being discriminated against . . . If the permanent five continue to employ

nuclear weapons as an international currency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its own state power and national security? Why admonish India . . . for not falling in line behind a new international agenda of discriminatory nonproliferation . . . Nuclear weapons powers continue to have, but preach to the have-nots to have even less.<sup>13</sup>

The Pakistani government maintained that “peace and security in South Asia cannot be promoted and sustained on the basis of discrimination and double standards. Those who advocate non-proliferation and disarmament must themselves be seen to practice this.”<sup>14</sup> “We will not accept commitments which would permanently jeopardise the ability of Pakistan to deter the nuclear and conventional threats which India poses to our security.”<sup>15</sup>

As their nuclear programs progressed, and particularly as India and Pakistan approached a de facto nuclear weapons capability during the 1980s,<sup>16</sup> there was much speculation as to whether the two countries would actually exercise their nuclear options and achieve an overt capacity.<sup>17</sup> Analysts worried that continuing Indo-Pakistani tensions were in fact likely to lead to such an outcome. As Leonard Spector argued, “If current trends persist . . . there is reasonable cause for concern that momentum will build for integrating nuclear armaments into the armed forces of both nations and for conducting tests.”<sup>18</sup> Speculation on the subject continued during the 1990s after India and Pakistan had crossed the de facto nuclear threshold. Leading scholarly analysis during this period was extremely sanguine regarding the unlikelyhood of overt Indo-Pakistani nuclearization. Devin Hagerty, for example, confidently predicted that India and Pakistan would almost certainly not seek to develop an overt nuclear capacity but rather would continue to maintain an “opaque” capability.<sup>19</sup>

The events of spring 1998 put this discussion to rest. On May 11 and 13, 1998, India carried out a total of five nuclear explosions at Pokhran in the Rajasthan Desert. Despite intense international pressure not to respond, Pakistan followed on May 28 and 30 with a total of six nuclear detonations of its own in the Chegai Hills. There was some controversy as to the magnitude of the explosions. The Indian government claimed to have detonated a thermonuclear device of 43 kilotons, a fission device of 12 kilotons, a 0.2 kiloton device on May 11, and devices of 0.2 and 0.6 kilotons on May 13. However, Western analysts were skeptical as to the size of the May 11 explosions and doubted whether the May 13 tests had even occurred. One leading American seismologist put the size of the May 11 detonations at a total of ten to fifteen kilotons.<sup>20</sup> The Pakistanis, for their part, claimed that their five devices tested on May 28 totaled forty to forty-five kilotons and put the largest of these devices at thirty to thirty-five kilotons. American analysts estimated the total yield of the Paki-

stani tests to be in the range of nine to twelve kilotons.<sup>21</sup> Despite this controversy, however, the incontrovertible fact was that India and Pakistan were now both nuclear weapons-capable states and possessed the ability to inflict enormous levels of destruction upon one another.<sup>22</sup>

### The Question

This study seeks to determine the effects that India's and Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons has had on the South Asian security environment. It focuses specifically on proliferation's impact on conventional military stability in the region.<sup>23</sup> Clearly, nuclear proliferation has not led to nuclear war in South Asia. Less obvious, however, are nuclear proliferation's conventional effects. The issue of conventional stability is important both because conventional conflict can itself be extremely costly and because conventional conflict between nuclear powers can potentially escalate to the nuclear level.<sup>24</sup> Thus, if nuclear proliferation has undermined South Asian conventional stability, it has rendered the region considerably less safe.<sup>25</sup> If, by contrast, proliferation has enhanced South Asian conventional stability, the nuclearization of South Asia has substantially increased regional security. Nuclear weapons' impact on South Asian security in turn will have implications for broader academic debates over the effects of nuclear proliferation and for American security policy, which assumes that the spread of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world is extremely destabilizing and dangerous.<sup>26</sup> This study therefore asks the following question: What impact has nuclear proliferation had on conventional military stability in South Asia?<sup>27</sup>

Unfortunately, despite intense debate, neither the policy nor the scholarly communities have been able to shed much light on this question. As I demonstrate, South Asian proliferation has left both policymakers and scholars mired in a seemingly intractable debate over nuclear weapons' effects on the region.

### The Debate over Proliferation's Effects on South Asian Security

#### *The Policy Community*

Indian and Pakistani policymakers have argued that the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia would stabilize regional security. "If deterrence works in the West . . . by what reasoning will it not work in India?" asked Jaswant Singh. "If the permanent five's possession of nuclear weapons increases security, why would India's possession of nuclear weapons be dangerous?"<sup>28</sup> Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad argued, "In South Asia, nuclear deterrence may . . . usher in an era of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing

the requisite incentives for resolving all outstanding issues, especially Jammu and Kashmir.”<sup>29</sup>

The international community, by contrast, has long believed that proliferation would make South Asia less secure, and it reacted with considerable alarm to the 1998 Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests. For example, the United Nations Security Council, stating that “the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” demanded that “India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests.” In addition, it called on them “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons” and urged the two countries “to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.”<sup>30</sup>

Western governments have echoed these concerns, arguing that nuclear weapons made South Asia more dangerous and slapping economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan in retaliation for the 1998 tests.<sup>31</sup> “The path that [India and Pakistan] have started down does not add to their security but diminishes it,” said Bill Richardson, U.S. representative to the United Nations in June 1998. “We call upon them to turn back now.”<sup>32</sup> U.S. President Bill Clinton argued that nuclear weapons “can only serve to increase tensions in an already volatile region. With their recent tests, Pakistan and India are contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation that does not add to the security of either country.”<sup>33</sup> Clinton later famously remarked that nuclear proliferation had made South Asia “the most dangerous place in the world.”<sup>34</sup>

#### *The International Relations Literature*

The scholarly community has been similarly divided on the issue of South Asian proliferation. Just prior to the 1998 tests, scholars such as Devin Hagerty argued that India’s and Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear capability had created robust deterrence between the two countries, stabilized their relationship, and defused Indo-Pakistani militarized crises that otherwise might have ended in outright conflict.<sup>35</sup> Hagerty made extremely powerful claims as to nuclear weapons’ salutary effects, arguing that “Indo-Pakistani nuclear dynamics lend further support to our cumulative evidence that the chief impact of nuclear weapons is to deter war between their possessors. There is no more ironclad law in international relations theory than this: nuclear weapon states do not fight wars with each other.”<sup>36</sup> Indeed, according to Hagerty, nuclear weapons’

stabilizing effects were so powerful that even an undeclared nuclear capacity would continue to deter Indo-Pakistani conflict into the future, rendering open testing and proliferation unnecessary. As Hagerty argued, "nuclear weapons seem to deter war by virtue of their very existence." Therefore, given the substantial economic and political costs of open proliferation, India and Pakistan, along with "all future proliferants," will "nuclearize in an opaque manner."<sup>37</sup>

The 1998 Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests belied the prediction that all future proliferants would have such faith in nuclear weapons' deterrent effects as to forgo overt proliferation. Nonetheless, in the wake of the tests, many scholars continued to maintain that proliferation would have a highly stabilizing impact on the subcontinent. Indeed, with an overt capability now clearly threatening to make any war catastrophically costly, they argued, nuclear weapons rendered conflict in South Asia especially unlikely. As Kenneth Waltz claimed, both India and Pakistan "will be deterred [from aggression] by the knowledge that aggressive actions may lead to [their] own destruction."<sup>38</sup> According to K. Subrahmanyam, "India's nuclear capability is a stabilizing and balancing factor in a dangerous situation created by the fallout of cold war and proliferation permissiveness of major nuclear weapons powers."<sup>39</sup> Shireen Mazari argued that "nuclear deterrence [is] making an all-out war between India and Pakistan a receding reality."<sup>40</sup>

Other scholars rejected these rosy predictions, arguing that nuclear weapons in fact were likely to have destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment due to a range of political, technological, and organizational factors. Scott Sagan, for example, maintained that "India and Pakistan face a dangerous nuclear future . . . [I]mperfect humans inside imperfect organizations . . . will someday fail to produce secure nuclear deterrence."<sup>41</sup> P. R. Chari argued that South Asian proliferation undermines a "widely held, *a priori* belief . . . that nuclear weapons states do not go to war against each other."<sup>42</sup> And Samina Ahmed maintained that it is "increasingly evident that a belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons has little basis in reality."<sup>43</sup> Thus, like the policy-makers, the scholarly community has been divided over the issue of nuclear proliferation's impact on the South Asian security environment.

### The Argument

In this study, I argue that although these competing analyses of nuclear proliferation's impact on South Asia capture important truths, they do not fully explain proliferation's effects on the regional security environment. It is certainly the case that nuclear weapons can promote stability-inducing caution on the



subcontinent. For example, during the 1999 Kargil War, the fear of nuclear escalation prevented India from considering all-out conventional escalation against Pakistan.<sup>44</sup> However, as I will demonstrate, an examination of Indo-Pakistani military behavior during the proliferation process shows that as proliferation has progressed, the region has become increasingly volatile. Indeed, close analysis reveals that nuclear proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the very crises upon which nuclear weapons later had some stabilizing effect.

It is also true that, as pessimistic scholars claim, political, technological, and organizational pathologies have contributed to volatility on the subcontinent. For example, as noted earlier, repeated Pakistani aggression against India can be attributed at least in part to miscalculation stemming from dysfunctional political institutions.<sup>45</sup> The organizational biases of the Pakistan Army also underlay key mistakes that drove the decision to launch the Kargil conflict and could increase the likelihood of similar confrontations in the future.<sup>46</sup> Other factors such as close geographical proximity,<sup>47</sup> violent history and intense mutual distrust,<sup>48</sup> misunderstanding of nuclear strategy,<sup>49</sup> small nuclear arsenals,<sup>50</sup> technological shortcomings,<sup>51</sup> and personnel problems<sup>52</sup> could augment these dangers.<sup>53</sup>

However, while these problems are significant, they essentially exacerbate an already unstable situation; the fundamental incentives for risky behavior in a nuclearizing South Asia do not result from such shortcomings. Rather, they are a function of India's and Pakistan's territorial preferences and relative military capabilities. Pakistan is militarily weaker than India and is revisionist<sup>54</sup> regarding the territorial status quo in Kashmir, the source of the two countries' fundamental dispute. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by weak, revisionist Pakistan creates strong incentives for limited conventional Pakistani aggression.<sup>55</sup> This is the case for two reasons. First, Pakistani leaders believe that nuclear weapons, by deterring full-scale Indian conventional retaliation, will enable Pakistan to alter territorial boundaries in Kashmir through limited conventional military action. Second, Pakistani leaders believe that the danger of conventional hostilities escalating to the nuclear level can draw international attention, enabling Pakistan to secure outside mediation of the Kashmir dispute and to achieve a more favorable territorial settlement in Kashmir than it could have gotten by itself.

India, by contrast, is militarily strong relative to Pakistan and wishes to preserve the territorial status quo in Kashmir. The acquisition of nuclear weapons has not in itself created incentives for India to become more conventionally aggressive or to alter its military behavior in any significant manner. This is the case because India is largely satisfied with the status of Kashmir and does not seek to alter territorial boundaries. Therefore, it has little motivation to behave

aggressively, with or without nuclear weapons. In addition, because India is conventionally stronger than Pakistan, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not enable India to undertake any subnuclear aggression that it could not have launched prior to proliferation with purely conventional forces. Thus, progressing proliferation has encouraged increasingly aggressive Pakistani behavior, but nuclear weapons have not directly encouraged Indian aggression.

However, with progressing proliferation, the Indian government has engaged in more forceful anti-Pakistani behavior, both as a direct response to Pakistani provocations and in a broader effort to demonstrate that it is not intimidated by Pakistan's nuclear brinksmanship. These Indian actions have contributed to regional tension and played a significant role in further destabilizing the subcontinent. By creating incentives for aggressive Pakistani policies, then, nuclear weapons have increased militarized behavior on the Indian as well as the Pakistani side.<sup>56</sup>

A full understanding of proliferation's impact on South Asian security thus requires an appreciation not only of the structural, political, technological, and organizational pressures on states in general but also of the specific territorial preferences and military capabilities of India and Pakistan. And it leads to the broader conclusion that nuclear weapons' potential to make war catastrophically costly can also make conflict between new nuclear states more likely; the inverse relationship between nuclear danger and the probability of conventional violence, which nuclear deterrence theory has taken as an article of faith since the Cold War, does not apply to all nuclear rivalries. Thus, nuclear weapons proliferation, by introducing nuclear danger into what previously were purely conventional conflicts, may make the world a more violent place.<sup>57</sup>

### Structure and Method

In this book, I seek to demonstrate that (1) South Asia has become more volatile since acquiring nuclear weapons than it was prior to proliferation and that (2) this increasing violence resulted largely from the incentives for aggression that proliferation can create for weak, revisionist states, not from some other unidentified factor. I therefore test my argument using both quantitative analysis and the comparative case study method. This two-tiered approach enables me to identify any correlation between progressing nuclearization and conventional violence and to engage in detailed process tracing, getting "inside" the South Asian case to determine whether my causal logic actually underlies the behavior that I observe.<sup>58</sup>

First, I employ quantitative analysis to determine the nature of the relationship between nuclearization and conventional stability in South Asia during

three critical time periods from 1972 through 2002: the period from the end of India's and Pakistan's Bangladesh War through 1989; 1990 through May 1998; and June 1998 through 2002. I divide the three periods from one another according to their level of militarily relevant Indo-Pakistani nuclearization. Although by the early 1970s both countries possessed ongoing nuclear development programs, the first time period was nonnuclear. Pakistan had no nuclear capability, and although India did manage a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) in 1974, it did not achieve nuclear status in any substantive military sense. The PNE was not explicitly for military purposes and was planned and engineered in such a way as to have few military implications. Despite its test, then, India did not achieve nuclear weapons status in 1974, and both India and Pakistan remained nonnuclear weapons states from 1972 through 1989.<sup>59</sup> During the second time period, from 1990 through May 1998, India and Pakistan were *de facto* nuclear powers, not openly possessing a nuclear weapons capacity but probably able to assemble a nuclear device in short order. Then, after the May 1998 tests, both states openly possessed a military nuclear capability. The difference between the time periods that the project will cover should thus be clear: no militarily relevant nuclearization from 1972 through 1989, *de facto* military nuclearization from 1990 through May 1998, and open military nuclearization from June 1998 through 2002.<sup>60</sup> My quantitative analysis shows that a positive correlation exists between progressing nuclear proliferation across these time periods and conventional instability in South Asia.

I then seek to explain this correlation between proliferation and conventional instability through detailed case studies, which closely examine Indo-Pakistani military behavior during the three time periods just discussed. In the case studies, I process-trace, drawing on books, official documents, scholarly articles, memoirs, and press reports, as well as a series of in-depth interviews that I conducted with senior Indian and Pakistani diplomats, military officers, and political leaders.<sup>61</sup> This approach enables me to determine Indian and Pakistani leaders' beliefs and preferences regarding the territorial division of Kashmir; the two countries' relative conventional military capabilities; the ways in which these preferences and capabilities interacted with the two countries' growing nuclear capabilities; and the extent to which this interaction was actually responsible for changes in Indo-Pakistani military behavior as proliferation progressed.

The periodized nature of my study offers a number of methodological advantages. Dividing a single case into multiple time periods increases the number of observations within a study, in effect creating several cases out of one.<sup>62</sup> In addition, by looking at how behavior within one conflict dyad has changed

over time, I am able to hold other variables more or less constant and focus on the effects of nuclear proliferation on Indo-Pakistani military behavior.<sup>63</sup> Dividing the Indo-Pakistani nuclear relationship temporally, then, enables me to compare the effects of three distinct levels of nuclearization on Indo-Pakistani behavior, derive three observations from a single "case," and control for potentially confounding variables other than nuclear proliferation.

As noted earlier, the implications of this book's findings extend well beyond the South Asian region. Territorial preferences and relative conventional capabilities should affect the strategic calculations of new nuclear states regardless of their geographical location. Therefore, I also include in the book brief studies of the behavior of new nuclear powers in regions beyond South Asia. First, I examine Chinese behavior during the Sino-Soviet Ussuri River conflict of 1969 to determine what role, if any, China's acquisition of nuclear weapons played in its decision to commence hostilities against the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet case adds variance to the study, allowing me to test my argument in a region other than South Asia and to show that my findings do not result from factors peculiar to India and Pakistan. I argue that while it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding Chinese decision making during the Ussuri River conflict, available information indicates that the case is compatible with my argument. The Chinese were conventionally weaker than the Soviet Union and began seeking to alter territorial boundaries in the Ussuri River region just prior to their 1964 nuclear test. The Chinese subsequently launched a premeditated attack against Soviet forces in the area in 1969, triggering the Ussuri River conflict. The evidence shows that it is possible, though not certain, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons emboldened Chinese leaders to take such aggressive action.

Next, I examine a prospective case of proliferation using the book's theoretical framework to predict the likely behavior of a nuclear North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK). I argue that given its relative conventional weakness, the DPRK's likely behavior turns upon its territorial preferences. If North Korea is a status quo state, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is unlikely to result in conventional aggression. If, by contrast, North Korea harbors revisionist ambitions, then nuclear weapons are likely to encourage limited DPRK aggression. Finally, I briefly explore the applicability of my framework to the case of a nuclear Iran. Although these prospective discussions do not provide a test of my argument, they illustrate its utility in anticipating the actions of future proliferators in regions beyond South Asia.

The plan of the book is as follows: In Chapter 2, I present aggregate Indo-Pakistani militarized dispute data from 1972 through 2002 and employ quan-

titative tests to determine the nature and strength of the relationship between conventional conflict and progressing nuclear proliferation. In Chapter 3, I account for these quantitative findings. I explain how territorial preferences and relative military capabilities can create incentives for aggressive conventional behavior on the part of proliferating states. I then perform a detailed examination of the Indo-Pakistani military balance and discuss the two countries' territorial preferences regarding Kashmir. I show that Pakistan occupies the weak, dissatisfied position within the Indo-Pakistani conflict dyad, whereas India is strong vis-à-vis Pakistan and status quo on the issue of Kashmir. I argue that Pakistan's politico-military position within the Indo-Pakistani conflict relationship created significant incentives for aggressive Pakistani behavior. And while India's position did not create incentives for similar Indian behavior, Pakistani provocations led India to adopt increasingly forceful policies of its own. Chapter 3 concludes with a brief look at the international relations literature beyond South Asian proliferation scholarship, assessing the literature's discussion of war initiation by weak, dissatisfied states.

Chapters 4 through 6 offer detailed case studies showing how territorial preferences and relative military capabilities affected Indo-Pakistani behavior during the three proliferation time periods discussed earlier. In Chapter 4, I examine the nonnuclear period from 1972 through 1989 and explain why the absence of nuclear weapons helped to ensure that this time period remained largely peaceful. In Chapter 5, I examine the period from 1990 through May 1998, during which India and Pakistan were de facto nuclear powers, and explain how the two countries' growing nuclear capacity encouraged increasing regional instability. And in Chapter 6, I examine the period from June 1998 through 2002, during which both India and Pakistan openly possessed nuclear weapons, and explain how this overt nuclear capacity made the Indo-Pakistani security relationship even more conflictual than it had been in a de facto nuclear environment.

Chapter 7 summarizes the behavioral incentives that various combinations of the relevant political and military variables should create for new nuclear powers. It then applies this framework to cases of nuclear weapons acquisition beyond South Asia. First, I discuss the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 to determine whether my findings are compatible with the only other case of protracted combat between nuclear weapons states. I then explore my argument's implications for the future behavior of a nuclear North Korea and briefly discuss the applicability of my framework to the case of Iran. Finally, Chapter 8 offers an assessment of the theoretical and policy significance of my findings.