



Mediated Memories as a Conceptual Tool

Many people nurture a shoebox in which they store a variety of items signaling their pasts: photos, albums, letters, diaries, clippings, notes, and so forth. Add audio and video tape recordings to this collection as well as all digital counterparts of these cherished items, and you have what I call “mediated memories.” These items mediate not only remembrances of things past; they also mediate relationships between individuals and groups of any kind (such as a family, school classes, and scouting clubs), and they are made by media technologies (everything from pencils and cassette recorders to computers and digital cameras). We commonly cherish our mediated memories as a formative part of our autobiographical and cultural identities; the accumulated items typically reflect the shaping of an individual in a historical time frame. But besides their personal value, collections of mediated memories raise interesting questions about a person’s identity in a specific culture at a certain moment in time.

Putting these “shoebox” collections at the center of a theoretical and analytical inquiry, this chapter investigates two questions and one concept. First, what is *personal* cultural memory and how does it relate to collective identity and memory? We can distinguish—though not separate—the construction of autobiographical memory as it is grounded in individual psyches from the social structures and cultural conventions that inform it. Personal (re)collections are often subsumed as building blocks of collective history rather than considered in their own right. Personal *cultural* memory

emphasizes the value of items as “mediators” between individuals and collectivity, while concurrently signifying tensions between private and public. The growing importance of media technologies to the construction of personal remembrance gives rise to a second pertinent question: what exactly is the nature of memory’s mediation? Media technologies and objects, far from being external instruments for “holding” versions of the past, help constitute a sense of past—both in terms of our private lives and of history at large. Memory and media have both been referred to metaphorically as reservoirs, holding our past experiences and knowledge for future use. But neither memories nor media are passive go-betweens: their mediation intrinsically shapes the way we build up and retain a sense of individuality and community, of identity and history.

Therefore, I introduce the concept of mediated memories not only to account for the intricate connection between personal collections and collectivity but also to help theorize the *mutual shaping* of memory and media. By defining and refining this concept into an analytical tool, I hope to turn the items in our private shoeboxes into valuable objects for cultural analysis. As private collections, mediated memories form sites where the personal and the collective meet, interact, and clash; from these encounters we may derive important cultural knowledge about the construction of historical and contemporaneous selves in the course of time: How do our media tools mold our process of remembering and vice versa? How does remembrance affect the way we deploy media devices?

Personal Cultural Memory

The study of what constitutes personal memory has traditionally been the domain of neuroscientists, psychologists, and cognitive theorists. We commonly think of memory as something we have or lack; studies of memory are concerned with our ability to remember or our proclivity to forget things. The majority of studies on memory in the area of psychology deal with our cognitive abilities for recall, and out of those studies, a fair number concentrate on autobiographical or personal memory.¹ The interconnection of memory and self, psychologists state, is crucial to any human being’s development. Autobiographical memories are needed to build a notion of personhood and identity, and our minds work to create a consistent set of identity “records,” scaffolding the formation of identity

that evolves over the years. The development of an autobiographical self is partly organized under genomic and biological control, and part of it is regulated by the environment—ranging from models of individual behavior to cultural rites. Remembering is vital to our well-being, because without autobiographical memories we would have no sense of past or future, and we would lack any sense of continuity. Our image of who we are, mentally and physically, is based on long-term remembrance of facts, emotions, and experiences; that self-image is never stable but is subject to constant remodeling because our perceptions of who we are change along with our projections and desires of who we want to be. As cognitive scientists argue, the key aspect of self-growth is to balance lived past with anticipated future.² Without the capability to form autobiographical memories—a defect that could happen as a result of partial brain damage—we are basically unable to create a sense of continuity in our personhood.

Grounded in the discourses of behavioral or social psychology, memory is also central to constructing a sense of a continuity between our selves and others. American psychologist Susan Bluck contends that autobiographical memory has three main functions: to preserve a sense of being a coherent person over time, to strengthen social bonds by sharing personal memories, and to use past experience to construct models to understand inner worlds of self and others.³ Reminiscence allows people to reconstruct their lives through the looking glass of the present, and “cognitive editing” basically helps to bring one’s present views into accord with the past. Of these three functions—self-continuity, communicative function, and directive function—Bluck regards the second as the most important one: people share individual experiences to make conversation more truthful, to elicit emphatic responses, or to develop intimacy and social bonds. In autobiographical memory, the self meets the social, as personal memories are often articulated by communicating them to others.

Expanding and refining Bluck’s definition of autobiographical memory, psychologist Katherine Nelson identifies a cultural notion of self, in addition to the cognitive, social, and other levels of self-understanding psychologists have long recognized.⁴ A cultural sense of self emerges around five to seven years of age, a developmental stage where children start to “make contrasts between the ideal self portrayed by the culture and the actual self as understood.”⁵ A child’s autobiographical memory evolves as a

culturally framed consciousness, where personal narratives constantly intermingle with other stories: “Personal memories, which had been encapsulated within the individual, become transformed through verbal narratives into cultural memory, incorporating a cultural belief system.”⁶ A culturally framed autobiographical memory integrates the sociocultural with the personal, and the self that emerges from this process is explicitly and implicitly shaped by its environment’s norms and values. As Nelson remarks, the narratives that confront children—fairy tales told by parents and teachers, or stories they watch on television—are an important factor in their development. Children test their sense of self against the communal narratives they are exposed to, either through verbal reports or via television or video. Even though some cognitive and developmental studies on autobiographical memory touch upon the important intersection of individual psychology and socializing culture, few psychologists specify the role of culture in relation to memory. Wang and Brockmeier eminently expound on the interplay between memory, self, and culture, arguing that autobiographical remembering manifests itself “through narrative forms and models that are culturally shaped and, in turn, shape the remembering culturally.”⁷ Even if (social) psychologists acknowledge the dynamic relationship between memory and self to be integrated in the larger fabric of a culture, and even if they affirm that conceptions of self are inscribed in various material and symbolic ways, the role (media) objects play in the process of remembering remains largely unexamined. Understandably but regrettably, psychologists seem to think those questions are the proper domain of anthropologists or media scholars.

And yet, opening up sociopsychological perspectives on autobiographical memory to insights in cultural theory and media studies may turn out to be mutually beneficial. Let me elucidate this by elaborating a simple domestic scene from everyday life. A fifteen-month-old toddler attempts to stand on his own two feet and take his first cautious steps. His parents are thrilled, and they converse about their relief over this happening. The delighted father brings out his video camera to capture the toddler’s effort on tape; that same evening, the proud mother verbally reports the first-step achievement to the grandparents. Snapshots of the child’s developmental milestone, complemented by a few lines of explanation, supplement the latest update on the family’s website. The parents mark the event through various activities: telling stories, taking pictures, and composing an

account help to interpret the event and communicate its significance to others. They concurrently produce material artifacts that may assist them—and their offspring—to recall the experience at a later moment in time, perhaps in different circumstances or contexts.

The autobiographical memory at work in this instance consists of several stages and layers—aspects that can be accentuated or eclipsed in consonance with respective academic interests. Psychologists center on how the parents interpret, communicate, and later recall baby's first steps. Mental frames and cognitive schemes help parents evaluate the event: they compare their own baby's achievement to infants' development in general. The average baby starts walking at twelve months, but this one is slower. Parents relate their experience in a narrative framework that places the event in the spectrum of their own lives and that of others. (How old was I when I started to walk? How old was the baby's sister? How slow or fast do babies in this family start walking?) Sharing their oral report with grandparents helps parents determine the significance of what happened, but it also sets the stage for later reminiscence: interpretation and narration form the mental frames by which the experience can be retrieved from memory at a later stage. Memory work thus involves a complex set of recursive activities that shape our inner worlds, reconciling past and present, allowing us to make sense of the world around us, and constructing an idea of continuity between self and others—the three functions Bluck describes, as noted earlier.

Cultural theorists considering this scene may shift the center of gravity and emphasize the way in which the parents record, share, and later reminisce about baby's first steps using various media. Recording the event through video, pictures, or a written account enhances its actual experience. Memory work involves the production of objects—in this case snapshots and video footage—with a double purpose: to document and communicate what happened. These items also portend future recall: for the parents to remind them of this occasion and for the baby to form a picture of what life looked like before his ability to register memories in the mind's eye. Later interpretations invariably revise the meaning of memories, regardless of the presence of hard evidence in the form of pictures or videos. In hindsight, baby's-first-step video may be viewed as an early sign of his lazy character, but it may also provide evidence of an emerging disability that went unnoticed at the time of recording.

Evidently, the same scene gives rise to two sets of inquiries into memory formation, each highlighting different aspects, and yet, the personal and cultural can hardly be disentangled because there is a constant productive tension between our (personal) inclinations to stake out certain events and the (social) frameworks through which we do so—between the (individual) activities of remembering and the (cultural) products of autobiographical recall. Acts and products of memory are far from arbitrary. In Western culture, filming and photographing baby's first steps are considered common ritualized attempts to freeze and store a milestone in a human being's development; hence, the decision of these parents to catch the event on film and arrest the moment in photographs is in tune with prevailing norms—norms that, naturally, change with every new generation and also vary culturally. Western European and American practices of remembering and recording significantly diverge from Asian or African mores in this area, due to diverging cultural norms and social relationships.⁸ In general, personal memory stems from the altercation of individual acts and cultural norms—a tension we can trace in both the activity of remembering and in the object of memory.

Therefore, I want to define “personal cultural memory” as *the acts and products of remembering in which individuals engage to make sense of their lives in relation to the lives of others and to their surroundings, situating themselves in time and place.*⁹ According to my definition, “personal” and “cultural” are the threads that bind memory's texture: they can be distinguished, but they never can be separated. We usually mark events because their significance is already ingrained in our conscious: first steps are an important happening in a child's life, just as birthdays and first school days are. The decision to record such events is already, to a large extent, stipulated by conventions prescribing which occurrences are symbolic or ritual highlights and thus worth flagging. Some events, such as conflicts or depressions, may seem unsuitable for video recording, but they may instead be amenable subjects for diary entries. Other events, such as household routines or intense emotions, are perhaps too dull or too poignant for any kind of inscription, yet that does not mean they cannot be recalled—most of our life's experiences, after all, go undocumented, and often deliberately so. Parents who decide *not* to take out their video camera may do so because they prefer to enjoy and remember the first-step experience without the camera's intervention. At various moments, people decide what to

record or what to remember without records, often being unaware of the cultural frameworks that inform their intentions and prefigure their decisions. These frameworks, in other words, already inherently shape the functions of self-continuity, communication, and self-direction that memory work entails. Personal cultural memory entwines individual choice with common habits and cultural conventions, jointly defining the norms of what should be remembered.

What holds true for acts of memory also pertains to its ensuing products, particularly those created through media. Products of memory, whether they are family photographs, diaries, home videos, or scrapbooks, are rarely the result of a simple desire to produce a mnemonic aid or capture a moment for future recall. Instead, we may discern different intentions in the creation of memory products: we can take a picture just for the sake of photographing or to later share the photographed moment with friends. While taking a picture, we may yet be unaware of its future material form or use. However, any picture—or, for that matter, any diary entry or video take—even if ordained to end up in a specific format, may materialize in an unintended or unforeseen arrangement. In spite of the indeterminacy of a memory object's final reification—and this may sound paradoxical—familiar cultural formats always inherently frame or even generate their production. A range of cultural forms, such as diaries, personal photographs, and so on, configures people's choices of what they capture and how they capture it. For instance, family albums funnel our memories into particular venues; a rather extreme example may be the preformatted baby's first-year book, in which developmental signposts—from prenatal ultrasounds to first steps—pictures—are prescribed by its layout. These normative discursive strategies either explicitly or implicitly structure our agencies; I return to this issue in the next chapter, when discussing the meaning of digital technologies as memory tools, but suffice it to say here that existing models often direct our discursive means for communicating and remembering.

Therefore, it is a fallacy to think of memory products as purely constraining or conformist. They do not only enable structured expression but also invite subversion or parody, alternative or unconventional enunciations. Products of memory are first and foremost creative products, the provisional outcomes of confrontations between individual lives and culture at large. When discussing family albums or diaries, I often encounter

prejudiced assessments that characterize these genres as boring, predictable, or bourgeois. Yet on closer inspection, it is quite remarkable how many people gain creative energy out of shaping their own histories and subjectivities in response to existing cultural frameworks.¹⁰ Admittedly, few people record family rows, and though teenagers shooting home videos of their fathers' most irritable habits may count as exceptions, they nevertheless illustrate my point that the very presence of cultural forms incites individual expressions. It may not be a coincidence that many successful commercial productions (feature movies, television series, or published autobiographies) expound on playful, expansive versions of personal memory accounts.¹¹ Conventional formats for individual cultural memory thus both constrain and unfetter people's proclivity to inscribe experiences.

The term "personal cultural memory" allows for a conceptualization of memory that includes dimensions of identity and relationship, time and materiality. Temporal and material aspects are extensively theorized in the next chapter; for now, I dwell a bit more on the relational nature of personal cultural memory. The term emphasizes that some aspects of memory need to be explained from processes at work in our society that we commonly label as culture—mores, practices, traditions, technologies, mechanics, and routines—whereas these same processes contribute to, and derive from, the formation of individual identities. Yet by advocating a definition of cultural memory that highlights the significance of personal collections, I do not mean to disavow the import of collective culture. Quite to the contrary, if we acknowledge that individual preferences are filtered through cultural conventions or social frameworks, we are obliged to further explore the intricate connection between the individual and collective in the construction of cultural memory.

Individual versus Collective Cultural Memory

Collective memory, like its autobiographical penchant, is commonly referred to as something we have or lack: it is about our ability to build up a communal reservoir of relevant stories about our past and future, or about the human proclivity to forget things—such as amnesia of collective traumas or shameful episodes in our history. For the purpose of this book, I prefer the notion of cultural memory over collective memory because

I am less concerned with what these reservoirs do or do not consist of; instead, this book concentrates on how memory works in constructing a sense of individual identity and collectivity at the same time. To set up this claim, I first need to sketch how prevailing notions of collective memory have structured academic thinking, most notably in sociological and historical accounts.

Just as individual or autobiographical memory is almost automatically associated with theory formation in the area of psychology, collective memory, since the early twentieth century, has been the privileged domain of sociologists, historians, and cultural theorists. Originated in late nineteenth-century French and German sociology, the concept of collective memory was most prominently theorized by Maurice Halbwachs, a critical student of both Henri Bergson and Emile Durkheim. In *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, first published in 1925, Halbwachs sketches the partially overlapping *cadres* (spheres) of individual and larger communities, such as family, community, and nation. In contending that memory needs social frames, he distances himself from more physiological approaches to memory, particularly those insisting on the isolated enframing capacity of the human mind. Far from being a cognitive trajectory activated by internal or external stimuli, human memory “needs constant feeding from collective sources, just as collective memories are always sustained by social and moral props.”¹² Halbwachs thus emphasizes the recursive nature of individual and collective memory, one always inhabiting the other. Collectivity, he claims, arises in the variable contexts of groups who share an orientation in time and space. Our memories organize themselves according to our actual or perceived participation in a (temporal) collectivity—a group vacation, a school class, a family, a generation—and recall tends to lean on a sense of belonging or sharing rather than on a relocation in real time or space. We may remember events chronologically or spatially, but quite often we remember in terms of connectivity. As social creatures, humans experience events in relation to others, whether or not these communal events affect them personally.

One of Halbwachs’s important observations is that collective memory is never the plain sum of individual remembrances: every personal memory is cemented in an idiosyncratic perspective, but these perspectives never culminate into a singular collective view. The memories of both parent and child participating in the same event are not necessarily the same or even

complementary: each partaker may retain vastly different interpretations of the occurrence. Yet even if their accounts are antithetical because of the different (social) positions of each member, they still “share” the memory of a communal event. Collectivity not only evolves around events or shared experience; it can also advance from objects or environments—anything from buildings to landscapes—through which people feel connected spatially. Halbwachs specifically draws attention to auditory expressions, such as music, voices, and sounds, to which people are exposed from an early age and that later serve as triggers for collective recall.¹³ Each memory derived from these common resources can be distinctly different, and individual memories never add up to a collective reservoir.

Ever since Halbwachs coined the concept of collective memory, it has prominently figured in the accounts of historians, where it was also renamed “social” or “public” memory.¹⁴ The historical meaning of “collective,” however, differs from its sociological counterpart. In a sociological sense, “collective memory” means that people must feel they were somehow part of a communal past, experiencing a connection between what happened in general and how they were involved as individuals.¹⁵ Adjusted to historiographical explanation, “social memory” constitutes the interface between individual and collective ordering of the past. Some historians have chosen collective memory as a central ordering concept for their interpretation of how history can be written. David Gross, who appropriates Halbwachs’s term for the purpose of historiography, views (collective) memory as a prism for historical reconstruction: his main thesis concerns the value societies have placed in either remembering or forgetting as a basic life-orientation, and from this point of entry he reinterprets history from antiquity to late modernity.¹⁶ Gross agrees that memory is a complicated encoding process and that memories are preserved through elaborate schemata and shaped by shifting forms, scripts, and social circumstances.¹⁷ To properly understand their own existence in the grand scheme of historical events, people continuously sharpen their own remembered experience and the testimonies of others against available public versions—official documents, exhibits, text books, and so forth. Especially since WWII, historians are increasingly intrigued by the way in which personal accounts, or “small histories,” reflect and refine the complexities of grand historical narratives. So-called ego-documents are now welcomed by official archives, museums, and other public “memory institutions.”¹⁸

The recent institutionalization of personal memory items can be seen as a corollary to historians' designation of a "new" collective memory. And yet, the elevation of personal memory objects to the status of collective history's ingredients paradoxically underscores their distinct hierarchy. A case in point is the inclusion of numerous individual testimonies in public representations of the Holocaust. Especially in the past two decades, the collective remembrance of the genocide, after a period of relative suppression, has exploded into a plethora of forms: exhibitions, monuments, films, audio-visual testimonies, books, museums, and so forth. Taking the Holocaust exhibition at the Imperial War Museum in England as an example, historian Andrew Hoskins explains that its "mixing artifactual representations . . . with audio-visual mediation of individuals' memories of their experience of the Holocaust in the form of testimony of survivors" is a relatively recent phenomenon in public exhibitions.¹⁹ Apart from the typically mediated nature of these testimonies—a pivotal aspect of Hoskins's characterization of "new" collective memory to which I turn in the next section—the relationship of innumerable individual accounts to collectivity seems self-evident and unproblematic. The aspiration to save all remaining individual testimonies of survivors to form a grand narrative of the Holocaust implicitly bolsters quite a few megaprojects such as Steven Spielberg's Shoah Foundation.²⁰

However, as Halbwachs already observed, no collective experience—and certainly not one of this magnitude—can ever be represented in a singular collective memory. The inclusion in our public memory sites of many individual testimonies, each presenting a unique prism through which to make sense of historical events, will never add up to an overall collective view of the Holocaust. Disputing the view of some of his colleagues, American cultural historian Andreas Huyssen argues that the plethora of personal memories of the Holocaust may obscure rather than strengthen the notion of collective memory: "The problem for Holocaust memory in the 1980s and 1990s is not forgetting, but rather the ubiquitousness, even the excess of Holocaust imagery in our culture."²¹ Huyssen questions the idea that individual memory representations serve as building blocks for, or form particular versions of, collective memory, because such a premise ignores the always inherent creative tension between individual and collective.²²

Although the foregrounding of individual testimonies has undoubtedly helped popularize important takes on communal history, the assumed

self-evident relationship between individual and collective memory is indeed problematic. Remarkable in both Halbwachs's sociological discourse as well as in Gross's historiographical account is the virtual absence of the term "culture." As an explanatory concept, cultural memory inherently accounts for the mutuality of individual and collective. Culture, like memory, is less interesting as something we have—hold or discount—than as something we create and through which we shape our personal and collective selves.²³ Like Halbwachs, I see the conjunction of individual and collective memory as dialectic, yet in emphasizing cultural memory, I stress the recursive dynamic of this ongoing interconnection beyond the level of cognition or sociality. Culture is more than the encounter of individuals with mental structures and social schemata, as Gross suggests; discursive and material artifacts, technologies, and practices are equally infested with culture, thus forming the interface between self and society.

Cultural memory is a guiding concept in the work of German historians Jan Assmann and Aleida Assmann. Building on Halbwachs's sociological theory, Jan Assmann defines cultural memory as "a collective concept for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation."²⁴ Aleida Assmann expounds on this definition by sketching cultural memory as one end of a complex structure that also involves individual, social, and political memory—going from a purely private level to the institutionalized and ritualized level of remembrance.²⁵ She petitions a seamless transformation from individual to cultural memory, the result of which is never a fixed reservoir but always a relational vector that connects self to others, private to public, and individual to collective.²⁶ Unlike other historians, Assmann stresses the importance of memory objects' materiality in texts and images; the sum of individual objects of memory never add up to one unified "collective" memory—in fact, Assmann is very suspicious of this term—but the objects are unique anchors of remembering processes through which self and others become connected.

My own concept of cultural memory shows clear affinity with Aleida Assmann's dynamic definition. Perhaps more specifically, I prefer to think of cultural memory as an act of negotiation or struggle to define individuality and collectivity. Closely entwined with these two notions are the spheres of private and public; memory is as much about the privacy to

inscribe memories for oneself and the desire to share them only with designated recipients as it is about publicness, or the inclination to share experiences with a number of unknown viewers or readers. There is not, nor has there ever been, a sharp distinction between private and public, but every act of memory involves a negotiation of these spheres' boundaries. The intention to inscribe or recall a memory exclusively for private use may change over time, as personal memory may acquire a larger significance against a background of evolving social mores or personal growth. Control over one's memory may also change in the course of time; one may lose command over either one's mental capacities for remembering, as a result of disease or death, or one may lose ownership over material inscriptions of former experiences, whether voluntary or involuntary. Intentions and control change along with our revisions of memories in the passage of time, and revisions, in turn, reset the boundaries for what counts as public or private. Those boundaries are concurrently the outcome and stakes in the act of cultural memory.

Let me illustrate this specified concept of cultural memory using an example—an example I further elaborate in Chapter 3. Anne Frank's diary is most commonly typified as the poignant personal lens through which we experience a collective memory of the Holocaust. From my perspective, though, Frank's diary stands for a continuous and ongoing struggle between individual and collective acts of memory. Defined as personal cultural memory, it signifies a Dutch teenager's choice to narrate her experience in a cultural form—a handwritten daily account, trusted to a notebook, that she later revised; Otto Frank's decision to publish selected parts of his daughter's journal turned the diary into a public, collective item. Anne's aspiration to become a novelist as well as her father's judgment to censor the first editions should be understood in the context of the larger cultural arena in which these mandates were negotiated. Naturally, the ensuing Anne Frank industry—the museum, the objects in the museum, the play, the movies, television series—are part of the (collective) cultural act of remembrance, but they are also products of the memory industry.²⁷ All past, present, and future choices made in the service of inscribing and preserving Anne Frank's legacy are in fact collusions of individuality and collectivity. Memory filtered through the prism of culture acknowledges the idea that individual expressions are articulated as part of, as much as in spite of, larger collectivities; individuality can be traced in every negotiation

of collectivity—past and present—as it is always a response to all previous representations.

In the disciplines of the humanities, cultural memory seems to automatically refer to collective remembering, whether or not as a subset of history, just as autobiographical memory appears to be the realm of the individual psyche, indeed operating as part of a social collective but always subordinate to it. By default, the term “cultural” has come to reflect collectiveness, whereas the term “autobiographical” connotes individuality. My argument that the term “cultural” inherently relates individual and shared memory should in fact render the preceding qualifiers “personal” or “collective” to cultural memory redundant. However, use of the modifier “personal” indexes the impossibility of insulating the individual from culture at large. *Mutatis mutandis*, when speaking of collective cultural memory, the term inherently accounts for those individuals creating collectivity and through whose experiences and acts culture is constituted. Even if my choice of terminology seems cumbersome, it is prompted as much by the genealogy of disciplinary appropriation as by a desire to stress the relational nature of these terms: cultural memory can only be properly understood as a result of individual’s and others’ mutual, interdependent relationship.

As much as I appreciate Aleida Assmann’s conceptual clarity, something is missing from her model of cultural memory that appears to be highly relevant to further translation of this concept into a usable model of analysis. Although she stresses the interference of mental and cultural frameworks in her theory, she clearly does not know how to account for the role of media and media tools in the formation of cultural memory. Like other historians, she refers to media as templates or repositories molding our experiences, and she considers media to be problematic in the way they profoundly affect memory discourse. As noted earlier, psychologists also allude to media (or media frames) as collective narrative forms affecting the individual psyche, but few proceed to include this alleged influence in their theoretical models. It is peculiar to notice how memory scholars recognize media to play a considerable role in the construction and retention of experience; and yet, media and memory are often considered two distinct—sometimes even antagonistic—domains. Therefore, I now shift attention to the mediation of memory to find out how we can render media an integral element of our new analytical tool.